

IOHANNIS WYCLIF

TRACTATUS DE LOGICA.


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BY

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INTRODUCTION.

All details concerning the manuscript (Univ. Prag. V. E. 14) and the authenticity and date of the work itself having been discussed at sufficient length in the Introduction to the first volume, we may at once proceed to examine the second with regard to its contents alone. It comprises the first eight chapters of the third treatise of *Logica*, or more properly of *Logicae Continuatio*. Wyclif goes over the same ground three times, it may be remembered: once in his Summary, or short abstract of Logic; a second time, with much greater developments, in the first and second treatises of *Logicae Continuatio*; and once again in the work which forms the second and third volumes of the present edition: in a most exhaustive manner this time, and treating of a variety of questions which often seem quite irrelevant to the science of Logic. It is true that in this third treatise Wyclif ostensibly deals with hypothetical propositions alone, and that he leaves out, or expounds only parenthetically, many questions already quite threshed out in his first volume. The difference, however, is to a great extent nominal. Both categorical and hypothetical propositions are for the most part as mere headings of chapters, or as texts from which Wyclif preaches his system with greater or less detail. In the third treatise, the matter is thus really the same, but approached from a different standpoint, and expounded for more advanced students. Perhaps some apology will be necessary for the very detailed summary that is to follow; if so, I may say that I thought it would not be quite useless to go thoroughly through the first work in which Wyclif's system is set forth as a whole, and of which the other philosophical treatises are but modifications and developments. Two volumes of metaphysics — *De Compositione Hominis* and *De Ente Predicamentali* — have indeed been issued already; but the editor has laid

much more stress upon their philological interest than upon their doctrinal meaning. I have, therefore, thought that a full exposition of Wyclif's ideas as set forth in this work might prepare the way for a better understanding of the other treatises.

It is perhaps superfluous to add — but in such cases I prefer saying too much to saying too little — that I must here repeat the thanks I gave to Mr. Matthew in the first volume of *Logica*. Even in so special and technical a subject as this, his general knowledge of Wyclif's views and style has been of much assistance in the understanding of the text.

Chapter I (pp. 1—23). Wyclif begins by a general discussion of hypothetical propositions. They form seven species, according as two or more propositions are joined by the word *and* (copulatives), *or* (disjunctives), *if* (conditionals), *because* (causals), *more than* (comparatives), *where* (locals) or *when* (temporals). These, as Wyclif affirms, comprise all other species; for all, however complex, are reducible to these, and they spring from the essential relations between God and the creature. God is, *and* the creature is; either God is, *or* created being is not; the creatures are *because* God is; God exists *more than* the creature exists; God creates beings *if*, *when*, and *where* He chooses. These primordial truths, seven and only seven in number, are the archetypes of all hypothetical propositions (pp. 1—2).

This classification is to some extent arbitrary, it is true, but founded on the nature of things. It is not denied that these propositions might be set in another order, or deduced from the primordial truths in another way; but the order given here is the best, because it corresponds best to the order of the universe (p. 3, l. 35 to end; p. 4, l. 1—5). The words *and*, *if*, etc., are neither sufficient to establish the order here given, nor to classify the propositions (p. 4, l. 5—12). If it be objected that many hypothetical propositions are false, and that consequently truth, and particularly primordial truth, has nothing to do with their classification (p. 2, l. 20—35), Wyclif points out that every proposition must be true at least in a transcendental sense. If it means something false, it means a thing that is not, and therefore is true — negatively (pp. 4, 5). His classification depends properly, not only on those signs which render the propositions hypothetical, nor on the truth or falsity of the latter, but upon the peculiar sense given by those words to the propositions which they unite into one whole (p. 6, l. 30 to end).

They might indeed be classified according to the first principle of abstract Being. For instance: Whatever is, is, *and* it is; *if* anything is, it is; it is *whilst* it is, and so on (p. 3, l. 1—6; p. 7, l. 5—10). But God's existence is the first truth of all; no other can be known perfectly without it, and in that sense it is prior even to the principle of contradiction, though both are equally primitive as regards the truths which flow from them (pp. 7, 8).

Other words might be employed to form new species of hypothetical propositions (p. 3, l. 13—30). But they may always be analyzed into one of those already given. *Neither — nor*, for instance, means the same as *and* with a negative (pp. 8, 9). These propositions may be combined with each other to the number of 120; but this does not increase the number of primary species. For if I say, A is B if C is D, *because* E is F, it is a causal proposition; but if we have, A is B, *if* C is D because E is F, the proposition is conditional (pp. 9, 10). Here Wyclif solves a number of sophisms at considerable length. It was no doubt useful and even necessary for students of those times to know them; a the present day, most of us would, for all these sophisms, endorse our author's opinion concerning certain among them, and say with him: *sunt mihi odibiles* (p. 14, l. 5). It is, however, worth while to note his remark that a sentence, however, long it may be, is a proposition, provided it imply one predominant act of the mind; where there are several it is not one proposition, and can neither be affirmed nor denied as one. The affirmation or negation bears upon the hypothetical sign. *God exists, and you are an ass*, is denied without any reference to its component parts separately (p. 10).

But there seems to have been a personal argument, particularly directed against Wyclif's theory of universals, which may be noticed apart. We must remember that the universal "animal", in this theory, is a real thing or entity, identical both in men and in brutes. So we have: "You are now *whatever you would be*, if you were an ass; in that case you could bray; therefore you can now." This somewhat humorous syllogism is gravely discussed, for it entails grave consequences. Wyclif not only grants that the major premiss is true, but that the minor is necessary (p. 10, l. 35—41); but this is quite natural, if we refer to his theory. He answers, however, that though a man is identical with an ass, the identity is only partial. What would be necessary to conclude

that a man *is* an ass, is the identity of individuality, not that of a universal attribute. But he adds: "I know that this answer does not please sophists" (p. 16, l. 11—27).

The affirmative or negative nature of hypotheticals is then investigated. Any proposition might with truth be called both affirmative and negative, since all affirm God's existence, and deny whatever is contrary to their affirmation (pp. 16, 17). We must therefore consider how best to classify them. Some say that in any proposition composed of two, both propositions should be affirmative, or both negative, for the compound to be one or the other; so that, where this requisite is wanting, the resulting proposition is neither (pp. 18, l. 31—38). Others, that the *nexus* alone, affirmed or denied, determines the quality of these propositions (p. 18, l. 39 to end; p. 19, l. 1—9). Others again, with whom Wyclif partly agrees, say that they follow the quality of the first of their parts (p. 19).

As for the quantity, i. e. the universality or particularity of such propositions, the first three are said to have no quantity at all; but the last four (causals, comparatives, locals and temporals) follow the quantity of the first of their parts (p. 20). It may be objected (p. 21, l. 25) that these last are really categorical in meaning, since they may be expressed in a categorical form. This, however, is a mere matter of taste and preference. Some prefer the number three, others the number seven. Wyclif chooses not to eliminate the four last species, because every point in the universe, is touched by six, and only six other points: thus making up the number seven. We need not here explain this reason farther than to say that it is at the root of his cosmological system, in which the universe is built of mathematical points. In the next volume, we shall see the whole theory developed at great length.

Chapter II. After a few preliminary remarks about copulative propositions, with which the chapter professes to deal (pp. 23—26), Wyclif launches boldly into the problem of the Universals. One is at first puzzled to see how he manages to bring it in. It begins with the question (p. 26) whether or no a pronoun stands merely for its antecedent, a particular concrete being, or for its antecedent as affirmed by a preceding verb. For instance: "Socrates is an animal, and *it* is an ass;" do we mean by *it* an animal in general, or *that animal which is Socrates*? Here we notice that any copulative proposition in which one of the terms of the

latter half is the same as one of the former, may have the latter term replaced by a pronoun. As, *A is B and B is C*, or *A is B and A is C*, may be rendered: *A is B and it* (meaning either *A* or *B*) *is C*. This is the slight link by which the controversy is connected with the subject of the chapter; and here comes the tug of war between Universalists and Nominalists. Wyclif urges that if we say, “*A certain man has stolen something, and he is a thief,*” we may very well be ignorant of the particular *he* who has committed the theft. *He* therefore does not stand, as Nominalists would have it, for the individual himself, but for the Universal “*A certain man who has stolen this or that?*”. Nominalists say they know this disjunctively: it is either *A* or *B* or *C*, &c. But this is an idle quibble: to know thus disjunctively is not to know (p. 26, l. 31 to end; p. 27, l. 1 to 20).

Now all this looks to modern readers — and since they are modern, they must of course be in the right — very much like mere loss of time and trouble; useless expenditure of brain-work. To the Oxford wranglers of those days, on the contrary, it must have been full of actuality and interest: for it was the very central point round which the battle raged, and Wyclif’s unerring acumen, in thus coming to the point at once, is greatly to be admired, if we can for an instant forget our superiority as “moderns”. The Nominalists flatly denied the existence of anything but the concrete. For them, a universal name was in itself a mere “*flatus vocis*”; according to Ockam’s famous expression; it had no meaning except when applied to its singulars. They therefore could not possibly admit that the pronoun *he* (or indeed any pronoun; *who* or *which*, for instance) stood for a universal Thing, nor even merely for the words which it replaced (which would still give universality of a certain kind). It had to stand for a singular object, an individual man or being. “But then,” said the Universalists, “if it stands for only one individual, you must know who *he* is, when you say, *He is a thief*, as usual in such sentences. If you do not know, and deny that it stands for somebody in general, the sentence becomes a jumble of words, without any meaning”. We are not here concerned in the Nominalist’s reply, which must have been rather shuffling and embarrassed, at least for those of the extreme school of Ockam. But their attack upon Wyclif’s position, and the staunch courage with which he stands up to defend it, is very noteworthy.

To put their attack into somewhat more modern language than the crabbed form of the text: If you say, "Socrates is an animal and *it* is an ass," you mean that the universal "Animal" is replaced by *it*. But suppose you substitute *vertebrate* for animal; the sense of *it* is at once altered. Substitute *mammal*; the sense varies again. Thus we have an endless series of different significations given to *it*, each of them more concrete, yet none ever reaching the ultimate limit of individuality. This would be the ruin of all science; for we could never draw any inference from the universal to its singulars; and between each of these *it*'s there could be found or imagined room for an infinite multitude of others. These constantly changing significations would destroy the possibility of deduction. "A is an animal; it (not A, but the animal) is a vertebrate; it (the vertebrate) is a mammal" — and so on. We can never conclude that A is this singular individual man (p. 27, l. 20—37). Wyclif answers (pp. 28—30) that, though less universal as a predicate than its antecedent, *it* has as a subject the power of standing for the same, and consequently for all the singulars which that antecedent represents. There is indeed an endless descent, because there is an infinite distance between any universal and its singulars. But, when we get to the lowest species of all, we have only accidents, that is, non-essential differences, by which the singulars are distinguished; so that makes no difficulty. If we say that one universal is infinitely beyond another, because it extends to more singulars, this does not mean that it is infinite, any more than a surface, infinitely greater than a line, would be infinite.

Beaten off on one side (as we may perhaps be allowed to suppose) the Nominalists return to the charge on another. "You say that *he* does not stand for an individual. Let us then suppose that two men, Socrates and Plato, are running." The proposition, "Somebody runs," will be true; but at the same time it will be true to add: "Socrates is not *he*, and Plato is not *he*." Now, what if no one else in the world is running at the time? (p. 27, l. 37 to end; p. 28, l. 1—12). This however is met (p. 30, 31) by denying that '*he*' has here the meaning of a universal man. It is clearly a singular, meaning *the somebody who runs* in both cases, and in one of the two it could not but be false.

The third argument is aimed more directly against universals. Each of them stands for all its singulars. But *he*, according to the supposition, is a universal. We may say of A, He is a king; and of B, He is a thief.

The same *he* stands for both, and is both. And if we know the universal ‘Somebody’, we also know — disjunctively of course; this is a retort against Wyclif’s argument a few pages above — who has committed any action, however secret: it is *somebody* (p. 28, l. 13—29). Wyclif answers (pp. 32—34) by enumerating various species of universals. Some exist before their singulars, and are God’s eternal ideas; some are mere passive potentialities; others are founded upon the individuals in which they exist; as, for instance, the idea of humanity. He then proceeds to deny that, when we apply the universal to its singulars, the supposition (application, or manner of using a word in a proposition) is other than personal. Now essential and personal suppositions are two very different things. When we say: “Humanity is animality together with rationality,” we have essential supposition; when we say that humanity comprises the man A, the man B, &c., it is personal. In the first case the subject stands for all that is in the predicate; in the second, only for what is *common* to each of the singulars predicated. Thus, in the case aforesaid, ‘*he*’ would not stand for all the attributes of A and of B; one might be a king, the other a thief; but *he* would have nothing to do with the kingship or the dishonesty of its singulars.

Such is, so far as I can understand it, the position taken up by Wyclif; though he observes that there are many different answers to this difficulty, some of which, in his opinion, amount to the abandonment of the Realistic doctrine (p. 34, l. 30—35). He no doubt alludes to the system of Moderate Realism, which, as it was followed by the immense majority of Schoolmen, and had, as our author himself admits, the advantage of avoiding great difficulties, I may here venture to state in as few words as possible.

When the same sign stands for a great many objects, and has exactly the same signification when applied to one as when applied to another, it is called a Universal. But *what* is Universal? Pure Nominalists say it is the word, and the word only; even the idea is different when applied to different individuals. Thus we do not mean the same thing by *man*, when we say, ‘A is a man,’ as we do when we say, ‘B is a man’. Moderate Nominalists, or Conceptualists, admit that besides the universality of the word, we have also the universality of the idea; so that subjectively we do mean the same thing in the above instance; that is, we mean our idea of humanity. But nothing farther; there is nothing *in any*

way identical between the man A and the man B in their several natures. Is there any midcourse between this doctrine and that of such Realists as affirm that there is in man a humanity corresponding to our idea, and *really identical in all its singulars?* There is; it is the theory of Moderate Realists. To ascribe the universality of our ideas to a mere groundless fiction of the mind would destroy the objective value of all reasoning. To suppose that there exists a mysterious something, substantially identical in each and all of the singular objects that come under a general name, would land us in endless difficulties, with which we shall soon see Wyclif attempting to grapple. They therefore draw a sharp distinction between the Universal, as not seen by the mind, and as seen. The Universal, as formally existing in many singulars, is nowhere but in the mind. Everything that exists in nature is formally concrete, and singular in its essence. Thus the Universal, *as known*, is nothing but a mere abstraction. But, *as able to be known*, it is otherwise; it is real; in each singular it exists as a basis from which our mind is able to abstract the universal idea. Their definition says of the Universal (as known) that it exists *formaliter in mente, fundamentaliter in re*. They avoid defending a position which they consider unsafe, and take up one which it is very difficult to attack with any chance of success. Asked by Nominalists if the redness of the rose, the geranium, and the cherry, is a real universal, they reply: Its reality is formally in the objects, fundamentally in the mind; its universality is formally in the mind, fundamentally in the objects. Asked by those of Wyclif's school if there is nothing identical in two shades of colour in which there is no difference, they answer: Nothing but the aptitude they have for being grasped in one idea; that aptitude, in objects similarly coloured, *really exists*; and when our mind thus grasps them, it becomes actual — but only in the mind. This may seem obscure, but I can find no words to state it more clearly: and indeed this seems to me the true solution of the whole problem. I do not see what the most determined Nominalist could find to attack in this reply, if he understood it properly. It might perhaps not satisfy him; for it keeps up a strict relation between signs, ideas, and things, between the subjective and the objective order, and maintains the validity of human reason without restrictions, *in whatever sphere it may work*. But it avoids with the utmost care giving a handle to this most embarrassing objection: How can anything be real and yet not

concrete? Such caution Wyclif thought excessive; it now remains for us to see how he fought — most courageously and skilfully, it must be acknowledged — against this objection in its various forms.

Faithful to his accustomed method of showing a bold front to difficulties, and never shirking them, however weighty they may be, he at once proceeds to enquire, 1st How we can distinguish Universals from their singulars, and from each other; 2nd How the transcendent entity, Being, is common both to God and to His creatures; 3rd Whether a Universal can receive accidental attributes, and 4th Whether a Universal, taken together with its singulars, makes up a number.

First. Every Universal is all its singulars, and each of them. It would seem that if so, it cannot be distinguished from them, nor from any other Universal that might happen to be those singulars too (p. 34, end). We are free to deny that the Universal is its singulars; it is in them, but is not *they*, having no personal supposition, as they have. But it is preferable to admit that it is its singulars, and, thus considered, receives a different personal supposition in each. This supposition, which it has in its singulars and not by itself, is amply sufficient to differentiate it from them (p. 35). In some cases this difference may be merely logical or notional, but still it suffices for a distinction; as that between the one universal Phœnix and the one phoenix existing in the physical world. Each is identical with the other in all but the fact that the universal Phœnix is (at least successively) communicable to many, whilst the corporeal phoenix is not. Thus, as we see, even in this test case, there always remains, between the Universal and its singular, one difference, — communicability (p. 37).

Second. If God is Being, and the creature is a being, and Being is a universal reality, the same in both: then we come to the Pantheistic conclusion that there is something common to God and His creatures, and really identical in both (pp. 37, 38). And in fact, as the Nominalistic position logically ends in Materialism, so Realism — unless it carefully steers the middle course which has been mentioned — necessarily tends towards (though not necessarily *goes to*) the extremes of Pantheism. To answer the objection, we must note that transcendent being is not in God and in the creature as a difference; — for instance, in the way that rationality exists in all men — but as a *mode*. This mode is one in itself; but it exists in God otherwise than in the creature.

It would be a false argument to say: "Manhood is a thing identical with Socrates and with Plato: therefore, Socrates is Plato." In like manner, to say: "Being is God and is Not-God; therefore God is Not-God" — is false too (p. 38, l. 10—34). We may say: "*That which* (meaning, or as Wyclif says, pointing to, *demonstrans*, Transcendental Being) is Not-God is God;" but we cannot infer thence that the creature is God (pp. 38, 39). But to admit even the former proposition seems perilously near Pantheism: so we must not be surprised if Wyclif reverts to this point and supports his distinction with analogies drawn from the profoundest mysteries of the Christian religion.

Third. To grant that the Universal Man is identical with each of its singulars seems to imply its doing and being all that every individual does and is. It is thus at the same time awake and asleep, white and black, &c., together with countless other contradictory attributes (p. 39, l. 38 to end; p. 40, l. 1—14). This objection may be solved either negatively or in the affirmative. Man is that which is white and that which is black; but Man is not white and black. For, as a universal, this term can receive no predicates but such as are essential to human nature: and it is evident that neither whiteness nor blackness are thus essential (p. 40, l. 15 to p. 42, l. 6). But again, taking ideal humanity as the exemplar and prototype of each man, and consequently as the cause of each, we may grant that it does every one of the actions of each. So universals do receive accidents: not indeed in themselves, but in their singulars, with which they are identical: and the countless different attributes, which are or may be contradictory in their singulars, are not so in them (p. 42, l. 5—25). This explanation is similar to that of theologians, who deny that the Godhead suffered, although it was *that which* suffered, i. e. the person of Christ (p. 42, l. 28 to p. 44, l. 25). Several other objections are propounded and solved in the same way, by pointing either to the mystery of the Incarnation or to that of the Trinity; in the latter, the essence of the Deity is substantially the same in each of the three persons; yet the Three are really distinct. The Father is not the Son, although *that which* is the Father is *that which* is the Son. "To every sophism against Real Universals, you can find a parallel one against the Holy Trinity," says Wyclif (p. 46, l. 18—22). Very true; and it therefore follows that, *for a Christian*, the distinction is not meaningless, meaningless as it may seem. But the following would seem an obvious

reply: "The Trinity is a mystery; are Real Universals so? If they are, faith and not reason should make us believe in them. If they are not, they destroy the mysterious nature of the Trinity itself." It is perhaps as an answer to this objection, never stated in so many words, that our author in several passages of his works (and in particular a few pages further, pp. 51, 52) takes care to note the differences between the Universal and the Divine Essence. But he only points out other mysteries, and leaves the *that which* distinction untouched, as parallel in both cases. — The serious difficulty, viz., that universals must move about, as they are wherever their singulars happen to be, is taken into earnest consideration (p. 47). Wyclif inclines to think that they move; at the same time he denies that this implies localization of the Universal.

Fourth. The most difficult point of all, where the writer seems to be most uncertain, and which he probably developed and explained at a later period, is, "How the Universals can be said to make up a number with their singulars". If the individual man A and the universal man are identical, they are not two, but one; if, on the other hand, there is a real distinction between them, they must be two realities, and be counted as such (p. 48, l. 3—10). It seems impossible to get a satisfactory answer to this objection; at least that contained in the present work seems to me rather lame, so far as I have succeeded in understanding it; and when I collated the chapter of *De Universalibus*. "Quomodo universalia ponunt in numero," I was too busy with the collation itself to pay much attention to the manner in which Wyclif supplements what seems wanting here. For a man of our author's skill and subtlety, it would have been very easy to wrap up his answer in a string of sentences impossible to understand, and signifying anything — or nothing; such a mode of proceeding would have been not without great precedents even in his time; and contemporary philosophers might perhaps tell us whether it has been quite abandoned at the present day. But Wyclif, often unintelligible when pursuing some of his favourite theories out of sight, is never so on purpose to embarrass an adversary. He may be lost in the clouds; he does not hide himself in mists. His sturdy English nature prefers momentary self-contradiction to wilful ambiguity, and remains in seeming absurdity until such time as he can get a satisfactory reply to what perplexes him. This, I believe, will appear a little further. I do not think that it takes anything away from the admiration due to his talent, and

it makes him respected from another point of view. He begins by enumerating different kinds of number (pp. 48—50), and for some he denies the possibility of ascribing them to a universal taken with its singular. If, however, number be taken to mean *all that can be counted*, then he admits that the Universal and its singular can be counted together, as the Godhead and the Three Persons of the Trinity. Such is the sense, if I mistake not, of the words “tunc concedendum est . . . quod quaelibet unitas quae est essentia substantiae singularis est trinitas suppositorum ejusdem substantiae . . . et sic [ut] homo communis differt ab homine singulari, ita essentia communis differt a personis non sic communibus” (p. 50, l. 20—28).¹ Here the mystery of the Holy Trinity stands Wyclif in good stead. While he takes care to point out the difference between the Godhead, as communicable to the Persons, and the Universal, as applicable to its singulars, he says: The numerical difficulty which you propose to me applies equally to the Divine Essence, counted with the Persons; *qui nimis probat nihil probat*. This would elude the difficulty; but Wyclif is not satisfied with that. Reverting to the above-mentioned case of the Phœnix, he affirms that the universal and the singular phœnix are not two, but one (p. 51, l. 16); for there are neither two universals, nor two singulars (l. 20—22). You cannot say *they*, pointing to both at once (l. 30). The universal Phoenix *is* in no wise other than (*aliud vel alia quam*, l. 27, 28) its singular, though they differ notionally (*secundum rationem* l. 29). This seems clear enough. Yet if the universal Phoenix is so identical with its singular that there is a mere logical distinction between them, and that we cannot even say ‘between *them*’ properly, can we continue to affirm that it possesses a distinct reality other than that of its singular? *We can*, answers Wyclif (“. . . duo distincta realiter,” p. 54, l. 10). Every universal and its singular are two things, really different from each other. This looks very like a contradiction in terms, unless (which is also possible) the text is corrupt. But I do not think so, on account of Wyclif’s sudden conclusion of the debate immediately after these words, his avowal that the difficulty is very great (l. 11, 12) and his pointing out two other ways of answering

¹ The text is slightly changed here from what it is in the treatise. I confess I understood it less at the time. Even now it is not quite clear, and some words are probably wanting.

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the difficulty, which might for a time be more satisfactory to some of his pupils. They were free to grant that universals might be counted apart from their singulars, though in reality one with them; or to deny it, because they are not different things. "But I," says Wyclif, at the close of the chapter, "stick to my first antwer" (l. 30). If the name of Doctor Evangelicus had not been given to him, he might have deserved, as well as if not better than Durandus, the title of *Doctor Resolutissimus*.

Chapter III. Under cover of investigating the nature of disjunctive propositions, Wyclif continues the debate on Universals, and now proceeds to carry the war into the enemy's country in a very practical way: viz., by asserting that the very idea of a promise demonstrates the truth of his theory. But we must first of all briefly note how he gets to this subject. The proposition which contradicts a disjunctive is a copulative of which both parts are contradictory to the former: as, A is B or A is C: *contr.* A is not B and A is not C (p. 56, l. 6, 7). Now *and A* may be replaced by *and it*; so here, as in the foregoing chapter, comes the question; for what do pronouns stand? In other words, ought the Realist or the Nominalist view to prevail? Only here the field of discussion is restricted and specified. I promise a penny. There is therefore a penny *which* I promise. Does this *which* relate to a universal penny, or to a singular one? Wyclif at once and of course chooses the first alternative. He says that, if anything singular is meant, not only philosophy, but political science and even all human intercourse must go by the board. And not only the act of promising becomes impossible, but purchase, sale, donations, acts of justice, rewards and punishments are rendered null and void. When I promise a penny, *a penny*, according to Nominalists, is a mere empty word, there being no universal penny, but only singular ones; and so the promise becomes ineffective (p. 58). One man owes another £ 20. According to Nominalists, even God's Almighty power could not make him pay. There may be and are particular sums called £ 20; but such a general promise of what is but a *natura vocis* in itself can have no value. And so on with many other cases, which all result in constructive absurdities; constructive of course, for, rightly or wrongly, they were denied by the partisans of the opposite system. Wyclif therefore declares (p. 59, l. 20) that we are obliged to admit the ancient doctrine of Universals, and closes his case with

observations concerning the nature of promises and obligations (pp. 60, 61) with which he deals at some length. He then takes up a series of objections, in which absurdities, very similar to those of which he accuses his adversaries, are laid to his charge.

1. We are never obliged to give anything but what we have promised. If then the promise concerns only a universal penny, nothing obliges us to give a singular one! Besides, as we may suppose that the other party has a (universal) penny already, how can we give a man what he possesses? So the Realist, not the Nominalist, standpoint is the ruin of promises, obligations, and in short of all human intercourse whatsoever (p. 61, l. 26—37).

The answer is that we are indeed not obliged to give anything but a universal penny, since no other is promised. But *that* we are obliged to give; and since it cannot be given without the singular which contains it, any one of its singulars must be handed over. As to the man's already possessing a universal penny, that has nothing to do with the matter: he must possess it in reason of the promise made, even though he had it already, and independently thereof. He then will have it in one more of its singulars, i. e. more plentifully (*abundantius*). Wyclif adds, with a touch of dry and possibly unconscious humour, that the multiplied possession of a universal penny in its singulars is highly advantageous (*multum confert*). Thus, if a promise concerns the Universal, its execution regards its singulars (p. 62, l. 16 to p. 63, l. 5). That the common people know nothing of universals is quite false; they have a sort of confused knowledge of them. Even those who deny their existence cannot help contradicting themselves and agreeing with us in practice (p. 63, l. 15 to p. 64, l. 7).

2. "But," the adversary urges, "I for one deny the existence, even the possibility of a real universal penny. So, at least when *I* promise one, the promise must be that of a singular: I really mean to give, and I cannot mean what is in my opinion impossible. Thus universality is not necessarily implied by the words of the promise in my case; and if not in my case, in none" (p. 61, l. 37 to p. 62, l. 5). "Quite the contrary," replies Wyclif. "You may intend promising one particular penny — the one, for instance, that you will happen to give — but you cannot help implicitly meaning the Universal which it contains. No doubt it is promised vaguely in this case; still it is promised. That you have

it not in your mind, nay, that you positively exclude it from your mind, is an altogether irrelevant fact (p. 64).” If I may be allowed to clear up the meaning of this by an example, we may suppose that one man promises to give another a piece of land in which he is convinced that there are no mineral riches whatever. Now it so happens that he is mistaken: does the fact of his belief render it untrue that, in promising the land, he has promised all its mineral riches? When you say: I promise a penny — a singular one — you surely promise all that is contained in that penny: now we say that a Universal is contained therein, and that, willing or unwilling, you promise it. — Here Wyclif, in connection with the indefinite universal term, *a* penny, makes some remarks by the way about terms of the first and second intention and imposition respectively. If a singular penny is spoken of, the sense, primarily universal, is contracted by the term *singular*. The promising verb indicates universality, and that is promised in any case. For instance, I have two pennies, and promise you one of the two. That means *neither in particular*; and it follows that the object of any promise must be universal (pp. 64, 67).

3. A third difficulty, made up of several put together, runs thus: Transcendental Being is identical with everything, and at the same time with anything in the world: if I promise *something*, it follows that everything has been promised! And yet such a promise comes to nothing in reality. I buy a man; if the meaning of this be ‘Universal Man’, then it includes myself; yet I surely cannot buy my own person. And it might be proved in the same way that what is promised is not promised (p. 62, l. 5—15).

All this is mere sophistry. The promise of Something is valid; but the very smallest thing given fulfils it, and so it happens to be an idle one, legally speaking; but that is not because its object is universal. There are many such cases which judges would put out of court as frivolous.” Notice, however, that when the singulars of any universal are of equal value, any one of them will do; when their values differ, we may not choose at will any one of the worst, but may be compelled by law to give one of average worth. (I suspect that Wyclif’s opponents might have found means to cavil here. You promise a horse; you give a hack only fit to be slaughtered; but you have given the ‘Universal horse’ with it just as well as if you had given a Derby favourite. Why should the

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judge enforce an average value, when the value is totally irrelevant to the thing 'principally given'? But this is by the way.) — Some promises may be legally binding, but impossible to fulfil, and not binding in conscience. — We may go to market intending to buy something there; now some of our own goods being in the market, it follows that we intend to buy our own goods. There is nothing absurd in all this, unless we go with the explicit intention to buy what we know to be our own (pp. 67—69). But what absurdity, if a Universal be really nothing, for a Nominalist to express himself grateful to a benefactor who promises him *a* horse, *a* saddle, &c. (p. 69, l. 39 to p. 70, l. 11).

As to the last quibble: "I will give the (singular) penny which I do not promise to give (since I promise the Universal)." Such a promise is a falsehood, for by its very tenour it flatly contradicts itself. Or we may understand the words to mean: *that I do not promise to give as a singular*; but then the sentence has no difficulty (p. 70, l. 12 to p. 71, l. 35).

The chapter closes with a few observations about obligatory acts, mortal sins incurred by their omission, works of supererogation, and fasting.

Chapter IV. Here Wyclif discusses four difficulties raised, the first separately, as one of the ordinary objections against Universals; the other three together, as raising the question of the greatest number of things possible. There are consequently two distinct parts in this chapter.

1. Given four propositions, *a*, *b*, *c* and *d* (*b* contradicting *a*, and *c*, *d*) we find that *a* and *c*, and that *b* and *d* can coexist respectively; but that the couples *a b*, *c d* cannot. It follows that the four propositions, if thought of as coexisting, are at the same time incompatible and compatible with one another. On the same lines we may prove that all men are equal and unequal, friends and enemies, &c. (p. 73, l. 15 to p. 75, l. 7). But Wyclif easily points out that though such contradictory qualities really exist, they exist relatively to different objects, not to the same; which makes short of the whole objection. They are indeed all contradictory and compatible; but not all with all; *a*, compatible with *c* and *d*, is contradictory to *b*; and *vice versa* (pp. 75—78). And we come to the conclusion that opposite qualities, though they cannot be predicated of individuals, may be ascribed to universals, either essentially, or

separately. *Four* is even; four is three and one; three is odd: therefore four may truly be said in two different senses to be both even and odd. Christ is indivisible as God, and divisible, as man (p. 78, l. 35 to p. 79, l. 22). All this is explained at what I cannot help thinking needless length; but it is also quite admissible that a teacher may be trusted to have known the requirements of his pupils and the exigencies of his times somewhat better than those who read or edit his works five hundred years after his death.

2. Then comes the second question: Whether God is able to create the greatest possible number of creatures. The three difficulties raised at the beginning of the chapter are answered thus; for if God cannot create this greatest number, the conclusions given there are inevitable; whereas if (as Wyclif maintains) He can, then they are worthless (p. 79, l. 22—26). We are, however, not very well qualified to decide whether this is a logical inference, and must take the assertion for granted, most of these difficulties being stated in a very unintelligible form. Perhaps the third (p. 73, l. 10—12) alone is not totally obscure: “*Omnia quae Deus potuit facere possunt esse Deus, vel nihil potest differre ab alio.*” This is itself not very clear; but if I can discern a glimmer of meaning in it, it somewhat resembles the problem still in vogue amongst Neo-Scholastics: “Whether the most perfect creature possible *is* possible.” If there is no limit to the number of creatures which God can produce, there is either no limit to their perfection, and one of the infinite multitude is infinitely perfect, though a creature; or we must deny any difference of perfection between them. I give this, however, merely as a hint, not being sure that it is the very same question to which Wyclif alludes: “*Omnia . . . possunt esse Deus,*” stands in the way.

The adversary is supposed to deny that any greatest number of all is possible; for it would be infinite; and that is no less absurd than a being of infinite size. To create it would exhaust the whole of God’s power, which is inexhaustible. At the Resurrection there would be no room for an infinite number of men come to life again. Not one man more could possibly be created or perish. This, too, would lead to a denial of Free-will. Besides, if the term *man*, for instance, is a Universal, its signification cannot be exhausted, however, great the number of its singulars may be; it may always be supposed capable of having as

many more: which would not be true, if all possible men existed at any time (p. 79, l. 22 to p. 81, l. 6).

But this flatly contradicts Wyclif's principles. To answer the arguments levelled against him, he makes a very remarkable and peculiar use of the term 'infinite'. He indeed affirms the existence of an infinite number, but says that whatever exceeds our power of knowing distinctly, is infinite to us. Thus, to give his own comparison — a striking one — in a given line there is a definite and fixed number of points, known to God, but absolutely beyond our powers of apprehension. As a fact, we must admit the existence of continuous extension: now, how many parts are there in any such extended being? The more we divide it, the more of them we find, and we never can get to the end of our division. Yet God, who created them, knows each in particular, and the sum total of them all (p. 81, l. 6—33).

Would Wyclif have considered the multitude of stars in the sky, or that of the sands on the sea-shore, to be infinite? I think not; for they do not exceed our faculty of counting, but the time we have allotted to us, or the instruments we are obliged to use; if we had time enough, their aggregate would be represented by a number, finite even to us. He takes an instance of quite a different nature; — we might go on counting for all eternity the number of points in a line, or of parts in a given volume, however small. Yet he contends that as those points are *really there* (again a consequence of his doctrine; a Nominalist would get out of the difficulty by saying that they were mere *entia rationis*), it is impossible both that their number should not be known to God, and that it should be infinite to Him. It is therefore definite. To the length of each line corresponds a fixed number of points; a line double that length will have twice as many; numbers beyond all arithmetical calculation, but numbers nevertheless. The idea is not wanting in boldness and originality; but, like all speculations on these subjects, it is liable to a good many formidable objections.

Wyclif strengthens his position by observing that certain propositions which are evidently true must be denied if we refuse to admit this conception of the Infinite. A body certainly consists of *all* its parts; but, were there no definite number, there would be no *all*; the very term supposes them either counted or at least numerable. Again, in Genesis, "God saw all the things that He had made," i. e. with all their details,

which to us are infinite. A line consists of points; the duration of a sound, of instants; the whole is the sum of all its parts. All these imply countless parts — countless, that is, in so far as our mind conceives their multitude. And yet the adversary is driven to deny all this. "I protest before God," cries Wyclif, indignantly "that of all fallacies ever invented these seem to me the most worthless!" (p. 82, l. 6—28.) — If our opponents admit that God knows each part of the said infinite multitudes, he must grant that all these parts exist. Granting this, but refusing to admit that these parts are separately affirmable, he is at once met by the fact that, as they exist, they must be beings, singular beings, and as such affirmable separately. Suppose he takes refuge in saying that, separately affirmable, taken together they are not so; he is forced from that last refuge by the remark that in that case there must be a limit to the number of beings which God is able to cognize collectively; and, since a man could count up to any finite number, his knowledge would be equal to that of God (p. 82, l. 29 to p. 83, l. 28).

It follows therefore that there exists a maximum number of singular possible beings (men, for instance), to which nothing can be added; and this is true both for simultaneously and successively possible beings (p. 83, l. 29 to p. 84, l. 32). Peripateticans, admitting the eternity of the world, affirm the successive possibility of an endless multitude of men (p. 84, l. 33 to end). But Christians deny this; some (those of Wyclif's opinion) asserting a fixed maximum number of every being, all in ideal and necessary proportion, so that nothing in the world can be increased or diminished (p. 85, l. 11—24). This does not limit God's power, but affirms His infinite wisdom; how could more men be produced, when all those who are to exist, exist already? Here, however, two curious exceptions are made; one in regard to the number of inferior animals (possibly because, not having immortal souls, they would never simultaneously make up an infinite number), and the other concerning that of human actions, which depend upon free-will and thus cannot be fixed. *Not all future things take place by necessity* (l. 37, 38). This is an important sentence, for Wyclif, in his theological works, is known to have maintained a doctrine which seems to contradict this clear statement of his views. It may perhaps be interesting to some future student of this subject to inquire when and how the change of opinion took place, if it took place at all. It is quite possible that when

Wyclif speaks of necessity, he may mean that, given the fact of free-will and the actions resulting therefrom, things cannot be otherwise than they are; this, however, is often set forth in language which must have astonished the ordinary Catholic. In Buddensieg's edition of Wyclif's Polemical Works there is a tract entitled *De Perfectione Statuum*, in which (vol. II, p. 450, l. 5—18) a passage occurs that evidently supposes free-will. Now this tract, according to Buddensieg, dates from 1383, quite at the close of our author's life. But, on the other hand, this, as directed against the Friars, may be explained away as an argument 'ad hominem'. And in the *Dialogus*, when accused of fatalism, he might easily have destroyed the charge by the well-known distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. Yet he gives none, and simply admits the necessity of all things that happen (Dial. pp. 45, 46). That some change or other took place in Wyclif's doctrine is evident from the following passage in *De Ecclesia* (p. 107, l. 12 and seq.), in which he explicitly admits the fact: "*Omnia futura de necessitate eveniunt . . . Quando autem variavi ab ista sententia, non cognovi, ut modo, quomodo res habet multiplex esse, sed omne esse posui existentiam individuam rei in suo genere.*" How he reconciles this doctrine with free-will is not quite clear to me, as I have not been able to find a passage dealing with free-will at any length, except a very orthodox one in *De Ente Praedicamentali* (p. 247); but this treatise, according to Dr. Beer, could not have been posterior to *Logica* by more than a few years. But we must not rashly assume that he did not reconcile them. The Dominicans, in their great controversy with the Jesuits, affirmed that God predetermined all human acts, making all things act according to their nature; so that, as the nature of will is to act freely, human acts were at once predetermined and free! And this theory was not condemned by the Church! — Having thrown out these few hints which may possibly be of use, I return to the summary of Wyclif's arguments.


The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic possibility has no real foundation. A seemingly possible soul is in reality impossible, if God has chosen never to create it. The number therefore of souls extrinsically possible is that of all those which at any time will exist in reality; it is consequently finite, though the abstract idea, 'Soul' contains an infinite multitude of singulars; for all those singulars to which their cause (i. e. God's will) is wanting, imply self-contradiction. Wyclif con-

siders as possible only such as are so in reality, and at one time or other must exist: this does away with all the difficulties that can be brought forward (pp. 86—88). The system in vogue at his time, refusing to limit God's power of creating all that is possible in the abstract, renders it necessary to deny that such a multitude is infinite. Wyclif, limiting God's power by His will, calls the fixed number of possible things that will be produced, infinite *to us* (p. 88 to end of chapter).

Chapter V. brings us to a discussion of causal propositions, after the writer's usual fashion, expounding his views on causes, accidents, modes of being, the identity of God causing Man with Man caused by God, and the origin of evil.

Of such propositions there are two kinds, the one affirmative, the other negative, and each is reducible to a categorical having the same sense. A conditional proposition does not imply causation, but only a nexus between two propositions, neither does a copulative, which means nothing beyond the coexistence of the two (pp. 90, 91). Accidents are caused by their subjects: *because* you are a man, you have such and such qualities. This is a proof that accident and subject are distinct entities, unless we deny the truth of causal propositions in general; but such a denial would be subversive of all science (p. 91, l. 12—39). 'Cause' cannot properly be defined, any more than 'being', because their spheres are equally universal. We can only state that the word signifies 'that which produces an effect', that of which the entity precedes the thing caused; whilst 'effect' is that other being produced, and of which the entity flows from that cause. All beings are causes and effects. Possibly there is no last being, but there is a first one; which is, according to Wyclif, not God, but Essence. This essence is *that which* is created (*unum creatum*); but it is itself neither created nor caused. In short, it seems identical with that Transcendent Being, of which we have already heard a good deal, and which is common both to God and to the creature; a conception so closely verging upon Pantheism that Wyclif avoids that conclusion only by his surprising skill in argument, and the constant employment of the highest mysteries of the Christian faith used as points of comparison and instances to maintain the value of his subtle distinctions (p. 91, l. 39, 40; p. 92, l. 1—18).

He then proceeds to enumerate the fourfold division of causes into material, formal, efficient and final, each of which is a cause either *per*



se or *per accidens*, a true cause or a mere occasion. We may pass over these details rapidly, only noting the conclusion: that the material exists for the formal cause, this latter for the efficient, and the efficient for the final cause. The ultimate End of all beings is that toward which all beings tend, and for which they all exist, whilst it exists for itself alone. Thus it can have no parts, but must be absolutely simple in its essence; for if it had parts, every one would be caused, and would exist only for the whole. Two beings may cause one another in different lines of causation, but not in the same (pp. 92—96).

Every causal proposition is reduplicative. For instance: You move, since you walk, means *Inasmuch as you walk, you move*. Therefore, though other propositions are also reduplicative (as: The more alike two things are, the less they differ), Wyclif takes the present occasion to investigate the nature of reduplicatives, and continues his investigation in the following chapter. Whenever such a proposition is reducible to a causal one, the predicate must be universal. If, for instance, Every man, *qua* man, is rational, then it also follows that Every rational being is a man. This is not always the case when the proposition cannot thus be reduced (pp. 96—98 to l. 6).

Here comes a difficulty. Suppose we say: *A man, in so far as he is white, does not build*: is this true, and may we consider that 'whiteness' is not a cause of his building? Some assert that we may not; for the whole man builds, and whiteness is an attribute of the whole man. Wyclif, on the contrary, thinks that the proposition is true. The connection between this apparently useless and meaningless subtlety and the profound mysteries of the Scholastic doctrine concerning the 'hypostasis', or essence of individuality, becomes clearer, when we ask, Did Christ, *qua* God, suffer and die? Did He, *qua* man, create the world? The answer given is in strict accordance with orthodoxy (p. 98, l. 6 to p. 99, l. 4).

This leads us to examine what such modes of being as whiteness, &c., added to the substance, are in themselves. Real they are no doubt, according to the general drift of Wyclif's opinions; but are they realities distinct from the substance to which they belong and which they modify? If so, every substance would, in each of its modifications, differ from itself. But the difference is merely modal, not substantial; only the modes differ: to be thus or otherwise, and to be existing, are

not the same. Size gives a man magnitude; quality gives him 'suchness', humanity alone gives him to be a man (p. 99, l. 4 to p. 100, l. 6).

But if so, another difficulty springs up. God, *as creating man*, has what is called an accidental mode, which is not identical with His essence, and therefore is posterior to Himself! And if we deny this; if we say that this mode is identical with God's essence, we fall into another snare: for the said mode (action and passion being admittedly the same thing taken from contrary points of view) is also identical with man *as created by God* (p. 100, l. 6 to end). Thus God and man would share in the same reality, or mode of existence; just as the hammer *qua* striking the anvil, is identical with the anvil, *qua* struck by the hammer. It is curious to note how this old-world objection has been reproduced and extended in modern times. Every student of Philosophy will at once recognize the system which says: "I think of an object: — therefore I am identical with the object, the Non-Ego. And the Non-Ego, thought by me, becomes identical with my Ego." What was formerly an objection, refuted in a few pages, has become the starting point and basis of many a volume of German metaphysical speculation, which, having spent its force and lost its interest in its own country, has lately found new life and men of talent to expound it in England. And yet this fallacy (to speak of it in the language of the Schoolmen) was well known even in Aristotle's time, Truly there is no new thing under the sun! But let us see how Wyclif refutes it.

First, he points out that an accident may signify a mere happening which does not in the least change the possessor's intrinsic nature: a rich man may become poor without any loss to his physical attributes. He then notes that not all relations are mutually real. A cause must be, in its essence, prior to its effect, though it is only properly termed a cause whilst the effect is being produced. This 'calling', or denomination, changes nothing in its being. So, the cause depends on the effect only in so far as a verbal change is implied, whereas the effect depends on the cause for its very being. A man, by means of his generative activity, produces a son: he is called a father as soon as his son exists. But the man existed before and independently; there is no real difference between the father and the man. Wyclif therefore answers that the likeness of me in God and the likeness of God in me, both produced by creation, are not identical. For the likeness of me represents me as

I am — i. e. — infinitely beneath God — and changes nothing in Him (pp. 101—103, l. 8).

And how would Wyclif, according to these lines, have answered the Hegelian puzzle of the Ego and the Non-Ego? With the utmost ease. My thinking of an object does not change the object in itself; it only makes it to be thought. The Non-Ego is the Ego — *in my mind*. Not otherwise. My Ego, in thinking — i. e. *mentally*, is identical with the Non-Ego; but only in so far. All this is merely a verbal, or if you prefer, a notional becoming. And the bubble is burst.

From this Wyclif concludes that no inherent accident has any existence of its own, or adds anything to its substance, as a substance (p. 103, l. 8—25); that every proposition of which the predicate essentially belongs to the subject infers a causal proposition, but not *vice versa* (for instance: *Man is essentially rational: man is rational because he is man*, but, *I exist because God wills my existence* gives no inference; p. 103, l. 25 to p. 104, l. 7); that a conclusion from a cause to the cause of that cause is a true one (p. 104, l. 7 to end); and that, while God's will causes my existence in the physical order, my existence causes God's will to be what it is in the intellectual order, i. e., a cause. One of the two gives the entity, but does not prove the existence of the other; whilst the latter proves the existence of the former, but does not give it entity (p. 105, l. 1 to p. 106, l. 9). It does not follow that either is prior to the other, unless in two totally different orders: that of being, and that of cognition (p. 106, l. 9—25). Nor that God's will, being a mere relation between the Creator and the Created, cannot cause anything (l. 26—34). Nor that any creature, to be willed, must first of all exist (l. 34—37; p. 107, l. 1—8).

But can we draw the following negative inference from a causal proposition: “*I do good because God wills it; therefore, if God does not will it, I do not good because God does not will it?*” It is the very same form of syllogism as the conclusive one which follows: *The day exists because the sun shines; therefore, if the sun does not shine, the day does not exist because the sun does not shine*. Some deny this; others explain the inference, noting that we may suppose the sun not to shine on the earth¹

¹ I have here slightly developed what I believe to be Wyclif's meaning. In other places, I have not scrupled to add a comparison or a line of explanation of my own, to render the sense clearer.

because of clouds that arise from the earth itself. In like manner, God's not willing me to do good (if He willed it, I should do good without fail) would proceed from an obstacle on my part — my non-reception of His grace; just as in the case of the sun's rays. What is not received cannot possibly be given. But I am responsible for not receiving it through my fault (p. 107, l. 8 to p. 108, l. 20).

So far, sin and its possibility and origin is explained in the orthodox way, and reconciled with God's First and absolute Causality. But Wyclif closes the chapter with one or two sentences which, even if defensible, have a somewhat strange sound. God cannot but be the First Cause of all; and therefore, though indirectly, of every act, including sin: of the eternal truth that whatever is able to sin may sin at some time or other; of the creation of such peccable beings; and also of the very happening (*contingentiae*, p. 108, l. 33) of the act, which is thus radically dependent upon God. We must, however, remark that there is no attempt to fix the sinfulness of any act upon God. On the contrary, says Wyclif, in so far as God is the author of sin, sin is good. Whatever is true is good; and the possibility of every sin depends upon the everlasting truth already laid down. Thus we have a logical deduction as follows:

A, B, C . . . Z are severally able to sin.

We suppose the *creation of A, B, C . . . Z.*

Also that, in Wyclif's system, *what is able to sin* means *what* (at one time or other, or in one subject or other) *will actually commit sin*; for *able to* does not signify mere abstract possibility, but the necessity of a future happening.


Then we necessarily have that *either A, or B, or C . . . or Z will at some instant or other of all time* (either the instant *a*, or *b*, or *c* . . . or *z*) *actually commit sin.*

Here we see, not only that there is no necessity for any of the given singulars taken in particular A, B, C, &c. to sin at all, but also that it is not necessary that the sin should take place at a given instant of time. And as contingency is the opposite of necessity, we now see what Wyclif means when he says that sin is of the extremest contingency (*summa contingentia*); for the truth would be verified if only one of the multitude A, B, C, &c. sinned but once.

Chapter VI professes to deal with those reduplicative propositions in which there is a comparison implied; but it in reality discusses only one of these propositions, viz.: *In so far as two things are like each other, in so far they differ.* Which means that the greater anything is, the smaller it is, for the magnitude of its smallness is so much greater; and so on of all qualities which are comparable with each other. Man of common sense would at the present day no doubt solve the question with a shrug, and they would treat no more respectfully a problem which I myself heard propounded by one of the lights of Philosophy: What becomes of matter in the intervals of sensation? If all men and beasts were sound asleep at the same time, where would the world be? The problem discussed here at length by Wyclif is certainly not more absurd. He gives three different answers which profess to solve the difficulty, and proposes a fourth of his own. The arguments on either side can hardly be of much interest, dealing with such flimsy sophisms that we can hardly conceive their being seriously set forth by any man in his senses; but we must remember that during the Middle Ages the right understanding of the spirit of mathematical science was in its infancy. Two points however deserve to be noticed here.

Why does Wyclif trouble himself so much about this question? Had it been, as it seems, a mere exercise of ingenuity in verbal juggling, he would probably have dismissed it with a few words of contempt, as he dismisses others, by no means more puerile in themselves, calling them Christmas jokes, "more joculantum in Natali" (p. 14, l. 10). But the fact is that, absurd though it may be, it is directed against his system. In Wyclif's theory, the universe consists of a multitude of real universals, shared by their singulars in varying degrees. Not only humanity, amongst the rest, is thus shared, but also merit, demerit, size, and in short everything intelligible almost; certainly every quality which allows of comparison with another. The Universal Man, if I may be allowed a simile, is thus, with regard to its singulars, like a straight line of a certain length, containing a number of points, infinite so far as we know, but fixed and known to God's omniscience alone. These points represent the number of really possible men; and their position on the line, the degree to which Universal Humanity is shared in by each individual man. And, to carry the supposition further, this line, produced further, would represent Animality, which includes Humanity and all its

singulārs, Life, including Animality; Substance, including Life; and the infinite line would stand for Transcendent Being, including *all*. The following figure will sufficiently show my meaning:



Singulārs of the Universal Man, or Humanity.

But it is quite clear that this objection goes to make Wyclif contradict himself. In so far as any man shares more perfectly in humanity, in so far he shares in it less perfectly! Of course the arguments are all grossly fallacious; but the subject itself is too important to let them pass without careful refutation.

In the second place, we may notice the tendency of Scholastic philosophy to apply the mathematical method to metaphysical reasoning. We have seen cases somewhat similar to this in *Logica* before; but nowhere does Wyclif mark it so strongly as here. He even goes the length of supposing numbers set down to denote the entitative perfections of diverse species (pp. 119, 120) and points out the fallacy of reasoning upon such numbers, if they do not stand for homologous things — I had almost said, quantities: for he evidently has in his mind the intensity of essential perfection, when he numbers them thus. This seems to have been a tendency more or less to be found in philosophers of all ages, who could not help admiring the fruitful accuracy of the mathematical method, and contrasting it with the barren vagueness of their own speculations. Not to speak of the ancients, of the school of Pythagoras, and of several curious passages in Plato and Aristotle, we find a good many traces of this spirit in the works of modern philosophers. Spinoza and Wolff attempted to reduce two very different systems of philosophy to a series of theorems, deduced one from the other, like those of Euclid. At the present day, De Morgan, Boole and

Jevons have in turn endeavoured to adapt Algebra to Logic or Logic to Algebra; whilst Abbé Gratry, in France, has tried to prove God and the Creation by the interpretation of certain mathematical formulae. And, to restrict myself to Mediaeval Scholasticism, we by no means find Wyclif alone in his way of looking at ideas — or rather at their universal objects — as though they were measurable things. Here I must regret not having taken note, in times gone by, of several passages of St. Thomas, in which he distinctly speaks, for instance, of the *distance* between the most perfect brute and man as greater than that between the former and a plant. Here we see an explicit comparison between two entitative differences. There are also in his works certain arguments which, though referring to pure abstractions, might very well be represented by an algebraical equation, if we admitted the assumption already mentioned. I equally regret not being able now to find the passages I refer to; but life would be too short to look through the multitudinous folios of the Angelic Doctor; I had to glance here and there, where I thought I had most chance to find them. One argument, I remember well, struck me as being based on the implicit assumption that "when two variable quantities (or objects of ideas) are always equal to each other as they approach the constants by which they are respectively limited, those constants are also equal to each other". And we may fairly believe that if, in the days of Schoolmen, mathematics had attained the high degree of development at which they stand now, there would have been wrought a complete transformation of Metaphysics; not perhaps to its disadvantage.

Setting aside the detailed examination of the debate, as useless and uninteresting to us, we may however notice by the way what Wyclif, in his answer to the fourth objection, remarks concerning goodness (p. 122 to end of chapter). Utility has no intrinsic element of goodness; it is good only extrinsically, and varies according to the demand for the thing that is useful. But reversely, whatever possesses intrinsic goodness possesses utility too; so does also that which is bad in itself; for even sin has its use in the world. Intrinsical goodness is divided into two species: that which is physically and that which is morally good. The latter is always useful, at least to some extent; virtue never can be badly employed; yet it may at times be less useful than what is merely extrinsically good. The same division of evil must be made; it is either

merely disadvantageons, or physically or morally bad. God is in no wise evil; He is of use to all; even his punishments are not injurious. Nor can he commit moral evil. Wyclif here (p. 124, l. 34 to p. 125, l. 15) corrects or qualifies what he said at the close of the foregoing chapter. God cannot make a man to sin; but when He permits evil, He gives it an element of goodness by the very fact. A man sins; therefore it is true (and consequently good) that he sins: God makes the inference, but does not posit the premiss. Good to all (p. 125, l. 15—35), He is infinitely good in Himself, and finitely so to His creatures. Many things that we call evil are in reality good; as, for instance, punishments and misfortunes (p. 126, l. 15—20); and in many cases we mistake the value of things, which varies according to supply and demand (l. 22—25). These never can be exactly regulated. Even should the variation in price not spring from the wickedness of men, it is impossible to fix prices exactly. We must leave that to nature; the real worth of anything is its utility in the universe.—This is a clear and far-seeing condemnation of the many attempts to fix or keep up prices which were so common during the Middle Ages, and are far from abandoned even at the present day. In these few sentences we find Free Trade in its germ.

'Hindrance' and 'obstacle' generally mean the reverse of utility; but in a certain sense they may not be evils. If, for instance, God is said to hinder any one from attaining eternal bliss, it is in order to work out His plan of the world, in which predestination plays a principal part. The natural tendency of all things is to sink to the centre; but some must be impeded in their descent, or the order of the universe would perish. Wyclif, however, speaks very guardedly here (*forte . . . difficultates plurimae*, p. 128, l. 34—36) and brings the chapter to a close without going into any details on this subject.

Chapter VII. Here our author, availing himself of comparative propositions, his nominal subject-matter, deals *ex professo* with the question whether there is for every faculty, or active power, a maximum and a minimum of intensity beyond which it cannot go either way. Of course he asserts that there is, and in his answer to the objections, he discusses various and very diverse questions, including God's omnipotence, the limits to human strength, size, and knowledge, the beatific vision, and our natural faculty of sight.

The problem is ushered in according to Wyclif's usual fashion; but it is not dragged in, as occurs in too many cases. Comparative propositions easily lead to the question whether, wherever there is a *more* and a *less*, there is not also a *most* and a *least*, not only existing (which is generally allowed) but even possible (p. 129; p. 130, l. 1—15). As preliminaries to the solution, several principles are laid down concerning God's power and His concourse in every act of His creatures. All things proceed from God, and every act of every creature requires an accompanying act of the Creator, without which that act could not possibly take place. There is also in Him a distinct and special power for every being, which, when that being has perished, exists no longer; but this takes away nothing from God's perfection, for it would imply absurdity that He could act with that which does not exist (pp. 130—132, l. 30). This power of concourse is a relation in God, but a purely logical one (p. 132, l. 30 to p. 133, l. 11). If there is no maximum intensity of an act, God cannot elicit it; and if there is, as we assert, such a maximum, His power itself cannot go beyond it (p. 133, l. 11—25). As God *could* do, absolutely speaking, things which *cannot* really be done, Wyclif objects to the theory which distinguishes His absolute from His ordinary power; the former cannot be *exercised* alone, and therefore is inadmissible. In any case, every being has power to act only so far as it is possible for God to coact with it (p. 133, l. 25 to p. 135, l. 10).

Every finite power or active faculty must have a maximum of activity, beyond which it cannot go. Being finite, it is limited, and the very idea of limit implies a maximum (p. 135, l. 21 to end). We may suppose it to be variable, increasing uniformly during a certain time; it then will become successively twice, three times, &c., as great as it was at first: that is, its limit of maximum performance lies twice, &c., as far as before; so, even in this case, it still has its limit (p. 136, l. 16 to end). The modern mathematical notion of a limit — that which a variable quantity may approach indefinitely, but never reach — finds scant favour with Wyclif. What cannot be done is not the limit of what can. A given weight — say, a stone — that I am unable to carry is not the limit of my strength; unless indeed it be the least weight that I cannot carry, and that is an assumption impossible to prove (p. 138, l. 7—23).

Objections. 1. An army that can defeat a great power can defeat any smaller one; an army that can be defeated by a small power will

be defeated by any greater force. This is the difference between active and passive power. Now, in the sense pointed out, either of these powers is without limit. — Wyclif replies that, in the sense given, passive power is a mere imperfection. If understood to mean receptivity of forms (as in the case of matter, primordial or other) without doubt there is a limit to that receptivity. Sense-impressions have likewise their limits, and produce a wrong judgment when the senses are too strongly stimulated in one particular way. Thence it is clear that our intellect, which perceives all things, cannot perceive them by means of any bodily organ; and also that there is a maximum of receptivity for each of our senses. Thus, whether active or passive, the power at work is in every case a form; and this form cannot be indefinitely perfect (p. 138, l. 23—30; p. 140, l. 23 to p. 142, l. 35).

2. God's power would be restricted by this theory; for then, even by a miracle, He could not make any creature go beyond the maximum of its power (p. 138, l. 30—38). — *Answer.* It is one thing to know that there are limits even to miraculous assistance, and another to know what those limits are. God certainly could not, even by a miracle, make a stone think. His assistance is necessary in every act, and miraculous assistance only displaces the limit, but does not destroy it (p. 142, l. 36 to p. 143, l. 32). Is there such a thing as the most rapid movement possible? Wyclif asserts that there is. As time is made up of indivisible instants, so movement also consists of indivisible degrees of velocity, and the most rapid movement possible is that which increases at every instant by one such indivisible degree. This is however, even from Wyclif's point of view, not the most rapid, but the most rapidly increasing motion possible; and surely we may suppose that at every instant the movement might increase by *two* degrees of velocity. That would certainly give us a more rapid motion: but the passage is not very clear, and I am not quite sure I have understood it rightly. — As for infinitely rapid movement, Wyclif at once sets it down either as impossible (as in the hypothetical case given by Aristotle, of movement *in vacuo*; for a vacuum is an absurdity) or else as not being properly a quantity. Here our author probably alludes to the instantaneous nature of the movement of light, a doctrine universally believed before the discovery of the telescope had rendered possible the celebrated observations on the eclipses of Jupiter's

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satellites (potest . . . aliquid subito moveri et multiplicari per quotlibet loca (p. 144, l. 2—4).¹ We have to consider, not what assistance God could absolutely give to His creatures, but what He gives them naturally and according to His Divine plan. To this there must be a maximum limit; it is that of the creature's ability to act with such assistance (p. 145, l. 13 to p. 146, l. 12).

Can God create worlds indefinitely? If He could, then we are compelled to posit an infinite and absurd vacuum beyond our world. These worlds, however multiplied we may conceive them to be, would form a body infinitely small in comparison with the enormous vacuum surrounding it. We should then find one infinite magnitude to be greater than another: which is a flat absurdity. This difficulty is absolutely unanswerable. An endless vacuum entails quite as many absurdities as the hypothesis of a body infinitely great. Yet God, though thus seemingly limited in power, remains Almighty, for His power is limited only by Himself. He eternally produces an infinitely perfect act (the Word); and above all, creation implies omnipotence. Yet creation could not take place but at a certain fixed point of duration; nor could the world be larger or smaller than it is. Some, refusing to admit these limitations, lay down as a principle that God's omnipotence extends to everything that we are able to maintain that He can do; and that He can thus grant an indefinite amount of assistance to any created faculty. This, as Wyclif points out, is a grossly unfair method of reasoning. He does not however deny that God *could* render such assistance, *if* He chose; but says that, not choosing, He cannot (pp. 146—152).

3. Supposing that a given power A can sustain a weight B during a certain time C, this being the maximum which it can bear, it could evidently bear a heavier weight for a shorter time; again, during this

¹ It is curious to note with what absolute certitude one of the greatest thinkers of old sets aside the true explanation of what light is, while he gets to the right, though vague, conclusion 'that it is not a body'. "Si lumen esset corpus, illuminatio esset motus localis corporis. Nullus autem motus localis corporis potest esse in instanti: quia omne quod movetur localiter, necesse est quod prius perveniat ad medium magnitudinis quam ad extrellum. Illuminatio autem fit in instanti; *nec potest dici quod fiat in tempore imperceptibili*. Quia in parvo spatio posset tempus latere, in magno autem non posset. Statim enim cum sol est in puncto horizontis, illuminatur totum hemisphaerium usque ad punctum oppositum." (St. Thomas, Sum. Th. 1^a Pars, qu. LXVII, art. 2.)

shorter time (C') a smaller power, A', would be able to bear this same weight B; this, in the opinion of the adversaries, would prove that no power has a special maximum of its own (p. 138, l. 38 to p. 139, l. 9). Wyclif answers here at great length (pp. 152—162), giving many different senses of the word 'difficulty'; but we need not go into them. The gist of his reply (p. 159, l. 4—10) is that the notion of a maximum must here be considered with regard to the time, and not apart. We may, however, in this long and discursive reply, note several striking sentences, some paradoxical, some quaint, and some proving a considerable knowledge of mechanics, as then known. "Of all difficult things — i. e. of those which deteriorate the agent that does them — mortal sin is the most difficult (p. 155, l. 26, 27)." "In the sense of 'something to be mastered', the universe is a difficulty to God Himself (p. 156, l. 20—25)." "Without God's aid we should find it as difficult to move a bean as to make a world (p. 157, l. 29—31)." "In the act of sustaining, much depends on the manner of application of the weight, An egg will not be crushed even by a considerable force; a sail will bear up against a strong wind; and experiments with levers prove this abundantly and in a marvellous way (*multa . . . mirabilia facere*, p. 160, l. 25—34)." "The least weight a man cannot sustain is the greatest that he can (p. 160, l. 34—37)." "Weight implies distance from the centre, or from the proper sphere of each element; water in its own sphere has no weight, as divers tell us, and I suppose that it is the same for the earth too (p. 161, l. 14—16)."

4. The biggest or the smallest man possible is impossible. If the former got a bump (*tunctionem*), he would then be too big to exist. If the latter lost a hair (*quamlibet ablationem partis superfluae*), he would be too small. — This humorous argument is answered on p. 167 (l. 34 & seq.) where it is pointed out that, though the greatest possible giant could not assimilate any more food, so long as his body remained of that size, a swelling would not render his organism, as a living body, any the larger. And a similar train of reasoning would apply to the smallest dwarf. But before this reply, we come to a very interesting digression (pp. 162—166). Wyclif, admitting a minimum of size for all bodily substances, implicitly asserts the existence of atoms from the very outset (*minima naturalia*; p. 162, l. 11); and a few pages later, he openly gives them their right name (*athomorum* p. 166, l. 32). It is too ge-

nerally believed that Schoolmen denied the existence of atoms. It would be more correct to say that they passed them over. They of course combated the systems of Democritus and Epicurus; and, finding that the system of matter and form sufficed to explain in metaphysical terms all that was then known of natural phenomena, they generally did not trouble themselves to enquire if atoms were or were not true in any other sense. St. Thomas, however, certainly says that there is and must be a limit to the divisibility of any corporeal substance; but he goes no farther.¹ Wyclif, with his principle that a limit not reached is not a limit, cannot help admitting atoms (p. 163, l. 13—22). He grants, in answer to objections made, that the combination or decomposition of two atoms is instantaneous; but this does not prevent the chemical change of the whole from taking up a certain time (p. 163, l. 23—31; p. 164, l. 13—31). To the well-known difficulty, urged even in our days by Ultra-Thomists against such Neo-Scholastics as believe in a ‘minimum naturale’, viz., that such a theory would reduce compound bodies to mere aggregates, similar to so many heaps of sand, he denies the conclusion in the case of organic bodies, which have a supervening form that gives unity to the whole; but whether homogeneous inanimate substances are mere aggregates is, he says, a doubtful point (p. 163, l. 31—41; p. 164, l. 31 to p. 165, l. 37). Division is favourable to chemical change; and on that account alchemists calcine metals, to give them the more perfect forms (v. g. that of gold, or ‘aureity’). But, as this calcination does not reduce the metals to their ultimate parts, the successful result of their experiments is ever a matter of chance. — We have thus: 1st, the elementary forms in the atoms, and 2nd, those of the compound: simple in themselves, these forms are to a certain degree extended in the bodies of the lower animals, which accounts for their continuing to live, although divided into several parts. As for monsters with double organs, they are properly two animals joined in one, and possess two forms, or vital principles (p. 165, l. 37 to p. 167, l. 34).

5. It is objected that, at least in the sphere of learning and knowledge, there can be no limit; for the more we know, the more able we

¹ “Quod etiam dicunt . . . quod corpus est in infinitum divisibile, vanum est. Non enim corpus naturale in infinitum dividitur, sed usque ad certum terminum.” (Sum. Theol. 1^a Pars, qu. LXVIII, art. 2.)

become to increase our knowledge. Nor can there be any limit to the raising of a pile indefinitely high (p. 139, l. 19—30). — All this is absolutely denied. We know by faith that the Saints in Heaven do really attain their maximum limit of possible knowledge by means of the beatific vision of God. The question *how* this can be — a favourite one both with Mediaeval and with modern Scholastics — is discussed at some length. The blessed are not infinitely more perfect than we; for their knowledge is an accidental privilege, not an essential attribute. Wyclif inclines to think that they see all things in God; but, however this may be, the essence of felicity consists in the sight of God Himself; even were they ignorant of something, they would none the less be perfectly happy (p. 168, l. 10 to p. 174, l. 18). As to the raising of a pile indefinitely high, of course the higher it went, the more difficult it would be to raise it any further; and there would come a point at which it would exhaust all the powers of the whole human race to get even one more stone to the summit. Thus, Nature imposes a limit to men in all things; excessive increase of anything, for instance, of *Church ceremonies and possessions*, is hurtful. This is a seed which at a later period developed into an enormous tree (p. 174, l. 33 to p. 175, l. 22).

6. A minimum of visibility is absurd. Seeing a surface, we see the whole of it, and therefore we confusedly see all its parts, even to the infinitely small. — But Wyclif posits as an evident principle that whatever is seen confusedly might, under other circumstances, be distinctly seen. This takes all the force out of the objection. A mathematical point cannot be seen distinctly under *any* circumstances; for the smallest thing visible must be the base of a pyramid having its apex in the eye. The chapter comes to a close with some details on the structure and organism of the eye, which may be curious as representing the state of optical science in those days; but I am not in a position to discuss them thoroughly; scarcely at all. As Wyclif avowedly takes most of what he says from the works, not only of Alhazen, but also of the famous Vitellio (Ciolek) of Cracow, one of the most celebrated opticians in the Middle Ages, I should have liked to compare his anatomical description with the summary given by our author. Unfortunately, the work in question was not in the Jagellonian Library when I asked for it, having been lent out at some distance from Cracow; but the English

student will no doubt find Vitellio's works in any great library. — One of Wyclif's mistakes struck me. He denies that the visual rays cross each other in the centre of the eye. If they did, he says, *they would form an inverted image!* This shows how little philosophers of that time cared for experimental tests; for nothing would have been easier, even then, than to examine the image formed and find out that it really was inverted (p. 175, l. 22 to end of ch. VII).

Chapter VIII. Of Conditional Propositions. Wyclif deals rather more at length with them than with the others; but he soon turns away to the problem of individuation, and thence to the question of the so-called *Insolubles*.

Logicians generally hold that such a proposition as, *If A is B, C is D*, does not posit the existence of anything, but merely affirms a connection between two propositions (p. 186, l. 14—16). Wyclif denies this rule, though granting that it possesses an element of truth (l. 23—31). Every proposition of this kind is either necessary or impossible. If necessary, its truth implies God's existence, on whom all truth depends; if impossible, it implicitly denies that He exists. Here occur some details about necessary truth. A truth may be at different times both true and false; and even at the time when it is false, its *having been true* is an eternal truth. The signification of the present may be extended to the past and the future. A thing true in the abstract may be untrue at a certain time and imply false inferences. If I move my hand, I produce a truth, new as to its present actuality, false in the past and the future, and again everlastingly true in an abstract present (p. 188, 189, l. 1—16).

But, what individualizes such propositions as *A will be, was, can be, &c.*? That is, what makes one among such propositions uttered in various circumstances to be true, whilst another of exactly the same form is false? It is the difference of time, say some. What is eternal in itself has a particular (not abstract, but individual) mode of being in time; and it changes accordingly (p. 189, l. 16 to p. 190, l. 3). But if so, this would infer a continual change in truth; nothing would remain the same. For time is constantly changing; no one temporal truth could hold good for more than one instant. And on the other hand, everything would be everlastingly true: before *I am* born, and for ever, *I am not-born*; therefore it is everlastingly true that *I am*. And the same

conclusion might be drawn from every proposition (p. 190, l. 4—30). Wyclif's opinion is that individuation itself proceeds only from the cause of each individual, and finally from God; but that we know the difference between two individuals by their difference in time. Suppose, for instance, that two sparks exactly alike are struck from a flint successively, we know their difference because one was struck before the other (p. 190, l. 30 to p. 191, l. 7). But even God Himself cannot create the same thing twice over; nor, by the same reason, can anything be annihilated (*et per idem videtur nihil posse annihilari*, p. 192, l. 8, q). Here is the first hesitating assertion of what was later to become so firm a doctrine, resulting in a new theory of the Eucharist.

After this, Wyclif comes to the grand question concerning certain propositions called *Insolubles*, on account of the great difficulty which their solution offered to logicians. They may in general be put under the form of a conditional, as follows: *If the present proposition be true, A is not A.* This therefore is the best place to deal with them. Before succinctly giving Wyclif's solution, it may be interesting to state various forms of so-called insolubles, and the answer which I fancy a modern logician would give, if he troubled himself to find any solution at all.

If the present proposition be true, A is not A. Grant that this is exact: an absurdity follows. Deny it, and you have another: *It is false that, even if the present proposition be true, A is not A.* We see that a mere denial of the nexus lands us in a contradiction connected with the antecedent; whereas its admission grants the contradiction which its consequent contains. This dialectical puzzle, as is well known, dates from very early times. In the days of the Greek sophists it took a form somewhat like this: A certain philosopher said that all Cretans were liars; but he was a Cretan himself: did he lie, or did he not lie? If he lied, he spoke the truth; and if he spoke the truth, he lied. To say that a liar may speak the truth sometimes does but elude the difficulty: for he might have said: "All Cretans *always lie*," and added the words "*myself included*", to exclude the possibility of an exception being made in his favour.

This may be expressed much more briefly. Suppose a piece of paper, with nothing written on it but: *What is written here is false.* This proposition, admitted as true, denies its own meaning; denied as

false, it proves itself to be true; and consequently false; and so on for ever. How shall we get out of this?

To make the case plainer, by contrasting it with one somewhat similar, suppose it is said: *No proposition is true.* If granted, the proposition itself is not true; and being false, some propositions must be true. Yes, but if denied, no difficulty follows. This is simply an absurdity akin to the Sceptical position: *It is indubitable that every proposition is doubtful.* It is only on one side that such utterances resemble insolubles: the essence of the latter consists in their being equally impossible to deny or to affirm.

Does a man who swears that he is committing perjury forswear himself or not? Not unless he speaks the truth; and if he is speaking the truth, how can what he says be perjury? Can any one believe that he is mistaken in that very belief of his mistake?

The puzzle seems still more intricate when a decision has, one way or the other, to be taken in consequence. A certain Greek rhetorician taught his art to a young man. Half his fee was paid down in advance; the other half was to be paid when, and only when, he gained his first suit. Time went by, and the young student, having ended his course of Rhetorique, and not appearing to plead, was called before the judges by his teacher. "If," said the latter, "you win this suit, you must pay me according to our contract; if you lose it, the sentence itself compels you to pay me." The pupil retorted: "If I lose, our agreement sets me free; if I win, I shall be free by the decision of the Court."

Or the following: A tyrant sets men at a bridge which is his property, with the order to ask every passenger whether he will pass or no, and allow only those to pass who answer truly. If he says: "I shall pass over," he can either be allowed to pass, or be turned back, and proved thus to have told an untruth; but what of the man who says: "I shall not pass?" If they turn him back, he has spoken the truth, and they fail in their duty; if they make him pass, they fail equally, for he has uttered a falsehood.

One last instance. A man has two slaves A and B. He decides to free them both, under the following conditions: A is to be free, if the first man he meets is a slave; B is to be free only if the first he meets is a free man. Now it so happens that A and B meet each other before

anybody else. A, meeting B who is a slave, is free that very instant; therefore B is also free, meeting a free man; therefore A is also a slave. And so on.

Debates on such questions have practically been dead for many centuries; they are considered as mere useless subtleties. And to speak quite frankly on this matter, they really seem ridiculous enough, even to a man pretty well versed in scholastic lore. But the greater the temptation for men of culture to endorse the sweeping judgments of that proverbially narrow-minded individual — the man in the street — the more they ought to strive against it. They well know that most of the present philosophical debates, though not apparently now so ridiculous, because fashionable, will appear so in the course of a few hundred years. All that we can say of them with certitude is that they serve to sharpen the wits by going as deep down into the principles of things and the laws of thought as it is possible to go. If these old world discussions then served the same purpose, they are worth studying at least from a historical point of view. And at any rate, the reader will perhaps feel some interest in the solution to these puzzles, given from what I should conceive to be the modern standpoint. I say, *I should conceive*; for I have been able to find nothing directly referring to them in any modern work of Logic; not even in the Neo-Scholastic text books of Liberatore and Tongiorgi, nor in that of the Thomist Goudin who, in the 17th century, argued with overwhelming violence to prove the immobility of the earth.

We should, I fancy, make but short work of all such propositions. The main point of the difficulty is that every proposition must be either true or false; the subject affirming of the predicate either the thing that is or the thing that is not. Now, taking any one of these propositions, we are compelled by overpowering evidence to admit that it is impossible to call them either true or false. Well then, what follows? Why, *that they are not propositions!*¹ They are mere strings of unmeaning

¹ A Scholastic friend to whom I showed this said to me: "What would you answer to *What is written here is a proposition?* It could be admitted without danger; and if you say that it is not, then by affirming its contrary, you admit that it has meaning." This was subtle. I answered that it could be admitted without danger, but that, belonging to the same class of sentences, it had logically to be not denied, but set aside. It chances that by thus ignoring, I apparently denied it;

words having the looks of propositions, but not their nature. They are not absurd merely; an absurdity is not quite unmeaning; *This square is round*, clearly means an impossibility, and its denial is evidently true. Not incoherent: *The number three is fragrant*, does not even seem to mean anything but the raving of a lunatic, which no one cares to deny. Not mere gibberish: *Blitri is Blathro* may be equally well denied or affirmed, nobody knowing what they are. The so-called propositions in question are in reality a peculiar class of pseudo-propositions: words which appear to have a meaning, but which falsify both themselves and their contradictories. And this, I think, would be quite enough to satisfy modern students of logic.

The idea of so simple and easy a solution did not, it would seem, strike any of Wyclif's contemporaries; and he himself, though coming nearest to it in my opinion, does not quite hit the mark. Some of them affirmed that such propositions were neither false nor true (p. 194, l. 24—37). Some, that they were both true and false (p. 194, l. 38 to p. 195, l. 14). Others, that they were in reality exceptive propositions, as no proposition can include itself in its own meaning (p. 195, l. 14 to p. 196, l. 20). Some said that the words implied contradiction if understood as they were, but they did not explain how they were to be understood otherwise (p. 196, l. 20 to p. 197, l. 20). And others again denied that such words as *proposition, true, false, &c.*, could receive universal extension (p. 197, l. 20 to p. 199, l. 9). Several other opinions are enumerated besides (pp. 199—203). Wyclif taking the material or grammatical side of the definition of a proposition, saw that both subject and predicate had meaning apart, and that they were joined by a copula; he naturally could not see his way to denying that in such cases there was no proposition. But then, how could it be one, if it had no meaning, if it neither affirmed nor denied anything? Wyclif's answer (p. 203 to end of work), comes to pretty nearly the same as the one I have given above. It is *not a proposition* in the ordinary sense of the word, for, in this ordinary sense, it has absolutely no meaning. But it exists. Whatever exists, means its own existence. In that sense, every such proposition is

but I do not really. "What is written here is not a proposition" *in my mouth* does not contradict "What is written here is a proposition" *on the paper*, any more than *I am a man* spoken by one person is contradicted by *I am not a man*, spoken by another. (See Wyclif's acute remarks on this subject, pp. 240 and 241 to l. 11.)

true; true, because it is an existing thing. When we inquire if it has any truth beyond this, we are forced to reply in the negative. A proposition reflected, so to speak, back upon itself, can mean nothing but itself; and in so far as it seems to mean something else, it is false. Thus every such proposition is both true and false, though in different ways (p. 205, l. 35, 36). In the case of the tyrant and his bridge, Wyclif cuts the Gordian knot by shortly stating that such a case would never happen; and that if it did, the man should be made to pass over (no doubt because in either case the attendants would fail to do their duty, and it mattered not what they did). As for the two slaves, mentioned above, it is doubtful whether they have not fulfilled the conditions of freedom imposed by their master; and as the law is in favour of liberty (*eo quod jura faveant libertati*) they ought both to be set free (p. 208, l. 8 to p. 209, l. 24).

A little further, Wyclif explains his theory more clearly still. Let C stand for the proposition: *The meaning of C is true*. This is true in the sense that C exists. True also, in that it means something, viz., *itself*. But false, if it be taken to mean anything further (p. 216, l. 14 to p. 219, l. 5). Here it is clear that Wyclif, saying that such a proposition is unmeaning in the third sense, says what amounts to affirming that it is no proposition at all, as we understand the word nowadays. For him, the word has a far wider extension. Every *thing* is a proposition (Log. vol. I. p. 15, l. 12—22), because it signifies itself, and makes itself known; he cannot therefore refuse to call an ‘insoluble’ by that name. But what he says, stripped of the numerous intricacies and subtleties which render this part of his work very difficult to understand, comes, I think, to the same.

One word more before we conclude. It is easy to be seen, from many different answers given to this question, that at Wyclif’s time it was considered to be a very important and difficult problem; and also that Wyclif, having laboured hard, and in the main successfully, to solve it, is entitled to the just praise which he felt that he deserved. His closing words, both modest and dignified, may be quoted here.

“This matter has given me more trouble and occupied me for a longer space of time than any other part of Logic. Nor do I doubt that every one of the authors of the six above-mentioned theories has also bestowed much care on the truths which they have discovered relative

to this subject. Yet little praise should be given to such as find out these truths; for it is certain that, both on account of the intelligible nature of truth (which manifests itself to whoever seeks it) and by the motion of Him Who is the First Truth teaching us, every one finds out at last, by dint of scrutiny, certain truths of which he was formerly ignorant. Therefore may full praise be given to the Lord of Truth!"

At this point the volume now edited comes to a close. It is, so far as I have been able to calculate, about the middle of the third treatise. Of the seven sorts of hypothetical propositions, five have already been dealt with; in the next volume, local and temporal propositions are alone discussed, but at such great length that they might each be separately considered as a treatise; and indeed, according to the indications given by the catalogues, many of Wyclif's adherents seem to have considered them as such. The question *De Insolubilibus* was also copied out and studied apart.



TRACTATUS TERCIUS.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

- B 33^a Sequitur de speciebus ypoteticarum, ut prius promiseram, in isto tractatu tercio pertractandum. Et primo supponatur VII esse species ypothetice, scilicet ^{Of hypothetical propositions; they are seven in number, three with syncategorical signs:} tres cum notis coniungendi mere quodammodo sint kategoricis: ut copulativam, disiunctivam, et condicionalem; et quatuor cum notis coniungendi quodammodo sunt kategoricis: ut causalem, comparativam, localem et temporalem.
- 10 Et potest sufficiencia numeri istarum specierum sic convinci: diversitas specierum ypoteticarum capienda est secundum diversitatem modi significandi veritates diversas significabiles per easdem. Sed VII sunt species huiusmodi ypoteticarum. Maior patet ex hoc, quia ^{and conditions; and four with categorical signs: causals, comparatives, locals, and temporals.} ^{The signs alone are not sufficient to diversify them, nor the truths signified, nor the modes alone: so it must be the modes taken with those truths.}
- 15 species ypoteticarum vel sunt diversificande solum ex diversitate signorum, vel solum ex diversitate signatorum, vel solum ex diversitate modi significandi, vel mixtum. ^{There are so many, and no more; for there are only seven modes of hypothetically expressing truth.}
- Duo prima non sunt danda: ergo, relinquitur alterum posteriorum; sed non est possibile modum diversificari, ^{And these together are seven in number;}
- 20 nisi presupposita diversitate significabilis. Ergo relinquitur 4^m membrum. Et minor patet ex hoc quod omne verum primarie significabile per ypoteticam est veritas 2^m aliquam habitudinem ex veritatibus aggregata, ^{copulative, from the union of the two primordial truths: the existence of God}
- 25 vel equivalenter; sed tantum VII sunt species talium habitudinum: ergo, tantum VII sunt species ypoteticarum. Minor patet ex hoc quod, posita prima veritate (que est *deum esse*) consequitur coniunctione vel copulacione prime veritatis causate (que est *ens esse*); et istis positis, ^{number;}
- 30 sequitur non solum quod deus est, vel ens est in communi, sed quod est dare veritates disiunctas vel

1. Cap. *deest* MS. 2. *Initial S in red ink* MS. 20. dm'te sig't B.

and of caused Being; *disjunctive*, inferred from these by their difference; *causal*, as Being exists because of God's existence; which, considered together, imply a *comparative*; differentes. Et 2^m talem coniunctionem vel disiunctionem sunt copulativa et disiunctiva exemplare, significando veritates sub habitudine copulandi vel disiungendi. Ex istis veritatibus immediate sequitur quod, quia deus est, ideo ens in communi est; et quod prius naturaliter est 5 *deum esse quam ens causatum esse*; et sic, habendo habitudinem causandi et comparandi, habemus duas alias species hypothetice: scilicet, causalem et comparativam.

and *conditional*, *local and temporal*, because God has power to produce if, when and where He chooses. And all other hypothetical relations can be reduced to one of these. Quibus 4 habitis, manifestum est sequi, *deum posse 10 producere causatum si wult, quando wult, et ubi wult*; et sic habemus tres alias habitudines: scilicet condicionalem, localem et temporalem. Nec est possibile invenire aliquam habitudinem hypothetice pertinentem quin sit aliqua istarum vel ad talem reducibilis. Ideo sequitur 15 quod sub septenario convenit ponere species hypothetice. Omnis autem hypothetica est copulativa, disiunctiva, causal, comparativa, condicionalis, localis, vel temporalis. |

B 33^b

Objections.

1. Many hypothetical propositions are false; truth has, therefore, nothing to do with their classification, but form alone.

The first truth: God exists, can be expressed by all the different forms of propositions; and here clearly only the form makes them differ.

2. And the stated order of dependency between them does not exist; for the principle of identity can be expressed just as well under any other form.

Sed contra ista sic instatur: Multe sunt hypothetice 20 que significant falsitates: ergo, veritates non sunt cause hypotheticarum specierum, sed solum modi significandi; et cum alium modum significandi in specie habet signum unius speciei, et alium, signum alterius speciei, sequitur quod secundum naturam et speciem signorum 25 sunt species hypotheticarum. Confirmatur per hoc quod eadem veritas simplicissima est significabilis quacunque specie hypothetice, ut patet hic: *deus est et deus est; deus est vel deus est; quia deus est, est ita bonus sicut est; deus est si est, ubi est, et dum est*. In quibus VII 30 exemplis patet quodlibet illorum precise primarie significare illud quod significat hec categorica, *deus est*. Ex quo videtur relinquiri quod, non a significatis suis, sed a signis parcialibus, specificantur hypothetice.

Item, quo ad veritates numerales, patet quod non 35 sit ordo inter illas, ut signatus est, quia eque primo est veritas disiunctiva, condicionalis (et sic de ceteris indifferenter), sicut est veritas copulativa: ergo, non propter ordinem talium veritatum est ordo et numerus specierum hypotheticarum. Assumptum patet per hoc 40

2. ex te B. 10. mai^m B. 29. quia deus est ita B. 30. ordinem talium twice B. 32. circa causata (?) pro categorica. 40. a^m pro assumptum B.

quod prima omnium veritatum causatarum est *nichil simul esse et non esse*; et illa est necessario; vel veritas disiunctiva, et eque primo cum illa sunt ille veritates: *si aliquid est, aliquid est, aliquid est dum aliquid est*,
5 quia deus est aliquid est, aliquid potest esse ubi aliquid potest esse, deus potest esse melior creatura. Ymmo in eadem specie veritatum est dare infinitas species eque primo, ut patet de veritatibus condicionalium et causalium. Ymmo, si ponatur aliqua prima veritas, ab illa procederet veritas posterior per viam causacionis; et sic, arte imitante naturam, foret talis prima species hypothetice. Ymmo disiunctiva precederet copulativam.

Item est dare multas alias species ad modum coniunctionum copulancium kategoricas ad invicem, preter illas VII; ergo, cum ab illis sorciuntur hypothetice suas species, sequitur plures esse species hypotheticarum quam VII numeratas. Et idem videtur de hypotheticis negativis oppositis affirmativis, que videntur esse disparum specierum valde ab illis, cum regule que deserviunt ad cognoscendum veritates hypothetice affirmative non docent cognoscere veritatem negative. Et consimilis est difficultas in commixtione hypotheticarum ad invicem, ut, miscendo disiunctiva cum rationali vel aliter quomodo-cunque. Non enim videtur racio quare talis proposicio foret unius speciei quin per idem foret mixtim alterius speciei; quia prioritas vel posterioritas signi contingentis non facit ad hoc, ut post probabitur. Et ex commixtionibus VII specierum foret secundaria species simplicis mixtionis, et duarum ad invicem. | Et conformis est difficultas de qualitate et quantitate hypotheticarum.

B 34 Ad istud dicitur quod non repugnat alias species hypothetice sub istas contineri, cum iste non sunt species specialissime; sed tales VII species hypothetice sunt ponende, ad quas omnes alie habent reduci; et hoc sufficit pro intento. Nec moveret racio facta purum logicum ad inevitabiliter asserendum conclusionem; sed pocius diceret quod est ex voluntaria ordinacione, sine causa ulterius querenda, quod sunt VII species hypothetice.

And in these different kinds there are infinite kinds (as in conditional and causal propositions) which are equally primitive.

If any species of proposition were to be put first, it should be the causal species; and the disjunctive should precede the copulative.

3. Besides, there are many other species, according to the conjunctions employed; negative hypotheticals, requiring other rules to prove them, cannot be classed with their affirmatives; and hypotheticals can be combined together, forming new kinds.

Their quality and quantity give rise to like difficulties.

General answer: These seven are not particular species, and, therefore, they may contain other kinds, but they are all reducible to these.

The reason why there are seven classes

23. ²³ voli pro vel B. 28. ²⁸ pro secundaria B. 35. pur⁹ pro purum B.

23. *Racionalis* seems to mean two propositions united by the particle *ergo*; but Wyclif uses the word sometimes for causal, sometimes for conditional propositions. See p. 8, l. 38.

need not be sought; they are made arbitrarily by man, but their order is based on the nature of things.

We deny the conclusion of the first argument: i. e. that the signs alone can serve to classify propositions.

1. We must remark that the words *truth* and *falsehood* have various significations. They may mean respectively the same as *being* and *non-entity*, or more properly, falsity signifies truth negatively, having no meaning by itself. They, however, add to this meaning a relation with the tense of the verb employed:

I said the truth: i. e. *I said something that then was*.

Again, *false* is sometimes part of a modal proposition; as: *It is false that . . .* Sometimes it means the defect of correspondence between the sign and the thing signified.

Sed certum tamen est quod non est ordinatum ab homine, quod sit naturaliter exemplatum, et a ratione priori, ordinacione hominis, causatum; quia aliter non est ordinacio, sed deordinacio; nisi illud quod promulgat prius naturaliter esset naturale.

Ad primum argumentum negatur consequentia, quia quamvis prima pars conclusionis sit particularis negativa vera, alia tamen est pars exceptiva falsa, cum modi significandi signorum audibilium sunt diversi in specie a modis significandi visibilium, et visibilia diversa in specie habent naturales modos significandi diversos in specie; et totum hoc est in pertinens diversitati speciei hypothetice.

Sed pro ulteriori responsione sunt 3^a notanda, primo quod isti termini, *falsum*, et *falsitas*, sunt equivoce; sicut *verum* et *veritas*. Quandoque enim omnis entitas veritas dicitur, sicut et omne ens dicitur verum; et iste terminus, *falsitas*, contradictorie significat convertibiliter cum illo termino, *aliqua non entitas*. Et talem falsitatem credo non posse significari, cum omne significans significat entitatem, et per consequens veritatem. Et sic iste terminus, *falsitas*, significat omnem veritatem negative. Sed isti termini, *verum*, *falsum*, et *veritas*, superaddunt super ens nominaliter intellectum temporis verbi; ut: *dico vel credo veritatem*, si dico: *ens* (quod est proposicio) *significat verum vel falsum*; hoc est, *ens* quod est vel *ens* quod non est. Et tunc dixi verum vel veritatem; quia tunc dixi *ens* quod tunc fuit, et *falsum* tunc dixi vel concepi, quia *ens* quod tunc non fuit. Et ita *verum* et *veritas* sunt passiones entis, significando ens quod vere est, fuit, erit, vel potest esse. Sic autem non ille terminus *falsitas*. Unde, si credo veritatem, credo *ens* quod est; si credo *falsum*, credo *ens* quod non est.

Falsum quandoque sumitur tertio modaliter respectu dicti proposicionis quodammodo negative; ut “*hominem esse asinum*” est *falsum*, hoc est, *illud non est*. Et sic non utrobius ille terminus, *falsum*, convertitur cum illo termino, *falsitas*. 2^o capitul veritas per adequationem signi ad suum primarium significatum, et *falsitas* per 40 defectum huiusmodi correspondie. Et huiusmodi

2. extū B. 24. ips B. 35. t'cio B.

veritas vel falsitas est in signo tantum, cum sit formaliter denominans ipsum esse verum vel falsum. Et omnis talis falsitas videtur michi esse veritas, et posse significari. Sic ergo *significare falsum* est significare ens

In this sense,
false expresses
a truth, and
has meaning
by itself.

5 quod non est; ut ista: *homo est asinus*, significat quod homo est asinus, et illud non est, et ideo est

B 34^b B 34^b falsum et impossibile | quia non potest esse; sed talis

propositio: *hoc est falsum*, et cetera simplices, significant falsitatem, que est forma privativa qua signum

Some of these
are contingent,
some represent
impossibility.

10 denominatur esse formaliter sine suo primarie significato.

Et talium falsitatum aliisque sunt contingencie, aliisque impossibilitates. Falsitatem vero, acceptam primo modo,

But *falsity*
taken in the
first sense,
cannot possibly
be anything.

claudit contradiccionem esse; quia tunc esset aliqua non entitas. Nec mirum, si talis terminus significat omne

So a false
proposition
signifies what
is false, i. e.
something that
is not; but not
falsity,
except as
a privation.

15 ens et non significat non entitatem, sicut ille terminus *intelligibile* significat omne intelligibile et non significat inintelligibile. Omnis ergo propositio falsa primarie

significat falsum, quia ens quod non est, sed non falsitatem, nisi forte significando privacionem; ut talis: *hec*

20 proposicio: "deus est", est falsa.

Secundo, notandum quod omnes denominaciones positive signorum respectu suorum signatorum fuerunt principaliter capte a suis significatis. Sed communiter, apud communiter loquentes denominantur signa false

2. Signs have
been called after
their
significations;
often inexactly.

25 denominacionibus huiusmodi, dum defecerunt sua significata propter similitudinem in modo significandi signorum. Videtur [quod] signum vere denominatur universale, et

A sign is
universal, when
it stands for a
universal; it is
singular when
it signifies what
is singular;
it is a *genus*, it
expresses the
determinable
essential part of
a being;

quia est signum primarium universalis a parte rei; et dicitur singulare, quia est signum singularis. Est enim

30 signum genus, si primarie significat universale *in quid* predicabile, demis differentibus specie. Et voco pre-

it signifies the
whole essence;
a *difference*,
if it expresses
the determining
part that

dicabile, quod habet aptitudinem ut predicitur. Nec est ficticia quod universale predicatur, quia vere et

realiter, *predicari est inesse*. Ut *animal* copulative pre-

35 dicatur de quolibet suo *in quid* inferiori. Dicitur etiam signum species specialissima; quia primo significat uni-

a *species*, when
it signifies the
whole essence;
a *difference*,
if it expresses
the determining
part that

versale precise communicabile singularibus *in quid*. Et dicitur differencia, dum primarie significat universale

per se, et essencialiter predicabile in quale de specie

8. ceteri B. 23, 24. *gunt' pro* communiter B. 26. *mōdi pro* modo significandi B. 27. *Vir* (*Vī?*) B; *ib.* quod *deest* B. 32. *predi-*

catur B. 34. *ra'* pri B.

separates
different
species;
a *property*, if it
stands for a
quality always
present in a
genus or
species; and an
accident, if for
a quality that
only happens
to be present.

differentibus. Et signum vocatur proprium, quod primo significat proprietatem vel passionem generis vel speciei, qualis per se ^{2^o suo subiecto inest. Et signum dicitur accidens, dum primarie significat universale quod per accidens et non per se inest subiecto suo. Et sic iudicandum est de aliis denominacionibus. Si autem signo defuerit tale significatum, vel non vere denominatur huiusmodi, vel aliter equivoce. Alique tamen denominaciones plus capiuntur ex modo significandi, ut quiditates, quantitates et qualitates propositionis; iste tamen originantur aliquibus significatis.}

3. The
primordial
truth —
God's existence
— may be
expressed in
many different
ways, but it is
the same truth;
we may thus
know it as
God does,
simply; or in a
complex way.

We proceed by
combining and
dividing; God
knows all in
one infinite act.

Thus we do
not take the
division of
hypotheticals
from their false
significations,
nor merely
from their true
ones, but from
their joined,
disjoined, etc.
senses,
according
to the case.
We often find
that order is
unconsciously

Tercio notandum quod prima et simplicissima veritas, que est *deum esse*, significatur nunc primarie, per terminum incomplexum, nunc per qualemcumque affirmative, kathegorice vel hypothethice speciem. Sed non est diversitas in illo significato, sed in signis et in modo intendendi. Verumtamen coniunction localis, causalis, temporalis equivoce significant in exemplis propositis, supposita veritate eorum; et sic contingit cognoscere eandem veritatem, ut *deum esse*, incomplexe et non complexe, ut deus cognoscit se; et contingit cognoscere eandem veritatem in complexe, 2^m quotlibet res et modos significandi. Nichil tamen complexe quicquam cognoscit, nisi quod componit vel dividit. Ideo, quod nos non sufficimus quicquam distincte cognoscere sine discursu, vel compositione vel divisione, cognoscit prima veritas sine discursu vel actu distincto infinitum perfectius. Nos tamen nichil cognoscimus nisi ad minimum novimus illud esse.

Non ergo fuerunt species hypotheticarum exemplate 3^o 2^m sua significata falsa, nec immediate 2^m sua significata simplicia, sed 2^m sua significata, correspondenter | B 35* copulata vel disiuncta, etc. si quis ipsa cognosceret. Frequenter enim contingit quod ordinans literas, ydiomata, vel alia signa habet communem influenciam et 35 veritates alias moventes; et ipse, ignorando ipsarum voces, putat quod ipse sit primaria causa huius ordinationis. Unde instituens istas VII species movebatur forte

3. *pe pro* per se B; *ib. inc pro* inest B. 8. ¹*c^{re}s pro* equivoce B.
9. *modi pro* modo significandi B. 17. *calis calis* B. 18. *B^{ut} pro*
significant B. 22, 23. *mos^{di} pro* modos significandi B. 26. *p^{ar}avⁱs pro*
prima veritas B. 35. *coc³ pro* communem B.

tali ratione. Tales VII sunt ponende, et superfluit ponere speciem que non sit aliqua illarum; ideo ille numerus nec est superfluus, nec diminutus. Ex istis ergo tribus notatis patet responsio ad materiam primi argumenti.

5 Ad 2^m dicitur quod non est magna utilitas ad propositum numerum de ordinacione veritatum, quia certum est quod qualescunque cathegorice vel hypothetice contingit esse eque primo quo ad consequenciam cum prima veritate, eo quod sunt quotlibet huiusmodi veritates quas claudit contradiccionem non esse. Verum tamen necesse est deum esse primam veritatem. Ipse enim non est veritas universalis vel singularis, presupponens aliam inmediate, *ex illa sequitur "ens esse"*; quia veritate contradiccionem claudit esse priorem causatam vel nobis 15 noscibiliorem; illa enim veritas est transcendens cuiusque noscenti. Primo omnium nota quo ad tempus, quo ad naturam, quo ad instinctam noticiam, et quo ad facilitatem noscendi. Et sub illa noticia confuse noscuntur que discemus in posterius; et principalissime 20 sub illa cognoscimus *deum esse*. Illam enim veritatem primo omnium noscimus quo ad tempus, sed confuse quo ad causam; quia ipsa primarie movet ad eius noticiam.

Ymmo, non est possibile nobis quicquam aliud 25 cognoscere perfectissimo genere cognoscendi nobis possibili, nisi prius temporaliter specialiter cognoverimus deum esse. Quodlibet enim aliud est noscibile nobis noticia *propter quid*, que presupponit dei noticiam. Unde, quamvis *deum esse* analogice contineatur sub transcendentie, ipsum tamen non ingreditur eius compositionem quidditativam, nec presupponit sibi, sed econtra. Nam, dato primo, tunc esset genus, et per consequens predicaretur *in quid*, distingwendo subiectum ab aliis per eius inexistenciam: quod est impossibile, cum nichil 35 distingwatur ab alio per hoc quod est eius; sed per hoc certificamur de prima questione, *si est*, et non de 2^a *quid est*. Si autem detur 2^m, tunc veritate transcidente non esset veritas prior, cum tamen essencia, communis multis singularibus, est causata. Est ergo prima veritas 40 extra omne genus, cum nec sit universale nec singulare, sed omnia talia causat.

influenced by
that which is
ordered.

These seven
classes are
neither too
many nor too
few, and any
other would be
superfluous.

Answer to

Obl. 2.

It matters little
what order of
deduction we
follow; all
truths flow
equally from
the first, which
is God.
But He is not
an abstract
truth

from which the
conclusion —
the existence of
Being — flows,
by means of
another that
comes before it:

He is
transcendent
Truth; first in
time, nature,
intuitive
knowledge, and
ease of
attainment.

And we can
know no other
truth perfectly
unless by means
of this one.

All cognition of
a thing by its
cause, must
suppose God's
existence.

Thus, though
this truth is
analogically
contained in
that of
transcendent
being, the latter
does not
properly
contain or
precede, but is
implied by it.
Thus this First
Truth is not
included in any
genus, and is
neither
universal nor
singular.

5. v^{ta} *pro* utilitas B. 19. p^{ncim} B. 26. fst *pro* specialiter B.

So we have first a copulative proposition (God is, and Being is); then a disjunctive (God is or Being is). But all these truths are equally primitive *qua* conclusions, and their order has besides little to do with the present debates: therefore let it be admitted.

We may add that the truth of the principle of contradiction, negation of the impossible, is equivalent to infinite truths in existence, but not in causality.

*Answer to
Obj. 3.*

There may be more than seven species of hypotheticals, but all are reducible to these. For this reason the only adverbs used are those of time, place, and comparison; and only a few conjunctions can be employed — copulative, disjunctive, causal and conditional.

Some conjunctions are closely allied

Prius ergo videtur esse veritatem copulativam, que est: *deum esse et ens esse*; quia est *ens esse*, quia *deus est*, eo quod *illam esse causatam* presupponit *illam esse*. Et per idem, intelligendo *deum esse vel ens esse* tanquam veritatem disiunctam, patens est quod illa presupponit *ens esse* tanquam communissimum; et per consequens presupponit *deum esse et ens esse*, cum nichil possit presupponere 2^m nisi presupponat utrumque. Omnia tamen istarum specierum veritates sunt eque prime quo ad consequenciam; cum ergo disputacio ordinis istarum 10 veritatum non multum pertinet huic loco, | accipiatur, B 35^b ut sic, suppositus numerus et ordo specierum hypothetice supradictus.

Et ulterius dicitur quod veritas primi principii est negacio illius impossibilis: *idem simul est et non est*,¹⁵ que negacio non est primo nota, cum impossibile sit ipsam cognoscere, nisi per cognitionem illius aut communis, *ens est*. Distingwo enim inter *esse et non esse*, antequam assencio huic negacioni. Veritas ergo primi principii convertitur, quo ad subsistendi consequenciam, 20 cum infinitis veritatibus, quia cum omnibus necessitatibus; sed non quoad essendi predicationem; et sic sunt omnia talia eque primo natura quo ad consequenciam, sed non quo ad causalitatem.

Ad 3^m dicitur, ut prius, quod non obest plures 25 quam VII esse species hypotheticarum, dum tamen sint ad illas reducibles. Unde non cum quibuscumque adverbiosis fiunt hypotheticae, sed solum cum adverbiosis loci vel temporis, vel cum adverbiosis comparandi, ut sunt talia: *ubi, dum, donec, usque, magis*, etc. Nec cum 30 quibuscumque coniunctionibus fiunt dispariter hypotheticae correspondenter 2^m distinctionem grammaticorum; quia iste coniunctiones, *nec, neque*, sunt copulative negative 2^m logicos; et maior pars coniunctionum quas grammatici ponunt expletivas, tales habent reduci ad copulativam; et breviter omnes vere coniunctiones habent reduci ad copulativam, disiunctivam, causalem vel racionalem; que et conditionalis potest dici. Alique tamen sunt coniunctiones adverbiales, et alie ad rhetoricae

1. co^{sa} pro copulativam B. 12. susupp^{tu}s B. 17, 18. a^{cōs} pro communis B. 22. p^{co}m B. 30. mg^f pro magis B. 31. disput B.
3a. rchōc^a pro rhetoricae B.

deservientes; et aliisque mixtum significant circumstancias diversarum specierum; sicut patet advertenti exempla prioris modi. Hec ergo coniuncio, *sed*, superaddit ad copulativam excessum, excepcionem vel aliam circumstanciam; et sic habet reduci ad copulativam. Iste vero coniunctiones *vel*, *et*, *ne*, quandoque ponuntur in orationibus rhetoricis et non propositionibus, et quandoque significant circumstanciam esse; et ita omnes coniunctiones incident in aliquos modos significandi coniunctionaliter supradictos.

Tria tamen sunt dicenda pro materia argumenti. Primum de mixtionibus hypotheticis, si componant novas species; 2^m de qualitatibus earum, et 3^m de quantitatibus earum.

Quantum ad primum, patet calculanti, si non fallor, 15 quod sunt 120 combinaciones distincte in septenario.

Nam iuxta conceptum Porphyrii, sunt ex coniungacionibus quinque universalium 643 821, sic illa speciebus hypothetice sunt 21^a combinaciones binarie, comparando sexies copulativam ad VI species residuas; 5^{es} disiunctivam ad quinque residuas habentur 10; combinando eciam copulativam et disiunctivam ad quinque residuas et post 2^m alias combinaciones, trium habebunt 35 combinaciones; combinando eciam 4 ad invicem habebuntur 35; combinando autem quinque ad invicem, 25 21 habebuntur; et combinando 6 ad invicem habebuntur septem; que coniuncta septennario constituit 120.

B 36^a Sed de istis | mixtionibus tria exempla satis est adducere pro intento. Primo coniungendo condicionalem et copulativam cum rationali, ut sic: *Si tu es asinus, tu 30 es caper et tu es asinus: ergo, tu es caper.* Illa magna

2, 3. ex ps ¹ pro exempla prioris modi B. 11. p ² m pro pro mater B.
16. coniugaciones B. 19. co¹⁸ pro copulativam B. 24. ad¹⁷ pro ad-
invicem B. 26. a¹⁹ pro septem B. 30. cap²⁰ pro caper before et and
before Illa.

26. Some of the numbers here seem to be wrong; at least I cannot account for the 10, nor for the expressions used. But the total is right; thus: any 7 objects, combined two and two, give 21 combinations; three and three, they give 35; four and four, 35; five and five, 21; six and six, 7; and there remains one combination of all seven: these numbers, added together, give 120. As for Porphyry's combinations of the five universals — genus, species, difference, property, and accident — with each other, I quite fail to see how, *on the same system* (iuxta conceptum Porphyrii) they could amount to the number 643 821, though it is unmistakably plain in the MS., as the other numbers are too.

with adverbs;
some are used
in oratory;
some signify at
once several
hypothetical
circumstances.
But is an
instance of
these last.
All can be
reduced to one
or other of the
seven species.

Three heads of
enquiry: I. of
combinations of
hypotheticals;
II. of their
quality; III. of
their quantity.
I. There are
120 sorts of
compound
hypothetical
propositions,
obtained
according to
Porphyry's
method of
combining
universals.

Examples of
these
compounds:
1. If A is B,
A is C and
A is B.
It is much
employed by

sophists to prove an absurd conclusion by confounding the place of the comma:

*If A is B,
A is C and
A is B;*

therefore,

A is C.

For the first proposition is true, when *A is B* is absurd.

*2. A is B or
C is D and
A is not B.*

Here sophists take a necessary proposition,

A is B, an

absurd one,

C is D, and

changing the

place of the

comma, say:

A is B or

C is D, and

A is not B:

therefore,

C is D.

Some employ this method to show that anything can be deduced from an impossible proposition; but wrongly, for they change the consequence in arguing.

3. You are now what you would be if you were an ass; in that case you could Bray:

therefore, you can now.

Here the minor is necessary, the major too; and the whole looks like a true syllogism.

consequencia videtur tenere per illam regulam; argumentando a condicionali ad suum consequens cum constancia sui antecedentis, tenet consequencia. Et antecedens illius consequentie est necessarium cum contradiccionem claudit *te esse asinum*, nisi *sis et caper*⁵ *et asinus*. Et illa arte utuntur sophiste ad probandum quodlibet impossibile, capiendo unum quod includit contradiccionem, et inferendo ex illo copulativam, cuius prima pars est proposicio quam intendunt probare, et 2^a pars est impossibilis primo sumpta. Secundum exemplum est copulando disiunctivam et copulativam cum rationali, ut sic argumentando: *deus est, vel tu es asinus et non deus est: ergo tu es asinus*. Nam ista magna consequencia tenet a disiunctiva ad alteram eius partem, cum opposito relique partis; et antecedens¹⁰ condicionalis est una disiunctiva, cuius prima pars est necessaria. Et illa arte 2^o utuntur sophiste ad probandum quicquid voluerunt, capiendo primo unum necessarium, et disiungendo sibi unam copulativam cuius prima pars est proposicio quam ipsi intendunt probare;²⁰ et 2^a pars erit oppositum necessarium primo sumpti. Ymmo ista arte utuntur quidam volentes deducere quodlibet ex impossibili. Sequitur enim: *tu es asinus; ergo, tu es asinus, vel baculus stat in angulo et ex consequente tu es asinus vel baculus stat in angelo et tu non es asinus*. Ex quo sequitur vel tertius, quod *baculus stat in angulo*. Ideo a primo, si *tu es asinus*, tunc *baculus stat in angulo*. Quamvis autem conclusio quam intendunt sit vera, verumptamen a primo ad ultimum modus argumenti inducit in errorem, cum consequentie³⁰ intermediate sint variate, eo quod consequens medie consequentie fiat disiunctive, et consequens ultime consequentie fiat copulative; et sic contingit probare quodlibet impossibile. Tercio miscetur conditionalis cum causalib[us] copulativa et rationali: ut sic; *quicquid esses si esses asinus, illud nunc es; sed rudibilis esses si esses asinus: ergo, rudibilis nunc es*. Tota magna consequencia videtur esse syllogismus hypotheticus in *darii*; et minor est conditionalis necessaria. Et maior patet ex hoc quod nunc es et omne illud, et solum illud quo esses,⁴⁰ si esses asinus. Talibus autem modis multis miscent

5. cap^u pro caper B. 33, 34. quod hoc pro quodlibet B.

sophiste proposiciones ad probandum *hominem esse asinum*, vel aliud impossibile; ut sic; si dico te esse animal dico verum; et, si dico te esse asinum, dico verum; et cum solum dico hoc ut pono, sequitur quod tu sis asinus. Et sic miscent copulativam cum condicionali, causalí et racionali; ut si tu es idem asino et tu es animal, quia tu es homo; ergo, tu es asinus.

Many other similar compound arguments are used, now with one form of hypotheticals, now with another.

Non enim valet dicere quod tales oraciones non sunt B 36^b proposiciones, quia quelibet talis est | oracio individua, 10 congrue verum vel falsum significans; ergo proposicio. Aliter enim syllogismus non esset proposicio, et per consequens non necessarius aut verus; nec oppositum consequentis repugnaret generaliter antecedenti, eo quod nullum signum est verum vel falsum, nisi proposicio; 15 nec proposicio repugnat alicui nisi proposicioni; nec esset concedendum tale antecedens negandum, vel dubitandum, vel ponendum, cum tamen omnia illa concedimus de oracionibus mixtis. Sunt ergo proposiciones, sicut convertuntur cum proposicionibus, et habent significaciones congruas proposicionibus sine impedimento ex parte multitudinis signorum vel alio signando. Ideo concedendum est quodlibet signum, quantumlibet longum, univoce subordinatum actui complexo principali vero vel falso, esse proposicionem; et, si fuerint quantulumlibet pauca signa, signancia alicui complexe sine habitudine ad unum actum principalem, non sunt proposicio; et sic non intelligit homo pro eodem instanti distinete et principaliter nisi unum; et quotlibet alia intellexerit, hoc erit sub habitudine ad illud unum, et 30 secundarie vel confuse. Sciencie autem multe in sunt que sunt impertinentes ad invicem, nec sunt partes alicuius totalis sciencie. Ideo dicit Aristoteles ad hunc sensum quod plura scimus et tantum unum intelligimus. Possimus tamen successive elicere intellecciones super- 35 tinentes ad invicem vel alicui tercio, dum tamen credimus. Sensus enim decipiuntur de similitate actuum quo ad tempus.

Ulterius notandum quod non propter tales mixtiones habebuntur nove species hypotheticarum, cum quelibet 40 talis proposicio mixta sortitur speciem hypotheticam, 2^m quod subordinatur actui hypothetico principali; et sicut repugnat eundem habere de eadem proposicie

To reply to them, it is useless to deny that these are propositions, for they come under that definition; a whole syllogism is a proposition, though compound; it is impossible to deny their truth except by their opposite, a proposition; and we could neither deny, nor doubt, nor posit them. Their length makes no difference here; whenever there is one principal act signified, whether true or false, there is a proposition, however long; and where that fails, however short, the sentence is no proposition.

All depends on the one act of simultaneous knowledge of things interdependently.

We have, however, the knowledge of many things independently of each other. Note that these compound propositions do not form new species; for the act signified by the principal verb is one of

28. distincta B; ib. quot est pro quotlibet. 42. proposiciones B.

the seven, and
specifies them.
And if one man
understands the
principal act in
one way and
another in
another, we
have no longer
a proposition;

thus a
compound
sentence may
be either
several
propositions or
one, as it is
understood;
and if one,
either
impossible or
necessary,
according as
they are joined
in the mind.

This answers
the first
sophism. We
admit the
consequence as
a rational, and
deny the minor.

A rational
proposition
(with the sign
therefore)
amounts either
to a conditional
or a causal.

As for the
antecedent, we
then must deny
it; for it was
only admitted
as part of the
consequence,
not separately;

and as a part
of the
consequence
it should be
copulated with
but, not with
and.

It having one
sense true, we
should admit it
in that sense;
but then it
would no longer
give us the
conclusion.

There are,
therefore, many
propositions
that must be

disparates actus principales, ita repugnat eandem proposi-
cionem mixtam esse copulativam, disiunctivam, etc.
eidem homini. Si autem diversi equivocaverunt de eodem
signo, tunc vel erit oracio equivoca et non proposicio;
vel aliter de possibili erit uni proposicio vera et alteri 5
falsa; quod est michi probabilius. Ut intendendo talem
propositionem: *tu es asinus vel deus est vel aliquid est*,
stat successive intelligere illud sine habitudine ad actum
principalem; et sic intelligenti non est una proposicio,
sed forte multe; et stat post successivam et disiunctam 10
inteleccionem parcium ad invicem intelligere totum
simul sub habitudine actus copulandi principalis. Et
sic intelligenti foret copulativa impossibilis. Et stat con-
fundendo intellecciones confusas parcium ad invicem in-
telligere totum actu principali disiungendi. Et sic in- 15
telligenti signum foret disiunctiva necessaria.

Per hec patet responsio ad primam mixtionem, quod
magna consequencia est concedenda tanquam rationalis,
cum habeat unum sensum primarium verum; et minor
est neganda. Nec credo quod rationalis est nova species 20
hypothetica; quia vel coincidit cum condicionali vel
causal in sentencia; | differt tamen in multis ponere B 37^a
illam notam *Si*, et illam notam *Ergo*, ut est in con-
sequenciis hypotheticis exemplatis. Vocatur enim syllo-
gismus hypotheticus, cuius premissae sunt hypothetice. Et 25
si queratur de toto antecedente prime mixtionis, utrum
sit concedendum, dicitur quod post concessionem magne
consequencie, est ipsum negandum, eo quod concessio
veritatis primarie significare per magnam consequenciam
limitat antecedens ad sensum copulativum; et propter 30
illum sensum limitandum communiter copulantur alie
cum illa nota *sed*. Proponendo ergo antecedens per se
foret ipsum concedendum, cum habeat unum sensum
condicionalem verum; sed ex isto sensu non sequitur
conclusio. Unde multe tales propositiones sunt extra 35
obligacionem, cum aliquibus partibus concedende et
cum aliis partibus forent negande, sine hoc quod fiat
mutatio de suo primario significato; ut patet in proposito,
ubi sensus copulativus limitatur per addicionem con-
clusionis. In omni tamen bona responsione respondendum 40

ii. ad^ī pro adinvicem B. 14. ad^ī pro adinvicem B. 16. foret
signum B. 18. 9^a pro consequencia. 23, 24. 9u9^a pro consequenciis B.
36. p^{bis} pro partibus B. 37. p^{bis} pro partibus B.

est principaliter ad esse significati, et per consequens respondendum est homini et ad eius signa. Sic ergo homo principaliter dicit et intelligit primarium significatum signo et consequenter 2^{arie} illud signum. Sed 5 ille concessiones sunt equivoce, cum concedere vel negare significatum est concedere vel negare id esse; sed concedere vel negare signum est concedere vel negare quod habet primarium significatum. Minor ergo prime mixtionis est falsa; et sic totum antecedens 10 negabitur, et cessat efficacia argumenti.

Per hoc patet ad 2^{am} mixtionem quod magna consequencia est concedenda et minor est neganda, sicut et totum antecedens est negandum; et principaliter sensus secundum quem antecedens infert consequens.

15 Et tamen illud antecedens, per se propositum, foret concedendum tanquam disiunctiva necessaria. Nec est talis modus arguendi a primo ad ultimum laudabilis, nisi stante univocacione sensuum propositionum. Nec est antecedens magne consequencie verum et consequens

20 falsum; quia iuxta dicta, dum magna consequencia est concessa, statim limitatur antecedens ad sensum copulativum et impossibilem, et suum similem esset concedendum ad alium sensum. Et quia gloriantur sophiste coram vulgo habere talem appareciam, ideo debet

25 logicus caute interimere altercaciones et conclusiones sophistarum; ut si querat utrum antecedens sit verum, dicitur satis quod ipsum, cum fuit vocale prolatum, non potest esse verum nec aliqua similis; alia tamen, talis qualis ipsa fuit, est vera, et alia talis qualis ipsa

30 fuit est falsa. Ymmo, scripta tota consequencia, est antecedens impossibile: sed antecedens forte erit verum: Ideo *impossibile* est concedendum; sed non *significatum* *impossibile* est dignum concedi. Magne ergo et infructuose

35 fiunt altercaciones de veritatibus et concessionibus talium signorum; ut stat, 4^{or} bene respondencium sine obli-

gacione ad eamdem propositionem, unum concedere B 37^b illam, alium negare, tertium | dubitare illam et 4^m dicere quod non cognoscit satis illam ut respondeat ad eandem.

denied when taken in connexion, as a whole when they should be granted, if separate. To answer well, we should always reply in the sense of the questioner; but such replies are ambiguous.

As to the second sophism we likewise admit the whole as a consequence and deny the minor and the whole antecedent in the sense of the conclusion. Yet the latter may be true, taken apart; but as soon as we grant the consequence, we limit its meaning to the sense that is false.

And to cut short disputes with sophists who want to show off their acuteness, we may say that this antecedent is not true, but that another proposition in the same form is true, and yet another is false.

We, therefore, grant what is impossible, but not as meaning the impossible. But there are many useless disputes and various ways of answering in this matter.

2. homī B; ib. Sic B. 14. a^a pro antecedens B; ib. g^a pro consequens B. 18. vñō^a pro univocacione B. 19. a^a pro antecedens B.
19, 20. gn̄sm^a pro consequens B. 22. similem z|t pro similem esset B.
25. intr'inc^a pro interinere B.

Again, when we say "This thing" is Robert; it is impossible that the signification of "this thing" should be

Robert. I do not approve of such useless quibbles.

V. g. to say: You are an ass or my hand is closed. As the hand is closed at the time, this is granted. Then, opening both hands, he says: But neither of my hands is closed. Here it is clear that there is no conclusion to be drawn, since the principal act of the whole antecedent is not true at any time.

Grant the consequence, deny the antecedent, and stop the debate as useless.

In the third example deny the whole as a consequence. We have a monstrous paralogism: two conditional premises (maj. If you were an ass, whatever you are now, you then would be) and a categorical conclusion.

The conclusion should be: If you were an ass, you could bray now.

Et patet de illa proposita: *hoc est Robertus*; sed hoc esset impossibile de significato; ideo equivocaret in sensibus. Inter alias alteraciones sunt huiusmodi disputaciones de signis; et huiusmodi demonstraciones singularium michi odibiles, quia indoctuales. Conformiter dicitur ad talem syllogismum: *Tu es asinus, vel manus mea clauditur; sed nulla manus mea clauditur; ergo, tu es asinus*. Concedenda enim est consequencia, et antecedens est negandum. Et si verificetur maior pro tempore sue prolacionis, claudendo manum, more ioculancium in Natali, et pro tempore prolacionis minoris verificetur illa, aperiendo ambas manus, illud nec probat antecedens esse verum nec fuisse verum; quia pro nullo instanti foret actus principalis tocius antecedentis verus: quod tamen requireretur. Unde non sequitur: *utraque pars illius copulative fuit vera; ergo, et copulativa*. Nec oportet ambas eius partes esse simul instanter veras; quia de copulativis vocalibus est hoc impossibile. Nec est color ibi, si seorsum maior conceditur, dum manus clauditur, et alia vice minor conceditur, non clausa manu, concludere conclusionem pro tertio tempore. Satis ergo est concedere consequiam et negare antecedens, et interrumpere intendentis probare tanquam frustracione innitentes.

Ad tertium negatur magna consequencia, tanquam non habens unum sensum verum, cum maior est universalis affirmativa de condicionato subiecto et categorico predicato, et minor sit conditionalis necessaria et conclusio categorica *de inesse*. Ideo patet quod non est syllogismus, sed monstruosus paralogismus decipiens incautos. Ergo oportet in tali modo arguendi addere quod condicio sumpta sit possibilis ad concedendum conclusionem *de inesse*. Ut sic argumentando: *Quicquid es, si es episcopus, illud nunc es, existente possibili te esse episcopum; sed episcopus es, etc., ergo quod potest esse episcopus nunc es*. Vel capiendo in maiori quod *cuiusmodi tunc es* si *es episcopus nunc es*, sequitur cum paribus quod *nunc sis episcopus*. Et ex primo antecedente sequitur illa conditionalis, *rudibilis*

4. demonstracionib, pro demonstracionas B. 19. minor; maior above B.
24. frustico⁴ pro frustracione B. 27. teto pro categorico B. 35. ergo etc. ergo B. 37. te = tenet pro tunc B.

11. Natali. Christmas games are alluded to here. See English works of Wyclif, p. 206.

nunc es, si nunc es asinus. Sed pro condicionato breviter We may note
notandum quod debet dari per negacionem prepositam that the opposite
toti: sic videlicet: *Non est ita ut quicquid esses si esses* of the
asinus, illud nunc es, quod est falsum; hoc tamen est *nō* before the
5 verum, quod *aliquid non esses, si esses asinus quod tamen* whole is in one
nunc es; quia, si esses asinus, tunc *solum esses* quod sense false,
nunc es et *non solum esses* quod nunc es, cum ante- implying
cedens infert contradiccionem. Ideo, propter ambiguitatem contradiction,
10 sensus multiplicis tollendam in talibus, proponenda est and in another
negacio cum illo termino, *est ita;* et illa universalis, true.
B 38^a *Quicquid esses,* debet exponi per secundam exponentem
talem: | *nichil nunc es quod non esses si esses:* quod est
necessarium. Et tamen, intelligendo proposiciones con-
diconaliter, necessarium est quod aliquid esses quod
15 nunc non es, si esses asinus. Nec contradicunt illa, cum
contradictorium talis affirmative condicionalis dandum
est per negacionem negantem actum categoricum, qui
est priori contradictorius et actus principalis eius; et
idem iudicium est de similibus quibuscumque.
20 Alii autem distingwunt huiusmodi proposiciones ultra
hoc quod oportet. Verumtamen tota equivocatio talium
stat in hoc quod possunt sumi hypothetice condiciona-
liter, vel cathegorice de condicionato extremo. Et in
aliquibus refert quo ad veritatem, in aliis autem non
25 refert.. In aliquibus est limitacio ad sensum kathegoricum,
et in aliquibus potest proposicio sumi ad libitum con-
cipientis; ut sic, dicendo *quicquid esses si esses asinus,*
id nunc es; intelligendo illam kathegorice, ita quod
ultimo eius verbum sit verbum principale, est pro-
30 posicio vera sed contingens, cum ponit te esse. Intelli-
gendo vero extorte illum sensum, *si esses asinus, quic-
quid tunc esses illud nunc es,* necessarius est sensus,
cum actus condiconalis sit actus principalis, et pro-
posicio nullum contingens ponit. Attendendum est ergo
35 principaliter ad actus principales proposicionum in
respondendo, in dando condicionalem vel convertibile
in tali materia.
Ulterius, quo ad aliam mixtionem videtur michi, sicut As for the
omnis falsitas presupponit veritatem, ymmo omnis other sophism
40 falsitas est veritas, sic omnis dicio falsi presupponit (si dico te esse
dicere verum) it is a fact that, every falsehood
dicere veritatis. Ideo non possum dicere *te esse asinum* being truth.
nisi dixerim verum, non solum quia necessario omnis nothing false

16. *cat^{um}* pro categoricum.25, 26. *audientis* before concipientis B.

can be said without its being true; everything affirms its own existence with truth.
And even for the thing primitively signified, some are of opinion that the saying is true in itself, but that its object may be non-existent. As for the last (*a man is identical with an ass*) the consequence is false; there is only partial identity. They are both indeed identical with a third (the universal animal) but only to a certain extent.
Sophists, however, are displeased with this answer, admitting the Universals: which are, however, necessary. It is possible to touch the most difficult subjects, while dealing with trivial fallacies.

II. Of Quality in Hypotheticals. Any proposition might, I think, be called affirmative or negative; each implying the existence of God, and denying infinite other things. And since they are called affirmative or negative because of affirmation or negation, they may receive either name.

res dicit se esse, et sic deum esse verum; quia notabiliter, sic proferendo dico et intendo ens esse in communi, etsi non proferam illud verbum. Si autem restringitur dicere ad primarium significatum per proposicionem prolatam, adhuc, secundum volentes partes 5 proposicionis prolate esse proposicionem veram, dicendo quod tu es asinus, dico verum: sed maior esset ad illum sensum falsa, quia potes tu non esse.

Et sic ad ultimam mixtionem dicitur quod magna consequencia non valet. Maior est vera, quia omnis 10 homo esset idem asino, cum sit idem in genere; et sic omnis homo est idem commune quod est asinus; sed nemo est asinus. Unde non sequitur: *hoc quod est asinus est homo; ergo, asinus est homo.* Sed si res singularis incommunicabilis sit tam homo quam asinus, tunc homo 15 est asinus; quod tamen non oportet, si ydemperetur alicui 3º communi utriusque; sed sicut sunt idem tertio (quia genere), sic sunt proporcionaliter idem inter se. Et patet quod [sic], demonstrando per illum terminum, *hoc, communem.* Etenim non sequitur: *hoc est homo* 20 *et hoc est asinus, ergo, homo est asinus,* quia medium non est ultimum singulare. Scio tamen quod sophistis non placet illa responsio, quamvis tam necessarium sit universalia esse, quam necessarium est neminem esse asinum. Sic ergo in communissimis formis sophismatis 25 possunt introduci materie difficillime; | quia omnes B 38^b veritates et opinabilia sunt connexa.

Quo ad 2^m, videtur michi quod omnis proposicio, sive kategorica sive hypothetica, tam affirmativa quam negativa rationabiliter dici potest; quelibet enim talis 30 implicat satis formaliter deum esse et infinitas alias negaciones. Cum ergo hinc dicitur proposicio affirmativa, quia subordinatur actui affirmandi, et negativa, quia subordinatur actui negandi; sequitur quilibet talen esse tam affirmativam quam negativam. Non 35 tamen dicitur proposicio hypothetica una, universalis, particularis (et sic de aliis denominacionibus), propter significacionem 2^{ariam}, etsi fuerit affirmativa; quia affirmare et negare sunt impertinencia ad esse affirmati et negati; et ad multitudinem vel proprietatem significantis. 40

5. pp^{sts} pro partes B. 9. ul^{am} pro ultimam B. 12. cone pro commune B. 17. alicuius B. 19. sic deest B. 31. alia B. 40. fig^{re} pro significantis B.

Sed veritas propositionis requirit esse significati; et alie proprietates sequentes requirunt certas condiciones signorum esse, preter significantes propter quos condiciones sunt huiusmodi. Logicus tamen, distingwens 5 actum affirmandi et actum negandi ex opposito, et correspondenter ad propositionem affirmativam et propositionem negativam, vocat actum affirmandi actum complexum, per quem principaliter veritas affirmandi est. Talem autem philosophi vocant actum componendi, 10 et propositionem illi subordinatam vocant propositionem affirmativam. Actum vero negativum vocant actum complexum per quem principaliter veritas est negata. Et talis dicitur actus dividendi. Propositionem vero illi actui subordinatam vocant propositionem negativam. 15 Unde significata primaria talium propositionum vocat Aristoteles nominibus actuum, affirmaciones et negaciones.

Sic ergo, loquendo de propositionibus affirmativis et negativis, sunt 3^s modi dicendi, quorum primus solum 20 attendit ad signa, 2^s solum ad significata, et 3^{us} mixtim. Primi dicunt quod hec proposicio, *homo est*, significando primarie quod *nulla chimera est*, est affirmativa, et hec: *nichil est*, significando primarie *deum esse*, est negativa. Ista tamen responsio est nimis vocalis, cum 25 nullum tale signum de se habeat quod sit affirmativum et negativum, sed a significato vel modo significandi.

Ideo dicit 2^a quod ista: *ita est quod nulla chimera est*, est negativa, et hec est affirmativa, *non est ita quod deus non est*. Prima enim primarie significat illam 30 negacionem: *nullam chimeram esse*, et cum idem sit *illam negacionem esse ens*, et illa negacio. Et per idem diceret hanc esse negativam *deus est nemo*, vel *non homo*, cum primarie significat *neminem esse deum*, et sic primarie significat negacionem, et per idem quelibet hypothetica foret sic affirmativa, cum quelibet significat primarie veritatem. Et sic nulla esset negativa composta. Cum enim ens et veritas convertuntur, et quelibet proposicio primarie significat ens, et per consequens 35 *ens esse*, quelibet proposicio primarie significat veritatem esse.

Yet a hypothetical proposition is not called universal or particular, etc. because its being depends merely on the nexus and not on the secondary signification, even when affirmative. Logicians, opposing the affirmative and negative acts to one another, call affirmation the whole act by which truth is chiefly affirmed, but philosophers call these the acts of combining and dividing.

On this point, there are three opinions.

One maintains that a proposition is affirmative according to the form of expression alone; but the form must depend on the signification.

The second takes the meaning alone, and would say that: It is true that *No chimera exists*, is negative, and that *God is not non existent* is affirmative. It would follow that no hypothetical proposition could be negative, since they all primarily mean what is true.

3. *fig^{as} pro significantes B.* 24. *necessaria B.* 25. *qst pro quod sit B.* 36, 37. *op^{ti} pro composita B.*

The third opinion (to which I adhere) asserts that the mode of signifying of the principal verbs must be particularly attended to. For the same sense may be rendered under different forms, affirmative or negative, and this causes a difference in the propositions. So there may be a great number of hypotheticals, signifying the same primary object without any difference.

And every negative is convertible with an affirmative as to its fundamental meaning. Thus: the affirmative affirms truth — negative or affirmative or impossible; in like manner every negative denies truth.

There are three opinions as regards the different quality of hypotheticals.

i. They are affirmative only when both propositions together with the *nexus* are affirmatives; negative only when both, with the *nexus* are denied.

So some would be neither negative nor affirmative: as, *A is not B,* and *C is D.*

Tercio autem dicitur quod maxime attendendum est ad modos significandi verborum principalium pro qualitatibus propositionum iudicandis, quamvis primarie ceperunt propositiones tales denominaciones ab affirmacionibus et negacionibus significatis. Sicut ergo actus 5 componendi, *deum esse*, est complexus, et actus apprehendendi essenciam divinam est incomplexus, quamvis idem sit obiectum et eadem potentia, sic actus componendi, *deum esse*, est affirmativus, et actus dividendi: *non esse ita quod deus non est*, est negativus, et tamen 10 utrique actui eadem veritas correspondet; sed talibus equipollentibus, ubi est unicum verbum, ut *non nullus homo currit*, differenter contingit actus affirmativos correspondere. Et contingit illis correspondere actus negativos geminatos; et sic de conformibus terminis 15 contingit habere propositiones cathegoricas vel hypotheticas ad placitum, sine distincione obiecti principalius apprehensi. Ut in istis: *sic est quod si tu es, aliquid est*, etc. *si tu es aliquid est*. Modicum enim variantur termini, et utrobique idem est significatum 20 primarium. Unde, sicut quelibet hypothetica est convertibilis cum cathegorica et econtra, sic quelibet negativa est convertibilis cum affirmativa, quo ad essendi consequenciam. Unde vere dictum est quod per actum affirmandi veritas affirmatur, sive illa veritas sit 25 negatio, sive affirmacio, sive non possit esse. Et per negativam veritas negatur, sive possit esse, sive non; veritas enim est communis ad omne significatum propositionis cathegorice vel hypothetice. Et affirmacio similiter, ut videtur; et isti vie ego innitor. 30

Quo ad qualitates hypotheticas, sunt tres modi dicendi. Primi dicunt quod de qualibet specie hypothetica alia sit affirmativa et alia negativa. Affirmativa, quando utrumque coniunctorum et nota coniungendi affirmatur; et negativa, quando utrumque coniunctorum et nota coniungendi negatur. Et sic aliqua est hypothetica que neque est affirmativa neque negativa. Ut talis: *tu non curris, et ego corro*.

Sed 2º dicitur quamlibet hypotheticam cuius actus coniungendi, qui est actus eius principalis, affirmatur, 40 esse affirmativam, et solum talem; ut sunt tales: *tu es,*

et asinus non est; si deus non est, tunc ipse est; tu non es vel deus non es. Sed proposiciones hypotheticas istis contradictorias, in quibus actus principales coniungendi negantur, vocant hypotheticas negativas, ut sunt tales; *5 non est ita quod tu es et quod asinus non est; non, si tu es asinus, tu non es homo.* Et sic, ut dicunt, hypotheticae sunt quodammodo equivoce affirmative et negative cum kathegoricis.

2. The notion of affirmation or negation comes from the *nexus* alone, denied or affirmed; and hypothetical and categorical propositions are thus somewhat on the same line.

Sed 3^a via dicit quamlibet copulativam, disiunctivam, vel condicionalem de partibus independencium significantium esse et qualem et quantam, more kathegoriarum, secundum qualitates et quantitates primarum parcium; ut hec est universalis affirmativa: *omnis homo currit ubi vel quando vel quia deus wult sic esse.* Et 15 sic de istis: *omnis homo est maior quam est milium, omnis homo est substancia et illa non est asinus vel illa non est asinus.* 4 enim note coniungendi sunt cathegorice; et alie, propter dependenciam sensus relativi, sorciuntur qualitates et quantitates primarum parcium; sed non 20 conditionalis. Videtur tamen michi probabile quod solum 4 species hypotheticarum supradictarum sunt quales 2^m qualitatem prime partis, ita quod talis hypothetica non sit qualis, sic: *Sor non est qui est albus.* Nec est de ratione hypothetice quod ambe partes sint per se signifcantes sine habitudine ad invicem, nec negatur uterque 25 actus in tali: *Sor | non est qui est albus,* cum iste sit eius intellectus: *Sor non est et ille Sor qui non est, est albus.* Verumtamen hec est negativa, *Sor non est ille qui est albus.* Hec autem est amphigorica, *Sor non est 30 qui est albus;* ex hoc quod potest habere sensus prioris propositionis, vel relativum inmediate referri ad subiectum. Et tunc convertitur cum copulativa impossibili.

3. All follow the quality and quantity of the first of their parts; for in four cases they are merely connected categoricals, and in the others the relative member follows the quality etc. of the other.

B 39^b que actus in tali: *Sor | non est qui est albus,* cum iste sit eius intellectus: *Sor non est et ille Sor qui non est, est albus.* Verumtamen hec est negativa, *Sor non est ille qui est albus.* Hec autem est amphigorica, *Sor non est 30 qui est albus;* ex hoc quod potest habere sensus prioris propositionis, vel relativum inmediate referri ad subiectum. Et tunc convertitur cum copulativa impossibili.

But I think that only the four first species really do so; for we find propositions which cannot be called either affirmative or negative, unless by changing the form into another less ambiguous.

Quo ad contradiccciones hypotheticarum, notandum quod istis quatuor speciebus que sunt quales more 35 kathegoriarum, sunt contradictoria, et cetere significande proprietates, sicut kathegoricis; sed cuilibet copulative, disiunctive vel conditionali contradicit cathegorica negativa; ut isti: *Si tu es homo, tu es animal* contradicit ista *non est ita quod, si tu es homo, tu es 40 animal.* Omnim enim contradictiorum actus principales sunt contradictorii; et vocantur contradictorii,

These four have contradictories, and the other properties of categoricals; but they are contradicted by a categorical: It is not true that . . .

11. nec . . . nec pro et . . . et B. 15. milīm A. 25. adm A.

Many propositions are equivalent to contradictrories without being so formally; and the rules of contradictrories based on the contraposition of *being* or *non-being*, are the same for all.

actus affirmandi et negandi primarie de eodem. Et patet quod multe proposiciones equivalent contradictoriis que non contradicunt; quia solum tales et omnes tales que habent actus principales contradictrios contradicunt. Disiunctiva ergo facta oppositis parcium copulative, repugnat eidem quodammodo contradictorie, equivalenter ad contradiccionem. Cum ergo omnium oppositorum eadem sit disiunctiva, patet quod regule que deserviunt ad noscendum veritatem vel falsitatem qualiscunque hypothetice, deserviunt directe vel in directe ad noscendum veritatem aut falsitatem sui oppositi; et tanta de qualibet hypotheticarum.

III. Of Quantity in these propositions.

I think that the three first kinds of hypotheticals have properly no quantity; but that the others (comparatives, locals, and temporals) have it by reason of their first members. A sophist would say: All these propositions when written, having length, have *quantity*, and quantity is a quality.

But logicians means quantity as concerns universality, etc.

The same reason would give every proposition many qualities, that are quite foreign to our intent.

Can a long speech be one proposition? Probably there is a maximum of possible length. The whole world is a proposition, and so is any artificial disposition of things, however considerable.

Quo ad tertium, dicendum de quantitatibus hypotheticarum, videtur michi probabile quod nulla trium priorum hypotheticarum sit alicuius quantitatis, quamvis qualiscumque quantitatis sit kathegorica de tali hypothetico extremo. Quatuor autem alie species possunt dici quante a primis partibus, sicut prius dicte sunt 2^m partes illas esse quales. Nota tamen quod sophista concederet omnem hypotheticam, sicut et kathegoricam, esse tam qualem quam quantam; ut *longa* hypothetica, in hoc quod longa, est *quanta*. Et in hoc quod est quantitate denominata, est qualis. Illud tamen dictum procedit ab equivoco, cum logicus non attendit ad quantum molis vel duracionis proposicionis logice, sed ad universalitatem, particularitatem, indefinitatem vel singularitatem. Unde indefinitam kathegoricam contingit esse hypotheticam scriptam, et cathegoricam contingit esse hypotheticam, tempore longiore, et utramque pulcrum, acutam aut aliter qualitatam; sed hoc est impertinens intentioni logice, restringentis qualitatem ad eius affirmacionem vel negacionem superius expositas.

Et hic communiter dubitatur quam longa oracio possit esse proposicio; et videtur michi probabile quod est dare maximum tale: quod sic esse proponam. Sicut totus mundus rationaliter potest dici proposicio, sic quantumlibet magnum artificiale secundum formam artis dispositivam potest esse proposicio. Nec requiritur intelligere omnes partes proposicionis simul, sicut patet de propositione vocali futura, sed successive, unam post reliquam. Superfluus tamen et in debitus esset grandis liber iste super quem non scriberetur nisi negativa

13. dum *pro* dicendum 11. 35. sit *pro* sic B. 38. possit B.

propositio; sicut indebet loqueretur qui, intendendo dicere quod *Sor scribit*, narraret totam genealogiam eius usque ad primum hominem. Est ergo in talibus dare maximum 2^m mensuram debitam proporcionatum, quod 5 constitueret propositionem artificialiem cum proporcionata concepcione. Nam contingit intelligere brevem oracionem sine habitudine proporcionali; sicut communiter intendunt truffantes cum pueris, proponendo illis claudendo manus talem disiunctivam: *Tu es asinus*, 10 *vel mea manus clauditur*, qua concessa, utramque manum aperiendo, proponunt illam negativam: *nulla mea manus clauditur*; que etiam est concedenda; tunc concludit conclusionem. Sed tota oracio precedens non intelligitur sub habitudine unius propositionis; vel si sic, ipsa est 15 neganda.

Aliam autem evasionem habent sophiste, concedendo quod *totum est sue partes*; et sic dicunt copulativam esse universalem et particularem, affirmativam et negativam; et tamen nec est universalis nec affirmativa, 20 sed est ille partes. Sed illud non placet michi, tum quia fundamentum est falsam, tum etiam quia quelibet ypotetica habet notam coniungentem, que neutrius categorice est pars. Ideo ypotetica non est ille categorice, sicut nec quique sunt 4.

25 Sed 3º obicitur evidencius quod quatuor species, que dicte sunt esse quales et quante, sunt categorice et non ypotetice. Aliter enim non esset hec categorica: *A est, significat sicut est, est maior Platone*, et sic de similibus. Sed quo ad illud videtur michi quod sicut 30 affectus numero septenario reducit omnes species ypothetice ad VII, sic affectus numero ternario reducit omnes illas 3^s ad 3^a. Sicut enim ad omnem punctum intrinsecum mundi circumstant solum 6 puncta ipsum tangencia secundum tres differencias posicionis (propter 35 quod numerus septenarius dictus est numerus universitatis), sic omnem veritatem kategoricam circumstant 6 veritates ypotetice, que cum illa constituunt veritatem copulativam. Sic enim completa est quelibet

But as superfluity destroys this art, there must be a maximum of length, beyond which no proposition can go, and with which it is grasped in one corresponding conception. A very short group may be deficient in this last quality; v. g. the fallacy of opening and closing the hand.

Sophists say: A whole is its parts: so a copulative will be universal, particular, affirmative and negative at once, like its parts.

But the principle is false, and besides, the *nexus* is an element which exists in neither of the component categoricals.

Another objection: These four kinds said to have quantity, are in reality categorical; if not, many propositions accounted as categorical would be so no longer. But I think that he who likes 3 reduces all to 3, and he who likes 7 reduces all to 7. Every

13. pcc^m B. 14. sⁱe B; ib. ipsum B. 15. negandum B. 27. 1st B.
23. 24. kate^m B. 24. fint B. 28. A enim (?) pro A est B. 32. 3^s ad
3 B. 38. co^m B.

32. *Ad omnem*. We shall find a good deal more of this, in Wyclif's theory of the Extended, later in the work.

point in the world is surrounded by 6, and 7 is the number of the universe. And as every reality can be reduced to three elements, all hypotheticals can be reduced to three; for causals, comparatives, locals and temporals are directly reducible to copulatives. Examples.

Thus all belong to one of these three classes: but it comes to the same for we then have 5 sorts of copulatives. And it does not follow that they are categoricals on that account.

essencia, sive corporea, sive incorporea in natura absoluta, que est communis tribus suppositis; et omnibus illis insunt proprietates, et communiter accidentia et oppositiones. Et sicut non est dare realitatem que non sit reducibilis ad aliquod trium suppositorum,⁵ sic non est dare hypotheticam quin sit reducibilis ad copulativam, disiunctivam vel condicionalem, cum omnis causalis, comparativa, localis, vel temporalis, directe reducitur ad copulativam: ut idem est *te esse animal quia tu es homo*, et *te esse animal, et causam eius esse quia tu es homo*. Et idem est *A significare sicud B significat*, et: *A significare unum ens et B significare illud idem*. Verum tamen ille terminus, *sicut*, quandoque dicit similitudinem in modo significandi et quandoque ydemptitatem significati; et idem est dicere *tu es ubi vel quando Sor est* et dicere *quod tu es in aliquo loco | vel tempore et ibi vel tunc B 40^b Sor est*. Et sic posset quamlibet talem dici esse copulativam. Nec est possibile aliquam esse hypotheticam que non sit aliqua istarum trium specierum. Verum tamen eadem est sententia utroque; quia reducendo illas 4 ad copulativam, habentur quinque species copulative. Nec sequitur, si sunt quales et quante, quod sint kategorice. Et sic primum exemplorum propositorum est hypothetica, et secundum est proposicio kategorica. Et tanta de hypotheticis sint dicta hic, quo ad suas essencias et accidentales proprietates in genere.

5. *suppr^p* B. 14, 15. *mō^{at}* B.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Sequitur de copulativis pertractandum; supponendo primo, quod omnis hypothetica subordinata principaliter actui hypothetico copulandi sit copulativa; et solum talis. Ex quo patet quod ex quibuscumque kathegoricis contingit copulativam componi; et quelibet copulativa, loquendo universaliter, tunc est vera, quando primarie verum significat. Et specialiter discernitur ex hoc esse vera, quando ambe partes principales sunt vere. Nota tamen quod propositionem equivocam copulativam stat esse necessariam, et ambas eius partes impossibilis; ut patet te ista: *non est ita quod deus est et tu es asinus*. Potest enim hec intelligi kathegorice, ita quod negacio cadat super actum principalem copulandi,¹ et consequenter super utrumque actum partis; et sic est kathegorica negativa et necessaria, contradictoria copulative. Vel potest intelligi copulative, ita quod negacio cadat super primum actum solum; et talis sensus est impossibilis: conceditur tamen propter sensum verum.
Nec ex hoc sequitur quod *tu es asinus*, quia antecedens non infert te esse asinum, nisi ad sensum copulativum. Hic tamen dicitur communiter quod oportet addere talem coniunctionem *quod*, ad hoc quod negacio neget utrumque actum; ut sic: *non est ita quod*, negacio cadat super actum copulandi principalem, et communiter super utrumque actum partis; et sic est categorica negativa et necessaria, contradictoria copulative, quod *tu es asinus* et quod *deus est*; tunc enim est limitatus sensus kathegoricus, de copulato predicato. Ista enim: *homo est, et deus hoc scit*, significando primarie [per hoc] quod *chimera est*, non est copulativa, sicut nec proposicio mixta ex

Of copulatives. We assume that every hypothetical of this class is subordinate to the mental act of combining. A copulative, true whenever it primarily signifies truth, is so when both its parts are true; but its negation, equivocally copulative, may be true and both its parts false;

unless the preceding negation falls on the first part alone.

To avoid ambiguity, it is recommended to add *that*; as: *It is not true that A is B and that C is D.* This is a necessary categorical, proposition.

Signs and sense must correspond, or the proposition is not truly

1, 2. Cap. and Initial S desunt B. 7. v^r pro universaliter B.
16. ne^o B. 27. after copulative B: vel potest intelligi copulative, ita quod negacio cadat super primum actum solum et talis est impossibilis, conceditur tamen propter sensum verum, etc. 30. per hoc deest B.

copulative,
as happens in
many cases.

copulativa et alia hypothetica, cuius actus principalis non est actus copulandi, nec proposicio simplex significans primarie eandem veritatem quam copulativa significat; quia ad esse copulative requiritur correspondencia signorum et sensuum. 5

The negative
might very
well apply to
both verbs of
the connected
members; but
it is better to
add that, as
above.

Certum tamen est quod satis debite potest negacio negare utrumque verbum in talibus, quamvis propter evitaciones sophisticas excludendas, expressius sit ponere illum terminum, *quod*, respectu ambarum parcum; tunc non est copulativa, sed kathegorica negativa de copulato predicato. Nec obest proposicionem esse hypotheticam, cum hoc quod 2^a pars dependenter significat ad aliam, quia sic est de copulativis quarum parcum posteriorum extrema referuntur ad extrema | propositionum priorum; ut hic, *Sor currit et ille movetur*. B 41^a 15

As a rule, the
relative in such
a proposition
refers to the
whole preceding
proposition.

Unde regulariter in talibus refert relativum suum antecedens sub habitudine ad totam significacionem prioris propositionis: ut idem est dicere: *omnis homo est Sor, et idem est masculus*, ac si diceretur *ille Sor qui est omnis homo est masculus*; et sic de similibus quibus- 20 cunque. Nec dubium attendenti ad experientiam quin tali propositioni correspondat actus hypotheticus copulandi; sed isti oracioni, *ita est quod Sor currit et movetur*, correspondet actus categoricus, cum tota veritas copulativa intelligitur, ut una de qua componitur, quod 25 illa est. Et si queratur cuius quantitatis sunt huiusmodi categorice, dicitur quod sunt multe, cum ille terminus, *ita*, demonstrat veritatem communem convertibiliter cum ente. Idem enim est dicere: *Ita est quod ego non sum, et dicere: ens est me non esse.* 30

Sometimes,
when the sense
of the second
member is
included in
that of the first,
the proposition
is copulative
only in form;
sum, and dicere: *ens est me non esse.*

A is B. Sed ille terminus, *ita*, in propositionibus copulativis accipitur communiter demonstrative, ut: *ita est sicut ego dico*, cuius unus intellectus est talis: *illud ens est, quod ego dico*. Tales enim oraciones sunt equivoce, et 35 ideo respondendo ad illas sufficit sensus primarii comprehendens. Et ita illa est concedenda, *tu es, vel deus est, et tu non es*, cum sensus disiunctus est verus. Nec prioritas vocem impedit, quin contingit illam intelligere copulative; quia, ut prius dictum est, in mixtionibus intelliguntur huiusmodi antecedencia copulative. Et in 40 talibus mixtionibus ex copulativa et condicionali, nota

A is B. The term *ita* is generally understood as demonstrative; but such propositions as employ it thus are equivocal.

It does not matter in compound hypotheticals which of the hypothetical signs comes first;

25. int^r B. 33. int^b B.

contradiccionis communiter facit ipsa esse condicionalia, ut hic: *tu es homo et tu es asinus si tu es asinus;* et sic est in rationalibus, ubi argumentatur a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem communiter in syllogismis hypotheticis, ubi possunt indifferenter specificari a nota priori et a nota posteriori. Nec curo sive negata fuerit talis proposicio, sive concessa in sensibus equivoxis. Ego tamen elegi concedere illas, supposito uno sensu vero. Et, si argumentans probare voluerit sensum alium, licet, et satis convenientiam quod arguatur ad sensum illam.

Unde probabiliter potest ista dubitari: *non est ita quod deus est vel rex sedet;* cum, intelligendo illam hypothetice disiunctive, est eque dubitabilis sicut 2^a pars.

15 Sed intelligendo illam kathegorice negative, contradiceret disiunctive ponenti principaliter veritatem disiunctivam. Et si queratur quare proposicio convertibilis cum contradictorio alterius non eque contradicit sibi sicut suum convertibile, dicitur quod in propositionibus convertibilibus est dare gradus. Unde solum in convertibili, quorum utrumque ponit explicite omnem veritatem quam reliquum, intelligitur quod, si proposicio contradicit uni talium, contradicit utriusque. Constat autem quod multe sunt propositiones convertibles, tam 2^m predicacionem quam 2^m consequiam, quarum una ponit explicite veritatem quam 2^a non sic ponit; ut patet de istis: *homo est risibile;* *3 duplum est, duplique dimidium est,* etc. Proposicio autem nichil significat explicite, nisi quod ipsa vel aliqua eius pars significat primarie; ut patet de istis, *Sor est et Plato est, et ita est quod Sor est et Plato est.*

B 41^b Sicut enim idem est *homo* | et *humanitas* et *esse hominem*, quamvis significatur nunc collective, nunc abstractive et nunc complexe; sic eadem veritas significatur, nunc kathegorice, nunc hypothetice; et nunc complexe, nunc incomplexe. Et hinc videtur quod quelibet proposicio, cum ponit veritatem quam primo significat et asserit, quod sit affirmativa; sicut et videtur quemlibet actum complexum esse actum componendi et copulandi. Diversitates enim talium actuum propter defec-

v. g. when we have *A is B* and *C is D* if *E is F*, it is usually considered as a conditional.

And if such a proposition is equivocal, it matters little whether it be granted or denied; but I prefer the former.

A negative proposition, contradicting a disjunctive, may have two different meanings, either denying the propositions as separate, or denying their disjunction. But how is it that each of the disjuncts, convertible with the contradictory of the other, is not that contradictory? Because propositions may be convertible either without adding any explicit meaning on either side, or adding such meaning.

The very same truth may be expressed in different manners, and these different manners add a shade of meaning.

Every act that posits a truth is that of affirming; we do not conceive a positive proposition under a negative

10. licet B. 27. ut₃ pro ut patet B. 30. ut₃ pro ut patet B.

33. ⁹g^{tive} = compleutive? B. 39. quelibet A.



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form in the same way as when its form was positive. Yet they may be both convertible with the same proposition.

This shows the truth of the rules, arguing v. g. from the whole copulative to one of its terms, and not conversely.

We must now examine those sophisms which concern pronouns.

Some express identity, others difference, the latter connoting it in different ways, and the former referring to universal or personal identity.

Logicians do not agree whether or no the pronoun stands for its antecedent as affirmed by a preceding verb.

If not, we could not know that a man had committed a theft without knowing who that man was: which is evidently false.

tum nominum facilius possunt concipi quam explicari; ut nullus dubitat quin alium modum concipiendi habet de tali, *ita est quod non est ita quod deus est et chimera est*, et alium de tali: *non est ita quod deus est et chimera est*. Et tamen significata primaria convertuntur, 5 prima existente affirmativa et alia negativa; et tamen utraque illarum convertitur cum ista disiunctiva, *deus non est vel chimera non est*. Et tamen illa non contradicit copulative, quamvis equivalenter opponitur; quia contradiccio debet esse prima et maxima opposicio, 10 cuius non est medium. Ex ipsis patent regule de modis argumentandi a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem, et non e contra, nisi forte fuerit pars convertibilis vel antecedens ad reliquam. Et sic de aliis regulis veritatum in illa materia. 15

Istis premissis, restat videre materiam sophisticam contingentem in terminis grammaticae relatis, explicatam communiter intra copulativas. Sunt ergo talium relativorum aliqui termini relativi ydemptitatis; ut *ille*, *ipse*, *qui*, *is*, etc. Alii autem sunt termini relativi diversitatis; ut *aliter*, *alius* et *alter* et *cetera*. Et differunt isti termini 2^m connotacionem; ut alii connotant disparitatem essentie; ut *aliud*; alii connotant disparitatem qualitatis; ut *alter*; et alii indifferenter cuiuscunque accidentis; ut *aliter*. Et relativia ydemptitatis quandoque 25 referunt sua antecedencia simpliciter pro communi, et quandoque referunt relatione personali; sicut aliqui sunt termini interrogativi pro personis; ut *quis?* et alii interrogant pro essentiis; ut *quid?* Et sic de multis famosis apud grammaticos. 30

Est tamen una regula grammaticae in qua dissident logici; scilicet, quod omne relativum refert suum antecedens sub habitudine alicuius actus verbi sui antecedentis; sic omne tale relativum limitacius se habet quam suum antecedens; ut idem est dicere quod *Sor 35 est animal et illud est asinus*, ac si diceretur quod *illud animal quod est Sor est asinus*. Et patet ista significacio ex modo loquendi. Nam nemo dubitat quin sit possibile unum abstulisse furtive bona, vel talem actum particularem fecisse, cum hoc quod ignoret *quis* fuit 40 ille. Ipsi tamen qui dicunt omne relativum convertit

18. *git' co***; intra deest B.* 34. *scilicet pro se habet B.*

cum suo antecedente, concedunt quod si sciunt quod aliqua res fecit aliquem actum bonum vel malum, tunc non ignorant que fuit illa; quia quamcunque rem sciunt fuisse, sciunt fuisse illam, cum omnem talem sciunt 5 fuisse rem, nec ignorant fuisse rem. Sed ista est satis patens pompa sophistica, qua dicitur quod *ego disiuncte scio quis fuit ille* qui commisit illud furtum, vel quodcunque factum occultum. Et ideo ostensio talium occultorum non est digna nisi premio sophistico.

10 Querendo ergo a tali sophista *quis fuit ille* qui fecit talem turpititudinem, diceret quod *ego et quilibet homo*

B 42^a *mundi est ille*: | ideo, cum accusabit se de quoquaque furto, significabit se suspendi; vel promittendo sibi quantamcunque rem pro revelatione sua vel labore 15 quoquaque, dando sibi quocunque bonum vel malum, habet ipse contentari; quia promittebatur sibi aliquid, et illud datum est sibi. Omnia ergo ista sunt ignoranciam grammaticam sine fructu altercaciones bombarie.

20 Sed pro ista opinione arguitur. Si enim quelibet intencio correspondens tali relativo fuerit inferior intentione sui antecedentis, tunc inter quascunque intentiones duas, ordinatas 2^m superius et inferius, contingeret esse intencionem. Et sic communitas termini 25 consisteret vere in latitudine, et per consequens esset processus in infinitum, tam ascendendo quam descendendo in generibus et speciebus cuiuscunque predicati; et per consequens periret omnis demonstracio vel scientia, cum nulla foret species specialissima nec ordo 30 universalium. Deduccio patet ex hoc quod, capto quoquaque termino quantumcunque remisse communi, contingit ipsum antecedere ad relativum minus commune illo; et sic inter terminos communes, secundum minimum suorum significatorum esset dare terminos medios, ut 35 inter terminum communem ad 3 et terminum communem ad 4.

Similiter, posito quod non sint homines currentes nisi isti duo, Sor et Plato; et dicat tertio utroque horum audiente, quod *aliquis homo currit*, et adiungat Sor: *Sor 40 non est ille*, et asserat Plato cum illis quod *Plato non*

And to say
that it is known
disjunctively is
a mere verbal
quibble.

A sophist
would say: "It
is either I
or another
man;"
perhaps
himself, and he
should be
hanged for it;
or his reward
should be
the promise of
something
disjunctively;
i. e. of
anything —
good or bad.

Arguments *pro*.
1. Suppose that
the prounoun is
less universal
than its
antecedent;
this implies an
infinite
multitude of
prounouns
between the
former and the
latter, all
varying in
universality,
and each of
them
antecedents of
the foregoing
one; which
would be the
ruin of all
science.

2. If only two
men, A and B
were running,
each of them
denying that it
was *he*,
supposing that

3. sunt *pro* fuit F.

6. *ds** *pro* disiuncte B.

18, 19. *bore* B.

23. *sri'g* *pro* superius B.

32. *cone* B.

both of them *est ille*; tunc videtur quod si terminus relativus sit spoke the truth inferior ad suum antecedens (ut pono quod *aliquis* and that *he was* less general homo currit et *Sor non est ille*, nec *Plato est ille*; quia than its antecedent, quilibet illorum trium dicit verum; vel, si uterque somebody would still run; currencium dicit falsum, quia dicit quod *Sor non est* 5 for there can be ille qui currit vel *Plato non est ille qui currit* etc.) assigned no reason for believing either that they both lied, or that one was to be believed rather than the other. sequitur cum veris quod *chimera non est animal* et tu vides illud; *aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille*, et *aliquis homo currit, qui non est Sor*: quod est contra grammaticam. Nec dicetur racio quare *Sor* dicit verum 10 in casu cum Ciceronis dicto, quin per idem *Plato* diceret verum cum eodem.

3. Argument *ad hominem*.

If there are universals *ex parte rei*, every pronoun would simply stand for its antecedent. The universal *he* would be a thief and a king at the same time, since it stands for the universal, *Man*. And knowing the universal, *Somebody*, we should know disjunctively who committed any secret action.

Answers. 1. We must note that any mental proposition means either its signs or the things signified; when we know a language we generally mean both, the former subordinate to the latter; and the acts of the mind are called propositions, even when the objects for which they stand have no existence.

Similiter iuxta sepe dicta, est dare universalia ex parte rei, que sunt singula suorum inferiorum. Ex quo sequitur relativum converti simpliciter cum suo ante- 15 cedente, et omnes conclusiones reputare false forent concedende; ut concedendum est quod *aliquis homo est turpissimus et indignissimus latro*, et rex esset ille; quia homo communis est omnis homo. Et sic *aliquis facit peccando maximam materiam in mundo*, et deus 20 est ille. Et sic, si quis fecit quantumcunque occultum factum, tu scis disiuncte quis fuit ille, quia disiuncte scis quod *Sor vel quecumque alia persona fuit ille*, in sciendo quod fuit *aliquis*. Et sic non fieret sola vel differencia inter ista; *omnis homo est animal quod est* 25 *racionale*, et *omnis homo est animal et illud est racionale*. Et sic de multis scole communium incredibilibus similibus.

Ad illud dicitur, sicut prius, quod generaliter tenet regula supra dicta. Et pro materia primi argumenti 30 sunt 3 dicenda. Primo, quod contingit proposicionem anime componi ex intentionibus signorum vel intentionibus signatorum. Et communiter scientes ydiomata B 42^b habent proposiciones de intentionibus ydiomatuum subordinatas proposicionibus de intentionibus naturalibus 35 signatorum. Et tertio, actus anime vocantur proposiciones eo quod illi immediate ponuntur pro veritatis signatis, etsi non significant. Per hoc dicitur quod quilibet terminus relativus proposicionis in anima primo modo est intencio significans ad placitum rem 40

1. sic *pro si* B. 4. utrique B. 7. *ver's* B. 11. *cic'onis* B.
18. *indignissim* B. 20. *maxim* *mam* B. 22. *dpt* B. 32. *am'e* B.
37. *mete* B.

signatam per accidens, et omne significatum per totam propositionem antecedentis: et sic contingit ipsam converti quo ad consequenciam cum antecedente. Ut hic: *animal potest esse et illud est Sor*; ista enim convertuntur quo ad consequenciam: *animal erit animal quod potest esse*. Et contingit relativum esse inferius subiecto quo ad predicacionem; ut; *hic homo est albus, et ille est Sor*. Nam *hominem esse album* est inferius ad *hominem esse*, quamvis plura significet; sicut communiter facit relativum. Sed, loquendo de propositione anime ^{2ⁱ} modi, tunc termino relativo correspondent multe intenciones, quarum aliqua est forte illud antecedens. Non enim sunt intenciones anime primo de eodem generate; sed per eandem intencionem contingit ¹⁵ frequenter tam vicissim quam simultanea diversis actibus concipere illud idem; et sic contingit talem propositionem anime ^{2^m} subordinacionem diversis actibus esse kathegoricam et hypotheticam, affirmativam et negativam, veram et falsam, ymmo contradictoriam ²⁰ sibi ipsi. Sed secus est de propositione vocali et de propositione anime facta ex intencionibus signorum; nec sunt actus tales nobis notissimi aliquales, sed sunt accidencia de genere actionis, firmantes intenciones et generantes habitus per ipsorum frequentem eleccionem; ²⁵ de intencionibus ergo non habemus experientiam, sicud de actibus.

Secundo notandum quod contingit terminum esse inferiorem reliquo aut superiorem, vel quo ad predicacionem, vel quo ad significacionem. Unde patet ex ³⁰ dictis quod relativum communiter est inferius suo antecedente quo ad predicacionem, et superius quo ad significacionem, sicut communiter sunt inferiora per accidens, per appositionem aggregata ex signis diversorum generum. Unde sic loquendo de inferioritate, videtur ³⁵ michi quod contingit in infinitum descendere, cum non contingit capere commune quin per aliam accidentalem adiectionem potest intelligi limitacius. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur quod non sit dare speciem specialissimam; quia sub specie specialissima contingit habere quotlibet

In meaning every pronoun is deductively the same as its antecedent, but it is as a predicate less universal.

When we say: This man is white, and he is A, he stands for the man who is white; which is less universal than man.

But in the second sense we may have many different meanings, and one of them may be antecedent. Thus the same mental proposition may be widely different, and even self-contradictory; and as for the acts themselves, they are mere accidents that serve to fix the objects in our mind.

One term may be called inferior to another in predication or in significacion and the pronoun is inferior in the first way, not in the second. And thus there is, it seems, an infinite descent; for however much we may add to the antecedent, we shall never reach the individuality of this.

14. geminanti B. 15. filia? B. 22. a¹ 9² pro aliquales B. 35. in simum B.

32. *Predicacionem — significacionem*. We should say to-day: *extension — intension* (or *comprehension*).

Yet we can get to the last species, for after this point is attained there are accidents which may be added; but these do not interfere.

The terms

inferior, prior,

and more

universal mean

the same

among

logicians; as

any term has

more

signification,

they call it

more common.

We must, there-

fore, admit an

infinite,

signifying more

than any other;

But a universal

term is more

common when

it can be

predicated of

more

individuals;

and the relation

of universality

between

universals

cannot be

known to us.

If one is

infinitely more

universal than

another, it does

not follow that

it is infinite.

2. The example

given proves

nothing; the

proposition, so

stated, is

meaningless,

there being no

one act of the

mind by which

we may

grasp it.

Note that *some*

man is more

singular than

the indefinite

man, and it

implies personal

supposition.

Not, however,

in the highest

genera of all,

nor as regards

logical entities.

intenciones accidencium; et inter speciem et suum genus proximum. Sed talia non erunt illius coordinationis cum connotabunt encia diversorum predicatorum; ens, cum est communissimum, quo claudit contradiccionem esse communius, cum omne posse sit 5 esse.

Sed 3º notandum quod logici habent pro eodem terminum esse inferiorem reliquo, priorem, universaliorum et communiorum; et unum dicunt reliquo communiorum quo ad significacionem, 2º quod plura significat. Et 10 consequenter ponendum est unum vocatum infinitum, in quaunque proporcione velareris reliquo maius. Sed B 43º terminus universalis propter suum significatum dicitur communior, quo suum primo significatum dicitur communicabilis; et sic communitas termini non consistit 15 in latitudine, sicut nec proporcio communitatum se habet in aliqua proporcione numerali nobis cognita. Et communitas termini solum finita significantis nobis est alterius rationis quam communitas termini significantis nobis infinita. Ideo non sequitur, etsi una sit 20 reliqua infinitum maior, quod sit infinitum magna; sicut dicitur de maioritate superficie ad lineam. Ista autem dicta circumstant dubia cuicunque.

Ad 2º dicitur quod conclusio non sequitur, nec foret illa oratio mixta proposicio, cum deficeret sibi significacio propositionis, eo quod nemo intelligit illam proporcionaliter, cum cuilibet propositioni oportet correspondere unum actum principalem preter actus correspondentes partibus. Pro materia tamen illius sunt 3º notanda. Primo quod intelligendo illum terminum, aliquis homo, personaliter, habetur communiter cum intencione speciei intencio de aliquo singulari homine. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod aliquis homo est singularis. Et logici ponunt quod signa particularia limitant ad suppositionem personalem, cum aliter viderentur 35 superfluere si non superaddherent ad indefinitas. In transcendentibus tamen generibus et terminis 2º intentionis supponunt termini cum signis particularibus pro communibus et singularibus indifferenter; ut substantiarum, vel universalium encium, quoddam est universalis, quoddam singulare. Et universalium quoddam est genus, quoddam species. Sic ergo intelligendo aliquem

18. *guitas* B. 19. *guitas* B. 23. *cmc3 pro* cuicunque B.

hominem, limitando ad certum singulare, sicut communiter intelligunt plebei et negantes universalia, foret verum quod *aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille qui currit*; sed tunc referret relativum suum antecedens singulariter pro homine communi; quod conceditur ab aliquo currente dicere. Quod si intelligatur antecedens incontracte, tunc cum paribus foret talis proposicio falsa; sed hoc foret verum: *ille non est Sor*, sicut *ille homo qui currit non est Sor*, dum falsum est *quod Sor non est ille qui currit*.

Et ex istis patet 2º quod sophismate componente sic: *aliquis homo currit, et ille non est Sor, et ille non est Plato*, false componitur; ymmo false componeret referendo ad eundem, sic componendo: *aliquis homo currit, et ille non est Sor, et ille non est Plato*; geminando tamen propositionem antecedentis, vel per unum intelligeret, vel per diversos, foret talis copulativa vera, sicut et esset, intelligendo illum terminum, *ille*, demonstrative. Et sic Socrates aliter intelligeret, intelligendo totum simul, quam duo intelligentes seorsum, geminando primam propositionem. Nec est inconveniens, ymmo communiter convenit, quod simillimis signis correspondent diverse veritates primarie significate; et specialiter intelligendo terminos communes contracte ad aliqua singularia; ut communiter faciunt moderni, vocantes singulare pro quo componunt predicatum. Et illis foret idem, *aliquis homo currit et Sor non est ille*, ut si componeret quod *aliquis homo currit qui non est Sor*; sed aliter intelligentibus non sic esset.

3º Tercio nota quod relativum quandoque refertur ad terminum pro suo significato, et quandoque ad totam propositionem pro suo significato ad terminum; | ut in exemplis propositis ad propositionem, ut *hic: chimera non est animal et tu vides illud*; potest enim intelligi quod *tu vides illam veritatem que est "chimeram non esse animal"*; vel aliter quod *vides animal quod non est chimera*; et in multis differunt tales sensus. Quandoque tamen oportet relacionem fieri ad totam propositionem pro suo primario significato; ut *hic: Sor currit et hoc placet michi*. Potest enim placere michi de *non esse rei*, et de eius suspensione, aut alio eventu, et si illa non placeat michi. Ideo patet quod ille ver-

And understanding by *some man* a certain individual, it might be true that *some man runs, and A is not he*; but then he would mean a certain individual, not a common term.

And if understood in general, the proposition would be false, but *A is not he*, true. Thus we can not admit the proposition *some man runs, and he is not A, and he is not B*; for we cannot refer *he* to the same individual man, unless we repeat the proposition. And it is quite possible for two very similar signs to mean different singulars.

The pronoun may stand for the term it signifies, or for the whole proposition relatively to that term;

and such senses are very different; sometimes it must necessarily stand for a whole proposition, for I may like v. g. certain qualities in an

individual,
and not the
individual
himself.

tates distingwuntur. Possum enim odire quod ille peccat, vel peccatum illius, quod idem est; et tamen non odire sed amare ipsum. Et sic possum ignorare quod ille est pater, vel paternitatem eius, quod idem est; et tamen non ignorare ipsum esse, quod est eius essentia 5 et ipse. Videtur tamen quod ego non diligo hominem esse in fovea, nisi quodammodo diligam eum dilectione confusa naturali, vel aliter inordinata. Nec cognosco Petrum nec aliquod accidens subiecti, nisi cognoscam ipsum subiectum, cum omne tale accidens sit *subiectum* ¹⁰ *aliqualiter accidentaliter se habere*. Sed de istis actenus sufficiat.

3. We answer that, according to Grosseteste, there are five species of universals: some exist before their singulars, and are not founded in them but in

God, in the Angels or in the heavenly constellations; and they bear different names.

The first are the eternal ideas, which assume only God's existence and His power of producing creatures.

They are in God as an extrinsical pattern for Him to produce by;

they measure the being of things, and we cannot know things rightly without knowing them.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod est dare universalia ex parte rei, et hoc secundum quinque gradus, ut docet Lincolniensis primo posteriorum. Aliqua enim sunt universalia ¹⁵ priora, singularibus corruptibilibus, non fundata in ipsis. Et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sint raciones fundate in deo sine alterius indigencia, vel in intelligentiis, vel ²⁰ 3^o in constellacionibus celestibus. Omnes enim manieres universalium vocantur ydee, vel forma exemplares, vel ²⁵ raciones, numeri, aut principia producendi aut causandi ista corruptibilia. Et prime sunt idee eterne, et vocantur a Lincolniensi concreatrices rei, nec ponunt aliud nisi deum esse, et talia posse produci a deo secundum ordinem debitum et mensuram, ut producibilitas hominis in deo esset, quamvis non esset alia essentia preter deum, cum sit coeterna et correspondens productiati dei, sicut coeterna cum deo est talis veritas: ³⁰ *ista possunt ordinate produci*. Nec potest illa veritas ponи, nisi in deo qui est plenus veritate, nisi forte equivoce sit in aliis, in quibus est deus. Et notum est quod illa racio est exemplar extrinsecum iuxta quod deus producit, cum non possit producere illas, nisi secundum suam producibilitatem. Ideo sunt cause principiantes et numerantes, hoc est, mensurantes esse rei; et ³⁵ illas oportet cognoscere cognoscendo res. Quis, rogo, cognosceret hominem debite, nisi precognoscendo quod est causabilis a deo ^{2^m} debitam habititudinem ad alias partes mundi? et illa causabilitas est ydea primi modi.

11. a'quar accip B. 16. corruptib⁹ B. 21. qpn^a pro principia B.
23. r'rl pro rei B. 26. esse B. 28. produc^te B. 34. cē pro
cause B. 35. r'r¹ pro rei B.

Causabilitas vero correspondens causativitati intelligentie est universale 2ⁱ modi. Sed causabilitas correspondens causativitati orbis celestis est universale 3ⁱⁱ modi. Unde universalia primi modi dicuntur nunc in 5 predicacione materiali esse deus, quia nullum alium ponunt esse, nunc distingwi 2^m rationem ab invicem et a deo, cum sint raciones formaliter diverse, sed nec substancialiter nec accidentia; et nunc dicuntur esse homines, quia sunt potentiae ex quibus homines sunt.

B 44^a Et ad istum sensum dicunt philosophi | quod quelibet creatura fuit eternaliter in deo in sua ratione.

Sed preter illa tria est dare universales substancias fundatas in singularibus: ut esse hominem est veritas, ymmo necessitas communis cuilibet hominum: et illa 15 veritas est species specialissima. Sed plebei et bruta, cognoscendo hominem in suis accidentibus, ut per figuram, vocem et alias proprietates accidentales, etsi cognoscant confuse hominem seu speciem illam, tamen primo cognoscunt accidentis vel proprium, posterius 20 specie; et illud vocat Lincolnensis universale 5^{ti} modi. Et de aliis speciebus universalium Porphyrii et suis distinctionibus dictum est superius.

Nec dubito quin, concedendo veritates correspondere quibusunque propositionibus veris, concedendum est 25 communiter illa universalia esse; ut hec propositione necessaria, homo est, significat primarie veritatem; et, cum sit necesse illam esse, patet quod oportet distinguere tanquam priorem a quacunque tali veritate, illum hominem esse. Et illam veritatem suppono esse essentiam, naturam, vel speciem humanam. Et propter ignoranciam talium universalium lapsi sunt moderni in multos errores; ut aliqui negant terminos universales, aliqui dicunt quod non est signare quid talis terminus communis significat: et sic nulla talis propositione significat primarie sicut est. Aliqui dicunt quod illa propositione, homo est, singulum hominem significat esse; et sic quelibet propositione significat primarie sicut non est. Alii dicunt quod est dare qualiter ex parte rei primarie significat talis propositione, sicut illud, qualiter, 40 non est ens. Sed ipsi peccant in noticia significacionis

1. catu^d pro causativitati B. 3. cativitati B. 5. mlij pro materiali B;
ib. nullam aliam B. 6. pont B. 9. po^e B. 21. port B.

but say that *as* termini, cum *ens* sit commune ad omne *ens* predicable, et omne significatum proposicionis; ut patet 4^o metaphisice 2^o, et 5^o metaphisice capitulo de ente; et 6^o metaphisice c^o 2^o.

We, therefore,
deny the three
first conclusions
of the last
argument,

because the
supposition of
the antecedent
is personal and
not essential.

But we admit
the last: there
is no difference
in saying *That
man is, is
necessary; or
It is necessary
for man to be;*
for the
supposition is
not personal,
but essential.

And in this
sense many
men are one,
and an animal
is every animal.

Different
authors have
answered these
objections
differently;
and as some
abandon the
position
because of the
difficulty of
answering, I
will subjoin the
usual problems
and solutions.
I. *How can we
distinguish
universals from
each other and
from their
singulars?*

Suppositis ergo omnibus istis delineatis a logica, patet 5 quod tales veritates, *hominem esse producibilem, hominem esse* etc. sunt; et illas suppono denominari per talia abstracta, *producibilitas hominis, essencia hominis*, etc. Et illa sunt universalia que ego pono, sicut et antiqui concorditer posuerunt. Et tunc ad 3^s primas conclusiones dicitur quod sunt negande, eo quod antecedens relativi stat personaliter per limitacionem signi particularis et predicati personalis. Ideo relativum refert ipsum personaliter et non simpliciter. Sed ultima conclusio est concedenda, cum eque contingit intelligere 15 terminum communem supponere confuse tantum a parte subiecti sicut a parte predicati, precedente termino confundente; sicut conceditur quod *hominem esse*, est necessarium; sic quod necessarium est *hominem esse*. Et talis supposicio in sensu composito, ubi non est 20 signare singulare pro quo proposicio verificatur, sed propter primarium significatum termini, est una manieres suppositionis simplicis. Sicut ergo predicacione speciei *plures homines sunt unus homo*, quia communis homo, sic *animal est omne animal*, sicut omne animal est 25 animal. Et sophismata que videntur sonare in oppositum sunt in onus logico, impediencia eum ad breviter et faciliter loquendum, et intelligendum sapientiam antiquorum. |

Sed ulterius notandum quod diversimode inventi sunt B 44^b auctores respondere ad evidencias factas contra illam posicionem. Et credo quod difficultas distingwendi probabilius in ista materia, et apparenzia inconsonancie conclusionum sequencium quo ad vulgus, fecit multos dimittere illam posicionem. Unde recitabo communes 35 raciones et responsiones in illa materia, ut veritas magis appareat. Videtur quod, si tale universale sit quodlibet eius inferius, tunc non distingwuntur universalia ad invicem vel a singularibus; cum omnē singulare sit species specialissima, genus intermedium et 40

5. delnat^p B. 12. p^r pro personaliter B. 16. tm pro tantum B.

27. in ova pro in onus B; ib. eu, or^m B.

1. See *De Ente Predicamentali* p. 1, l. 1, 2; p. 2, l. 27.

genus generalissimum; et per consequens conversim e contra non est genus vel species, nisi singularis. In illa materia est duplex responsio. Prima negat universale esse singulare et speciem esse genus generalissimum, 5 vel sic mixtim; quia, cum termini tales 2^e intenciones limitant ad suppositionem simplicem solum pro illis que primo significant, patet quod, sicut raciones illorum significant seu differunt, sic et illa; nec sunt illa universalia a singularibus separata, sed insunt illis; non tamen sunt 10 illa. Et illa responsio satis tollit evidencias supradictas.

Sed alia est responsio, concedens omne universale esse quocunque eius inferius, quia termini tales 2^e intencionis possunt supponere suppositione simplici generali, ut hic: *animal predicatur*, demptis speciebus; vel suppositione simplici speciali, ut hic: *animal est species specialissima*; suppositione personali; ut hic: *animal est Sor.* Nec impediunt termini 2^e intencionis tales suppositiones, existentibus aliis extremis, proporcionatis ad tales suppositiones. Et isto modo invenies auctores 20 sepe loquentes, ponentes universalia multiplicari numerosius in suis singularibus. Et totum universale per hoc differt a toto integrali, quod ipsum est eius pars subiectiva, et non totum integrale est eius pars; quia aliter non vere predicaretur genus de sua specie, nec 25 universale se haberet ad sua singularia sicut essentia trina se habet ad sua supposita. Et sic, demptis evidenciis, quantum ad eleccionem responsionis in illa materia, non dubium quin intricacio non est in reipsa, sed in signis. Nec dubium quin ille due responsiones 30 non contradicunt; sed eadem est sentencia tenendi utriusque. Teneo ergo 2^{am} responcionem, que est communicacionis; et cum hoc dico quod est differencia universalium, ut prius dictum est.

Unde, pro responsione notandum quod tripliciter 35 accipitur differencia: primo modo, pro quacumque accidentalis proprietate, sive separabili, ut accidentia generum, sive inseparabili, ut passiones per se inexistentes. Secundo modo accipitur pro speciali qualitate, que non est substancia, sed principium substancie, sicut 40 *racionalis*. Sed 3^o modo accipitur pro relacione, que est, unum differre a reliquo. Et sic differencie duorum

Some say that singulars are not properly species and genera, since these cannot receive personal supposition. Thus these universals are in them, but are not they.

Another solution is that the universal is each of its particulars, but with different suppositions.

It is in this sense that the Universal is said to be multiplied in its individuals. A universal whole is a subjective part of an integral whole, and not vice versa.

So the difficulty is not in the things themselves, but verbal and though both answers come to the same, I prefer the second as more convenient in debate. Difference may mean any accidental property, or any specific quality, constitutive of a substance, or the relation of non-identity between two things.

33. 8^r (d^r?) pro diferencia B. 37. 9 grūn B.

35. See *De Ente Predicamentali*, p. 32, l. 5.

Again two may priorum modorum affirmant differenciam 3ⁱⁱ modi. differ totally, as 2^o notandum quod tripliciter dicuntur aliqua differre individuals, or ab invicem: vel totaliter 2^m essenciam, sicut duo individua vel due species incommunicantes, ut *Sor* et *Plato*, *homo* et *asinus*; vel 2^o parcialiter, ut *vel* vel duo 5 particulariter, ut singularia que communicant in partibus B 45* integralibus, et universalia que communicant in partibus subiectivis: quomodo differunt *corpus Sortis* et *medietas Sortis*, et *animal* et *homo*. Sed tertio dicuntur aliqua differre secundum rationem, quando eadem est 10 essencia utriusque, sed raciones formales sunt diverse: ut quantitas eiusdem subiecti, et figura, et superficies, et eius concavitas. Sicut enim curvitas accedit linee, sic concavitas superficie. Et sic sunt isti tres modi differendi specie specialissime differenciarum, cum aliqua differunt primo plus quam genere, ut *deus* et *homo*, alia genere, ut *homo* et *albedo*; aliqua specie, ut *homo* et *asinus*; aliqua numero, ut *Sor* et *Plato*. Aliqua eciam differunt 3^o modo in genere et sunt idem subiecto singulari: ut *figura Sortis* et *eius quantitas*; eadem tamen 20 est essencia utriusque, quia *Sor*. Essencia enim famose vocatur substancia que potest per se subsistere, licet quandoque cuiuscunq; predicamenti species vocetur essencia, sicut et substancia, respectu sui accidentis. Aliqua autem differunt et secundum rationem, dum 25 sunt idem singulare; ut *memoria anime*, et *ratio eiusdem*. Memoria enim, racio et voluntas, sunt una anima in numero et differunt inter se. Aliquando non differunt 2^m rationem, dum unum sit subiectum alterius, sic quod forma dicit idem subiectum et superaddit modum 30 vel rationem; sive forma sit accidentis accidentaliter inexistens, ut *albedo*, sive accidentis per se inexistens, ut *passio*, sive substancialis qualitas per se 1^o inexistens;

Some differ more than generically, some generically, some specifically, and some individually. And some, though differing specifically, may be identical with the same subject.

Some differ only logically, while they are the same singular being; as the mind is memory, reason and will.

1. Multipliciter aliqua different *in marg.* B. 5, 6. *Another hand-writing from the words* *vel duo particulariter* B. 13. *sua pro eius corr.* B. 14. *ut pro et sic* B. 25. *tñ; a above* B. 28, 29. *Aliquando — alterius in marg.* B.

5, 6. The second handwriting (from f. 45* to f. 122*) is illegible rather on account of its being very close and much abbreviated than from careless penmanship; while the third (f. 122* to 176) is just the contrary. The first is fairly good. From f. 45* to 122* there are many marginal notes, very few of any value. — *Ut duo particulariter* is evidently a duplication, including a mistake. I have left it in the text because the page begins with those words.

ut *racionalitas* inest homini; et quodlibet illorum dicit eandem essenciam in numero.

Sed 4º dicuntur aliqua secundum rationem [differre,] 5º se invicem, secundum equum ambitum. Sed raciones diverse insunt illis; ut existente unica fenice, tunc fenix universalis differt a illa, non subiecto sed ratione, cum illa sit incommunicabilis et fenix communis est communicabilis et illa apud aliquos vocatur distincio et 10º non differencia. Et per ista dicitur quod genus differt a sua specie secundum partem, cum sit reliqua species, que totaliter dividitur a priori specie; sicut homo communis per aliquid singulare differt a Sor, et tamen est Sor; et econtra Sor differt ab homine communis, 15º non secundum suppositum, sed secundum rationem, cum sit communicabilis, et homo communis est incommunicabilis; et sic homo communis dupliciter differt a Sorte, quia et secundum suppositum et secundum rationem.

Et si dicatur quod si Sor differt ab homine communis, 20º tunc non est homo communis, iuxta exponentes dictas tractatu proximo; dicitur quod ibidem exponitur differencia primi modi et non complete ista differencia, quia paulatim oportet ascendere in tales subtiles materias. Unde sicut prius dicitur [quod] oportet resolutum vere primum terminum in exponendo huiusmodi proposiciones; ut ista: *Sor differt a specie* debet exponi resolvendo hoc verbum *differt*, significans confuse ad differencias supradictas; ut si *Sor aliqua differencia differt a specie*, ergo *Sor differt a specie*. Et antecedens 25º patet ex hoc quod Sor ratione incommunicabilitatis differt a specie. Et tunc ista proposicio: *Sor ista incommunicabilitate differt a specie*, debet exponi, ut superius dictum est: *Sor ista incommunicabilitate est, et species est, et Sor ista incommunicabilitate non est species*. 30º Igitur etc. Nec sequitur: *ista incommunicabilitate vel individuatione Sor est ille homo*; ergo, secundum illam est species; et conformiter dicitur ad omnia similia.

2º dubitatur si ens transcendens sit commune ad deum et ad omnia creata, ut supra dictum est. Et

There is yet another difference (called also a distinction without a difference), as between the universal and the individual phoenix; there can be only one of each, but the former is communicable to successive singulars, and the other not. It is by this difference that the genus differs from its species, and the universal from the individual man.

According to the last treatise, if A differs from the universal man, he is not the universal man; but I then purposely avoided going into all the details of these differences, on account of the difficulty of the matter. But it is clear that A must differ, if he is incommunicable and the universal not; as may be set forth by exposition.

II. Is
transcendent
Being common
both to God
and creatures?

2. ea pro eadem B. 3. differre deest B. 4, 5. de se ⁱ = de se ipsis? B. 16. incommunicabilis B. 23. paulatim B. 24. quod deest B. 26. sse (= species?) B.

21. See Logica, vol. I, p. 122, l. 4—16.

If so, then there would be an identity beyond that of genus, species or number, which can coexist with the

greatest possible diversity; and God would be caused by

Himself, since He caused all

being and is all being.

But on the other hand, the universal can belong to its particulars in two ways;

either as a difference or as

a transcendent mode of being.

The first must be denied; but

the second is univocal, since it signifies the same by the

same sign.

It does not follow that anything

besides God is

God:

that which is God is indeed

other than God; but this

is a subject of transcendent

being.

So also, the universal man

is that which is A, and that

which is other than A.

All deductions to the contrary are mere paralogisms.

videtur quod non, quia sic foret alia ydentitas quam identitas generis, speciei vel numeri, et per consequens summa diversitas vel differencia non excluderet idem-
ptitatem, sicut summa magnitudo excludit parvitatem; et sic de omnibus similibus infinitis denominacionibus 5 positis. Videtur eciam quod deus sit causatum a deo, | quia ens transcendens est primum causatum a deo, et B 45^b deus est illud, cum ipse sit omne ens, sicut homo est omnis homo.

Sed pro illo supponitur quod dupliciter commune 10 possit univoce participari suis inferioribus: vel secundum rationem differencie, sicut universalia participantur a suis individuis; vel ratione transcendencie, ut ratione essendi, sicut analogia participatur. Primo modo non est ens univocum, quia sic esset genus. Sed 2º modo 15 satis univoce participatur, cum significat omnia illa sub eodem signo naturaliter representata. Unde licet ens transcendens sit omne ens, non tamen aliud a deo, vel inferioris deo, est deus. Sicut ergo non sequitur: *homo communis est Sor et ille homo communis est Plato: ergo, 20 Sor est Plato*; ita non sequitur: *ens transcendens est deus et ens transcendens est aliud a deo, ergo, aliud a deo est deus*. Nec est maior color in istis quam in suis convertibilibus, sic argumentando: *homo est Sor, et homo est aliud a Sor: igitur Sor est aliud a Sor*. Nec sequitur: 25 *illud quod est aliud a deo est deus: igitur aliud a deo est deus*; ut non sequitur: *illud commune quod est aliud a Sor est Sor; igitur aliud a Sor est Sor*. Sicud enim homo communis est Sor, ita est aliud a Sor; sicud in suo convertibili: *Sor est homo, et aliud a Sor est homo: 30 igitur Sor est aliud a Sor*. Nec sequitur, *hoc est deus et hoc est aliud a deo; igitur, aliud a deo est deus*; sicut non sequitur: *Ista natura communis est Sor et illa est aliud a Sor: igitur Sor est aliud a Sor*.

Nec est maior color in ista deduccione quam sic 35 argumentando: *homo est Sor et homo est aliud a Sor*,

5. similibus underneath omnibus B. 11. ptird B. 17. eo pro
eodem B. 27. nec above ut B.

16. *Univoce*. In the great question of the Analogy of Being, moderate Realists abhor using the very term *univoce*; but their *analogia proportionis secundi generis*, as Suarez calls it, does not seem to differ very substantially from Wyclif's position. Yet the slightest differences are important here.

ergo Sor est aliud a Sor; nec est talis deduccio syllogismus expositorius, sed paralogismus syllogismo expositorio oppositus, sic argumentando: hoc est deus, et hoc est aliud a deo; ergo deus est aliud a deo, posito

5 quod iste terminus, *hoc*, convertatur cum transcidente. Argumentatur enim affirmative a superiori ad suum inferius. Pronomen enim non est demonstrativum in proposito, nec vere pronomen, sed terminus convertibilis cum ente. Et si intenditur eius significati demonstratio, tunc aliud demonstratur in maiori, aliud in minori. Sicut ergo *Sor est illud quod est Plato*, ita *quodlibet est ens transcendens, quod est deus; sed non est deus*. Nec sequitur, si *deus est illud quod est creatura vel creatum, quod deus sit creatura vel creatum*.

10 *Deus tamen necessario est supremum causatum, sicut est creatura per naturam assumptam, ut narrant theologi. Non est vis, sive ponatur illa conveniencia in transcidente idemperitas, sive non; ideo consequens. Philosophus tamen loquitur de idemperitate in genere*

15 *et non alia.*

Ex istis patet quod illi qui dicunt nullum individuum esse speciem ad illum sensum quod nullum individuum potest communicari multis individuis separatis, et illi qui dicunt quodlibet individuum esse quodlibet suum superius, et econtra, intelligendo per terminos 2^c intentionis sua denominata confuse, non contradicunt; sic nec illi qui concedunt quod homo est species et nullus homo est species. Prima enim significat quod *esse hominem* est communicabile cuicunque individuo hominis; 25 et 2^a significat quod nulli individuo hominis contingit sic communicari. Nam communissime, cum terminis significantibus per se idem significatum sed variatis in suppositione vel modo significandi, propositiones sunt valde disparium sensuum, ut hic: *homo est homines et homo est homo; A videt hominem, et hominem videt A; homo communis est omnis homo, et homo singularis est omnis homo*.

Sed 3^o dubitatur si universale recipit accidentalem predicacionem; ut conceditur quod homo communis comedit, dormit, et facit quidquid singularis homo

"This" is God; "this" is other than "God". Nothing follows, for "this" has only meaning as the pointing to something; now there are two distinct pointings here; or if it be not a demonstrative, it means transcendental being, which is not God. Nor does it follow that God is caused: though God, by the Incarnation, is really caused.

To deny that an individual is a species, because of its singularity, and to admit this in the sense of belonging to a species, is not contradictory; we grant that the essence is common, and deny that the individual is so.

Propositions may have very different significations, according to the supposition given to them.

III. Can a universal receive accidental attributes?

3. sic argumentando *in marg.* B. 9, 10. ut dem^{ra}o B. 15. spp = supremum B. 32. p^e pro per se B. 38. d^ut^r pro dubitatur B.

If so the universal *man* eats, drinks, and has many opposite qualities at once; if not, universals are of no use; besides, universal accidents would then have no subjects.

facit, sicut derisorie arguunt illi quibus deficiunt argumenta in ista materia. Et videtur quod non, quia sic idem esset album et nigrum, sedens et non sedens; generaretur et corrumperetur; et esset maius et minus se ipso; et sic de multis inconvenientibus. Videtur 5 tamen quod suscipit | predicaciones accidentales, quia aliter superfluerent universalia, nisi aliquid possent facere vel ad aliquid deseruirent. Nec haberent universalia accidentia subiecta illis proposita, nisi inessent substancialiis 2^{is}, que ideo minus sunt substancialie quam 10 substancialie prime secundum doctrinam Philosophi; quia minus substantia accidentibus quam substancialie singulares.

To answer this, we may first deny that they receive such attributes.

Predication is either
(1) essential,

or (2) accidental by inference of a form; this latter is to be denied: humanity is not white, but it is that which is white.

Or (3) by connection with a cause; or (4) as a mere extrinsical relation.

Why these are to be denied. If the essence received

Pro illa materia notandum quod duplex est responsio, sicut in prima materia. Aliqui enim negant tales predicaciones accidentales formales de substancialiis universalibus, distingwendo primo de 4 generibus predicationum. Alia enim est predicatione secundum essenciam, quando predicatum inest subiecto, sed non per formalem inexistenciam suo subiecto; ut hic: *homo est animal*, ²⁰ *species est album*, et generaliter quando predicatum significatum est nomen substantivatum per subiectum. Alia est predicatione per inherenciam forme, ad quam contingit esse motum, vel inexistenciam quam consequitur per se mobilitas; ut quando predicanter verba ²⁵ adiectiva, vel nomina adiectiva substantivata per substancialiam; ut hic: *homo quantificatur, qualificatur, agit, patitur, locatur, durat, sedet vel ditatur*. Et tales predicationes negantur de universalibus et de terminis ultimate abstraccionis: ut *humanitas non est alba*, nec ³⁰ *essencia generat*. Et sic de similibus predicationis personalibus. Humanitas tamen est *album*, et essencia est *generans*, intelligendo in negativo genere substantivato. ^{3us} modus predicationis est predicatione secundum causam, ut hic: *dies est lacio solis, motus est mobile*, et sic de ³⁵ aliis. ^{4a} predicatione est secundum habitudinem; ut *homo intelligitur, similatur*; et sic de aliis relacionibus differentibus. Et tales predicationes recipiunt universalia.

Causa autem quare negantur predicationes particulariae de terminis abstractis, est ista. Terminii abstracti ordi-

3. ^am pro *album* B. 17. ^jo pro *primo* B. 26. ^{na} pro *nomina* B.
28. *sedet in marg.* B. 33. ^{ine} pro *in negativo* B.

nantur ad significandum simpliciter veritates abstractas
quas primo significant, eo quod aliter sequitur confusio
locucionum distinguencium huiusmodi veritates; ut, cum
aliud sit *esse hominem*, et *esse album* eciāli aliud (et
5 sic de ceteris), quomodo cognoscentibus haberentur
signa distingwencia huiusmodi veritates? quoniam, di-
cendo quod ^{1a} est qualitas et eciāli albedo vel albacio,
modo, si isti termini supponerent concretive, sicut
homo est album; tunc sicut *homo est albus*, ita *humanitas*
10 *esset albacio*; nec esset distinccio accidentium a sub-
stancia. Non ergo sequitur: *humanitas est ille homo*, et
ille homo est albus; ergo, *humanitas est alba*, quia
humanitas est essentia hominis; que si esset alba, tunc
esset albedo; talem enim sensum limitat subiectum,
15 supponendo abstracte.

Unde aptissimum medium inveniendi differenciam
vel distinccionem aliquorum est regula Aristotelis: Si
aliquid ens inest uni quod a reliquo removetur, tunc
ista differunt; ut, quia *esse hominem* potest manere cum
20 hoc quod *esse album* tollatur iam ipsis existentibus;
ergo, quod est *esse hominem* et quod est *esse album*
differunt. Et illam differenciam nomino supradictis
abstractis. Quando tunc unum est communius ad reli-
quum, tunc non sequitur simpliciter negacio superioris
25 de suo inferiori; ut non sequitur: *ista potencia est in-*
communicabilis et illa essentia est communicabilis; ergo
illa potencia non est illa essentia; sed bene sequitur
quod *illa que sunt illa potencia et ista essentia differunt*.
Nec esset possibile tollere illam regulam condicionalem.

30 Infinitive tamen oraciones sunt concrete, nec conver-
tuntur cum abstractis, ut: *hominem cecum esse est ho-*
minem esse, et per consequens *homo*. *Cecitas* autem
non est *homo*; ideo non convertitur. Verumtamen in
re *cecum esse est esse cecum* et per consequens *cecas*;
35 sed signa non convertuntur, ut dicit Aristoteles. Uni-
versalia ergo causant individua, et per consequens
multum deserviunt in universitate. Nec sequitur; *uni-*
versale facit illum cursum; ergo currit; sicut non
sequitur de deo. *Homo communis ergo facit quicquid*

accidental
attributes (such
v. g. as
whiteness) it
would be
essentially
white,

and there
would be no
distinction
between
accident and
substance.

Aristotle's rule
for knowing
whether two
things differ is
the possible
absence
of the one, the
other
remaining;
whiteness
differs, therefore,
from humanity.

A quality
may be
the essence,
but that which
is the essence
and that which
is the quality
are different.

The universals
cause the
individual, and
therefore are of
great use; they
sustain
universal
accidents only,
not particular
ones, and are
therefore less of
substances than
their singulars.

3. lacu ^{com} pro locucionem B. 5. quo B. 9. et pro est before
album B. 11—13. est ille — est essentia in marg. B. 22 noīo B.
25. po ^{usūl} passio B. 27. po ^m B. 28. po ^m B. 29. 9di^{am} pro
condicionalem B. 31. et pro est B.

homo singularis facit, cum causat illud efficienter; et tamen non loquitur, generat, comedit, et sic universaliter substans accidentibus universalibus tantum; sed singulare substans tam singularibus quam universalibus accidentibus, et ideo est magis substancia. 5

Secondly, we may grant that they receive accidents in their particulars, since they are what their particulars are. The Universal would not then be *simply* greater than itself, but greater than in one or another individual. By this means, it can have infinite different attributes, positive but not negative; or at least negative only in this or that individual.

Alia vero responsio admittit terminos tales in suppositione personali, concedendo quod homo communis currit, sicut et ille homo; et est eiusmodi cuius est aliquis singularis homo. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod sit sapiencior vel maior se ipso: sed bene sequitur quod sit sapiencior vel maior quam est in isto vel in isto supposito. Nec sequitur, si generatur et moritur vel corruptitur, quod non est, sed bene sequitur quod incipit vel desinit non esse in isto vel in isto subiecto. Et sic ridet cum ridentibus et flet cum flentibus. Nec sequitur quod sit monstrum, quamvis habeat infinita capita et omnia organa hominis singularis, quia non in eodem supposito, sed in diversis habet illa. Sed negative negantur, ut non sequitur: *iste homo non sedet, et iste homo est homo communis; ergo homo simpliciter* 20 *vel homo communis non sedet.* Sed bene sequitur quod non sedet in illo supposito. Sed alii concedunt quod *homo communis non sedet;* nec ex hoc sequitur simpliciter quod *nemo sedet,* sicud nec ex affirmativa sequitur quod *omnis homo sedet.* 25

I note these answers, because there is often much confusion, authors admitting and denying the same thing in different senses; for my own part, I think both are good, but prefer the wording of the former, according to which theologians deny that the

Godhead suffered, although it was a person who suffered. Examples of similar

Istas responsiones recito, ut concipientur auctores qui quandoque locuntur secundum unam et quandoque secundum aliam. Nec contradicunt, sed equivocant in suppositione. Ego autem elegi utrumque sensum et utramque sentenciam, sed utor verbis prioris responsionis, quia non dubium quin Aristoteles negaret quod *essencia hominis albatur,* 30 etsi ille homo *qui est* illa *essencia albatur:* ut theologus [non] habet concedere quod divine essencia est mobilis, divisibilis, paciebatur etc. quamvis sit illud quod paciebatur, moriebatur etc. sed est passum, divisibile, creatura; et sic de predictatis substantivis. 35

Nec debent talia recitari pro argumentis: *hoc albatur, et hoc est illa essencia: igitur illa essencia albatur; hoc est Sor et hoc est Plato: igitur Sor est Plato.* 40 *Omnis natura universalis hominis est Sor; omnis Plato*

8. cuq³ pro cuius est; est above B. 11. existo vel B. 17. arga^r pro organa B. 31. ne^r pro negaret B. 33. non deest B.

est natura hominis universalis hominis: igitur, omnis Plato est Sor. Nullus Plato est Sor: omnis natura hominis specifica est Plato: igitur nulla natura hominis specifica est Sor. Et sic de infinitis in vanum multiplicatis. In omnibus enim talibus est variacio suppositionis alicuius termini terminorum principiatiivi syllogismi; ut in primo arguento quod sinistre vocatur syllogismus expositorius, supponit *ly* 'hoc' in maiori pro supposito vel persona compositi; et, sub ratione qua illud suppositum [est,] sibi inest albedo vel albescetas; et in minori supponit absolucius pro essencia, que, ut illa essencia, non est albedo. Ideo idem est ac si existitis premissis concluderetur quod *illa essencia est albedo.* Cum enim terminus abstractus supponit similiter pro *esse hominem*, et oppositum predicatur formaliter, dependenter substantivatum ad subiectum, oportet ipsam supponere abstracte, ut ille sit sensus: *esse hominem est esse album.* Sed si predicatum per se supponeret sine dependencia ad subiectum, tunc contingaret ipsum intelligere personaliter: ut hic: *illa essencia est album;* et illa conclusio sequitur bene ex illis premissis, sed alia non. Unde conformiter dicunt theologi quod et persone sunt *eterne* et tam res quam persone *eterne*, et tamen non sunt *eterni*; quia adiectivum professionis per se supponens supponit similiter pro essencia, ipso significante proprie illud quod est commune tribus.

objections, all solved in the same way:
In all these the supposition of the middle term varies from the major to the minor;

if the supposition is kept the same all through, the conclusion is not against us. Thus, for the first example, we admit that the essence is, not white, but something white; which distinction occurs in the mystery of the Trinity.

Quo ad 2^m, patet argumentum quod non est color in deduccione, cum medium sit commune. Ac si sic argueretur: *Sor est homo et Plato est homo; ergo Sor est Plato.* Et eodem modo non sequitur: *Illa potencia, vel illa materia est illa essencia et illa forma vel illa actus est eadem essencia: igitur, materia illa est forma illa.* Sed bene sequitur ex premissis quod *materia sit illud quod est illa forma;* quod est verum, cum illa essencia sit communis ad materiam, formam et compositum ex hiis. Unde, sicut theologi concedunt quod mobile et divisibile est immobile et indivisibile, | cum homo sit natura divina, et tamen ille homo non est indivisibilis, invisibilis, increatus, quamvis sit illud quod

For the second we cannot argue, from the fact that two things agree, that they are identical, v.g. matter and form are each of them the compound body; yet matter is not form.

Man is the divine nature (in Christ), yet he is not increase, and thus the communicable universal is

1. hominis *in marg.* B. 8. homo *pro hoc* B. 10. est *deest* B.
15. appo ^o ^w *pro oppositum* B. 29. yme *pro communis* B.

incommunicable in its subjects, but not in its nature

And thus, immovable in itself and movable in its subjects; and when we say: *that nature is extended, seen, &c.*, we should convert it so: *the nature that is extended, seen, &c., is that nature,* and the adjective, attributed thus to the subject, makes one verb.

For the third: it is quite true that of two individual men, A and B, both are *that which* the other is; but not that A is B, no more than for matter and form.

The nature v. g. of fire, being made up of three different factors, we cannot conclude that each of them is igneity;

est huiusmodi; sic communicabilis universalis, quia natura communicabilis, est incommunicabilis, quia tam res quam persona incommunicabilis; et tamen illa natura communicabilis non est tantum natura incommunicabilis. Et conformiter conceditur quod illud quod non potest 5 moveri est mobile, quia res mobilis; et tamen illa res non est mobilis. Unde illa proposicio debet sic converti: *natura mobilis est illa res*; et illa: *natura extensis, visa etc. est illa natura*. Et eodem modo de 10 negativis, ut est illa: *nulla natura communis est incommunicabilis*, debet sic converti: *nulla essentia incommunicabilis est natura communis*, quorum utrumque est verum. Cum tamen illa natura est res incommunicabilis, quia persona incommunicabilis, quia quandoque adiectivum 15 appositum substantivatur per suppositum, tunc equivalet ac si verbum adiectivum predicaretur in adiacens: ut, si homo est quantus, albus, relatus, etc.. tunc homo quantificatur, albificatur, refertur, etc. Sed hoc non oportet, quando predicatum substantivatur per se. Unde 20 peheles in absoluto dicit quod ex significato adiectivi appositi et significato substantivi suppositi implicatur fieri una usia, sicut fit ex materia et forma, non sicut quando predicatum non substantivatur per subiectum. Et illud est cum diligencia inprimendum. 25

Quo ad 3^m argumentum, patet quod non sequitur; sed ex illis premissis bene sequitur quod *omnis Plato sit idem Sorti vel illud quod est Sor*, et hoc est verum; sed non sequitur, si *Sor est illud quod est Plato*; ergo *Sor est Plato*, sicut non sequitur: *materia est illud 30 quod est forma*: ergo *materia est forma*. Nec sequitur: *illud est omne quod est ille; ignis est illa igneitas; ergo omne quod est ille ignis est illa igneitas*. Nam essentia vel natura illius ignis est 3^a differencia inter se. Ideo non tantum illus ignis est illa essentia, cum illud quod non 35 est iste ignis est ista essentia, quia tam materia quam forma. Unde, quamvis ille ignis sit *alius* quam sua igneity;

4. tam B. 15. [¶] pro persona B. 16. sbstma^r pro substantivatur B.
20. sbstma^r B. 21. pehelie B. 25. ip'q B. 26. Quo pro Quo B.

21. Peheles. I can find no meaning to this word. *Peri Hermeneias* seems too far-fetched, unless this is a conventional abbreviation for an often recurring title. 32. I am not quite certain whether we ought not to read here *ille*; *ille*; or *ille ignis: ille ignis*.

materia, non tamen est *aliud*, licet *hoc* sit aliud (demonstrando istum ignem). Nam ille terminus, *aliud*, in neutro genere substantivatus dicit alietatem essentie subiecte vel nature. Et aliter non oportet, quamvis aliqua dicta antiquorum sonant quod unus homo est *alius* quam reliquus, sed non *aliud*; quia tunc, ut dicunt, non essencialiter eadem natura singularis vel universalis. Probabile tamen videtur quod est dare alietatem essenciarum singularium, que sunt eadem essentia universalis: ut *ego sum aliud a Sor*, quia alia natura singularis; et *materia illius ignis est alia ab illa forma*, quia aliud suppositum; et tamen illa non est aliud, quia non est alia essentia. Unde illa exclusiva est falsa: *Tantum aliquod illorum est essentia ignis*, demonstrando per *ly* "illorum" omnes formas ignis, habebit illam universalem affirmativam convertibilem: *omne quod est essentia ignis est aliquod illorum*; quod est falsum, cum tam materie quam composita sunt essentie ignis. Et sic corruptibile est incorruptibile, quia essentia et materia incorruptibilis; et tamen illa ignis non est incorruptibilis, cum possit naturaliter corrumpi. Nec sunt illa opposita: *res corruptibilis et res incorruptibilis*, sicut nec ista, *corruptibile et incorruptibile* convertibiliter significantes. *Quilibet enim homo est res incorruptibilis*, quamvis non quodlibet sit incorruptibile. Unde, sicut non sequitur: *Ego sum natura universalis, et illa est incorruptibilis; ergo ego sum incorruptibilis*; ita non sequitur: *ista ignis est ista essentia, et ista essentia est incorruptibilis: ergo, iste ignis est incorruptibilis*. Nec sequitur ex isto quod *homo sit non homo, album, nigrum, vel quocunque reliquum inconveniens*. Album enim est illud commune quod est nigrum, quia suppositum nigrum; et tamen illa res communis nec est alba nec nigra.

35 Quo ad exemplum 4^m, dicitur quod non sequitur: sed bene sequitur ex illis premissis quod *nulla natura specifica est Sorteitas vel individuacio Sortis*; quod est necessarium. Nec sequitur, *nullus Plato est Sor*, ergo *nullus Plato est illud quod est Sor*; sicut non sequitur: *nullum album est nigrum; ergo nullum album est illud quod est nigrum*. Si enim *album* esset *nigrum*, tunc *res*

B 47^b

3. *Substatinat* B. 4. *a^r pro* aliter B. 32. *g^me pro* commune B.

alba esset *res nigra*, sicut *res corruptibilis* esset *res incorruptibilis*; sed hoc non potest verificari pro *re singulari*, quod *res singularis alba* esset *res singularis nigra*; et cum nulla *res universalis* sit *alba vel nigra*, patet quod non verificaretur, qualitercumque extrema⁵

If it is urged
that the
universal man
is 'able to
laugh' and yet
cannot, we
again
distinguish:
able to laugh
in its subjects,
in those beings
which it is.

All sophisms
against the
Trinity find
their parallel
here, and must
be answered
likewise.

supponerent. Et si obiciatur quod *natura specifica*, puta *animal risibile* ex hoc quod potest ridere, tamen sit nichil, dicitur quod illa *natura* non est *risibilis*, sicut nec potest ridere, sed est *omne risibile* et *omnis homo risibilis*. Nec sequitur: *omnis homo est risibilis*; ¹⁰ *natura specifica est homo*: ergo, *natura specifica est risibilis*; sed bene sequitur quod *illa sit risibile*: quia in maiori medius terminus supponit personaliter, et in minori simpliciter. Et eodem modo negantur paralogismi ¹⁵ 3ⁱⁱ medii; ut sic argumentando: *Quicquid est illa essencia est immobile*; *iste filius est aliquid quod est illa essencia*; igitur, *iste filius est immobile*; sed bene sequitur quod *ille sit immobile*. Et breviter, non est aliquis paralogismus negandus in materia de trinitate increata, quin proporcionalem contingit habere tam ²⁰ in materia de universalibus quam in quacunque materia de trinitate creata. Et ideo expedit cognoscere logicam de universalibus.

All these
fallacies come
under the heads
of figures of
speech, or of
the accidental.

As: you are
now what you
were yesterday;
yesterday you
were sitting;
therefore you
are so to-day.

Comparison
with a fallacy
on the persons
of the Trinity.

There is a
mean
between *per se*
and *per
accident*.

Unde secundum antiquos, isti paralogismi reducuntur ad fallaciam figure diccionis, vel fallaciam accidentis. ²⁵ Unde, sicut hec est fallacia accidentis: *Quicquid heri fuisti, illud nunc es; sedens heri fuisti: ergo, sedens nunc es*. Ista cum verbis de presenti est conformis fallacia: *Omne quale est qualitas: omnis homo est quale: ergo omnis homo est qualitas*. Notum est consequens ³⁰ esse falsum; et minor foret vera, et subiectum supponit simpliciter sicut predicatum limitat. Et conformis fallacia est hic: *omnis pater est relativus; omnis essencia increata est pater; ergo omnis talis essencia increata est relativa*; illa tamen essencia nec per se nec per accidens est ³⁵ pater, quia est dare medium inter *per se* et *per accidens*, ut dictum est superius; et sic omnis substantia etc. significat *quale quid*; ut quidditatem vel aliam essentialem qualitatem; et quando variantur suppositiones commutatur quid in quale, ut sic: *omnis* ⁴⁰

19. a's B. 20. quin *above* cum B; *ib. cōporlē* B. 30. *negandum;*
notu above B. 37, 38. *f^a z* B. 20. *gumiar* B.

homo movetur; natura universalis est homo: ergo, natura universalis movetur.

Dubitacio tamen est si universale potest moveri. Et videtur quod sic, quia potest esse ubi prius non fuit, et, motis subiectis, moventur omnia que causaliter illis insunt. Cum ergo universale non est nisi ubi est aliquod eius singulare, sequeretur quod universale fuerit ubi prius non fuit, [ut] et singularia sunt ubi prius non fuerunt aliqua huiusmodi singularia.

Can the universal move? It seems so, for it is where its singulars are, and as they move, so must it.

10 Pro isto supponatur omne universale esse ubique ubi est aliquod eius singulare, et sic universalis substancia, universale corpus (et sic de quotlibet accidentibus) sunt ubique et semper. Alia autem sunt ubique ubi sunt sua singularia; tunc videtur michi probabile quod sic unde 15 universalia possunt esse ubi prius non fuerunt, sic possunt moveri localiter, sed non augeri vel alterari. Unde modus localis predicit secundum habitudinem aliter quam alii motus. Contingit ergo universale dupl. citer acquirere locum: vel secundum sui individui 20 generacionem, sicut deperdit locum ad sui individui corrupcionem; et isti motus vocantur multiplicaciones vel deminuciones universalium; quando scilicet numerosius vel paucius insunt suis singularibus. Sed 2º modo contingit universalia acquirere vel deperdere loca per 25 suorum singularium motionem localem; ut, Sorte currente ad designatum locum, fit homo universalis ibi, tam per cursum Sortis, quam formaliter per motum communem. Sed universalis punctus, linea universalis, et cetera que necessario sunt ubique, non possunt moveri. | Nec sequitur: *Sor non movetur, et ipse est homo communis: ergo homo communis non movetur;* B 48* quia repugnat quod moveatur et non moveatur, sicut repugnat quod sit album et non sit album. Moto autem subiecto, movetur quodlibet quod inest, ratione motus 35 subiecti acquirentis novum locum. Nec oportet, si natura universalis est alicubi, quod illa sit ubicacio, cum sit proporcio secundum habitudinem in qua predicit transiens connotando circumstanciam communem universalis et singulari; ut *esse in loco, esse in tempore, esse intellectum, animatum, etc.* Natura ergo 40

The principle that it is wherever its singulars are must be granted; but some universals are wherever any of their singulars are, and do not move: as, v. g. substance, or body. But setting these aside, I think it probable that, as the others can be where they were not, they can also move with their singulars; which gives us a two-fold species of movement;

except for points, lines and all those things which necessarily cannot move. But we cannot conclude from the non-movement of a particular, that its universal does not move. Yet this movement does not imply localization of the universal, but a mere relation of identity between it and its singular.

8. ut *deest* B. 9. *sn'istnt pro fuerunt* B. 13. *eiüs above sua* B.

25, 26. *currere* B. 33. *igitur above autem* B. 38. *tnf^m pro transcen-*
dens B. 40. *n^m pro intellectum* B.

universalis est iustus, grammaticus, et sic de ceteris adiectivis professionis que per se supponunt.

IV. *Do universals, taken with their singulars, make up a number?* Sed 4º dubitatur de logica cum terminis numeralibus; ut dubitatur si universale ponitur in numerum cum suis singularibus. Ut, si dicatur quod sunt 3 homines, non 5 V. g. are there existente aliquo singulari preter *Sor vel Platonem*. Et three men when there are only ita, si alicubi est unus homo, ibi sunt duo homines; two individuals, sic igitur sunt due res vel due substancie, quarum

A and B? For where there utrumque est homo, cum veritas universalis detur a is one man there are two singulari, et utraque illarum veritatum est homo. In 10 beings one universal, the other singular, non est nisi multitudo singularium, eo quod specificie but each is a man. differencia, non numero, sed specie dicuntur differre The usual reply ab invicem. Sed largius sumendo numerum, tunc quo- rumcunque numerorum multitudo dicitur numerus; et 15 isto modo quinarius est numerus specierum universalium, senarius est numerus specierum politici regiminis; et sic de ceteris numeris communium.

Tunc dicitur quod terminus numeralis, additus termino prime intencionis, limitatur ad significandum 20 numerum primo modo dictum. Unde, sicut terminus distribuens limitat speciem specialissimam ad suppositionem personalem, ita ille terminus numeralis limitat terminum prime intencionis, et specialiter speciem specialissimam ad suppositionem personalem. Cum ergo 25 homo communis sit quilibet hominum singularium, non ponit seorsum in numero cum illis; ideo existente omni homine, Sorte vel Platone, non superest 3^{us} homo communis ab illis, sed est uterque illorum, et non esset tertius, nec esset 3^a persona hominis. Et per idem 30 non oportet, ubique ubi est unus homo, esse duos homines. Nec sequitur Sortem esse tot substancias quot universalia sunt eius partes; quia Sor est homo communis, animal commune, corpus commune, substancia communis, et ens commune: ideo singulare non est 35 multa sed unum in omnibus illis; e contra tamen universale est multa, cum universale sit omnia eius singularia. Et sic duo sunt 4 et 5. Et sic de quocunque

4. ponit B. 7. sibi pro ibi B. 8. sicut pro sic B. 22. dist^{us}
pro distribuens B. 24, 25. ffst ff^m B. 33. p^o pro partes B.

3. All this looks like another and aggravated form of the difficulty stated thus by Biondello (*Taming of the Shrew*): *A horse and a man is more than one, and yet not many.*

numero finito vel infinito assignando. Nec ex illa one; nor is A sequitur quaternarium esse quinarium, et sic de aliis plus a man, speciebus numeri, formaliter dicti, quia talis numerus plus an animal, non est ille res numerate, sed ipsarum accidens. Sicut plus a body, enim quantitas continua est continuum esse quantum, plus a substance; sive sit corporeitas, que est substanciam esse corpoream, Similarly with the different kinds of sive superficietas aut superficies, que est substanciam esse superficialem, sive linealitas, que est substanciam esse linealem, sive punctalitas vel punctus, qui est substanciam esse punctalem: sic numerus vel numeracio est substancias esse multas: quod dividitur ab illis et quolibet illorum. Aliter tamen multiplicius accipitur numerus.

Sed sic loquendo impossibile est unam speciem numeri esse aliam. Ymmo, sicut impossibile est aliquod moveri sine motu, ita impossibile est aliquas substancias esse multas sine tali numero, et sic necesse est tales numeros esse; sic quod claudit contradiccionem numeros ydearum non esse. Unitas igitur a qua unaqueque substancia una dicitur, est in qualibet substancia secundum individuum veritatem, est simplicior et prior puncto, cum est in intersticiis, et punctus superaddit positionem. Sed species puncti, multiplicata secundum puncta indivisia, linealiter posita, principiat lineam tam secundum speciem quam secundum genus; et species linee, multiplicita secundum lineas individuas superficialiter positas, principiat superficiem tam secundum speciem quam secundum individua; et sic de corporeitate quo ad superficiem. Et sic omnis quantitatis principium est unitas, sicut docet lincolniensis 1º posteriorum 15º.

B48º Sic ergo ascendendo in universaliora invenietur paucitas, et descendendo in inferiora, invenietur pluralitas; ut, omnes homines individui sunt unica species, et omnes species animalium sunt unicum genus; et sic omnis multitudo reducibilis est ad unum, non solum secundum communitatem sed ad unum separatum in genere causandi. Et vere layci iniciati in ista materia ad pauca respicientes de levi pronunciant veritates quas doctores signorum balbuciendo referunt sompniantes.

Nec sequitur quod homo communis sit populus, etsi 40 sit illi homines divisim, qui collectim sunt populus.

Really laymen, who study this subject know more about it than these stammering Doctors of Signs!

It does not follow that the universal man is a people; for he is each individual separately, and

1. signando B. 7. ar = aut! B. 11. & vir B. 21. int'cis. B.
26. fñm B. 36. vñ B.; ib. initii B; ib. locl = layci? B. 38. fyff signisto
in marg. B.

the people is so Populus enim est multi homines civiliter connexi. Et
 collectively.
 A line, though sic illi homines per accidens sunt populus, sicut in-
 made of points, telligunt ipsi qui concedunt quod totum est sue partes,
 is not a species containing ut collectim componentes. Et sic negatur quod species
 points; and that puncti est linea, etsi sit illa puncta que componunt
 one species is many things, does not prove that unity is multitude.
 Different sorts of unity; transcendent and numeral.
 As numeral, it is the principle of number in a substance.
 which is one: this is a stricter sense than transcendental Being.
 But if by number we mean anything that can be counted, we must grant that the unity, essence of the individual, is the trinity of its supposita.
 Here there are many difficulties, all of them concerning the Holy Trinity as well as the Universals.
 Thus, God the Father differs from God the Son, i. e. God from God and the universal from the singular man.

22. *Tintas B.* 30. quandoque *B.*

Et sic negatur quod species puncti est linea, etsi sit illa puncta que componunt
 linea; quia non credo quod aliquod continuum sit eius pars. Nec sequitur, si una species sit multa diversa,
 quod unitas sit multitudo, vel quecunque species numeri reliqua. Pro quo nota quod sicut unum est transcenden-
 tens, convertibile cum ente, sic unitas est convertibilis cum entitate et cum veritate. Sed quandoque sumitur
 unitas pro principio numeri; et tunc connotat per se substanciam esse unam; et sic striccius significat quam
 unitas transcendens. Sicut ergo falsum est *quod substanciam esse unam est substanciam esse quadruplicem*,
 et sic de aliis numeris; ita falsum est quod unitas est quaternarius, vel quilibet alias numerus.

Extendendo autem numerum ad quecunque numerata, sive sicut accidencia, sive partes quantitative substancie, sive partes qualitative, tunc concedendum est ad sensum equivocum quod quelibet unitas que est essentia substancie singularis est trinitas suppositorum eiusdem substancie. Et hic multiplicantur multa argumenta apud theologos in materia de trinitate increata, ut aliqui arguant quod deus a deo differt, quia deus pater a deo filio differt; et sic homo communis differt ab homine singulari. Ita essentia communis differt a personis non sic communibus. Et per idem trinitas incommunicabilis non est essentia communicabilis, nec persona. Et sic essent queque distincta, quorum quodlibet esset deus. Si enim omnis deus est pater, tunc tantum est deus pater, et communicabile. Et illud quod “nec spirat nec spiratur”, ut *essentia divina*, tantum esset spirans vel spiratum; quia tantum est aliqua illarum trium personarum; et breviter nullum esset argumentum in illa materia, quin contingit proportionale facere in materia cuiuscunque trinitatis create.

And then, following up the comparison, there would be three singulars of the universal, God.

22. *Tintas B.* 30. quandoque *B.*

22. Wyclif here alludes to his theory, developed at greatest length in *De Materia et Forma*, that in all things the essence corresponds to the *Godhead*, the matter to the *Father*, the form to the *Son*, and the compound to the *Holy Ghost*. These three he calls the *Created Trinity*. 33. *Nec spirat nec spiratur*: allusion to the words in Declar. Greg. Dist. I cap. 1: Firmiter.

Quantum ad primum, videtur michi probabile quod ille terminus, deus, nunquam supponit personaliter nisi per limitacionem appositi nocialis; ut deus pater differt a deo filio, deus genuit deum, etc. Nec sequitur: *5 gignens a genito differt, et uterque est deus: igitur, deus a deo differt*, propter limitacionem suppositorum.

Pro secundo, notandum quod in parte est similitudo inter universale et sua supposita, et essenciam divinam et sua supposita; et in parte dissimilitudo. Similitudo, *10* in hoc quod ipsum est singulum suorum suppositorum; et dissimilitudo in multis. Primo in hoc quod natura illa habet supposita sibi accidentalia, ut sic, inter se; nec illa participant communi denominacione secundum magis et minus; ut homo communis potest carere quo-*15* cunque supposito corruptibili, et unum istorum potest esse sine reliquo; sed contradiccionem claudit essenciam divinam esse sine omnibus suis suppositis, vel unum illorum esse sine quolibet illorum. *20*, universale maius, melius, et quomodo cunque dispariter accidentatum sup-*25* positum habet hic, et opposito modo accidentatum suppositum alibi. Sed contradiccionem claudit unum suppositum increatum distare a reliquo, esse maius, potencius, sapiens, vel durabilius reliquo. Primum tamen est causa secundi, et ambo sunt una causa *30*; et sic est quasi prioritas, non nature, cum sit eadem *35* natura singularis, sed prioritas originis inter illa. Sed longe similior trinitati increase est trinitas cuiuscunque essentie create, cum in qualibet tali contingit habere proporcionalē proprietatem, cum contradiccionem claudit aliquam talem excedere vel deficere a ternario suppositorum parium quo ad omnia in quibus comunicat.

Racione ergo illius diversitatis utendum est diversis terminis et diversa logica in materia de trinitate et in *35* materia de universalibus; ut 3 persone hominum sunt 3 homines, sed non sic 3 persone divine sunt 3 dii vel nature divine; nec deus est triplex, sed trinus; nec multiplex sed singularis, cum non habeat universale superius. Nec discrepancia vel numerus est inter illa,

6. imitationem B. 20. h̄ B. 24. ca^a B. 25. sint B.

24. Causa. This word, applied to the Uncaused Being, is generally disliked by Scholastics. They prefer the more general term *principium* — *id a quo aliquid fit vel est.*

*4**

But 1. The word *God* has a personal supposition only when applied to the persons; therefore the syllogism is faulty, and God does not differ from God as such.

2. The comparison between the Universal and the divine Essence as to their *supposita* obtains only in so far as each is its *supposita*; but in the former case these are accidental to it and to each other; in the latter, absolutely essential; in the former case, they may be unequally perfect and modified in different, nay, contrary manners; in the latter, this is impossible. The priority of the Father to the Son and of these to the Spirit, is priority not of nature but of origin.

But the similitude between the increase and the created Trinity is far more perfect than between the Universal and its singulars. We have to use other expressions in dealing with the Trinity and the universals.

Three persons
are three men;
three persons
are not three
Gods, etc.

And we say,
not that the
Godhead
differs,
but that it *is*
different from
each of its
persons.

This difference
is the
communi-
cability of the
Divine Nature.

The Trinity
is also an
essence, but a
plurality; not
a person, but
persons.

Communicable
may be said
either of an
essence,
or of a person,
in different
senses.

Some grant
that the
Godhead differs
logically from
each person,
which it is
nevertheless;
and that only
the Godhead
which is the
Father is God,
and yet not
only the Father
is God;

that the Father
and the Son
'spire' the
Holy Ghost
as one
principle, the
cause being
equally each of
the persons,
yet not the
Holy Ghost,
as nothing can
cause itself.

And so each of
the three are
one Cause;
yet there are
several
causal agents.

The Cause of
the Spirit is
that of the Son;
yet the Son is
the Cause of
the Spirit and
not of himself.

sed differencia et pluralitas. Et sic de multis singni-
ficacionibus et differenciis terminorum, ad que labo-
riosum est pertingere. Sic ergo, propter excellenciam
idemperitatis personarum in eadem essentia singulari,
negatur quod illa essentia ab aliqua illarum differt,⁵
sed est a quacunque illarum *differens*. Et hoc concludit
communicabilitas conveniens essentie et non personis;
ut, quia ista essentia est communicabilis, et ista per-
sona non sic; ideo, quod est ista essentia non est ista
persona. Et quia trinitas est pluralitas et non sic ¹⁰
persona, ideo talis nulla trinitas est persona, sed per-
sone; est tamen illud quod est quelibet illarum per-
sonarum. Nota tamen quod *communicabile* accipitur pro
communicabilitate ad personas; ut essentia communi-
catur; et accipitur pro communicabilitate ad naturas,¹⁵
sicut una persona est multe nature; scilicet, natura
humana et natura divina; et sic de termino opposito.

Alii autem concedunt quod essentia differt secundum
rationem a persona, et tamen est illa persona; sicut
trinitas incommunicabilis est essentia communicabilis,²⁰
sed non persona: ymmo, persone. Ulterius conceditur
quod tantum essentia que est pater, est deus, sicut
omnis deus est pater; sed non tantum pater est deus,
quia quod non est pater est deus. Ulterius conceditur
quod pater et filius sunt unum principium spirans²⁵
spiritum sanctum, et unus spirator, una causa spiritus
sancti, sicut et est una spiracio activa. Unde eadem
causa que causat omnes creaturas, causat filium et
spiritum sanctum; et illa causa est tam pater, quam
filius, quam spiritus sanctus; et tamen causa spiritus³⁰
sancti non est ille, cum nichil inmediate et essencialiter
causat se. Nec causa filii est filius: et sic tria sunt,
quorum quolibet est causa; *causa*, et non multe cause;
quamvis sint multi causantes et multa causancia;
sed non cum predictis substantivis. Unde omnis causa³⁵
Spiritus sancti est causa filii; et tamen aliquod suppo-
situm est causa spiritus sancti quod non est causa
filii; sicut patet de filio. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod
aliquid vel aliqua sit causa spiritus sancti quod nod
est causa filii. Filius enim, sicut non est aliud vel⁴⁰
alia res quam pater, sic non est alia causa quam pater.
Aliud enim, si non sit contractum per terminum per-

17. *detio* B. 35. *sbtis* B.

sonalem, dicit diversitatem essencie; ut filius est alius quam pater, sed non aliud, est nec alia res. Nec argumenteratur ab inferiori ad suum superius: *hec est alia persona*: ergo, *hec est alia res*; sicut non sequitur: *hec est alia persona*: ergo, *alia essencia*. Sed nec econtra: *hec non est alia essencia*: ergo, *non est alia persona*. Sed in istis lapsus sum gratis, tum quia proporcionaliter dicendum est in logica de aliis trinitatibus, tum eciam quia materie sunt connexe; superesset [ut] juvenis, postquam sapuerit materiam de universalibus regendam, pretereat ad materiam de trinitate eiusdem essentie subtilius cognoscendam.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, concedi potest principaliiter quod quamvis aliud sit fenicem esse, et aliud illam fenicem esse, cum universalitas differt a singularitate, tamen non sunt due fenices, quia tunc essent duo singularia. Nec sunt due res, due substancialia, duo corpora vel duo animalia quorum utrumque est fenix; quia non sunt due sed una fenix singularis: quia vel oportet quod terminus talis supponatur simpliciter vel personaliter; et secundum utrumque sensum, falsum esset quod sunt due fenices. Nec sequitur: *A fenix B 49^b differt a B: ergo A et B sunt duo supposita differencia*, | cum terminus numeralis limitat terminum prime intentionis ad suppositionem personalem. Ideo non sequitur quod aliquot differencia sunt illa, quamvis illa sunt differencia. Nec sequitur quod fenix universalis sit aliud, vel *alia*, quam fenix singularis, etsi differat ab illa secundum rationem; sed erit aliud singulare quam est illa. Et per idem negandum est quod *ille fenices sunt*, demonstrando fenicem universalem et singularem; sed

In this matter we can neither argue from the particular to the general, nor vice versa. This digression is excusable by the connection between the created Trinity and the connection between the three persons of the Trinity.

Return to the main subject. There is indeed difference between the existence of a phoenix and that of this particular phoenix. But they are not two, but one for all that. We must give the term a supposition, either essential or personal; in either case, there is but one phoenix. The difference between them is not a difference of *supposita*, nor of otherness of essences: it is a logical distinction.

7. *gt̄p.* 9. *Srf3 (?) B*; *ib. ut deest B.* 9, 10. *cum*; *postquam in marg. B*; *ū possint in marg. B.* 10. *regā B.* 11. *pr (l) B.* 14. *quodvis B.*

11. *Superesset*. This sentence presents extraordinary difficulty, as is seen by the readings, which however are obviously insufficient. Mr. Matthew suggests that *regendam* being the technical word for certain obligatory lectures which the 'Magister' has to give after inception, the sentence may mean that he should first be qualified to lecture on universals, before studying the more difficult matter of the Trinity. 29. *Racionem*. This word seems to imply that Wyclif abandons his Realism in presence of the difficulty; but a few lines below he says that they are *really* distinct.

We must also deny any plurality between them, so as to say: *These Phoenixes.* cum termino indefinito facienda est divisio; ut sic: rerum alia est universalis, alia particularis; substantiarum alia prima, alia secunda; causarum alia universalis, alia particularis. In quibus exemplis Aristotelis supponit terminus indefinitus mixtim, pro universalis et singulari. Et ita respondendum est ad quotlibet media que implicant universale, ut sic, ponere in numerum cum suo singulari.

Yet they are really distinct from each other: for every suppositum is of two natures. Conceditur tamen quod omne universale substantie et eiusdem singulare sunt duo distincta realiter; quia omne suppositum est due nature. Sed propter difficultatem et apparenciam illius conclusionis sunt duo alii modi dicendi, quorum primus concedit universale ponere in numerum cum suo singulari, eo quod utrumque potest demonstrari, et universale causans singulare est eius causa et prius singulari, et habet multa que non habent singulare. Et sic in cuiuslibet hominis veste sunt tria animalia: scilicet *animal* singulare, *animal* species specialissima, et *animal* generale; et ita de aliis sequentibus. Et ita unum singularium est multa communia, sicut unum commune est multa singularia. Omnia tamen illa communia communicant in parte subiectiva singulari. Secunda via dicit quod nullum universale differt a suo singulari, quia per idem argumentum essentia in divinis foret res differens a persona secundum rationem communicabilitatis; et sic loquendo facile est videre quomodo universale non ponit in numerum cum suo singulari. Eligat ergo logicus unam, quia sententia de universalibus est necessaria tam a plebico quam a philosopho implicata; ego autem elegi primam responsionem. Et tanta de copulativis transgrediendo sint dicta.

Let which opinion pleases most be chosen; I choose the first.

6. quecunque; quotlibet *above* B; *ib. me^a* B. 18. aliam *pro* animalia B. 28. *vñ* B.

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

Sequitur de disiunctivis tertio pertractandum: supponendo primo omnem ypotheticam subordinatam principaliter actui disiungendi esse disiunctivam; et solum 5 talem. Proposicio enim de disiunctivo extremo, et proposicio subordinata actui kathegorice quomodo cunque composita nou est disiunctiva; sicut nec kathegorica disiunctive significans. Nec proposicio mixta cuius principalis actus est actus hypotheticus disiungendi; 10 ad esse enim disiunctive requiritur proporcio signorum et significacionis. Verumtamen de propositionibus disiunctivis in anima, factis ex intentionibus rerum, non oportet illum ordinem observare, cum ibi non sit intencio de sinkategoricis distincta, contra intentionem 15 signi. Ymmo quotlibet accidentibus, tam simul quam successive, potest eadem intencio subici. De hiis ergo nou directe tractat logicus, sed de propositionibus sensibilibus et suis significatis.

Patet ergo ex dictis quod a quacunque parte principali disiunctive ad ipsam, tenet consequencia, cum ad eius veritatem sufficit veritas alterius partis. Sed econtra non tenet consequencia, nisi forte pars ad quam argumentatur fuerit sequens ad reliquam; ut sic: *tu curris vel tu moveris; ergo, tu moveris.* *Tu es homo vel tu es asinus: ergo tu es homo;* et sic de aliis. Patet eciam quod quam vera est altera pars disiunctive, tam vera vel verior est ipsam disiunctiva; non quidem verior quo ad adequacionem signi ad suum significatum, cum equacio non suscipit magis vel minus; sed verior propter prietate sui significati, sicut unum ens dicitur reliquo realius. Istud patet ex hoc quod falsitas partis

Of disjunctives. They are such, and such only, as are subordinate to a principal disjunctive act in the mind. A categorical proposition containing a disjunctive term, or having an equivalent meaning, does not come under the definition. We do not speak here of merely mental propositions, which do not require this similarity of sign and of signification: they do not belong to Logic. If one principal part of the disjunctive is true, the whole is true; but the truth of the whole does not prove that of a part, unless one of the parts is inferred by the other; as: *A is BC or A is C;* therefore *A is C.* The truer one part of a disjunctive is, the truer it is itself; i. e. in signification, not in degree.

1. Cap. *deest.* 2. blank space for initial S. 9. non est B.
14. de signatis; corr. in marg. B. 17, 18. *f&ib.* B. 27. *ipamg* B.
30. quomodo; sicut above the line B.

Every disjunctive made of two contradictories that are contingent is necessary, as also of a more general proposition and the opposite of disjunctive contradicitorum equivalet copulative facte one more particular; as: *A is C, or A is not BC.*

And of all such the opposite is an impossible disjunctive. Thus the parts are less true than the whole, being less necessary. Whence comes this necessity? From the very meaning of the proposition; for it means more than its parts.

There are, therefore, some necessities and impossibilities more obvious than others; *A is, or A is not*, can be at once seen; but that *A is sitting or A is*, does not appear so clearly, and we may be deceived. It we take the opposite however: *A is not sitting and A is not*, we see that *A cannot be sitting if he is not.* We can often see the falsity of a proposition than the truth of its opposite. These principles laid down, we shall deal with fallacies concerning pronouns, especially relatives.

desiunctive vere non facit ad desiunctive falsitatem | vel B 50^a inconcedibilitatem eiusdem. Et universaliter hoc: quilibet desiunctiva facta ex contradictoriis contingentibus est necessaria, sicut et quilibet desiunctiva facta ex consequente et opposito sui antecedentis, ut hec; *tu es* 5 *coloratus, vel tu non es albus.* Cum enim cuiuslibet ex oppositis parcum, et e contra; patet quod cuiuslibet *A is C, or A is not BC.*

Ex quo patet ulterius, cum tam vera est proposicio 10 quam falsum est eius contradictorium et econtra, quod quilibet talis desiunctiva est necessaria, dum neutra eius pars fuerit ita vera. Et si queratur a quo capit talis desiunctiva suam necessitatem, dicitur quod a qua- cunque eius causa, et a sua significacione ac necessi- 15 tate quam primo significat. Non tamen est dare partem prius necessariam, secundum quam ipsa est necessaria; sed ipsa est primo necessaria, sicut primo significat illam necessitatem.

Ex quo patet quod sicut necessitatum una est reliqua 20 patencior; ita impossibilitatum. Nec correspondent sibi iste impossibilitates ex opposito. Quilibet enim desiunctiva facta ex oppositis significat veritatem facillimam ad cognoscendum de natura veritatis; ut nullus sciollus ignorat quin *hoc est vel hoc non est*, quoconque 25 demonstrato. Sed necessitas desiunctive facte ex conse- quente communiori et opposito sui antecedentis inferioris est occulcior. Non enim est aliqua facilitate notum michi quod necessario *Sor non sedet vel ipse est.* Incauti autem decipimur admittendo in deposito 30 cionibus huiusmodi desiunctivas, et tamen in utraque est par necessitas, quia quam impossibile est *hoc esse et hoc non esse*, tam impossibile est quod *Sor sedet et tamen ipse non est.* Prima autem istarum opponitur prime desiunctive noscibiliiori, et 2^a opponitur 2^e minus 35 cognite. Frequencius ergo est falsitas date propositionis evidens quam est veritas sui oppositi; et frequenter contingit oppositum quod est ex habitudine naturali scientis ad scibile.

Premisis istis generalibus de desiunctivis, superest trac- 40 tare materiam sophisticam cum terminis relativis factam,

15. *ca* B. 28. *anima* (?) *pro aliqua* B. 30. *enim: autem above the line* B.
33. *non sedet* B. 36. *frequenter* B. 36, 37. *date — veritas in marg.* B.

ut superficialiter tactum est in priori capitulo. Maior ergo pars sophisticacionum in ista materia exsurgit ex hoc quod relativum in eadem proposicione vel in proposicione disparata refert suum antecedens stans confuse tantum, 5 vel sinkathegorice disiunctum. Unde negantes universalia statuerunt sibi, tanquam regulam faciendi sophismata, quod quandocunque relativum idemppitatis refert suum antecedens stans confuse, et indeterminate, facienda est copulativa ex duabus proposicioneibus consumilium ter- 10 minorum et contradictorie qualitatis. Ut, *promittendo denarium*, cum nulliusmodi singularis sit, *ille promittitur denarius qui non promittitur*, sicut et *ille non promittitur*; et *omnis homo est animal quod illud non vidit*; et sic differencia non ponitur inter tales proposiciones 15 ubi relativum in eadem kathegorica refert suum ante- cedens, et proposiciones in quibus relativum ponitur in disparata proposicione a proposicione sui antecedentis. Ut hic: *omnis homo est animal quod est rationale*; 20 *apparet homo esse animal quod est hoc*; et sic de similibus verificatis in sensu composito, sicut patet per exponentes earum. Sed aliter in sensu diviso de similibus terminis sunt false; ut falsum est quod *omnis homo est animal et illud est rationale*; sicut falsum est de auricalco quod *apparet hoc esse aurum, et illud aurum 25 est hoc*.

Sed patet ex dictis superius quod maior pars sophismatum in ista materia est neganda, et disiunctive facte ex oppositis parcium sunt concedende. Ymmo, sicut conceditur quod *omnis homo est animal quod est racio- 30 nale*, quamvis illud non sit dandum, sic concedendum esset de possibili quod *promitto tibi denarium quem tibi promitto*, quamvis ille non sit dandus. *Promittere* enim facit sensum compositum, cum potest fieri in communi circa aliquid cum hoc quod nullum eius 35 singulare terminent istam promissionem; ut, *promittendo sub istis verbis, dabo tibi denarium quem promitto*.

Most of them proceed from the fact that when the pronoun stands confusedly, for its antecedent, sophists make up a copulative out of that proposition, and another, its opposite: as: *I promise a penny, this penny not being singular, we have: I promise a penny that I do not promise i. e. and I do not promise it.*

Yet and . . . it does not amount to the same as the relative that; v. g. *man is an animal that is reasonable*, or: *man is an animal and it is reasonable*.

Most of these subtleties are to be denied, granting a disjunctive instead of the copulative. And we say: *I promise a penny that I promise*; for a promise can be made in general without specifying which.

2. in ex above the line B. 4. desperata B. 8. tro B. 11. nro B.
13. ille? B. 17. despata B. ib. a proposicione before sui in marg. B.

21. alie B. 35. tromet B.

4. *Disparata*. Here I have slightly changed the text; but later we find the words *proposicio desperata*, meaning one that entails great logical difficulties.

These sophists
cannot deal
with
philosophers,
politicians, or
any men
capable of
speech; their
assumption
would go to
prove the
wildest
absurdities,

and destroy the
very idea of
promising,
buying, selling,
gift, justice or
obligation,

and all possible
merit, or action
worthy of
reward.

All this is
impossible.
Every
meritorious
deed receives
its reward.

Patet ergo quod | maior pars sophismatum conces- B 50^b
sorum a sic opinantibus reputarentur apud antiquos
inpossibilis. Nec communicaret sic sophisticans cum
philosophis, cum politicis aut cum quocunque expro-
mendo conceptum suum; ut patet de istis: *promitto* 5
tibi aliquid quod non possum tibi dare; vado Romam
ad videndum hominem quem scio non posse videri; ego
iuste et provide emi vel vendidi equum quem scio et
scivi continue non posse emi vel vendi. Sor debet michi
viginti libros, et deus non potest facere ipsum satis- 10
facere pro debito quod sic debet. Sor racionabiliter obli-
gavit se ad faciendum penitentiam ad quam non potu-
erit obligari, cum non potuit illam perficere nec deus
illam exigere. Sor est dicior ex promissione Platonis
quam est Cicero, vel quam ipse prius fuit; sic quod sibi 15
est ius aquisitum valens. 20; et tamen si ex hoc in
aliqua proporcione esset dicior, ipse est in infinitum
dives. Promissio, emcio, vendicio, dotacio, iusticia,
obligacio, et cetera huiusmodi possunt esse cum hoc
quod non ad obiecta terminantur, nec sint de materia 20
vel de ente signando. Requiritur vel oportet ad hoc
quod *homo equitet vel habeat equum qui non potest por-*
tere eum; sicut, ad hoc quod cattus moveat caudam
suam, requiritur ipsum caudam habere, que non diffe-
rat a duabus. *Sor meretur amando hominem et tamen deus* 25
nec scit quod amat, nec scit sibi apparare premium quod
meretur; posito quod Sor noscat in universalis multos
concretos esse homines, et faciat actum universalem
volendi, vel amandi, quod concretus est talis, qui sit
omnis actus voluntatis Sortis; et mereatur ex nunc 30
habere premium, sed nullum premium exinde mereatur
habere; sic enim *operarii merentur mercedes, sed nullas*
mercedes merentur.

Et tunc patet conclusio iuxta principia illius opinionis,
que indubie est impossibilis; quia pro omni merito 35
ordinat deus premium quod scitur esse proporcionatum
merito. Nec Sor amat hominem, nisi ametur homo; et

4. poli^e B. 8. igit^e B. 16. aq^m B. 22. eq^{t3} B. 25. 2^b B.
26. ap^r B. 27. noscatur B. 30. exuc^t B. 31. cxm^t B. 35. i^due B.

5. We must remember that *a penny*, as promised, is a
universal; and Nominalists, denying these, denied that anything
was promised, unless in particular.

tamen actus verbi non cognoscitur nisi precognoscatur substancia actus. Patet quod si amatus vel amatum est tale amabile, tunc illud amatatur, sicut *hominis esse* amatatur, et illud est homo; quia *hominem esse* vel *natura humana*. Actus ergo amandi Sortis terminatur specialiter et capit suas condiciones ab amato; et tamen solum a signo in anima; ymmo *amare hominis* est in amato sicut honor est in honorato, quia aliter non differret ab amancia. Nec esset talis benevolencia hortata, nisi esset conformis benevolencie dei; ita quod deus amet illud idem, vel saltem velit hominem amare quem amat. Uterque enim wult et amat quod illa proposicio primarie significat: *Eiecus est bonus*. Deus ergo scit distinguere inter amatum a Sorte et inamatum ab illo; sicut sciret cui proficeret oracio Sortis, si caritative oraret, correspondenter ad amorem suum. Non ergo sophistandum est sic cum deo. Sicut ergo sic sophisticans dicit se mereri laudem ex illa subtilitate qua non meretur, ita premiabitur premio quod non senciet.

Supponatur ergo antiqua sentencia de universalibus cum qua logicus potest communicare cum grammatica et logica laboriose inventa et cognita, cum loquentibus in qualibet facultate; et tunc patet quod omnes conclusiones ille sunt impossibilis. Sed pro facultate loquendi,

notandum primo quod promissio est assercio aliquid dandi in futuro; et talis solum est subjective in rationali. Sed obligacio est in quocunque; nec refert sive promissio sit dotatum, sive pro equivalente exhibitum: oportet tamen quod assignatur dari promissum pro futuro; quia si daretur in presenti, tunc non esset promissio, cum promissio dicitur quod *pro omnibus missio*.

2º modo accipitur promissio pro signo promissionis | :
B 51* ut carta, voce, vel alio signo promissionis primo modo dicte. Et 3º modo accipitur pro illo quod promittitur. 35 Dividitur autem promissio in confusam et distinctam; in universalem et particularem. Confusa promissio est [qua] promittitur omne singulare universalis primo, principaliter, et distincte promissi.

Ex quo patet quod non oportet omne promissum dari 40 satisfaciendo pro promissione; sed sufficit quod detur

7. amari? B. 9. *aaηα* B; *ib. ozta* B. 10. am3 B. 13. Eieco? B.
13, 14. ds tig? B. 17. sic cum in marg.; *ib. ergo sic above the line* B.
31. qpol missio B. 37. qua deest B.

13. *Eiecus*. Probably the name of an imaginary man.

Love cannot exist without an existing object; if we love this: that a man is, we love humanity or human nature. It is in the loved one that the act of love is terminated.

And as all well regulated love corresponds with God's love of any person, He at least would know who was the object of love.

Sophists turn the tables on themselves; their subtlety merits, without meriting, a reward to which they are insensible. Let us then admit the old doctrine of universals; we shall see that all these conclusions are absurd.

Note that a promise is an assertion that something will be given; it exists only in reasonable beings, and may be conditional on another promise, or not; but it must imply the future.

It is not necessary to give *all* the essence promised; only what is promised explicitly or implicitly. It is enough to give one legal penny, if a penny has been promised; thus I shall have the 'universal' penny in its singular.

Note also that *I promise* includes a verb in the future, and may be expressed in many different ways; some of which imply obligation. 'Obligation generally signifies to be obliged' for a benefit; but there are three natural significations of the word:

1. When a person obliges himself without any necessity but his own will; this belongs to God alone.
2. When the obligation proceeds from a superior.
3. When it proceeds from need of a superior towards whom one is obliged: this implies servitude.

There are also obligations between man and man, parallel to the three former;

illud quod est explicite vel implicite promissum; ut, promittendo unum denarium in communi, omnis denarius promittitur, sed confuse; et sufficit dare quemcunque legalem denarium, et quemcunque singularem homo dederit michi, dat denarium communem qui explicite 5 promissus [est]. Patet eciam quod hoc verbum *promitto* de presenti, includit verbum de futuro. Ut si *promitto quidquid tibi*, tunc assero quod *dabo tibi illud*; et ideo non refert quibus istorum verborum promittens utatur: ut, *promitto tibi* hoc, *spondeo* vel *assero quod dabo* 10 *tibi* hoc, *obligo* me ad *dandum tibi* hoc, vel *dabo* tibi hoc. Verumtamen unum istorum potest quod non possunt reliqua. Possum enim dare tibi hoc, etsi non promittam tibi hoc; possum eciam obligare me ad *dandum* hoc ex debito insurgente, ex mutui receptione, 15 vel ex gracia promissione.

Obligacio tamen vel debitum famosius sumitur pro obligacione ratione beneficii preaccepti. Utraque tamen significacio est satis conveniens. Ex quo patet quod 3^x est obligacionis, vel debiti manieres. Prima est qua 20 debens vel obligatus *ex sua gracia*, sine superioris limitacione vel sui indigencia, statuit dare bonum alteri. Et omnem talem obligacionem vel debenciam concomitantur summa libertas in debente, cum solum deus potest sic obligari. Secundo modo obligatur quis quod ex 25 superioris essencie limitacione ad beneficiendum alteri sine debentis indigencia; et illo modo obligantur super celestia inferioribus; quamvis enim non recipient ab inferioribus equivalens, recipiunt tamen a causa limitante ipsa ad hoc quicquid habent; ideo illam obligacionem non concomitatur summa libertas. 3^o modo obligatur quivis alciori, ratione sue imperfectionis vel indigencie; ut creatum obligatur suo conservanti obligacione essenciali; et ista obligacio infert servitutem.

Alio autem sunt obligaciones preternaturales inter 35 homines, que sunt istis proportionales, ut dominus gracie obligat se ad beneficium sui inferioris, et sibi subserviens est obligatus benefacere inferiori suo ad preceptum domini; et serviens vel mutuum accipiens est obligatus domino vel creditori. Omnes autem obligaciones ille implicant indigenciam, cum dominus

6. est *deest* B. 15. debito insurgente et *in marg.* B. 19. *qunus* B.
27. *frcest* B.

indiget servo vel benefacto suo ad eius servicium vel exercicium in virtute.

Alie autem sunt obligaciones coactive, non exemplate in natura; sed pocius sunt non debite obligaciones, cum sint violente contra naturam.

Alie vero sunt obligaciones logicales, que non sunt nisi posiciones casuum; ut ponitur quod tu tenearis concedere *hoc* et omne sequens ex illo; vel quod debeas negare *hoc* et omne antecedens ad illud; et sic de aliis, que logici observant in posicionibus et depositacionibus; ubi [posicio] non est aliud nisi cognoscere quid sit possibile, et omne tale admittere; et post cuiuscunque talis posicionem concedere ipsam et quodlibet ex concessu sequens, et negare quodlibet bene concesso repugnans.

Et ad inpertinens (hoc est, quod non sequitur nec repugnat) respondendum est secundum suam qualitatem, sicut foret absque casu. In depositione vero, negandum est depositum et omne antecedens ad illud, vel ad bene negatum; et ad inpertinens respondendum est secundum sui qualitatem. Ista tamen bene cognita sufficient pro obligacionibus sophisticis; quia imposicio ipsa non est nisi posicio significacionis signi, cui imposicioni est significatum inpertinens. | Ideo, post imposicionem significacionis proposicionis, respondendum est ad illam ut ad inpertinens.

Sed dimisso isto, argumentatur tripliciter contra dicta.

Primo per hoc quod, si solum denarius communis promittitur tali communi promissione, et solum ille est iuste vendicabile ex promissione quod promittitur eidem: sequitur quod solum commune est vendicabile in placitis casuum promissionum; consequens est falsum, tum quia communia habita sunt per ante, si possunt haberri, et solum dare vel promittere quod habetur non valet; tum etiam, quia promissiones sunt practice, que solum fiunt per singulalia, cum vulgus non cognoscit talia communia.

Similiter, esto quod promittens promittat sub hiis verbis, *dabo tibi denarium singulare, vel alterum illorum in altera manuum mearum;* tunc non solum commune promittitur, sed singulare, sicut patet ex verbo promissionis; et tamen non potest convinci quod est illud

violent obligations: but these are not properly obligations; and logical obligations.

These are merely positions to be maintained, admitting a proposition and all that follows from it, or denying one, and all its antecedents; always supposing that it be not self-contradictory; and answering any irrelevant proposition as it should be answered in reality.

The affirmative course is called position; the negative, deposition.

Three objections.
1. If I promise a universal penny, I am not obliged to give anything but a universal one; but I cannot give a man what he has already, i. e. a universal penny; a promise is a practical matter, to be fulfilled by singulars.

2. Suppose that I promise somebody a particular penny,

6. non *pro* vero. 11. posicio *deest* B. 31. *pmmissionū* B. 33. v, B.
35. aliqua *pro* per B.

neither I nor the other man admitting the existence of universals; no universal penny can be promised in that case.

3. If I promise something, I promise everything; yet anything given fulfils my promise; if I buy a man, I do not buy myself, and therefore not a 'universal man'. And if I do, then I promise what I do not promise.

Answers. 1. We grant the first conclusion; what is demanded in justice is a universal penny, not this or that particular one. But it cannot be given, unless by means of a particular one; so it must be paid down.

The receiver had, we suppose, a universal penny before, but not on account of the promise; if he could have it thus without the particular one, it would do.

Similiter, promittendo *transcendenter aliquid*, non posset esse amplior promissio, quia omne intelligibile promitteretur; et tamen illa promissio non esset efficax, cum non oporteat dare optimum nec medium promissor, sed quidlibet dando foret satisfaccio. Non ergo homo emit seipsum et omnem hominem, etsi emat hominem [in] communi; et sic de vendicacione, accusacione, et conductione, et talibus que fiunt in universalis circa hominem. Sic ergo necessario est aliquid quod non necessario est. Ita, promittitur aliquid in casu quod non promittitur.

Ad primum dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda, cum nemo placitans pro communi promissione denarii vendicat illum denarium vel illum, sed vendicat quod debetur sibi denarius: quod fuit promissum. Sed quia tale commune non potest dari vel haberi nisi per singularare, ideo requiritur promittentem dare singulare; et tunc sequitur ipsam, dando universalem, impleri promissionem. Non enim potest quandoque dari vel promitti singulare, nisi in sic faciendo involvatur universalis; quia omnes tales predicationes secundum habitudinem suscipiunt universale a suis singularibus. Et sic conceditur quod habeam communem denarium per ante (si habeam aliquem denarium) non tamen ex illa promissione, ideo vendico illud commune michi dari ab illo qui sic promisit; quia, si posset michi dare illud sine denario singulari, placet michi. Sed cum non potest, ex dacione sua multiplicius habebo illud commune. Quotquot enim denarios quis habuerit, tottunus pliciter habet communem denarium, ut si infinitos denarios habet, infinitupliciter habet communem denarium; sicut infinitis vicibus dando denarium, infinities daretur denarius. Talia enim adverbia numeri significant vicissitudines, et alia adverbia numerum suppositorum. Et sic multum confert dare et promittere, more magnatum,

1. *cō above the line* B. 11. *in deest* B; *ib. accusare* B. 23. *pt*
quā B. 27. *habitum* B. 28. *habitum* B. 35. *habet tunc* B.
39. magtū B.

denaria in communi, et si illa habita sint per ante, quia exinde multiplicius habebuntur; et in duplo plus valet habere denarium communem duplicitus, supposito quod habitus ille non aliunde noceat.

5 Ulterius patet quod tam actus iusticie coniunctive quam actus iusticie disiunctive, sicut et actus liberalis, B 52^a magnifici et quomodolibet aliter virtuosi | fuit circa universalia. Execucio tamen actuum respicit singularia; sicut lex est de universalibus et execucio legis de 10 singularibus. Potest enim dominus promittere vel dare michi dextrarium, et si non habuerit tale, et dacio valet michi multum. Sed subserviens non deliberabit michi dextrarium nisi singularem habuerit, executive michi dando.

15 Nec dubium quin plebei naturaliter confuse cognoscunt universale; sicut patet de incantantibus et tam animatis quam inanimatis naturaliter intelligentibus universalia. Unde bruta naturaliter cognoscunt quod album, dulce, vel tale sensibile est; ad hoc enim sufficit sensus 20 interior. Et sic negantes universalia, ignoranter conveniunt in sententia cum ipsa ponentibus; ut nullus negabit sensum talem, *hominem esse est necessarium*. Et ad hoc quod homo sit, nullum singulare hominis requiritur; sed sufficit quod unum singulare sit posterius 25 aliquid et illud, quod sine aliquo homine potest esse; et est tam necessarium et permanenter volitum a deo et intentum a natura; salvatur in diversis succedentibus; et sic est eternum, necessarium, incorruptibile quid, commune cuilibet eius supposito et ubicunque fuerit 30 aliquid eius suppositum; et sic de aliis que philosophi breviter locuti sunt de universalibus.

Nec dicet grammaticus quod hec est incongrua: *hoc est multiplicatum*, demonstrando per *ly 'hoc'* primarium significatum huiusmodi propositionis, *homo est*; nec 35 dubium quin verbum sit parciiale; et bene sequitur: *hoc est multiplicatum; ergo, hoc est hoc*. Verumtamen pronomen in proposito appellat communiter, cum demonstrat universaliter illud quod est multa; et sic non proprio est pronomen. Et sic invenimus de omni sententia 40 quam ponunt philosophi de universalibus, quod omnes

So acts of justice, liberality etc. concurred universals, but the execution of such acts regards singulars.

A lord may promise me a steed, though he has none; but his groom will not deliver it to me, unless there is a steed to deliver. We deny that the people knows nothing of universals: incantations prove the contrary. Even brutes know them to some extent; even those who deny them will not deny that humanity is a necessary essence, without any singulars of men being required to make it up. It is willed by God and intended by Nature; eternal, unchangeable, and present in each of its singulars.

To say: *This is multiplied* is not against grammar, if this means the being of man. And it is then not properly a pronoun.

2. pro inde. 19, 20. vel—universalia *in marg.* B. 28. quod B.

35. pale B. 39. inveniens? B.

All men grant sciolli convenient in sentencia, sed errando discrepant this in reality, in verbis. Sunt tamen multe subtile斯 consideraciones de it in words; universalibus, quas plebei et clerici ignorant in parti- and there are secret depths culari, que subtilibus logicis et metaphysicis reservantur. of this doctrine that acute Wulgus ergo, sicut ut brutum, cognoscit sibi conveniens 5 logicians and metaphysicians alone can know. specifca, que non fundatur in signis.

2. Even when a man promises one particular penny, he promises a universal, because the universalis here included in the singular; only he promises it vaguely.

Ad 2^m dicendum quod promittens sub tali forma verborum, promittit communia; quia sicut non potest esse commune sine singulare, nec econtra, sic nec pro*mitti*. Verumtamen secundum quotlibet gradus potest tam singulare quam commune promitti; ut confuse et confusius. Nam promittendo singulare primo et distinete, promittitur universale secundarie et confuse, et econtra. Sicut ergo sequitur: *A significat homo, ergo significat animal*, ita sequitur: *promitto tibi illum denarium; igitur, promitto tibi denarium*. Unde in casu limitato promittitur denarius in universalis contractius, et promissione sic confusior quam si promittitur cum paribus suis hiis verbis, *dabo tibi denarium*. 20

Universal and *singular* are terms of the 'second intention'. A term is of the 'first intention' when it does not connote either universality or the reverse in the thing signified; of the second when it does.

Nam isti termini, *universale* et *singulare*, sunt termini 2^e intencionis, connotantes communicabilitatem et incomunicabilitatem. Vocatur enim signum, terminus prime intencionis qui significat suum significatum, non connotando rationem universalitatis vel singularitatis; ut isti 25 termini: *homo, animal* etc. Et vocatur terminus 2^e intencionis qui connotat alterum istorum, ut isti termini *universale, singulare, genus, species, substancia prima, et substancia 2^a*.

A term is of the 'first, imposition', when it has not been artificially created; of the second, when it has. These two sets of expressions neither include nor exclude each other. And the terms *genus, species* *universal,* *singular,* are analogously employed for all predicamental beings, and are above them all.

Sed terminus prime imposicionis vocatur terminus 30 quicunque, significans primarie significatum quod non est signum artificiale, ut sunt isti termini: *universale, homo, etc.* Et terminus 2^e imposicionis vocatur terminus significans signum humanitus inventum, ut sunt talia: *nomen, verbum, etc.* Ex quo patet quod terminus 35 2^e intencionis est terminus prime imposicionis; et multi termini prime imposicionis sunt termini prime intencionis. Patet eciam quod isti termini: *genus, species, universale, singulare*, sunt analoga encia circum decem genera, et sunt superiora ad quemcunque terminum prime 40

8. dr *above the line* B. 18. *īvīs* or *īvēs* B. 19. s' *pro sic above the line* B. 21. *āqui* B. 39. *cūteq̄* B.

intencionis per se in genere; cum omne singulare sit genus, et species, et omnis species est genus, et econtra; sed ratione differunt, ut prius dictum est. Unde iste raciones |
 B 52^b vocantur res 2^e intencionis; et res significate per ter-
 5 minus prime intencionis vocantur res prime intencionis.

Dicitur ergo quod cum verbis primo significatis promittitur denarius universalis; sed iuxta prius dicta, ille terminus singularis 2^e intencionis contrahit terminum communem ad supponendum limitate pro de-
 10 nario singulariter dando, sicut et faciunt signa particula-
 ria. Ideo non est idem dicere: *dabo tibi denarium*, et *dabo tibi denarium singularem*; quia intendendo primam, feruntur intenciones universaliter incontracte in denarium; sed intendendo 2^{am} feruntur intenciones
 15 indifferenter in unum singulare; et illud principaliter est promissum. Et sic contrahitur etiam illacio per illum terminum: *alterum illorum*. Ideo ex ista pro-
 missione est dare denarium qui specialiter promittitur; sed solius promittentis est discutere quis sit ille. Ideo
 20 sufficit legi quod cogatur dare unum denarium, vel alterum istorum. Nam, iuxta prius dicta, est dare in-
 finitos gradus contrahendum communium suis quacunque specie specialissima, ex limitacione accidentalis pro-
 prietatis adiecte speciei; ut, *vir* est specialior quam
 25 *homo*, et *anglicus* quam *vir*; et commune ad utrumque istorum est specialius quam *anglicus*. Ita tamen non sunt species substancialis, quia ponunt formaliter acci-
 dencia substancialium.

Et faciliter patet quid promittitur quacunque tali 30 promissione primo et principaliter; quia illud quod primo et principaliter significatur verbis promissionis; ut commune ad utrumque illorum promittitur, quando sic promittitur: *dabo tibi alterum istorum*. Ista tamen signa partitiva: *aliquid*, *alterum*, *singulare*, *duo*, *unum*,
 35 et quotquot similia, limitant ad intellectum pluralem; et ita limitant verba predicata, ut: *intendo emere bovem*, *conducere equum* vel *apararium*, etc. intenditur parti-

We, therefore, answer that the words, as they signify, promise a universal penny; but they are contracted by the 'second intention' of the word *singular*, etc.

So the meaning is indeed different.

Here, therefore, there is one particular penny to be given; but which it will be must depend on the giver, and the law cannot do more than force him to give some penny or other. There are infinite degrees of individuation of a universal term.

What is, therefore, promised? That which the promising verb principally signifies, i. e. the universal.

17. ex ista and dare very illegible B. 22. ^{9m} pro contrahendum B.

37. *apariū* B.

13. *Primam*. And. (l. 14.) 2^{am}. I do not know what feminine substantive this refers, and therefore leave the words as they stand.

25. *Cummune*. Wyclif evidently means 'combinatum ex utrisque', i. e. *vir anglicus*; but I do not think the MS. is wrong.

37. *Apararium*, I believe, means *apparel* here.

culariter de illo quem non habeo, et de quo potest esse racionabilis commutacio; quamvis logicus diceret hoc non oportere.

It may be said
that man
is an equivocal
term if it
signifies at once
the universal
and the
singular.
'Man' —
including a
painted 'man'
and a living
one — is indeed
an equivocal
term; not so
this.

How can
species differ
specifically
from their
individuals?
There would
be another
species
including
both, and so
on for ever.

I do not
admit that
mortal belongs
to the
definition of
man;
corruptibility
and
incorruptibility
may be
differences
found among
things of the
same species.
The Corruptible
and the
Incorruptible
differ very
widely; yet not
all things that
are one or the
other differ
so much.

A singular man,
denotes
incommuni-
cability; a
universal man,
the reverse;
man denotes
neither.

Et si argumentatur quod iste terminus, *homo*, sit equivocus, cum significat homines singulares et hominem communem, qui differunt plus quam genere, cum unum sit corruptibile et aliud incorruptibile; nec est illa vera diffinicio, cum unum sit mortale et aliud inmortale: dicitur quod iste terminus, *homo*, est equivocus, significando hominem et ymaginem hominis pictam, sed non significando universale et eius singulare; et sic eundem terminum contingit nunc esse equivocum et nunc univocum, secundum diversitatem intendendi per illum. Nec esset possibile quod species differret specificè ab individuis suis, quia super ipsam speciem quodlibet illorum. Nec est dare speciem specialissimam communem speciei, sibi et illis singularibus, nisi cavendum ne sit processus in infinitum. Et cum species sit quodlibet eius individuum, patet quod est *omne animal rationale et mortale*, et per consequens communicat in diffinicie cum eius individuis.

Credo tamen quod *mortale* non est propria diferencia hominis, quia est accidentis privativum; ymo, stat res eiusdem speciei specialissime differre corruptibilitate et non corruptibilitate: ut patet de celestibus et sublunaribus, et de accidentibus eorum; ut numerus, linea, superficialitas, corporeitas, lumen, figura; et quotlibet talia accidentia in celo incorruptibilia sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime cum accidentibus corruptibilibus sublunaribus. Et sic, quamvis corruptibile et non corruptibile differunt plus quam genere, non tamen omnia huiusmodi plus differunt. Sed corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt istis proprietatibus, et non solum genere logico, nec solum genere suorum subiectorum, nec pluri diferencia quam diferencia generis. Non tamen oportet quod differant plus quam aliqua que genere differunt.

Sic ergo iste terminus, *homo singularis*, de sua particulari significacione significat naturam hominis incommunicabilem multis personis; et *homo universalis* significat eandem naturam, ut communicabilis est. Et

15. stripā ē B. 35. pli B.

iste terminus, *homo*, neutram istarum racionum connotat. Frequenter tamen termini 2^e intencionis significant similiiter sine connotacione racionis huiusmodi; ut patet in istis: *Ego sum species, ego sum homo communis.* Et 5 frequenter connotant tales raciones; ut in istis: *singulare man mean one differt ab universali.* Ideo, sicut supra dixi, in talibus que videntur contradicere non est repugnancia sententie.

Et si obicitur quod contingit intelligere *alterum 10 istorum*, sicut et *singularem*, non contracte, intelligendo unum singulare pocius quam quocunque, sicut experientia docet; dicitur quod sic intelligentes abutuntur significacione termini; et frequenter cogitat homo confuse de singulari, dum tamen ignoraverit; ut cogitando 15 quod *rosa est pulcer flos*, et *homo est elegans creatura*, communiter intelligendo illas species sub conceptibus ymaginabilium que notacius in una specie sunt in ymaginativa mea. Et sic facit maior pars hominem, que non habet intellectum elevatum sufficientem ad intelligendum universaliter illas abstractas essencias, sicut docet Lincolnensis. Intelligendo ergo sic similiiter non repugnarent illa: *Alter 20 istorum denariorum promittitur*, et *neuter istorum promittitur*; quia sicut hic non est contradiccio, *homo est species et nemo est species*, propter suppositionis singularis mutacionem in pluralem; sic nec in proposito, cum eadem sit causa, ut dicitur. Sic ergo, etsi nolim quod sit universale, non eo minus erit, me invito: ymmo, sequitur me illud promittere communi promissione, etsi velim oppositum. 25 Ad tertium dicitur quod talis promissio non valet ad lucrum illi cui promittitur; quia etsi esset dare invisibile, minime valens, cum tamen illud non potest per se dari, deficeret execucio iuris in talibus casibus. Ideo iurista reputaret omnes tales casus frivulos, sicut 30 et casum quo ponitur Sor mereri cum Platone per horam uniformiter gradu meriti ut 4^{or}, sed mereatur Sor usque ad finem inclusive et non ultra, et Plato usque ad finem exclusive. Certum est quod nullus iudex mortalis sciret proporcionare illa premia suis meritis 35 totalibus correspondenter; sicut nec testes possunt per experientiam proporcionare, vel docere quod de facto unus

But these adjectives are not always necessary to make the word "man" mean one way or the other.

To say that a *singular* means one particular singular, is an abuse of language; we often think by imagination of some particular which we do not know to exist. Such are the thoughts of most men, whose intelligence is not sufficiently lofty to understand abstract essences. There is, therefore, no real contradiction between:

One of the two, and neither, is promised; and the promise will have a universal object, even in spite of me. 3. The promise of "something" is a valid promise, but a useless one; it could not be judicially enforced, as the smallest of things cannot be given. As in the case of two men meriting a reward, but one during only one instant less than another: no man could settle the

difference
between their
merits; nor
could the fact
be proved.

sic alium excessit in merendo. Sic ergo quodlibet, promissum tali promissione, valet; sed promissio talis non est utilis propter defectum executionis de mere nobis cognito possibili. Deus tamen scit si promittens teneatur dare ex promissione tali quiddam, et quomodo tenetur dare.

When we
promise to
give a universal
of which the
singulars are of
equal value,
any of those
singulars will
do, but none of
less value;
when the value ut
varies, we are
bound to give
an average one
and the judge's
duty is to see
that, as nearly
as possible,
this is done.

Nota tamen quod, pro promisso de aliquo communi inter eius individua non differencia in valore, satis est dare quodcumque individuum; ut promittendo denarium in communi, satis est solvere quemcunque denarium ari- 10 genteum non peccantem in pondere vel figura; sed non est satis dare denarium peccantem in aliquo istorum, est satis dare plumbeum vel aliter equivoce bonum. Quod si promittitur, cuius individua sunt gradatim bona, capien- dum est de illis mediocriter bonum, secundum circum- 15 stancias promittentis et persone cui promittitur; quod relinquo politicis secundum epikeiam iudicandum. Ut, promittendo lignum vel bovem in specie, habet iudex proporcionare valorem individui dandi ad circumstan- cias [et] particularitates []. Et in talibus satis est quod B 53^b iudex arbitretur, iuxta suum credere, arbitrio pro- pinquo veritati, quia non tenemur, cum non sufficiamus arbitriari iustum simpliciter. Et taliter arbitrandum est quando promittitur aliiquid in genere; ut si sic: *dabo tibi unum animal*. Et, si queratur quantum debet dari, pro- 25 mittendo universaliter, distributo termino significante promissum; ut sic dicendo: *dabo tibi omne aurum mundi*, dicitur quod multe promissiones huiusmodi sunt inanes. Ideo sufficit logico dicere quod de veritate significacionis esset solvendum. Sufficit ergo quod pro tempore con- 30 gruo detur omne aurum quod fuerit in mundo pro tunc. Et patet quante differt universaliter promittere aut confuse.

When a man
promises *every*
animal, or all
the gold in
the world, we
may say that
the promise is
logically
obligatory,

but ethically he
would not be
obliged, because
in all such
promises it is
understood that
the thing
promised must
be possible.

So every
impossible
promise or vow
is null and void.

Et si ulterius queratur utrum illud quod non potest esse potest promitti, dicitur quod sic. Ideo diceret logi- 35 cus quod sic promittens: *omne aurum mundi dabo tibi*, aurum quod non potest esse promittit; quia omne aurum significatum per terminum promittit et infinitum mag- num significatur per terminum, *aurum*. Sed politicus diceret quod, quando sub communi includuntur aliqua ad que obligatus non potest tendere regulariter, intelligenda 40

7. promissio B. 8. non est B. 18. hone B. 20. et deest B.
26. v^m pro universum B.

est tacita condicio de possibilibus; ut in quocunque voto vel obligacione alia intelligitur: *si illud potest fieri*. Vana ergo est huiusmodi promissio universalis, et alia quecunque, que non potest impleri.

5 Ulterius conceditur quod fatue emendo bovem in communi incontrakte, universalis bos distinete emitur, et quilibet singularis bos confuse. Et sic de vendicatione, accusacione, conduccione, que sunt in universalis; nec est inconveniens quod quis improvide vadat ad forum ad emendum vel conducendum res proprias; quia intendit hoc, sed confuse; principaliter enim et distinete, si discrete intendit tali commutacioni subcibilia quibus indiget; et sic contraccius intenditur quam speciem; et sic non secuntur inconveniens adducta. 10 Nota tamen quod facientes sophismata cum talibus verbis, negando universalia et actus confusos, habent cum quocunque gerundivo talia facere sophismata, rationi verbi inclusi; ut: *vado ad videndum*, est sensus: *vado pro videre*. In omnibus enim talibus gerundivis intelligitur actus proponendi, vel actus intendendi. Et si dicatur quod inconveniens est concedere quod homo intendit vel proponit emere res proprias, dicitur quod non. loquendo de intencione vel proposito confuso inordinata; sicut non est inconveniens hominem scire illud quod nunc ignorat et cum difficultate adiscit. 15 Et si communiter delectant restringere tales actus ad distinctos, tantummodo respectu illorum ad que principiter terminantur, tunc concedendum esset quod homo bovem emit, sed nullum singularem; sed et vadit ad emendum alloc, sed nullum alloc vadit emere. Vel 2º oportet dicere quod in omnibus commutacionibus subauditur "taliter commutabile". Vel 3º commutatio illa est irrationalis; ideo fatuitas sequitur ex illa. Moderni ergo, reputantes superiorem modum loquendi absurdum, modicum attendunt quomodo absurdius esset dicere quod vadens ad forum ad emendum victualia nescit quid emat; ymmo, emit pisces et cetera multa, et tamen nec deus nec ipse scit quid emit, quia nichil 25 emit. Ymmo, unus dedit sibi equos, sellas, et multa | talia 40 donaria, et tamen non debet sibi regraciari pro donatis,

12, 13. subcibilla B. 18. errantes est sensus errantes B. 20. ppo^{dt} B.

25. indefinite; corr. in marg. B; ib. non pro nun̄c B. 26. commune B;

ib. delcat B. 30. alloc or aleoc before sed B. 39. sellas telas B.

has been given, if v. g. A horse is given. cum aliis nichil dederit sibi: ymmo, utroque oblivisce donacionis, vanum esset laborare rememiniscendo vel referendo quid donans vel magnificus dedit sibi, sicut vanum esset querere de specie, magnitudine, bonitate, et ceteris accidentibus huiusmodi donacionis. Ta- 5 liter enim sophisticans ex sua sophistica incurret indignacionem suorum benefactorum promulgando illam logicam suam. Accusacio autem est de singularibus; et de querela in casu de universalibus, ut dicitur, predatus conquiritur de latronibus, et post evidentem noticiam de personis predantibus, accusat eosdem.

Though a thing may necessarily not be necessary, it does not follow that what is promised is not promised: because necessarily alludes to the whole proposition; and we must also have something — universal or singular — that is promised. I may know in general that a planet exists, without knowing the existence of any one in particular. And this knowledge, even referring to particular instances, is distinct, i. e. in its principle; but not distinct as to the facts it may or may not include. Sed pro ultimo dicto est notandum quod sicut necessario aliquid est contingens, ita necessario aliquid est quod non necessario est. Sed non ex hoc sequitur per locum *a simili* quod possibile sit hominem promittere aliquid quod non promittitur; quia actus termini mobilis fertur super veritatem significatam per illam propositionem: *Aliquid erit quod non necessario erit.* Sic ergo, si similitudo esset ad propositum, significandum esset illud quod promittitur. In omnibus ergo talibus veris sophismatibus est dare commune, vel singulare, super quod fertur talis actus: ut distincte scio planetam esse quem non ut sic distincte scio esse; posito quod distincte sciām quod planeta est, et quod omnem planetam ignorem esse, tunc scio planetam esse quem non distincte scio esse: est unum commune quod distincte scio, sed nullum eius singulare sic scio; et cum commune non sit dandum nisi aliquod eius singulare sit dandum, patet quod si distincte *quemlibet planetam cognovero esse planetam*, tunc falsum est quod distincte scio planetam esse quem non sic scio esse. Infinitas tamen partes celi non distincte scio esse; et tamen, quacunque michi ostensa, sic quod sim certus illam esse partem celi, statim scio distincte illam esse. Unde planetam aliqualiter scio esse, qualiter nescio istum planetam esse; quia distincte scio *hoc esse*, demonstrando rationem; et tamen non distincte scio illum planetam esse, cum ignoro utrum sit planeta sicut pono. In proposito autem non est dare denarium quem non

2. bonum vanum at top of page B. 3. *t above the line for vel*
after donans B. 10. em^{tem} B. 23. *que* = quem? B; *ib.* sicut B.
25. scio B. 26. *que* = communem B.

promitto super quem fertur talis promissio, cum omne singulare communis denarii promittitur confuse. Si autem promittam sub hiis verbis: *dabo tibi denarium quem tibi non promitto*, adhuc communem denarium confuse promitto. Et sic falsum dico; nec excusor per hoc ne tencar solvere denarium, quia in illo falso implicatur *quod dabo tibi denarium*; ad quod teneat, cum sit possibile.

Unde in talibus obligacionibus sunt tria: scilicet casus, actus obligacionis, et verba obligandi. Quodlibet autem illorum trium est possibile per se: sed primum est incompossible cum duobus sequentibus: ut ponatur *quod* *dabo tibi denarium quem non promitto*; quia, si sic non *dabo* denarium *quem* non *promitto*; quia, si sic non *obligem* me sub hiis verbis sic sequentibus, et *quod* *obligem* me, tunc omnem denarium promitto. Si autem sub hiis verbis *obligem* me: *dabo tibi denarium quem non distinete promitto*: certum est quod in solvendo universaliter promissum, generaliter verificatur tale dictum.

B 54^b Unde in tali casu: *promitto tibi denarium quem non distinete promitto*, et ille est dandus, quia quilibet denarius singularis est talis; et tunc sophisma est simile priori, ut cum distinete scis aliquid esse quod non scis esse. Sed in omni tali casu illud est dandum, nisi quia quid distinete promitto in tali casu, dicto quod *denarium quem non distinete promitto*; sed nec illum nec illum sic distinete promitto. Et si *obligem* me sub istis signis: *dabo tibi alterum istorum et quem non teneor tibi dare*, satis bene admittitur casus, quia teneat multa facere que nunc non teneat, cum succedente oportunitate temporis, vel alia variacione circumstancie, insurgit nova obligacio. Unde deperdicio, consumpcio, vel alienacio unius promissionis obligat me ad dandum, reliquum ex debito. Multiplex tamen est obligacio tenenda, vel debitum secundum variationem modi obligandi.

35 Unde, secundum theologos, aliqua debeo facere sub pena peccati mortalis, et aliqua sub pena parva amissionis antiqui meriti, cuiusmodi sunt opera super-

I cannot give the penny that I do not promise, for there is none such.

And if I say, I will give the penny that I do not promise, I tell a falsehood, and yet the object is universal, and I am bound by my promise. Three factors here: the particular case, the obligation, and the words: the first is incompatible with the two others.

But if I say: I will give the penny that I do not distinctly promise, there is no difficulty, for any particular

penny is such, and we return to the previous case (of distinct knowledge). Also, if I say: I will give the one of these two that I am not obliged to give; for I may be obliged to give it hereafter.

Some acts are obligatory under pain of mortal sin, and others, of loss of merit.

12. pōr puta B. 19. q̄p || que B. 22. ut above the line B. 36. vā or pā pro parva B.

37. *Meriti*. According to the Catholic Church, merit can be lost only by mortal sin. *Antiqui* is very likely a mistake; perhaps *maioris* (atis) would be the right word.

As we cannot always do what is perfectly right, we sin continually. We ought not to oblige ourselves to do anything in the future; and I am not obliged to fast on any particular day; for it might be that my fasting would be more acceptable on any other. Thus I ought to do many things which I am not absolutely compelled to do; and if I gave them up for a year, I should sin continually. Another answer to the foregoing difficulties: I am obliged to give a particular thing, which God only knows.

errogacionis. Unde non est possibile non bene omnia hic facere que debemus. Ideo continue peccamus, licet non mortaliter. Unde obligans se et heredes suos ad dandum annuatim 10 in perpetuum non debet infiniti-pliciter; nec debet dare 10; sed debebit isto anno dare 5 decem. Et ex isto patet quod non est possibile quod racionabiliter sim obligatus ad ieunandum aliquo die huius anni quo tenebor ieunare; quia, si bene ieunabo alii quando, tenebor tunc ieunare; nec potest esse rationale quod obliger sub pena mortalis peccati ieunare illo 10 die, quo non tenebor sub pena mortalis peccati ieunare; quia tunc deventus ad ultimum dierorum limitatorum, essem perplexus, et per idem ante illum diem. Multa ergo sunt racionaliter fienda ad que deus non potest obligare me sub pena peccati mortalis: ut racionabile 15 est quod faciam multa ad que non obliger sub tanta pena. Ymmo, si per annum cessavero a faccione talium, ego continue peccarem mortaliter.

Alia responsio est, concedens quod deus scit quod singulare universalis teneat dare, cum non potest esse 20 indifferencia quo ad deum. Sed ego ignoror illud; et ita est dare singulare quod debo dare, quamvis indi-viduum humanum deficiat. Et ignorancia istius inducit omnes illas frivolas conclusiones supradictas. Negando ergo formam casus ponentes in datoribus in talibus 25 commutacionibus.

All this is but an introduction to the difficulties of this subject. Ista autem iam dicta erunt occasionalis introduccio ad inveniendum latentes difficultates in istis materiaiis.

2. qnt^o in marg. B. 4, 5. iſſitup^r B. 8, 9. al^η B. 25. pot^{es} B;
ib. drōb, B.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Sequitur de sophismatibus ortis de relatione relativi Continuation of
idemperitatis ad antecedens pluralitatis, discretum pro the same
suppositis quorum non est dare totalem multitudinem. subject;
5 In talibus enim fiunt huiusmodi sophismata. solution of
sophisms.

B 55^a Primum : omnia compossibilia illorum 4 contradicto-

riorum sunt scripta, que vel sunt deus, vel illa non possunt esse. 2^{um}. Omnes homines quos deus potest producere, possunt esse chymere, vel illi non possunt

10 esse producti ab aliquo si non a chymera. 3^m Omnia que deus potuit facere, possunt esse deus, vel nichil

15 B 55^a potest differre ab alio. [4^m.] Aliqua possunt fieri; et si ipsa, vel aliquid illorum esset factum, deus differret a se. Et sic de quotlibet similibus sophismatibus.

20 Primum autem probatur, significando ista 4 contradictoria : *tu es, tu non es. Ego sum, ego non sum*; que sunt a, b, c, d, scripta secundum ordinem ; et tunc patet quod prima pars est vera, sicut et sue exponentes;

25 et secunda pars est vera, eo quod repugnat aliqua esse omnia compossibilia illorum. Si enim aliqua duo dentur omnia compossibilia, supersunt alia duo com-

possibilia istorum : non ergo data sunt alia compossibilia istorum et 3^a istorum sunt omnia com-

possibilia istorum : tum quia quecunque istorum iam dentur, illa sunt incompossibilia, tum eciam quia perinde alia 3^a essent compossibilia istorum. Nec 4^{or}

25 B 55^a sunt omnia compossibilia istorum, quia nulla 4 sunt istorum, sed ista, et illa 4 non sunt compossibilia.

Et isto modo probatur quod omnes homines universales similes, equales, socii, vel adversarii, currunt, et nullus illorum movetur. Et omnes ille conclusiones

I. Four given written contradictions are either God or impossible. II. Impossibility of the production of man by God. III. All is God, or all things are identical. IV. God would differ from Himself by creation.

I. Demonstration. Take four such; A is B, C is D, not B, C is not D. A and C, B and D are two couples that can coexist;

but the couples A and B, C and D cannot coexist. Thus the four: A, B, C and D are and are not possible at the same time.

This reasoning, extended, applies to universals that must exist at the same

1. Cap. deest, space for initial S. 3. plits B. 9. chys B. 10. chys B.
12. ab al B; ib. 4^m deest B. 24—26. istorum—essent in marg. B. 26. plus, B.



time; yet the coexistence of some of them at the same time implies contradiction.

probantur per hoc quod nulla talia possunt esse omnia talia qualia exigent conclusiones. Contra illas conclusiones argumentatur supponendo duo: primo quod omne relativum restringit suum antecedens ad kategorice supponendum. Aliter enim non plus posset esse 5 suum antecedens quam adverbium vel aliud synkategoricum. Et hoc pretendit illa posicio, ponens vere quod omne relativum idemperitatis reflectans significacionem super suum antecedens significat idem quod suum antecedens; ut si omnis homo est animal et ille 10 currit, tunc ille qui est omnis homo currit. Per hoc enim probatur quod falsum est omnia compossibilita istorum esse, et illa esse finita vel infinita, eo quod tunc illa que sunt omnia compossibilita istorum sunt huiusmodi et finita: illud fundat omnes conclusiones 15 huius materie.

Every object of thought may be indicated by a demonstrative pronoun: if not, these and those are to be excepted; which is itself an indication.

2^o; supponatur quod quecunque significanda sint, sive finita vel infinita, sive possibilia sive impossibilia, sunt demonstrabilia, ut illud patet expositorie; quia aliter esset dandum de aliquibus quod illa non sunt 20 demonstrabilia. Sed, negando quod illa possunt demonstrari, vel concedendo quod *illa non possunt demonstrari*, satis implicatur per subiectum huius propositionis 'demonstrari illa que data sunt non posse demonstrari.' Ideo tam expositorie quam inductive patet supposicia.²⁵

Things that cannot exist, may be thus indicated, since they can be known to the mind. These may be pointed out in particular, and infinite others. For the number of things compossible is infinite.

Similiter, aliqua que non possunt esse, possunt demonstrari, cum possunt intellectui notari; et eadem ratione omnia que non possunt esse: ergo nulla impossibilitas existendi impedit demonstrabilitatem. Et ex istis patet quod hoc verbum *demonstrari*, est summe 30 ampliativum, ita quod sequitur: *omnes homines demonstrantur, igitur omnes homines qui possunt esse vel qui non possunt esse demonstrantur*. Et forte deus necessario demonstrat alicui omnia demonstrabilia, et per consequens infinita que non possunt esse. Similiter,³⁵ secundum precipuos philosophos, unus numerus infinitus est reliquo maior, sicut tota universitas causatorum est infinita. Sed nulle tales propositiones essent concedende, vel negande, nisi infinita possent demonstrari illorum. Sive enim sit verum sive falsum quod 40 unus numerus infinitus est reliquo maior, dande sunt

^{23.} implicatur; *ex above* B. ^{27.} uori B.

singulares talium, per quarum subiecta bene intellecta demonstrari habent infinita. Est ergo firmissime tenendum quod si aliqua possunt intelligi, ipsa possunt demonstrari, et per consequens, cum necessario infinita intelliguntur, necessario contingit demonstrari infinita.

B 55^b Quibus habitis, argumentatur tripliciter contra primam Yet it is not so.
conclusionem. Primo sic. Ista sunt | omnia compossibilia These propositions
istorum; ergo, aliqua sunt omnia compossibilia istorum. are all that are compatible,
10 Et demonstro per *ly*, 'ista', omnia que sunt compos- understanding by *these*, all that can
sibilita istorum, et solum illa que sunt compossibilia coexist, and only those; for
istorum. Cum enim possum demonstrare quecumque I am free to take which
voluero iuxta secundam suppositionem, et sine dubio libenter volo sic demonstrare, patet quod possum sic I like.
15 demonstrare. Sicut ergo impossibile est rationale non And thus the
posse intelligere quicquid voluerit, sic impossibile est whole aggregate
rationale non posse demonstrare quidquid voluerit. is compatible.
Possibile est ergo demonstrare hoc aggregatum, sive
20 possit esse, sive non. Et antecedens patet per hoc
quod omne demonstratum per *ly* 'ista' est istorum,
sive sit multitudo, sive unitas; ut patet ex casu. Hec
ergo proposicio: *ista sunt omnia compossibilia istorum*,
primarie significat sicut est.

Similiter, ista sunt, cum quodlibet istorum est, eo Again, these
25 quod nichil demonstratur per *ly* 'ista' nisi quod est; exist, for no
et cum ista non sunt infinita, sequitur quod sunt things can be called *these*
finita, et omnia finita de aliquo numero sunt quo ipsa unless they formaliter numerantur. Ergo et ista sunt de tali exist; therefore their number is finite, and is numero. Et quicunque detur, patet quod istorum theirs;
30 numerus sic est istorum sicut et ista habent illum for number is distinct from its subject.
numerum. Sic enim est idem numerus 10 canum et
10 equorum; nec forent ista formaliter multa, nisi haberent numerum, sicut suppono, cum omnis species
quantitatis distinguitur a subiecto. Quod si loquamur
35 de numero pro rebus numeratis, patet idem, cum singula illorum sunt de istis, et partes numerales
illorum; nec habet aliud sensum hec proposicio apud
bene intelligentes: *Ista sunt [omnia compossibilia] istorum*. Again, call these
Similiter, ista 4 sunt A B C D; sed illi duo binarii propositions
40 sunt compossibilia: ergo ista 4^r solum sunt illa que A, B, C and D, A and C, and

13. sppom B. 29. demonstratur de^r B. 38. omnia compossibilia
deest B.

B and D can be coëxistent, and these couples alone. But these two couples are the four contradictories, which are therefore compatible;

It is not necessary that each proposition should possibly coëxist with the other, or there would be no contradictories.

Answer.

I consider this conclusion as impossible. That each of the 4 is coëxistent with the others, I admit; they are those that they are, and yet differ from those that they are.

The four, and not only three of them, can be coëxistent.

sunt compossibilia, et per consequens, sicut sunt illa compossibilia, ita sunt aliqua compossibilia. Sunt enim duo paria compossibilia, et illa duo paria compossibilium non sunt nisi duo et duo, que sunt illa 4. Aliter enim non cognoscerentur plura compossibilia quam A; et sic, posito quod ista 4 essent omnes propositiones, et sic prime essent tot compossibilia quo sunt binarii vel paria possibilium; scimus tamen quod BD sunt alia compossibilia quam AC. Ideo Deus conservans omnia compossibilia, conservat et cognoscit plura compossibilia quam A et C. Non enim oportet quod singulum compossibilium sit compossibile singulo, quia sic non contradicerent propositiones, nec converterentur, nisi singula sic se haberent ad singula illorum; quod est contra dicta tractatu proximo.

Videtur ergo michi quod prima conclusio, sicut et quelibet consimilis, est impossibilis. Ymmo conceditur quod ista sunt 4 compossibilia istorum, quia singulum istorum est compossibile alteri; nec est inconveniens quod ista sunt istorum et tamen sunt ista, sicut ista sunt ista et tamen differunt ab istis. Potest enim quelibet talis proposicio dupliciter sumi; in sensu composito vel diviso, tam ratione subiecti quam ratione predicati. *Ista 4 ergo sunt compossibilia, et non 3^a istorum sunt omnia compossibilia.* Nec sequitur ex istis quod 4 contradictoria sunt unum istorum vel quod unum 4 sunt pauciora quam 4. Et si obiciatur quod 4, inter se contradictoria, sunt compossibilia, conceditur conclusio.

Just as well as we can say that these four are contradictory, we can say that they are compatible; they are contradictory and compatible, two and two.

Unde pari evidencia qua conceditur ista 4 contradicere inter se vel sibi ipsis, concedendum est quod sunt compossibilia inter se vel sibi ipsis: Sicut enim bina et bina contradicunt, sic bina et bina sunt simul; et sic de ceteris que diversim, reciproce, vel alternativam, inexistent, 4or vel quotlibet pluribus. Attendum est tamen est ad numerum subiectorum et ad condiciones 35

Note again the subjects and predicatorum; quia 4 proposiciones sunt convertibilia et predicates; the subjects are different, but the predicates either identical or contradictory. We grant that istis 4 or all things compatible

contradictoria; sed duo non. Et duo homines amant se in casu, quia reciproce; et odiunt se, quia alternativam. Et si 2º obiciatur quod omnia compossibilia sunt ponibilia et admittibilia, et per consequens sic est de 40

compossibilia, conceditur conclusio.

26. sunt contradictoria B. 34. p̄fib⁹ B. 36. p̄tor⁹ B.

Ymmo, conceditur quod simul sunt possibilia, et sic admissibilia; et concedo quod stat in casu ita 4 bene admitti ab ipsa ponentibus sic primarie significando; quia stat unum par bene admitti ab uno et aliud par bene admitti pro eodem instanti a reliquo. | Ymmo stat eundem bene admittere ista duo paria pro eadem mensura a diversis hominibus. Non tamen oportet quod si ista sunt compossibilia vel possunt simul esse vera, quia possibile sic et illa simul esse vera, quia 4 sunt duo paria possibilium que possunt simul esse vera; sed non est possibile quod simul sint vera. De duobus tamen non sic sophisticatur secundum sensum compositum et divisum. 4 enim sunt compossibilia, quia duo paria compossibilium; et eadem 15 4 sunt duo paria incompossibilium.

Nec sunt aliqua incompossibilia. In 4 enim sunt 6 coniugaciones binarii possibilis, iuxta dicta de duobus; ergo sequitur *ista sunt compossibilia; ergo possibile est quod simul sint vera;* sed de 4 non sequitur, propter 20 combinaciones binariorum in 4 quales non sunt in duobus. Nec tantum dicuntur combinaciones compossibles, quamvis sint possibiles pro eodem instanti, sed quia significata primaria illarum stat simul esse pro eodem instanti. Multe autem sunt propositiones com- 25 possibles que, ut secum convertibles, possunt esse vere pro aliquo instanti: ut patet de ipsis; *nulla proposicio est, et hoc instans est,* et multe possunt esse vere pro aliquo instanti que non possunt simul esse vere; ut iste due possunt esse vere pro medio instanti crastine 30 diei: *Ego sum et ego non sum,* quia utraque istarum in sensu diviso potest esse vera pro illo instanti; et tamen neutra simul potest esse vera cum altera istarum, continue sic primarie significando sicut iam significat primarie.

35 Et si 3º obiciatur quod iste 4 propositiones non sunt compossibles, nec possunt simul esse vere, eo

may be admitted, and that these are together possible;

one couple may be admitted by one person, another by another at the same time.

But if they are possible that may be true, yet it is not possible that they be true at the same time. These sophisms can not be made with one couple only:

Four — i. e. two couples of incompatibilities, and compatibilities — are required.

In these four propositions we find six separate compatibilities which can together be true; but it does not follow that all the four propositions can be true together.

Many propositions may be true at a given instant, and some, true at a given instant, cannot continue true; as the fact of an existence that ceases to be.

Is may be objected that if these four could be true at

3. b₇ ad i p mitti ad b; *place of words here very doubtful.* 4—5. ab uno — admitti *in marg.*; instanti a reliquo bottom of page B. 9. quod; quia above B. 25. n^o pro ut B. 26. ut — instanti *m* *marg.* B. 32. cum altera istarum *in marg.* B. 33, 34. sicut — primaria *in marg.* B.

17. 6. *A is B; A is not B; A is C; A is not C;* and so on. Of these pairs of propositions, six are compatible: *A is B; A is C, A is D, B is C, B is D and C is D.* But the six negatives (*A is not B, etc.*) are also compatible with each other.

one time they would be compatible; but it seems inconsistent to say that at the same time they are compatible and incompatible.

quod tunc omnes iste 4 essent compossibles, et tales sensus pretendunt communiter loquentes in talibus sophismatibus. Non enim videtur bene illa sonare quod ista 4 possibile est esse vera pro B instanti, et non est possibile ista 4 esse vera pro B instanti; nec quod 5 ista 4 sunt compossibilia et eadem 4 sunt incompossibilia, et per consequens non compossibilia. Sic enim duo contradictoria et contraria incomplexa vere predi-

We repeat that they are compatible two and two, and incompatible likewise.

Thus four men may be friends and brothers, enemies and strangers, each to each, but not each to every one; like coaltenerate angles.

So 4 contradictions may be true at a given time; but not two.

Ad ista dicitur concedendo sicut prius, quod omnes iste 4 proposiciones sunt 10 compossibles, quia divisim bine et bine; et omnino ille 4 contradicunt, quia divisim bine et bine: et sic 4 homines sunt similes, amici et fratres, et tamen sunt cum hoc valde dissimiles, inimici et disparium nacionum. Unde si quilibet vir sit frater alicuius, 15 omnes viri sunt fratres: non singulus singulo, sed sin-

gulus alteri. Anguli enim sunt sese respicientes, coaltene, aut contra se positi; etsi non quilibet sic se habeat ad quemlibet. Et sic conceditur, tam de 4 quam de duobus contradictoriis, quod illa possibile est esse 20 vera pro B instanti, et non est possibile illa esse vera pro B instanti; sed 4 contradictoria possunt simul esse vera pro B instanti, et duo non. Et sic, si duo sunt contradictoria, tunc utrumque contradicit alteri, nec de duobus similibus vel quibuscunque connotanti- 25 bus relacionem equiparancie. Non tamen oportet, si duo sint paria contradictiorum, quod unum illorum parium contradicat reliquo; sed sufficit quod singulum illorum contradicat alteri vel alicui illorum. Et patet

Thus two couples of contradictories are not necessarily contradictory; it is enough for one member be opposed to one in the other couple.

quod sequitur: *hoc est par contradictiorum et hoc est par 30 contradictiorum; ergo, ista sunt contradictoria et paria contradictiorum;* et tamen non sequitur: *hic est frater et hic est frater: ergo isti sunt fratres;* cuius diversitas satis patet.

Opposites cannot be predicated of individuals, but they can of universals;

Ulterius, quantum ad predicacionem oppositorum 35 de eodem, patet ex prius dictis quod non est possibile de eodem ultimo singulari duo opposita diversim per se formaliter predicari, sed de eodem communi pro

1. Essentially: divisus bene possunt. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo modo as of Christ, twofold and yet indivisible. *et hoc est divisible,* demonstrando Cristum, qui est

10. sic B. 26. eq'pon^e B. 30—31. et — ergo *in marg.* B. 40. 2^m
above per B.

due nature. 2º modo de eodem ternario numerali predicantur duo opposita ad sensus equivocos; ut, *4 homines sunt similes, et idem 4 sunt dissimiles.* Et 3º modo coniunctim, ut: *ista 4º sunt numerus par et numerus 5 impar.* Sed duo contradictoria inconnexa non predicitur per se divisim formaliter de eodem | ; ut, quamvis illa 4 sint incompossibilia, non tamen sunt *non* compessibilia; quia tunc sunt illa que non sunt compessibilia; et per consequens ad nullum sensum sunt compessibilia. Sed termini privativi non sic negant.

B 56º Et si dicatur quod tenet consequentia ab affirmativa de predicato privativo ad negativam de predicato infinito, dicitur: est ut sic, et est ut non. Nam in terminis de plurali, ubi multi sensus sunt negandi, non oportet predicatum privativum inferre sic predicatum infinitum quod plus negat. Nec valet subtilacio illorum qui dicunt quod si iniustum est, quod tunc non iustum est, et nullum iustum est. Innumerabilia ergo contingit fieri sophismata secundum diversas combinaciones sensuum, et denominacionum cum terminis de plurali; sicut hic et in fine tractatus proximi est videre.

Quo ad 3ª alia sophismata, restat videre si aliqui possunt esse omnes homines, vel omnia que deus potest creare. Si non, tunc illa tria sophismata et quecunque similia sunt vera. Et si sic, tunc omnia talia sunt impossibilia. Argumentatur ergo 1º de hominibus, quod non est dare omnes homines qui possunt produci; quia significatis illis, si possunt produci, tunc possibile est quod illi sunt vel erunt. Posito ergo quod erunt, querendum est utrum pro quolibet instanti vel tempore erunt infiniti vel non. Quomodounque dicetur, sequitur inconveniens; quia impossibile est quod sit magnitudo universitatis infinite vel multitudo encium actu infinita. Et si continue, omnes tamen erunt simul infiniti; tunc deus continue creabit homines secundum ultimum sue potencie et sic terminaretur sua potencia ad valde parvum, quod foret maximum in quod posset; et tunc nemo possit producere suum simile, nisi qui de facto producit; nec posset accelerari produccio alicuius,

2. Separately, with different meanings; four men are like and unlike.
3. Together: *four* is at once even, and includes an odd number.

We may say: these four are incompatible, but not *not* compatible; privative terms deny separately, but not together, like negations. It may be urged that privations imply negations. Yes and no. No, when plural terms are affected by them.

On this point there are countless fallacies; see the end of the foregoing treatise.

II. Can God create the greatest possible number of creatures? If so, an infinite number of men could be produced, and exist together; but an infinite number is impossible; so is infinite bulk.

God would exhaust His power in this infinite multitude, which is yet very little. No man would be able to beget his like, unless he actually did so, and with his

14. universaliter pro ubi? B.

21. *Videre.* In *Logice Continuatio* 2nd part, last chapter.
22. This is a favourite question amongst Schoolmen, bristling with difficulties, whichever answer be given.

ultimate effort
there would
be God's
infinite power
exerted to the
utmost.

Again, if a
general
resurrection is
possible, all
these infinite
men could
exist together
and the world
would be
infinite, or God
could not make
a more perfect
creature.
And then not
one man more
could either be
created or
perish.

The positing of
this greatest
possible number
would lead, by
the same
reasoning, to
the denial of
free will.

Take the word
man, and take
that greatest
number of men
possible; it is
certain that
man includes
infinitely more;

we cannot
exhaust the
signification of
a general term;

nor suppose
that *man* may
signify some
individuals that
God cannot
possibly
produce.

For what
reason could he
not produce
them?

nisi forte desperdatur potencia producendi hominem pro tempore futuro. Primo sic quilibet applicaret se ad producentem suum simile tam efficaciter sicut posset; et preter hoc deus tantum multiplicaret creaciones hominum sicut posset. ⁵

Similiter, quicunque homines possunt esse, possibile est eos simul esse, cum resurreccio generalis sit possibilis. Cum ergo omnes isti possunt esse, possibile est eos simul esse; et tunc haberetur mundus infinitus; vel in potentiam dei ad faciendum quamlibet creaturam maiorem; quod de facto est. Sequitur eciam quod nullus istorum prodest producere suum simile, nec deus novum hominem creare, vel aliquem istorum corrumpere; et si aliquem istorum corrumperet, non posset novum loco illius producere, eo quod tunc non ¹⁵ essent primo dati omnes homines qui possunt esse. Ymmo verisimiliter vel ex dubio sic ponenti *quotquot homines possunt produci sic producentur*, et per idem ex simili dubio: *omnia que evenirent inevitabiliter evenirent*, et nichil casualiter, nec aliquid posset mereri vel demereri ²⁰ et tolleretur omnis contingencia ad utrumlibet et libertas.

Similiter, certum est quod iste terminus, *homo*, significat infinitos preter istos vel aliquem istorum; sed quemcunque iste terminus significat, deus potest producere. Ergo infinitos preter istos potest deus produ-

²⁵
cere. Maior patet ex hoc quod non solum contingit ymaginari vel intelligere quod infiniti alii ab ipsis erunt, verum eciam contingit probabiliter credere quod alii ab ipsis erunt. Et certum est quod sic intelligens conciperet per talem terminum, *homo*, istos alios ab ³⁰ ipsis vel aliquo istorum; igitur talis terminus, *homo*, non solum significaret istos vel aliquos istorum. Et iuxta illud videtur sequi quod non est dare omnia que terminus communis quicunque significat. Et minor argumenti videtur, ex hoc quod caret omni ratione ³⁵ significare aliquem hominem quem impossibile esset deum producere; cum quoslibet homines quos ymaginor esse infinitos, deus potest producere. Ideo aliud B 57^a

est dicere quod deus non potest producere talem essenciam, et aliud est dicere quod deus non potest ⁴⁰ facere ipsam esse huiusmodi. Theologo ergo videtur

6. rr^o gual in marg. B.

esse difficile fingere rationem quare deus non potest producere illum hominem; vel annichilatis istis omnibus, producere in toto novos, quia aliter, anichilatis omnibus possibilibus preter deum, non esset possibile esse 5 aliquid preter ipsum.

Talia ergo argumenta et multo potentiora contingit facere ad probandum quod non sit possibile omnia que possunt esse, fore in tempore eterno; quia contradictorie veritates contingencium ad utrumlibet possunt esse sive 10 fore: etsi una erit reliqua non erit; ut sunt quotlibet tales: *hoc fuit futurum*, et *hoc non fuit futurum*, demonstrando filium meum. Caret ergo omni apparenzia probabilitatis quod nullus relativus vel eius significandum posset causari ab homine, vel ab aliquo, nisi id quod 15 de facto erit esset.

In oppositum argumentando, suppono prima aliqua esse infinita; sed quia istud communiter negatur, probo illud supponendo 1º quod, si sunt aliqua quorum numerus non sit distincte a nobis noscibilis, tunc illa 20 sunt naturaliter infinita. Ut, si aliqua sunt omnia puncta illius linee, non est nostrum distincte scire quot sunt, nec in qua proporcione se habent ad 4^{rium} vel ad quemcunque numerum nobis finitum. Quo supposito, argumentatur intentum sic: aliqua est universitas rerum, 25 sicut et aliquis est mundus; sed neutrum potest poni, nisi aggregatum ex numeraliter infinitis: ergo aliqua sunt taliter infinita. Similiter contingit demonstrare quecumque infinita, ut patet ex predictis demonstratis; ergo, omnibus partibus que componunt hoc continuum, 30 et solum illis vel aliquibus illarum. Non est racio negandi quod isti sunt, aut quod ista sunt ista, cum proposicio solum significat illa esse que de facto sunt singulariter.

Aliter sequitur quod infinitum multa sunt corpora que deus non cognoscat nec essencialiter, et per consequens valde multa sunt corpora que non sunt cognita vel causata. Antecedens patet per opinionem concedentem quod non tot corpora possunt esse. Cum ergo sequitur: *infinitum multa corpora sunt*: ergo *aliquot corpora sunt*; et cum antecedente stat, ymmo sequitur,

6. S|| before talia zt¹ in marg B. 13. r^{ens} B. 33. Sil^r = similiter B. 33. a^{lr} above; argumentatur B. 35. cor^s — con^s in marg. B. 40. a^{te} B.

30. The general sense is sufficiently clear, but some words are probably wanting in this place.

Such arguments go to prove that in eternal time all that can be, will not be;

and that our principle concerning relatives is false.

To answer, we assume firstly that some things infinite exist.

Whatever multitudes exceed our power of distinct knowledge, are infinite. We cannot v. g. know how many points there are in a line.

As we must grant that the world exists, so we must grant things infinite; for as already shown, we must assume that the parts of a continuum are so; and that each part exists separately.

If not, we are driven to deny that God causes these parts or even knows them; and yet they are proved to exist!

quod deus non causat illa: ergo cum consequente stat quod deus non causat illa. Nec alia, vel plura significat antecedens unius relativi in una propositione quam in reliqua: ideo relacio ad diversa antecedencia non facit diversitatem. 5

We also have
to deny all
propositions
that imply the
infinite,
among which
several are
evidently true.

And in the case
of lines, sounds
and such things
in general of
which no
ultimate element
makes up the
whole, but only
a part, we must
deny that they
have a cause.
The whole is
no longer the
sum of its parts,
for then it
would be
infinitely great.
I protest, these
seem the
poorest of all
sophisms.

And the answers
given are of no
value.
Some say that
there is an
infinite
multitude,
known by God
separately; but
then this
infinite
multitude really
exists.

Others, that
these (infinitely
numerous parts)
are; but cannot
be separately
affirmed; but if
they *are*, they
are beings; and
therefore, *these*
singular beings,
or nothing.

Similiter, iuxta istam viam neganda est quecunque affirmativa in qua predicatum implicat kategorice infinita, ut tales: *hoc corpus componitur ex omnibus suis partibus*; *deus cognoscit omnia que ego cognosco*; *deus videt cuncta que fecit*; et sic infinita conservaret, 10 quorum nullum potest conservare, cum nullum illorum potest esse bonum vel non bonum. Ymmo, si ipse conservaret omnia corpora que ego conservo, tunc esset infinitum potencior quam est modo. Ymmo, quando infinita successive concurrunt ad aliiquid causandum, 15 sic quod nullum illorum faciet totum, sed quodlibet suam partem, sicut contingit de linearibus, de sonis, et aliis tam permanentibus quam successivis; tunc illud causatum non causabitur ab aliquo, nec ab aliquibus causacione univoca. Et sic ubi auctores ponunt totum 20 esse omnes eius partes, vel saltem causari ex illis, ista via dicit quod si aliqua earum esset complete compositum ex omnibus eius partibus, ipsa esset infinitum; et tantum pompat de suis diviciis, quod deus non potest cognoscere omnia bona sua propter multipliciter. Sed, deum contestor! inter omnia sophismata unquam inventa videtur michi quod ista minimum valent. 25

Nec valent responsiones devie que dantur | ad B 57^b salvandum ista dicta; ut aliqui concedunt quod in-30 finitum multe res sunt, et deus cognoscit eas in sensu diviso; sed hoc est contra primam suppositionem, que declarat quod ista implicat quod deus cognoscit illas res que sunt infinitum multe; et hoc bene concedit opinio. Alia via concedit quod *ista sunt* (demonstratis 35 infinitis), sed *ista non sunt ista*: Sed certum est quod si *iste numerus est*, tunc *ista que sunt iste numerus sunt*; et per consequens aliqua sunt iste numerus; et sic ista sunt ista. Sequitur enim: *ista sunt*; ergo, *encia sunt ista*, per conversionem. Sed que encia, si non 40

1. *quante pro consequente* B.

8. *componi* B.

13. *genuo* B.

17. *Imbg* B. 22. *aliquid* B.

ista? Si enim solum demonstrarentur per *ly* "ista" *illa que sunt*, et illa demonstrarentur per *ly* "ista", sequens est quod ista sunt ista que sunt. Tertia via dicit quod omne demonstrantur per *ly* "ista" est, ^{Others, that each separate part is singularly affirmable, but not together in the plural.} sed non omnia demonstrata per *ly* "ista" sunt. Sed ista via, sicut et priores, dicit in devium; quia contra istam viam stant raciones priores. Si unum omne demonstratum per *ly* "ista" est, tunc omnis numerus vel multitudo demonstrata per *ly* "ista" est.
 10 Nec habet colorem quod omnia visa a me videntur a te et tamen, si deus cognosceret quod nos videmus illa, ipse annihilaret nos ambos; Sor tamdiu numerabit materias primas quo usque deus non possit ipsas cognoscere; et tamen quelibet quam numerabit est eterna;
 15 quelibet res intellecta a Sor est: et tamen si aliquis numerus esset omnium istarum, tunc ipse esset asinus, quia impossibile est quod sit aliqua multitudo que non sit pars alterius multitudinis. Similiter sequetur quod Sor promisit infinitos denarios et deus non potest satis-
 20 facere pro illo per se vel alium; sed Sortes satisfaciet promissioni, solvendo quemlibet denarium quem promisit, posito quod Sor in loculo habeat denarium cuius aliquam partem continget inferre residuo, existente legali denario. Tunc patet quod Sor in illo infinitos
 25 denarios communicantes habet; promittat ergo Platoni omnes denarios qui sunt in loculo suo, et solvat omnem partem illius.

Supposito ergo quod quecunque infinita sunt demonstrabilia, argumentatur quod aliqui possunt esse omnes homines. Nam *isti homines possunt esse* (demonstrando omnes homines qui possunt esse et solum illos). *Nulli non possunt esse, nisi omnes homines: ergo, aliqui possunt esse omnes homines.* Minor patet ex hoc quod omnes homines demonstrati per *ly* "isti" possunt esse, sicut 30 quilibet illorum potest esse. Sicut ergo omnes res collectim sunt omnis res, sic omnes homines collectim possunt esse omnis homo, cum ipsi non possunt esse alii. Similiter maxima significabilitas humane nature est danda, cum data parte, dandum est suum totum. Sed 35 illa non esset danda, nisi esset danda maxima multitudo hominum quibus potest communicari: igitur etc. As, therefore, each individual in this infinite number can be pointed out, some certain men are all men. As each of them can exist, so can the whole multitude: and as all things are everything, so all men are every man. We must admit a maximum of significance of the term "man"; if so, a maximum of individuals to which it can apply:

6. *ducunt* B. 13. ³*mas* B. 38. *ficatis* B.

or we should not know to what extent God can actuate the possibility of man.

And God Himself, not knowing the number producible would not know the essence of man perfectly.

Every individual signified by the term must be possible, or the term would signify what it does not.

There is, therefore, a maximum of men possible. And if of men possible, of men simultaneously possible.

If not, the indefinite number would imply a world that might be infinitely great, and, therefore, an infinite and useless vacuum surrounding our world.

This is a problem of far more depth than the preceding sophisms. It is answered:

By Peripateticians, granting an infinite number of men to exist in an infinite time and an eternal world: but not at the same instant. By Christians, denying the

Aliter enim non esset dare quam productivus esset deus hominum, cum non sit precise tam causativus hominum sicut est conservativus hominum, nec tam conservativus individuorum alicuius speciei quam voluntivus est conservare eadem; quod repugnat omni 5 potencie divine; et per idem non cognosceret deus gradum communicabilitatis illius termini *homo*, cum non cognosceret quot ad maximum significat. Nec cognoscit in qua proporcione sit iste terminus, *animal*, eo ipso communior: et similiter, cum omne quod iste 10 terminus *homo* significat potest esse, sequitur quod omnia que iste terminus, *homo*, significat possunt esse. Et certum est quod non plura nec altera, nisi illa vel aliqua illorum significatorum possunt esse homines. Ergo est dare | maximum numerum hominum qui B 58* possunt esse, sicut est dare totalem multitudinem quam iste terminus, *homo*, significat.

Ymmo cum omnes homines qui successive possunt esse possunt simul a deo conservari, sicut est dare quot homines possunt simul esse ad maximum, sic est 20 dare quot homines possunt esse ad maximum. Si enim non est dare maximum numerum hominum possibilem simul, tunc infinitum magnus posset esse mundus, et per consequens esset vacuum infinitum extra mundum plus capax corporis quam aliquid esset causativum 25 corporis; quod claudit contradictionem, cum tunc quilibet pars illius vacui superflueret, et per consequens esset causatum a deo et non causatum a deo. Et similiter, consimilibus mediis, contingit arguere quod omnium specierum vel generum est dare maximam 30 multitudinem individuorum possibilem.

Quoad istam difficultatem, patet quod longe aliud quam istam sophisticam requirit declaracio illius materie. Unde varie responsiones, secundum quod diversimode sic opinantur materiam se habere. Peri- 35 patetici autem ponunt generationem rerum eternam esse a parte utriusque extremi; et illi ponent quod impossibile est omnes homines qui possunt esse, fore pro aliquo instanti. Verumtamen, ampliando verbum, bene possunt esse in tempore eterno. Cristiani vero 40

1. *productivus* B. 2. *causativus* B. 8. *qualiter pro quo?* B. 11. *per* B.
33. *item* sop^a. B.

vere ponunt quod impossibile est mundum esse eternum
a parte ante, cum necessarium sit quod omnes partes
mundi pro certo instanti inceperunt esse, et pro certo
instanti cessabunt generaciones sublunarium, cum
mundus habebit ultimum eius complementum.

Et utraque pars oppositionis est bipartita. Nam primorum aliqui ponunt nulla posse esse, nisi que sunt vel erunt; et sic omnia ponunt inevitabilitate naturali evenire. Aliqui vero ponunt contingenciam ad utrumlibet, vel ratione materie, vel ratione libertatis prime cause. Et sic de 2^{da} secta. Aliqui ponunt quod deus terminat se ipsum maximo numero possibili numerorum punctalium, ex quibus fit mundus, et sic nichil potest annichilare, nec mundum maiorare vel minorare; sed animas usque ad certum numerum creare et non ultra. Et sic terminat se ipsum, secundum raciones ydeales maximo numero individuum substantie possibili. Et specialiter de partibus mundi eternis. Quo ad illas enim ordinat numerum simpliciter congruum; ita quod superaddendo excederet, et diminuendo deficeret a proporcione debita, sicut est de magnitudine, figura, etate, et numero mundi, cum suis partibus.

Nec est talis limitacio propter defectum potentie, sed propter infinitatem scientie, mensurantis talia secundum ultimum et optimum sue factibilitatis; sicut deus non est impotens, quamvis non posset facere hominem esse asinum, corrigerem circulum vel aliud factum secundum ultimum sue complecionis. Et ita cessabit homines producere, cum sciverit tot esse productos quot esset conveniens produxisse; nec plura posset superaddere, quia non potest agere omnimode superflue, et omnes tales partes mundi servabit in eternum post datum tempus i. e. post diem iudicii: bestie tamen et alie substancie corruptibiles cum accidentibus hominum possunt diversificari in numero, magnitudine, loco, et tempore, et aliis circumstanciis. Et sic non omnia futura inevitabiliter evenient; cum illa que subiacent humanis actibus possunt impediri ex quotlibet causis fortuitis

eternity of the world, and the continuation of generation after a certain instant.

Of the former, some posit absolute necessity, and others admit a contingent happening.

Of the latter, some say that the maximum number of men corresponds with that of the punctal atoms of the world; and that nothing can be destroyed, increased or diminished, God's power terminating itself with this maximum number; and as all things are in ideal and necessary proportion, He can change nothing in the world.

This limitation proceeds not from finite power, but from infinite wisdom, doing all that is best; just as God is almighty, though He cannot make a man to be an ass, or a round line straight. No more men can be produced, when all that should exist, exist. As for brutes etc., and human actions, they are not subject to this absolute rule.

11. [¶] pro cause B; ib. [¶] pro 2^a B. 24. po^o B. 35. acci ^o horum hominum in marg. B.

11. *Aliqui ponunt.* This is Wyclif's opinion

Thus, not all future things are inevitable: events that depend upon the human will may be prevented or not.

In the state of immortality, there will be no generation of men, for the very reason of that state.

If, therefore, God's power is said to transcend these limits, it is dependent on His will;

that anything can exist if it is necessary to have a cause able to produce it; and of two seemingly possible souls, the one that will not exist is impossible, because God cannot will it to be.

And so of any other creature.

It is impossible that all these beings are or will be these singulars: separately they may be; but together, one excludes the other.

Thus, without denying the infinite multitude of possibles, without denying

vel iuvari, nec est de imperfeccione hominum, cum fuerint sic incorruptibiles, quia tunc non poterunt producere sibi similia; nec deus tunc continueret generationem rerum secundum illum ordinem. Tunc enim erunt homines inmortales sicut celum et intelligentie; 5 per consequens ad perfectionem illorum carebunt indigencia producendi sibi similia pro se salvandis vel perficiendis, cum hoc non sit perfectione | sic nisi secundum quid, ponens imperfectionem evacuabilem.

Quo ad dicta hominum quibus est credendum, 10 dicitur quod, si ponunt quod deus potest in plus, intelligunt conditionaliter: *si voluerit*. In hoc enim stat omnipotencia sua, quod, si iubet aliquid fieri, tunc illud facit: quod impossibile est competere alteri ab illo: et ista negat secundam conclusionem sicut et 15 primam. Sed concedit alia duo sequentia; quia contradictionem claudit quod omnia que ego vel quecumque alia res potest facere sunt vel erunt, cum a quo cumque tali veritates possunt et fieri; et si una illarum fieret, reliqua non fierit. Ut patet de talibus: *Ista anima erit*, et 20 *ista anima non erit*. Nam iste [sunt] due veritates que possunt esse, et tamen nec deus nec aliud a deo potest creare ipsas, quia non possunt esse causate, nisi ab aliquo quod non potest causare illas. Et sic: *ista possunt causari*, demonstrando omnia creabilia; sed non 25 est possibile quod *ista creabuntur*, nisi aliquid potest causare ista; et sic ista ambo possunt esse, sicut utrumque illorum potest esse, quia utrumque potest esse de numero quo ista possunt numerari. Sed non est possibile quod *ista sunt vel erunt ista*; quia si 30 unum erit, reliquum non erit; et ista deus potest causare, quia utrumque divisim; sed non potest causare *ista*. Et sic multa sunt cognoscibilia, sed deus non potest cognoscere illa, quamvis illa potest cognoscere; ut patet de istis: *Ego fui producturus filium*, et 35 *ego non fui producturus filium*.

Non ergo negandum est aliqua esse infinita; nec repugnat signare quecumque deus potest facere. Ymmo, conceditur quod ista possunt esse ista divisim; et

3. *erit* B. 19. *una utre* B. 21. *sunt deest* B. 23—25. *ipsas — causari in marg.* B.

quando ponitur quod *ista sunt vel erunt*, negandus est casus. Nec videtur michi verum quod infinita numeratiter sunt finita numeraliter. Sed infinitum multa sunt finitum multa, ut patet per exponentes; sed hoc non antecedit ad priorem propositionem, cum illa sit infinita cuius quodlibet singulare est impossibile, nec est aliter particulariter verificabilis. Non enim est dare quanta sit, si non infinita; nec quomodo disparitei significabit subiectum eius a subiecto multiplici de 10 similibus terminis.

Est ergo signare aliqua infinita, quorum aliqua possunt esse et aliqua non possunt esse, cum numerus numerat aliqualiter que non possunt esse: non sic quod mensurat quot sunt, sed mensurat quot vere intuemur.

15 Et illa solet antiquitus concedi intellectualiter. Et si dicatur quod in aliis terminis talia convertuntur: *Ista possibile est esse et: possibile est ista esse; Ista deus potest cognoscere et: deus potest cognoscere ista, vel ista cognoscere*, quod idem est; dicitur quod hoc est 20 gracie materie, quia multa verificantur de infinitis que non competit finitis; et aliquibus finitis multa possunt competere que reliquis non possunt competere. Quandocunque hoc verbum *potest* (vel equivalentis) precedit affirmative oracionem imperfectam, impli- 25 catur potentiam posse in suum significatum; ut, *si deus potest ista cognoscere*, tunc est potencia vel possibilitas ad ista cognoscendum. Sed quando mediat, tunc sufficit quod ad illa divisim est potencia cognoscendi.

Addit eciam illa posicio quod ille terminus, *homo*, 30 non significat infinita, sed solum illa que possunt esse, sicut nec aliquid significat: *inintelligibile* vel: *melius deo*. Isti termini iuvant ad significandum *hominem*, vel aliquid absolutum, aliqualiter se habere qualiter non possunt se habere; ut iste terminus, *homo*, consignificat 35 in casu hominem esse iusinitum magnum, et ipsum esse omnes res, vel infinita supposita, et quotlibet modis se habere, non per se, sed racione adiuncti.

Primo ergo et per se significat naturam illam, et secundarie significat quotcunque individua, quibus 40 ipsa potest communicari; et 3^o, racione adiuncti, significat quecunque volueris, ut in ista: *Tot possunt esse*

that certain in particular are causatively possible, and even that all may be so, it is denied that all will be so.
An infinite multitude is, therefore, finite, though an infinite number is not.

Of this multitude some can, some cannot exist.

These things can be; therefore, it is possible for these things to be.

True, if by 'these things' the abstract objects of thought alone are meant; they are infinite. The place of *can or possible* in a sentence, may in many cases change the sense.

In this theory, *man* does not signify an endless multitude, but merely those that are really possible; the rest imply self-contradiction.

So it means in the first place, human nature; in the second, all individuals that can have that nature; and

4, 5. *m̄ta* B. 7. *m̄ce* B. 24. *p̄m* B. 27. f.; sufficit above B.

thirdly (with an addition) anything whatever.

This last meaning is, however, quite irrelevant to the universality of the term.

homines quot possunt esse animalia significat iste terminus, *homo*, causatam multitudinem hominum quanta potest esse animalium; ymmo illam naturam per se, et homines qui possunt esse, primarie significat; sed secundarie posse esse tot homines quot possunt esse animalia. Sed talis significacio est impertinens communitatim termini, cum attenditur penes communica | bili- B 59^a tatem sui primo significati et non penes multitudinem, cum ymaginabile est ipsam communicari; quia ymaginabile vel intelligibile est hominem esse omnia que possunt esse, vel ydemptificari cuilibet.

Thus God knows the precise degree of extension of each term, and the individuals each contains; and I much prefer this opinion.

Ideo, ut superius dictum est, deus scit gradus communitatim terminorum, sicut scit quot ille terminus, *homo*, significat; nec significat ille terminus, *sol*, multos soles; nec iste terminus, *ly* "chymera"¹⁵ multas chymeras, cum talia multa possint esse, vel forte ex adiuncto. Et tenendo istam viam, que est michi valde opiniabilis, tollerentur faciliter instantie supradicte.

Another system is now more in vogue, which refuses to limit God's power to anything below the Infinite, exclusively. For this reason, an infinite multitude has been denied not only to exist, but to be individually affirmable *as such*. Without this denial, there would be an infinity of things that God could not produce. So God cannot distinguish what He can and what He cannot do; though He understands both. These things are possible, though God cannot cause them;

Alia autem est responsio famosior modernorum que abhorret terminare divinam potentiam ad aliquod finitum, sed ultra omne finitum potest; sic quod potentia sua terminetur ad bonum intellectivum, ad infinitum exclusive. Et pro isto defendendo inventa est illa improbabilis logica, que dicit quod nedum nulla sunt infinita, sed nulla infinita possunt demonstrari. Dicit ergo quod signatis omnibus illis in que deus potest, sequens est quod signarentur infinities infinita que non possunt. Nec esset possibile omne signare omnia que possunt [esse], nisi signarentur aliique que non possunt. Unde deus, quamvis intelligat omnia illa que possunt, et omnia illa que non possunt [esse], tamen nescit distincte discernere inter ista, nec demonstrare illa seorsum ab aliis. Sic ergo, quantumcunque homo velit intendere distincte possibilia per se, ignoraret et non intenderet impossibilia. Nec sequitur: *quemlibet hominem quem ego intelligo deus potest causare: ergo, omnes quos ego intelligo deus potest causare*; quia multis intelligo quorum nullus potest esse, quamvis tamen quilibet quam ego intelligo possit esse. Et talis 40

6-7. q̄¹⁶ B. 7. p̄s B. 8. p̄s B. 13. q̄m̄¹⁷ B. 20. moder-
orum in marg. B. 23. bo^m B. 30. esse deest B. 32. esse deest B.

copulativa conceditur: *Omnis homines intelliguntur a me et illi non possunt esse*, quia non possunt esse omnes homines possibles, cum oportet, demonstrando omnes homines qui possunt esse, conde monstrari 5 homines qui non possunt esse. Et sic deus non potest intelligere omnes homines qui possunt esse; quia tunc isti possent esse; aut saltem non potest cognoscere omnes causas cuiuscunq[ue] hominis, et tamen omnia que ego nosco.

10 Cum tamen solet dici quod ad perfectam causati noticiam requiritur cognoscere omnes eius causas, et quod deus docet hominem primo in cognoscendo omnia que ipse cognoscit; ideo non dubium quin iste conclusiones, sicut quotlibet similes, repugnant isti 15 opinioni et veritati. Si enim aliquos significaret terminus, *qui non possunt esse*, potissime foret de multitudine infinita hominum, quod talis non est demonstranda, ut dicit opinio. Ymmo si esset demonstranda, adhuc illam posset deus successive producere, et potest anichilare, 20 iuxta sic opinantes. Ymmo simul posset in totam multitudinem, sicut et signabilem eius partem, vel saltem deus posset illos indivisim producere, etsi non posset producere illas. Non ergo possum demonstrare homines aliqualiter se habere, qualiter non possunt se habere; 25 et tunc non significat iste terminus complexus, infinitos homines; sed finitos significat esse infinitos. Nec potest intelligi *homo*, nisi aliquis illorum, demonstrando homines qui erunt, et illos oportet necessario fore; sed non sic omnia. Eligat ergo philosophus sentenciam sibi plus 30 placentem.

8. z3 in marg. B. 20. τοιν υπ̄ B. 21. σγιλ; B.

5. We must here note the Scholastic distinction between intrinsic possibility, or mere non-absurdity, and extrinsic possibility, or being causable. We can think of an infinite multitude of men as possible in the first manner and not in the second. But if God saw them as possible in the first manner, He would also see Himself to be their cause, i. e. they would be possible in the second too. Which would involve contradiction in the case of those who will never exist.

we can know objects that are impossible; v. g. the existence of all men.

But God cannot, or they would be possible by His knowledge of them.

All this is false; to know a thing perfectly we must know its causes, and God's knowledge is the cause of ours.

If an infinite multitude of men were affirmable, God could produce them successively and annihilate them.

In short, infinite men means a certain fixed number, which is the Infinite, or maximum possible.

Let the philosopher choose which system is the best.

CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

Of causal propositions : definition ; propositions related by the idea of cause.

Divisions, *affirmative*, in which one proposition is affirmed to be the cause of another;

and *negative*, in which such causality is denied; the negative or affirmative form of the component propositions being irrelevant.

So to every causal we can substitute a categorical proposition with the verb *to cause*.

A causal, therefore, differs from a conditional, because it affirms both of its parts; and from a copulative, because it adds the idea of causation.

Sequitur de causalibus pertractandum. Ubi primo supponatur omnem yppotheticam, subordinatam principalius actui yppothetico causandi, esse causalem; utputa quando due kategorice coniunguntur ad invicem cum nota cause.

Sunt autem causalium talium quedam affirmativa et quedam negativa. Affirmativa, quando significatum primarium antecedentis significati prioris consequentis asseritur esse causa; ut hic: *quia tu curris, tu moveris.*¹⁰

Ista enim asserit tuum *currere* causare tuum *move*re.

Et vocatur antecedens, proposicio immediate subsequens notam cause; et alia vocatur consequens. Vocatur autem causalis negativa yppothetica | per quam negatur B^{59b} principaliter huiusmodi causacio. Ut hic: *non ideo tu es animal, quia tu es asinus.* Unde stat esse affirmativam, quamvis utraque eius pars fuerit negativa, ut hec; *paries non respirat, quia non habet pulmonem.* Attendum est ad negacionem actus yppothetici principalis.

Ex ipsis patet quod quelibet causalis convertitur cum kategorica, in qua predicatur terminus significans veritatem consequentis, de termino significante veritatem antecedentis, mediante verbo causandi. Ut idem est dicere: *tu es animal, quia tu es homo*, ac si diceretur: *humanitas tua causat animalitatem tuam.* Non *quia tu times, tu curris*; et *non timor tuus causat cursum tuum*, et sic de aliis. Et sic de ceteris patet quod talis longe differt a condicionali et a copulativa. Causalit enim ponit utriusque partis significatum inesse, sicut non facit conditionalis. Et quamvis in hoc conveniat cum copulativa, superaddit tamen causacionem unius partis

i. Cap. *deest*: blank space for initial S B. 7. q̄ B. 8. q̄ B.
18. pies B. 27. de ceteris in marg. B. 29. potest B.

per reliquam. Unde mirabiliter abutuntur tam grammatica quam logica, qui concedunt quamlibet copulativam converti cum causali. Ut si *ego sum, et baculus stat in angulo*, tunc *ego sum, quia baculus stat in 5 angulo*; et econtra. Nam sic ponentes ignorant grammaticam, que ponit huiusmodi coniunctiones ideo esse causales quia sunt note causandi. Et ad talem sensum vocant logici yppotheticas causales. Per idem enim dicerent quod amodo existens cum reliqua causat ipsum.

10 Grave est ergo semper stare in significacionibus terminorum, communicando cum ignorantibus.

Et ex isto patet 3º, noscentibus istam grammaticam et logicam, quod species et genus differunt sicut subiectum et eius predicacio. Ymmo quocunque subiectum 15 et eius accidentis sequitur manifestissime differre ab invicem; ut: *quia tu es homo tu es animal et risibile et quantum et coloratum*. Ideo animalitas et humanitas differunt; et per idem risibilitas et quantitas et coloratio, et [cetera] huiusmodi differunt ab humanitate a qua 20 causantur. Et ista puerilis consideracio de causalibus est medium electum ad probandum quecumque accidentia esse, et distingui a subiecto. Quis enim negaret quin aliqua causa sit quare substancia est quanta, qualis, relata, agens, paciens, locata, temporalis, posita, et 25 habens? Nec dubium quin quicunque concedit aliquam unum talem causalem, habet consequenter concedere accidentia talia esse, et distingui a subiecto. Ut, si *Sor ex hoc sedet quia placet sibi*, tunc *placere sibi Sortis est causa sessionis sue*. Ideo vel negent tales causales vel 30 concedant; quod sequitur consequenter. Sed negatis causalibus, vanum est philosophari, cum ad hoc adiscimus ut sciamus causas rerum; nec aliter arbitramur nos quicquam cognoscere. Vanum ergo esset querere rei causam, quare animalia habent membra secundum talem 35 anathomiam ordinata; et sic de omni ordinacione nature. Non enim ageret natura, nisi propter finem, cum non posset esse causa quare natura aliqualiter ordinaret. Sed omnia talia corrumput bonam doctrinam.

Supponendo ergo ista tria corollarie illata, restat 40 describere causam in communi. Sed forte non potest

Some absurdly deny this last difference; according to them, coexistence and causation are the same. Such an assertion contradicts both grammar and logic.

This shows clearly how species and genera, subject and predicate, differ from one another; i. e. causally.

This childish discussion, therefore, leads us to prove the existence of accidents distinct from their subjects.

Causals ought either to be denied, or the doctrines that follow from their admission allowed. But without the former all science would perish, and nature would no longer work with a purpose: an utterly false doctrine.

What is a cause? As its

9. amo B. 14. prio B. 19. cetera deest B. 22. i. q[uod] B.
23, 24. qualis B. 39. cor. t[em]o B.

signification is as wide as *being*, it cannot be described *a priori*, but *a posteriori* as that which causes its effect, and effect as that which is caused by a cause.

It follows that all beings are causes and effects.

If not a last, there is a First Being; which is Essence.

Four sorts of causes: material, formal, efficient and final.

The material cause is either analogous or proper; if proper, it is either that out of which, that about which, or that of which anything else is.

The formal cause is either intrinsic or extrinsic: either that by which or that according to which the thing is.

The efficient cause is what makes anything to be; in a wide sense every cause is

describi *a priori* vel nociore, cum sit analogum convenientie cuilibet enti. Ideo oportet colligere noticiam cause *a posteriori*, sicut cognoscimus universale experimentale. Sicut ergo qualitas est accidentis denominans formaliter substanciam accidentaliter qualem, sic causa est ens causans suum causatum; vel ens cuius *esse* antecedit ad aliud; et causatum e contra est ens cuius *esse* sequitur ad aliud.

Ex quo patet quod omne ens est causa; sicut omne ens est illud quod est causatum. Primum patet, ex hoc quia dato ultimo ente adhuc illud cognoscitur confuse a me et multis aliis. Et sic habet infinitas denominaciones sibi accidentales quas omnes causat. Ex quo videtur patere quod est dare primum ens si non ultimum. Primum tamen ens est essentia que est 2º creata, et per consequens est unum creatum, quamvis illa essentia non causatur nec est creata.

Sunt ergo 4 genera causarum, scilicet, materialis, formalis, efficiens et finalis. Causa materialis est causa ex qua est suum causatum. Et hec est duplex, scilicet proporcionalis et propria. Proporionalis, ut genus est causa materialis cuiuscunque sui per se inferioris. Si propria, hoc est tripliciter; vel quod sit pars rei ex qua et in qua est sua forma, sicut est materia prima elementi et materia proxima elementi; vel quod sit materia de qua, sed non in qua formaliter sit forma illa; ut subiectum de quo est sciencia est eius materia; vel 3º, quod sit materia de qua sed non ex qua fit parcialiter suum causatum; ut subiectum accidentis causat ipsum materialiter.

Causa formalis est causa a qua formaliter est suum causatum; et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sit causa intrinseca que est pars qualitativa rei; ut igneitas est forma ignis, vel aliter, causa formalis extrinseca; ut formula est causa exemplaris formati; ut deus est causa exemplaris cuiuscunque essentie causate vel create. Differencia etiam communis est causa formalis speciei; et omnino universale dicitur forma.

Causa efficiens vero, large loquendo, dicitur esse quocunque causans; omne enim causans facit suum causatum esse. Sed specialiter, restringendo terminum,

14. pterre B. 24, 25. et — elementi *in marg.* B. 37. gems B.

solum agens vel conservans active rem in *esse* dicitur
esse causa efficens; qualiter solum substancia activa
potest efficere: et illa vocatur causa unde motus.

Causa finalis est causa gracia cuius est suum causa-
tum, et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sit finis extrinsecus,
sicut deus est finis omnium rerum causatarum; vel
finis intrinsecus, sicut felicitas est finis operacionum hu-
manorum.

Ista ergo confuse dicta non docent ignorantem cog-
noscere causacionem; sed cognoscendo de quocunque
ente quod ipsum est requisitum ad *esse* alterius, cog-
noscitur quod est causa eius. Ut video quod species
lignorum et lapidum requiruntur ad *esse* domus, quia
ipsis pereuntibus perit domus et non e contra, exinde
cognosco quod sunt *cause* domus. Et sic cognosco so-
lem causare lumen, et obstaculum, umbram. Multe
tamen sunt habitudines causandi quas non cognosco per
sensum; ut causacionem qua unum universale causat
reliquum, et causacionem qua unum universale eternum
necessario causat reliquum; ut deus causat universitatem
encium; pars materie causat suum totum, ut composi-
tum; et sic de multis causacionibus insensibilium.

Nec sufficit cognoscere quod unum sit reliquo prius
natura ad cognoscendum causacionem; quia, cum que-
libet pars materie prime sit equae primum natura sicut
alia non communicans cum illa, videtur quod sicut
materia ignis est ipso prius natura, sic quelibet materia
prima esset prius illo igne in natura; et tamen non
quelibet est eius causa, quia non quelibet requiritur ad
esse istius ignis, nec antecedit ad *esse* eius. Nec sequi-
tur: deus necessario requirit quotlibet veritates pro
causacionibus inferiorum, ergo ille veritates requiruntur
ad *esse* dei; cum *ly* 'ad' consignificat circumstanciam
causandi. Infinita ergo sunt sine quibus ego non possum
esse, que non requiruntur ad mei *esse*, quia non con-
ferunt ad hoc. Si ergo vis videre quid iuvat ad *esse*
alterius, [oportet] discurrere per 4 genera causandi supra
dicta cum suis membris, et videre *ex quo* vel *de quo*,
unde vel *a quo* est, *secundum quid* est vel *quid* est,
40 *gracia cuius* vel *propter quid* est; et si nullum istorum

efficient;
but it is
restricted to the
principle
causing
movement.
The final cause
is that for
which anything
is: it is either
extrinsic or
intrinsic.

When we know
of anything
that it is
necessary
to the existence
of another,
we know it as
a cause,

either by
sensible
cognition, or
otherwise.

Yet mere
priority of
nature, or the
circumstance of
being required,
does not give
us the proper
idea of cause;
it must have a
real influence on
the being it
causes.

We must, to
know if
anything is a
cause, enquire
if it belongs to
one of the
above-
mentioned
genera of
causes.

5. qpt pro quod sit B. 23. non above nec B. 26. ag above B.
37. oportet deest B.

4 possis invenire, nec causacionem quesiti invenies. Et, si aliquod illorum inveneris, illud genus causandi invenisti. Sic igitur ad inveniendum istas raciones causandi deserviunt regule quas invenerunt philosophi.

Priority of
nature can be
understood in
two senses;
in the order of
perfection and
in the order of
cognition.

Nota tamen quod dupliciter aliquid dicitur nocius; 5 vel prius natura; vel quia ipsum est principalius intentum tanquam perfectius in natura, sicut omne totum est prius ens et cognitum in natura quam est aliqua eius pars; vel quia ipsum precedit in ordine cognoscendi, qualiter l omnis pars naturaliter precedit suum B 6^a totum; et sic est ordo naturalis inter materias primas omnium, cum prima quo ad primum modum, sit maxima materia ex quo mundus constat, et prima omnium quo ad secundum modum, est materia punctualis; et sic aliis quantis. 15

There are
many divisions
of causes; but
for brevity's
sake we shall
only take the
first: a cause
per se or per
accidens.

Per se has three
meanings here,
as in the case
of Being;
applying it
either to all
causes, or to a
principal cause,
or to a cause of
which causality
is predicated
from a certain
point of view.

Sunt ergo istorum generum causandi multi modi; ut aliqua est causa per se et alia est causa per accidens; alia est simplex et alia composita; alia in actu, alia in potentia; alia parcialis vel incompleta, et alia totalis et completa. Et de quolibet istorum modorum alia est 20 causa universalis et alia est causa particularis. Sed propter brevitatem tantum loquendum est de primo modo. Sicut autem tribus modis aliquid dicitur per se ens, sic tribus modis dicitur aliquid esse per se causa. Magis tamen famosa accepcio est, vel large accipiendo 25 pro quaunque causa requisita, vel striccius pro causa requisita cum qua non concurrit ex equo alia in eodem genere causandi: ut tota materia ignis per se causat ipsum, vel 3^o quando causans sub ratione alicuiusmodi causat, utputa, quando sibi inesse causat per se 2^o 30 modo predicandi per se; ut edificator per se edificat, medicus per se sanat, statuificaturus qui per se statuificat: et sic de aliis. Nec refert sive iste terminus, per se, precedat, sive subsequatur, dummodo terminus supposuerit simpliciter. Et iste modus loquendi est cre- 35 brior apud philosophos qui accipiunt verba significantes actus, ut significant aptitudinem ad actus; ut edificare est esse edificativum; et sic de aliis. Nec sequitur:

3. al. Et above sic igitur B. 9. ordn^e B. 12. om. B. 15. 2^o^a
q̄tis B. 18. alii above the line B. 23. quinque 2 bus above B.
24. quinque 2 bus above B. 26, 27. vel — requisita in marg. B.
27. exeq^o B. 29. acq[<] B. 30. causare B. 32. statu^{fc}rg B.

edificator per se edificat; omnis edificator est homo: ergo, homo per se edificat. Terminis tamen supponentibus personaliter, utrobique bene corresponderet de dicto.

5 3 bus eciam modis dicitur aliquid causa per accidens alterius: primo modo, ex hoc quod causanti accedit datum causatum causare, sicut deus accidentaliter causat me. 2º modo, ex hoc quod causato accedit causari a dato causante; et illo modo individuum corruptibile causat speciem incorruptibilem, cum species possit esse sine illo. Et 3º modo dicitur aliquid per accidens causare causatum, quando ipsum non ut huiusmodi causat causatum; ut musicus per accidens edificat, sed non ut musicus. Et sic idem est per accidens musico cum esse edificativum, et musicum per accidens edificare, ut termini supponunt simpliciter. Nec sequitur ad illum sensum: musicus per accidens edificat, et omnis musicus est edificator: ergo edificator per accidens edificator.

20 Ex istis patent aliisque veritates. 1º, quod stat eidem querere rationem cuiuscunque generis causandi; ut deus est finis omnium finitorum, forma exemplaris est, efficiens vel conservans continuitatem eorumdem, et est materia vel subiectum sapiencie. Non tamen est possibile quod componat tamquam partes rei; sic enim materia non coincidit cum forma, vel cum movente, vel cum fine illius materiali. 2º patet quod totum genus esse intrinsece materialis est propter formam, et totum genus esse formalis intrinsece est propter agens, et totum genus compositorum agencium est propter finem.

Ex quo patet quod impossibile est quicquam habere causam, nisi habuerit causam finalem que sit per se causa; nec est ratio causandi materialiter vel formaliter intrinsece perfectionis simpliciter, sed ratio causandi

35 efficienter vel extrinsece finaliter. Et 3º patet quod ultimus finis simpliciter non habet partes integrales qualitativas, quidditativas, vel subiectivas. Et per consequens est omnino indivisibilis, unicus et eternus. Si enim haberet alias partes, tales causarentur, et per consequens haberet causam finalem, et sic non esset finis ultimus. Et eodemmodo sequitur quod non sunt multi

Per accidens
has also three significations;
either that it is accidental for a given cause to produce a given effect; or that a certain causation is accidental to the thing caused; or that a given cause, producing its effect, does not produce it as such.

We thence conclude,
1. That the same being may be several causes in different ways at the same time, but not when those causes are tantamount to parts of a whole.

2. That the material exists but for the formal cause, this for the efficient and the efficient for the final cause.

3. And that the ultimate End of all things can have no parts; for if it had, they would be for the whole, and thus would not be the ultimate End of all: likewise it is unique and eternal.

3. torret B. 23. 9ti⁹; in marg. 9ti⁹ B. 27. māti B. 38. in-
divisibile B.

tales fines, nec possunt fieri; quia sic haberet universale suam causam, et efficiens quod ipsas generat, ipsas conservans continue. Quamvis enim necessarium sit aliqua causare se reciproce in generibus diversis causandi, hoc tamen est impossibile in eodem genere causandi, sicut et impossibile est idem causare se.

Causal propositions follow the same divisions as the causes which they signify; some being *per se* and complete, others *per accidens* and incomplete, etc.

And this also holds good of reduplicative propositions;

some signifying the same as cause, and some the proportional accompaniment of one fact by another.

When they signify causality, they are said to have four exponents: Because A is B, C is D, i. e. A is B, and C is D, and every B is D, and if anything is B, it is D.

But one of these last is surely redundant.

These exponents cannot be applied to reduplicative propositions that are not causal.

Notatis istis preambulis, notandum quod conformes | B 61 sunt divisiones propositionis causalium, sicut dictum est de divisionibus eodem modo, cum de qualibet causa et suo causato contingit facere causalem veram; ut dividenda est causalis per se et completa, cuius antecedens infert suum consequens; ut quia deus wult me esse, ideo ego sum. Et aliqua est causalis particularis et incompleta: ut, Sor currit, quia frigescit; et sic de aliis, ubi antecedens est causa consequentis, sed per accidens, 15 incompleta vel remota. Et sic proporcionaliter dicendum est de divisionibus causalium, ut dictum est de divisione causalium; et cum omnis talis causalis sit reduplicativa, et non econtra, patet quod conformis est divisio reduplicativarum. Aliqua ergo reduplicativa re- 20 duplicat gracia cause, et aliqua gracia proporcionalis concomitancie. Gracia cause, ut hic: *In quantum tu curris, tu moveris*; gracia proporcionalis concomitancie, ut hic: *proporcionaliter vel in quantum vel de quanto vel prout aliqua magis convenient, minus differunt; et econtra*. Et ista est yppothetica comparativa et non causalis.

Quando ergo sunt causales, tunc dicuntur habere 4 exponentes, ut ista: *Ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es animal*, dicitur debere sic exponi; *tu es homo et tu es animal et omnis homo est animal et si aliquid est homo, ipsum est animal*. Sed revera illud videtur michi superfluum et non sufficiens, quia sequitur: *Tu es homo et si aliquid est homo ipsum est animal: Ergo tu es animal et omnis homo est animal*. Ideo certum est quod due 30 exponentes signande, ut patet de talibus: *In quantum deus est, non idem simul est et non est; in quantum deus wult me esse, ego sum; et sic de aliis*. Ymmo ista est falsa, tenta causaliter: *In quantum tu es nichil tu es*

7. *gforoēs*; conformes below B. 41. *tēta cār* B.

homo; et tamen exponentes sunt vere; nec exponunt iste exponentes sensum reduplicandi gracia proporcionis concomitancie.

Et ideo notandum quod terminus reduplicativus quandoque tenetur reduplicative, quandoque simpliciter, et quandoque comparative. Reduplicative, quando tenetur sinkathegorice et mobilitat terminum connotando completam causam, ut hic: *In quantum numerus aliquis est senarius, est numerus perfectus*: quod tantum valet ac si diceretur quod esse *senarium est per se et complete causa quia ipse est numerus perfectus*. Vel secundum volentes exponere sufficit capere causalem et condicionalem, ut: *quia Sor est homo est animal; et si aliquid est homo ipse est animal, ergo Sor, in quantum est homo, est animal*. Et sic sequitur expositorie: *quia deus est, nichil simul est et non est*. Et, *si deus est nichil simul est et non est: ergo in quantum deus est, nichil simul est et non est*. Et racione note condicionis debet terminus reduplicativus mobilitare terminum super quem cadit: ut, *si iusticia est bonum, in quantum bonum; tunc iusticia est omne bonum*; quia dato antecedente, tunc in quantum aliquid est bonum, ipsum est iusticia; et per consequens iusticia in commune est omne bonum. Vel si iste terminus, *iusticia*, supponat personaliter cum paribus in hoc dicto, *Iusticia est bonum in quantum bonum*, tunc aliquam iusticiam implicat esse omne bonum.

Quando vero terminus reduplicativus terminatur simpliciter, tunc dicit confuse kathegorice quamcunque causam vel formam racione inherencie predicati ad subiectum, ut hic: *motus est actus, id est forma mobilis in quantum actualiter est mobile*, quod tantum sonat ac si diceretur, *motus est forma actualis mobilis secundum quam ipsum formaliter est in motu*. Et ita auctores describunt quascunque formas, dicendo quod forma talis est actus secundum quem subiectum est sic formatum; et tunc isti termini *in quantum, secundum quod*, et sic de ceteris terminis usitatis in talibus descriptionibus significant circumstanciam cause formalis. Et patet generaliter quomodo forme quecunque sunt describende, et quomodo descripciones auctorum sunt

The reduplicative term is sometimes to be understood reduplicatively, sometimes simply, and sometimes as a comparative. Reduplicatively, when *as such*, &c. point to a cause or a condition;

and in this case, the predicate becomes universal; if A *as such* is B, then every A is every B.

Simply, when it merely implies in general some cause that unites the subject with the predicate: as: A is B in so far as it is C.

In such cases the terms modified by *in so far does not become universal*.

2. reducit B. 18. d⁴ B. 20. est bonum est B. 28. te^e sif^r B.
30. actu*s*i. B. 32. act^d B.

intelligende, et iuxta illum sensum non mobilitat terminus reduplicativus terminum super quem cadit, cum idem sit dicere: *motus est actus mobilis in quantum movetur ac si diceretur, Motus est forma qua formaliter mobile movetur.*

But as for negative propositions, logicians do not agree.
Some admit, v. g. that *a white man, qua a man, does not build,* understanding the negation to fall on whiteness. Some admit that simply: Some say that he *does build,* considering whiteness as a remote cause. Some, denying this, would except the case of Christ's actions *qua man.*

In negativis autem, ubi reduplicativi supponunt simpliciter, altercantur logici; ut alii concedunt quod *Sor in quantum albus non edificat*, intelligentes propositionem negative simpliciter, scilicet ad illum sensum, *Sor per albacionem non edificat*; quod tantum valet ac si ¹⁰ *white man, does not build,* diceretur: *Sor albacione non edificat*, vel: *non in quantum albus edificat.* Alii autem concedunt illas ultimas propositiones in quibus negacio precedit terminum reduplicativam, et negant propositiones in quibus negacio subsequitur. Alii etiam in affirmativis ¹⁵ concedunt propositiones reduplicativas, ponentes causam remotam causare suum causatum ut hic; Cristus secundum quod homo passus est, moriebatur et sitivit etc., et tamen humanitas non fuit per se causa completa talium. Alii autem negant omnes huiusmodi; sed ²⁰ concedunt quod Cristus secundum quod homo fuit ambulatus, materialis etc., nec Cristus secundum quod deus fuit inmortalis et inmobilis etc., quia non fuit inmortalis inmobilis.

I prefer the first opinion.

The reduplicative term understood as above, no inconvenience follows.

The human actions of Christ proceed from his humanity; and if also from his Deity, it is in another way altogether; so that they cannot be ascribed to the Godhead.

And thus a man does not build *qua man,* but *qua able to conformiter negatur quod aliquid, in quantum homo,* ⁴⁰

²¹, ²². *albatus;* *ambulatus above deus;* *Cristus above B.*
^{24.} *imo^t B.*

edificativum est, sed in quantum habens artem; quia *build*, which is
esse *edificativum* non est passio sed accidens separabile; of a different
et sic homo est alterius generis quam edificabilitas. order of things.

Dubium tamen est apud multos logicos, si omnis A question:
5 substancia, secundum omnem rationem qua est, sit ali- whether every
quid. Et videtur quod sic; quia sequitur: secundum is- substance is
tam rationem Sor est: ergo, secundum istam rationem est something in
ens et per consequens secundum istam est aliquid. In every one of its
oppositum sic: Si homo est secundum omnem rationem modes of being;
10 qua est aliquid, tunc per omnem famulatum accidente for a mode is
talem sui esset aliquid. Sed quid est per hoc quod est something.
albus, pater, currens etc.? Certum est quod ille nichil On the other
esset per ista, nisi homo; et per consequens quodlibet hand, every
illorum esset substancia et non accidens. Dicitur ergo possible
15 quod quelibet substancia infinitis modis rationum est, accident would
secundum quarum nullam est ipsa substancia vel ali- then make it
quid; sed aliquantum, aliquale, vel aliquidmodi. Pro something substantially
quo nota quod ablatus in tali propositione: *Isto acci-* new; which is
dente Sor est potest regi ex vi cause, et sic esset sensus not admissible.
20 falsus; vel ex vi accidentis, et sic tunc esset sensus These modes
verus; ut: *iste equus est albo colore vel albi coloris vel do not make*
secundum albedinem vel rationem albandi: que omnia idem a substance to
sonant. Et patet quod ista proposicio est equivoca: *Iste be some thing,*
homo est isto modo, ex hoc quod iste terminus: *iste homo* but of some
25 potest simul intelligi ut subiectum, et ablatus regi de size, quality
ly 'est' ex vi accidentis ad illum sensum: *Ille homo est* or manner.
huiusmodi; vel aliter, quod pronomen sit subiectum, et The ablative
iste terminus, *homo*, sit appositorum, regens alterum ex case is
vi cause formalis, ita quod sit sensus: *iste homo isto ambiguous,*
30 modo formaliter est homo. Notata ergo ista equivocatione, and may be
patet quod quelibet substancia secundum infinitas ra- understood in
ciones formales vel modos accidentiales est, quia est several ways,
illorum subiectum; et tamen non secundum aliquam some false.
B 62^a istarum est *ens* vel *aliquid*, | cum in talibus regitur ter- The answer is
35 minus ab apposito ex vi cause; ut suppono ex grammatica. therefore that
Homo ergo humanitate est homo vel substancia, to be thus and
aliquid, et *ens*; et quantitate est *quantus*, et qualitate thus, and to be
est *qualis*, et aliis modis aliqualiter; sed nec substancia being, are not
nec aliquid Nec sequitur *secundum istam the same'; a*
40 rationem Sor est similis alteri, ergo secundum istam est man is
aliquid; quia circumstancie significante per huiusmodi something by
humanity, such by
quality, &c.

3. edificat^{us} B. 5, 6. a'd B. 8. a'd B. 10. fatm B. 35. a^{ta}
or o^{to} B. 39. after aliquid, a space for three words B.

The argument from what is accidentally

more particular abstracta impedit modum argumentandi a *per acci-*
to what is more *dens* inferiori ad suum superius; vel ad transcendens
universal, does not hold. *superius. Sed in genere, argumentando a per se inferiori*
ad superius, tenet consequentia; ut, si ista albedine Sor
est albus, tunc ista albedine Sor est coloratus. 5

Can the same thing be, through these accidental modes, posterior to itself in its essential being? v. g. God, as cause of my being, is not God, and as such, He is in relation to me, and thus identical with my being.

2º dubitatur si eadem res secundum raciones accidentales sit posterior quam est secundum rationem substancialis; et videtur quod sic, quia deus secundum infinitas raciones est, secundum quarum nullam ipse est deus; secundum rationem ergo qua ipse est causa mei 10 non est deus; et secundum illam rationem habet se in aliquo ordine ad me. Cum ergo secundum illam rationem est prior me, vel posterior me, vel eque primo mecum, non potest dici quod secundum omnem rationem ipse sit prior me; quia, ut sic, ipse est relatus michi, et 15 relativa, ut huiusmodi, sunt simul natura; et per idem sequitur quod non secundum illam rationem ipse est posterior me, potissime cum, ut causa huiusmodi, est prior suo causato. Sed ad oppositum videtur esse hoc medium: Si deus, ut huiusmodi, sit eque primo mecum, 20 tunc ipse est eque primo mecum. Et tunc per idem ipse est eque primo cuilibet rei, et infinitum est posterior se ipso. Sequitur enim: secundum illam rationem est deus eque primo mecum; ergo secundum aliud et secundum veritatem est eque primo mecum. Nec aliter concederent 25 theologi quod deus ex humana concepcione est minoratus. Sicut ergo deus, ut homo, est par nobis, sic, ut causa illius causati est eque primo cum illo. Et in isto est tediosum communicare cum trutani qui nunquam respondent ad tales proposiciones, nisi addendo determinacionem reduplicativi. Ut, quando queritur utrum pater est prior fili, dicunt quod pater, ut pater, est eque primo cum filio; et aliter non respondent; et in ista materia legiste et plebei sunt nutriti.

On the other hand, if God is identical with me in any point of view, then He really is not above me in so far;

and God has become our equal by the Incarnation. Some frivolous adversaries never answer such arguments, unless by repeating the reduplicative term in the conclusion.

10. *(S) pro rationem!* B. 12. *vel pro cum* B. 16. *h⁹* B. 20. *me⁹* B.

26. *hua cōē* B. 29. *trutais* B.

16. *Simul natura.* This expression is one side of a double distinction: *together in time — together in nature.* I have chosen to render it by the idea of identity; for the difficulty of Wyclif is the very same as that concerning the identity of cause and effect, of subject and object.

Dicitur ergo quod dupliciter dicitur accidens. Primo modo quando ipsum in sui natura est substancia sed secundum habitudinem alteri actualem habetur ab alio; et illo modo divicie sunt accidencia diviti, et igneitas 5 est accidens essentie ignis, sicut et humanitas accedit Verbo. Ubi ergo est unio talium naturarum in eodem supposito, bene sequitur illud suppositum, in quantum homo vel ignis, est aliquid, cum natura in se unita sit substancia. Cum ergo tale suppositum sit more universalium multe nature, concedendum est quod est maius et minus, prius et posterius eodem; et sic de aliis que insunt illis naturis. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod idem sit maius et minus se ipso, ut verbum est par patri et minus patre, quia natura minor patre et tamen illa 15 natura est verbum. Nec sequitur: *ista humanitas incipit esse et ipsa est deus, igitur deus incipit esse.* Nec sequitur, etsi verbum quod est illa humanitas sit natura divina, quod illa humanitas sit natura divina. Nec sequitur, si verbum assumpsit illam humanitatem, que est 20 ipsamet persona, quod verbum assumpsit parem vel se ipsum. Nec sequitur quod illa humanitas sit in infinitum perfecta, etsi sit in infinitum perfectum. Nec sequitur, si libere contradictorio assumpsit illam naturam, quod poterit sumpsisse aliam, faciendo se alium hominem, 25 sicut homo facit libere se esse istum currentem, nec possit esse aliud currens. Nec sequitur quod aliqua res que est non idem deo possit fieri idem deo, cum illa natura non posset manere dimissa, cum illa natura sit *Verbum esse hominem.* Est ergo homo optimus possibilis, et tam bonus homo quam bonum est ipsum esse hominem. Aliud ergo est homo et aliud deus, quia alia natura; sed non alius est iste homo quam deus, sed est homo eiusdem speciei et univocus cum quolibet altero homine. Cristus ergo, in quantum est homo, est 30 aliquid, quia substancia et creatura; | et in quantum homo, est posterior essentia divina.

B 62^b Sed 2^o modo dicitur accidens quod claudit contradiccionem esse non inherens, ut accidencia 9 generum; et illa non possunt in se esse substancie. Ideo nichil

Accident has two meanings. The first implies one substance that, happening to belong to another, is called its accident; as v. g. riches. Now when two such substances are united in one person, this person is greater or less, &c. according as we speak of one substance or the other; yet not greater or less than itself, nor does any other contradiction follow thence,

because they bear upon the natures, not on that which is these natures.

The second, meaning of 'accident' is what must

20. *pm* B. 23. *qdīe* B. 24. *ptrit* B. 28. *manere dī's dimissa;*
in marg. dimīsa B. 39. *pūt* B.

*essentially
belong to
another;
and such an
accident brings
no otherness
with it, nor
does it render
the substance
more or less
perfect.*

*A cause is
thus at the
same time with
its effect, and
prior to it,
because there is nature,
priority and
simultaneity
both of
causation and
of consequence.
God is infinitely before the effect
which he
causes,
precisely in the
order of
causation.*

*Aristotle,
saying that
relatives are
simultaneously
related, is to be
understood to
mean as to
consequence; as
to causation, one
may be prior to
the other.*

*This
simultaneity,
however, does
not identify
God with us.*

*I choose to
answer that
God, though
like to me, is
not identical;
but that His
likeness with
me is identical
to mine with
Him.*

in quantum sic accidentatum est aliquid, nec mutat speciem propter tale accidens; quia non est illud accidens concreтивe vel abstractive. Nec dicitur substancia prior aut posterior propter illud accidens, quia sic necessario deus esset posterior quam aliquid posset esse, 5 cum esset postremum ens, et impossibile est dare postremum ens. Et sic conceditur quod deus, ut est causa mei, est summe prior me, ymmo omnis causa, ut causa, est prior natura suo causato; et tamen aliqua causa, ut causa, est simul natura cum causato suo; quia est 10 dare duplē similitudinem sicut duplē prioritatem et similitudinem quo ad causacionem et similitudinem quo ad consequenciam. Et sic multe cause simultaneae quo ad consequenciam sunt simul cum suis causatis; sicut omne subiectum est eius passio; sed 15 concessis termini reduplicati simpli- citer; quia aliter essent sensus impossibilis. Deus ergo, causando me, facit se esse summe priorem me; nec ex hoc sequitur: omnis causa mei esse summe prior est me. 20 Patet ergo quo ordine prioritatis deus se habet ad me, quia secundum causacionem qua causat me.

Et ad Aristotelem de similitudine nature relativorum dicitur quod ipse vult omnia correlata esse simul quo ad correlativa; et tamen non repugnat unum relativum 25 antecēdere reliquum causacione secundum quam est relata, et simul alia similitudine. Alii vero intelligunt per relativa, aggregata per accidens ex subiecto et relacione; et illa possunt simul esse natura; et sic non est dare causatum, quin aggregatum ex deo et relacione 30 ad illud sit eque primo cum illo causato; et talia aggregata intelliguntur communiter per substanciam et per terminos reduplicativos. Et ex illis non sequitur: *deus, ut est causa mei, vel deus causans me est simul natura mecum; ergo deus est simul natura mecum.* Et sic de 35 similibus. Nec est ista sentencia falsa; sed cavillacio verborum stat in eleccione.

Ego vero determinavi me ad priorem responcionem, negando quod deus similis michi est simul natura mecum, sed similitudo dei ad me est simul natura cum 40 similitudine mei ad deum; et deus eque primo natura

10. quod B. 10, 20. nec — me in marg. B. 23. Ar f. B.

est similis michi vel causa mei, sicut ego sum. Ideo God is like me,
posterior natura est similis michi quam est, quia prius as I am; so I
naturaliter est quam est similis michi. Nec sequitur: being after
deus isto gradu prioritatis vel posterioritatis est causa Him, this
5 *mei vel huiusmodi*; ergo *isto gradu est*, nisi equivocando likeness is also
intelligatur quod est subiectum huius gradus; et ita de posterior to
similibus est dicendum. Him.

Ex istis dictis inferri potest evidenter quod nullum We thus see
accidens inherens potest esse aliquid per se existens, ut that no inherent
10 partes substancie; quia tunc possibile esset quod sub- accident can
stancia in quantum taliter accidentata esset aliquid; exist by itself,
utputa in quantum alba vel similis vel quanta esset for if it could,
aliquid. Et per consequens proporcionaliter ut esset it would by
magis alba, esset magis illud aliquid, et per consequens itself render the
15 in infinitum posset aliquid unius speciei esse reliquo substance other,
eiusdem speciei magis ens. Consequens est impossibile and whiteness,
de naturis. Ideo dicit philosophus signanter quod sub- v. g., increasing
stancia non suscipit maius et minus. Si ergo albedo indefinitely,
esset aliquid per se existens, aut natura potens per se would make it
existere, tunc utique esset aliquid, et unio illius ad sub- more of a being
iectum esset accidens quo subiectum foret accidentatum than it was;
immediate formaliter, et non illa albedo. Omnis talis but there is no
unio esset vere qualitas et non albedo data; ut alias more or less in
declaravi.

25 Ex istis patent quedam regule. Prima, omnis propo- Whence several
sicio de *per se* predicacione infert causalem in eisdem rules follow.
terminis, et non econtra; ut, si per se homo est ani-
mal vel risibile, tunc ex hoc quod aliquid est homo, I. Every
ipse est animal vel risibile. Patet prima pars regule ex proposition,
B 63^a descripcione causalis vel reduplicative | complete et dic- when the
tis de universalibus, eo quod quelibet species est com- predicate is
pleta causa sui generis et sue passionis. Et 2^a pars affirmed per se,
regule patet ex hoc quod multe sunt veritates, quarum infers a causal
una est completa causa alterius, inter quarum extrema proposition in
35 non est per se predicacio, ut patet in istis: *ex hoc the same terms;*
quod paries non habet pulmonem, ipse non respirat; quia but not vice
deus est, ego non sum asinus; quia deus wult me esse, versa; the first
igitur ego sum. Et patet quam deminute sunt 4 expo- and the second
nentes supradicte, ymmo iuxta illas sequitur indifferenter also, because
40 econtra quod in quantum sum risibilis vel gressibilis many true
sum homo vel animal, sicut econtra Et patet quante causes cannot
be predicates per se.

2. filii B. 17. natis B. 20. vere above utique B. 40. egv B.

41. egv B.

It makes a great difference in the sense if we

place the subject refert preponere subiectum ante terminum reduplicative before or after the reduplicative tentum, vel postponere ipsum, ut hoc est verum: *Ali-*
term. *quid in quantum est substancia, ipsum est homo, quia*
Sor ex hoc quod est substancia est homo et tamen non
in quantum aliquid est substancia, ipsum est homo; 5
quia tunc, si aliquid est substancia ipsum est homo.

II. Every causal proposition to which is added a minor stating the cause of the antecedent, gives a conclusion, thus: *Because A is B, C is D; monem non respirat, sed quia non est non habet pul-*
Because E is F, monem; ergo, quia non est, non respirat. Tenet autem illa *A is B;* *Because E is F, regula per hoc: quidquid est causa cause est causa* 15
C is D. This repose on sui causati; et quidquid antecedit ad antecedens antethe axiom: The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect. cedit ad suum consequens. Ut patet quod pulcre syllo-gizatur ex causali tanquam minori et ex alia causali cuius antecedens est primum consequens ad 3^{am} cau-salem cuius antecedens est antecedens primo sumptum, 20 et consequens est illud quod est consequens in minori; ut sic argumentando: *quia tu es homo, tu es animal,* 25 *quia tu es animal tu es corpus; ergo, quia tu es homo tu es corpus.* Et tenet ista regula per hoc quod quid-quid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad suum ante-cedens; utrumque tamen istorum dictorum intelligitur quando non est variacio in genere vel in modo cau-sandi. Ex hoc patet quod terminus super quem cadit reduplicatio mobilitatur, ut sequitur: *In quantum tu es homo, tu es animal; tu es iste homo; ergo, in quantum* 30 *universal; qua tu es iste homo, tu es animal.* Et si capiatur in minori quod *iste est homo*, sequitur simpliciter quod *iste est animal.* Sed tamen non tenet descendendo ad inferiora per accidens: ut non oportet quod, si *ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es animal, et tu es iste homo* 35 *albus; ergo, ex hoc quod tu es iste homo, tu es animal.* Nam impossibile est quod *tu sis homo ex hoc quod tu es iste albus homo, pater, quantus, etc.;* sed ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es hoc album, quamvis non secundum causam completam et per se sufficientem. 40

2. *tētū B* 24. *consequencia; regula above B.* 33. *Non tamen illud; corr. above B.*

3º patet quod sicut ex nulla causa necessaria per se sequitur logice contingens, sic non quilibet parcialis causa et per accidens inferens causatum sequitur logice ex eadem. Verbi gratia, quamvis deum esse sit causa 5 quare ego sum, non tamen si deus est, ego sum; sed oportet illi necessario adiungere causam contingentem, ut est volicio dei respectu mei esse, vel aliquid consimile. Ex quo patet quod non est latitudo causandi a prima causa usque ad contingens, quia totum genus 10 contingencium est creatum a causa necessaria, et inter necessarium et contingens est magna distancia. Ymmo, dato opposito, sequitur quod, posita prima causa, ponetur omne possibile. Ex quo sequitur quod oportet dare causas reciproce se causantes, ut volicio qua deus 15 est formaliter et contingenter volens me esse bonum est relacio ponens deum et me esse bonum; et illa causatur a me, sicut quodlibet extrinsecum volitum a deo causat in ipso, sine eius mocione, unam volitionem vel complacenciam; omnia tamen volibilia extrinseca 20 causantur ex eius volacione eterna, que est prima essencia. Est tamen ordo in volitionibus dei, cum una prior B 63^b causat aliam posteriorem: | ut volicio qua wult me esse precedit volitionem qua wult me esse virtuosum; et sic volicio qua wult omnem hominem esse precedit volitionem 25 qua wult me esse; nec indiget volubili extrinseco ad eius volicionem, quia non indiget sic velle. Nulla ergo accidentia sunt subiective in prima essencia que implicant ipsam esse mobilem.

Exemplum 2º partis est: lumen ideo est, quia producit 30 citur a luminoso; et anima est, quia creatur a deo: et tamen lumen et anima possunt esse sine talibus productionibus. Tales autem producciones sunt cause parciales et per accidens productorum, et per se causa productionum passivarum, sicut producciones successive permanentium non sunt cause illorum productorum, sed suarum productionum passivarum. Sic ergo producencia mundi fuit causa per accidens mundi, sed mundus fuit

III. As a necessary cause does not infer what is contingent, so neither does it infer a partial cause. V. g. God is the cause of my being; yet God's existence does not infer mine. We must, therefore, admit that some causes cause each other; for instance God's will that I exist causes me and is caused by me to be such.

There is besides an order in the volitions of God, one being prior to another and causing that other; the universal v. g. causing the particular.

Though light is because produced by a luminous body, it can exist without that production; so also of the soul. This brings us to admit the existence of certain truths which are

34. Sicut B.

29, 30. *Produccionibus.* I can only understand this passage by supposing Wyclif to mean by *production* and *creation* what takes place at the first instant of being; it is then true that during the rest of their existence, both light and the soul *are*, while the first act of causation is no longer.

neither the causing nor the caused substances; if not, the world could not have been produced.

causa per se sue producionis, cum sit subiectum illius accidentis, sicut deus fuit subiectum illius active producencie. Nec aliter esset possibile mundum fuisse productum, nisi esset reciproca causacio, eo quod necesse est omne causatum habere causam, qua posita ponitur,⁵ et qua non posita non ponitur; quod non esset possibile nisi essent veritates preter substancias causantes, et enia reciproce causata a se ipsis.

Three objections severally answered.

Sed huic obicitur; si A causat B, et econtra, tunc A est prius natura quam B et econtra; et sic idem esset¹⁰ prius se ipso natura. Similiter complacencia dei, cum sit relacio, non causat suum causatum ipsa prius natura. Similiter subiectum pro instanti prioritatis naturalis foret non volitum a deo, cum non prius sit volitum quam deus illud velit.¹⁵

1. If A and B cause each other mutually, they are each of them prior to the other. This, however, does not follow except with a distinction: prior *qua* causes, not otherwise.

Ad primum dicitur quod consequencia ultima non valet, quia est dare multos ordines prioritatum naturalium; ideo, ad modum exponendi hoc verbum *diffr*, superius expositum, debet ista proposicio: *A est natura prius B*, sic exponi: *A est aliquo ordine nature prius B*;²⁰ et, notato omni ordine in quo utrumque est, capienda est 2^a exponens: *talis B non est isto ordine eque primo cum A*. In diversis ergo ordinibus utrumque antecedit reliquum.

2. It is false that relations cannot be causes; but one volition of God, if posited, at once posits infinite others. He Himself being the efficient cause of all.

Ad 2^m dicitur quod relaciones faciunt multa bona;²⁵ ut proporcio causat modum. Videtur tamen michi quod ista: *deus wult me esse*, ponit infinitas voliciones dei; et alia est causa esse mei, ut volicio qua wult me esse, volendo omnem hominem esse (et sic de multis aliis); et causa agens in ipsis omnibus volucionibus est ipse qui³⁰ est prima voluntas. Complacencia ergo presupponens me esse, si sit causa conservans me, conservatur a me in illo ordine causandi obiective.

3. A creature must be willed by God before it exists; for if not, it would not depend on His volition.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod conclusio est impossibilis. Et admittantur quotlibet instancia nature esse simul in³⁵ eodem instanti temporis, cum illa instancia non sunt nisi gradus prioritatum naturalium. Nec posset deus

12. ipso B. 25. Ad 2^m dr *underlined* B. 34. Ad 3^m dr *underlined* B. 35. *q*a* pro* instantia B.

6. Before the world existed, God could not have become its cause, if there had not been *something* to make God that cause; that something is *the truth that the world is possible*.

ponere complacenciam suam in instanti nature quo est obiectum, quamvis utrumque sit quandocunque est alterum, altera. Pro illo ergo instanti nature nec est obiectum volitum a deo, nec pro illo est non volitum,
 5 sed pro illo est volitum *vel* non volitum in sensu composito. Illud patet de virtute sermonis, ut alibi expoenitur.

4º patet quod si affirmacio sit causa affirmacionis, et negacio est causa negacionis: et hinc solet regula-

10 riter antiquitus inferri ex qualibet completa causalি conditionalis facta ex causalи oppositarum parcium; ut, si *Sor est respirativus quia habet pulmonem; ergo, si non habet pulmonem, ideo non est respirativus vel igitur non est respirativus quia non habet pulmonem.* Solertia tamen

15 est, quando capitur oppositum consequentis et quando oppositum antecedentis; quando enim consequens est naturaliter prius quoad consequenciam suo antecedente; tunc antecedit condicionaliter negacio consequentis ne-

gacionem antecedentis; ut: *quia tu curris, tu moveris:*

20 *igitur, si non moveris tu non curris, quia non moveris.*

B 64* Sed si antecedens sit causa completa, convertibiliter in-
ferens suum causatum, sicut est de subiecto et sua
passione, tunc negacio cause antecedentis sequitur mix-

25 tim causaliter et condicionaliter ex negacione causati
consequentis; ut: *Sor, quia est homo, est risibilis; ergo,*
si non est homo, ideo non est risibilis, quia ideo non est homo: et non econtra; sed non oportet, si antecedens

30 sit causa convertibilis efficiens consequentis, quod nega-
cio antecedentis sit causa negacionis consequentis; ut:
quia deus wult me bene agere, igitur bene ago; si deus

non wult me bene agere, ideo non bene ago quia deus
non wult me bene agere, non sequitur secundum ali-

quos; quia tunc deus esset causa quare non bene ago,

et cuiuscunq; inordinacionis mundi. Ac si gratis sub-

35 traheret volucionem suam, necessitando me cessare a
bene agere, cum tamen cuiuscunq; defectus moralis

radicalis est causa in deficiente et non in summo bono
conservante; ideo, sicut repugnat solem debite applicari
medio diaffano et non illuminare idem, nisi defectus

40 fuerit in medio, causans privacionem luminis, sic repug-

nat hominem esse non motum a deo ad agendum sibi

But we must
distinguish
between time
instants and
nature instants.

In the same
instant of time
there may be
infinite instants
of natural
priority. Before
the creature
exists it is
willed or not
willed.

IV. Affirmation
causes
affirmation,
negation
negation:
thus every
causal
proposition

is tantamount

to a conditional

with a

contradictory

members.

Ex: *A is B*

because A is C;

therefore:

1. If *A is not C,*

A is not B

because *not C*;

or. 2. If *A is*

not B, A is

not C, because

A is not B;

1. being

employed in the

case of partial

and 2. in that

of complete

causes.

This, however,
does not hold,
according to
some, when the
antecedent is
the efficient
cause of the
consequent.

Digression
concerning the

origin of evil:

I do well

because God

wills so; if God

wills that I do

ill, I do ill

because God

wills it.

It would surely

follow that,

God's will that

I do good

being removed,

I cannot do

good;

4, 5. a deo — in sensu *in marg.* B. 18, 19. above negacionem an
illeigible word; id? B. 38. ymmo; ideo above B.

but the defect would be in me, not in God, as the opacity of an object prevents the light from penetrating; and God would not give His grace, because I should not receive it.

complacenter, nisi defectus sit in homine. Sic quod deus non causat istum defectum; quia defectus posicione illius solis, vel defectus applicacionis, vel invidia de *bene* esse alicuius non potest sibi inesse, cum tunc foret mobilis. Solum ergo antecedens quod est iniustum et 5 per consequens naturaliter causans suum consequens est in beneplacitum deo; et consequens iustum beneplacitum; ut peccatum causat penam, sicut et negacio eius, affirmacio est diminuta. Et tamen talis displiceret deo. Sed consequens non sic, cum sit iustum. Ipse ergo 10 est tam bonus et tam impotens deficere quod si non dat, ideo non datur, quia accipiens non accipit. De nobis autem qui sumus avari communicatum frequenter contingit quod ideo non accipit accipiens, quia non damus. Quod si arguatur deum esse causam uniuscuiusque cau- 15 sati, dicitur quod est impossibile, cum negaciones et privaciones et earum futuriciones vel pretericiones eterne sonantes in deordinacione non causantur ab illo, cum nichil causat nisi complacendo de causancia et causato.

We grant, however, that all, directly or indirectly, depends on the peccato, quia sum peccabilis, et sum sic motus, cum illa pauca sufficiencia ad resistendum; et non bonum est ut causatum a deo quod sum peccabilis. Sicut et ista veritas eterna est bona: *Omnis natura peccabilis* 25

erit peccabilis; et ab isto bono processerunt contingenter futuriciones peccatorum, et de necessitate primo omnium futuricio omissionis alicuius debiti deo. Et prima obmissio habuit dispositionem et inclinacionem in obmittente, cum qua non tunc stetit oppositum illius 30 omissionis; et tamen inmediate ante instans omissionis fuit declinacio omissionis possibilis, cum summa contingencia sit de talibus futurionibus, cuius contingencie primaria et radicalis causa fuit prima essencia. Ista ergo generalia de causalibus notata habuerunt introduc- 35 toria in pulcrrimas veritates.

2. po^e B. 3. fol B. 13. av'e above avari B; ib. qm^r; in marg.
9mcati B. 23. mō or zuō B. 24. est et B.

5. *Antecedens . . . iniustum*. Wyclif means here, I believe, that the fact of sin, because of its injustice, being the cause of its punishment, pleases God. 34. *Primaria et radicalis causa*. It is well to note the boldness of Wyclif's speculations in this (apparently) his first work.

CAPITULUM SEXTUM.

Restat ergo dicere de terminis reduplicativis comparative tentis. Hoc autem non est commune omnibus terminis reduplicativis, cum iste terminus, *ex hoc*, ex presse connotat causam et non comparacionem, sicut isti termini, *in quantum*, *de quanto*, *pro ut*, *secundum quod* etc. Quando ergo predicti termini tenentur comparative, propositiones ratione illorum exponende debent exponi secundum exponentes positivi gradus, de quibus dictum est tractatu proximo. Sunt ergo denotationes sibi mutuo correspondentes, ut bonitas | creature et eius obligacio deo, entitas rei et eius cognoscibilitas, et intellectivitas, et intelligibilitas; et sic de omnibus denominacionibus, quarum unam gradatim repugnat correspondere alteri; sicut est de per se causis et suis completis causatis. Ut entitas rei causat eius cognoscibilitatem, sed non intelligibilitatem, eo quod omne ens est necessario eternaliter intelligibile, quanto deus est illius intellectivus; ipse enim est tam intellectivus quam volitus. Quamvis multa intelligit que non wult, quia non de omni intelligibili habet volucionem; et per idem est tante causativus, ordinativus, et productivus, sicut est volitus. Multa tamen wult que non ordinat; et volendo se non causat se, quamvis causet illud quod est ipse. Quelibet autem alia persona volitiva est plus volitiva quam causativa. Ipse eciam precise tam bonus est quam iustus est; et sic de aliis que non sunt sibi actualia. De ipsis autem respectu cuiuscunque subjecti est maxima difficultas, cum tangat raciones ydeales que sunt principia rerum, sine quibus cognitis nemo est sapiens.

Reduplicative terms, considered comparatively. They cannot all be so considered; v. g. *ex hoc*. The exponents of such propositions follow the rules of comparisons of equality (*as much, as &c.*) already dealt with.

B 64^b There are many qualities that go beyond each other in degree and cannot be thus reduplicatively affirmed. Examples: entity, intelligibility, &c.

But this question is full of difficulties, touching as it does, the ideal principles of all things.

1. *Cap. deest.* 2. *Space for initial R. B.* 26. *creativa B; ib.*

Ipsa B. 28. *accua* B.

The present chapter deals with positive and negative 'breadths' of qualities. Is it true that if two things agree to a certain extent, they disagree to the same extent?

If so, every privation that admits of variation in intensity is equal with the opposite quality.

And many absurdities follow.

For if some opposite qualities are thus equal, all of them are so.

Take a line; an infinitely small part of it belongs to the line; so the line is what its part is, infinitely small; and its smallness is infinitely great: so it is both at once.

Increase, lessening, and change, are all impossible thenceforth.

What is proved of size can be likewise proved of all other qualities. An infinite number is infinitely small, because its smallness is infinitely small; *etc.*

Istis autem primissis, tractandum est de denominacionibus, latitudinibus positivis et latitudinibus privativis ex opposito sibi correspondentibus: ut si aliqua in quantum convenient, in tantum differunt. Quod si sit verum, tunc aliquorum consequencia et eorum diferencia sunt pares; 5 et per idem quelibet privacio suscipiens magis et minus foret parificabilis suo positivo; ut similitudo disimilitudini, magnitudo parviti, intensio remissioni, rarefaccio condensacioni, distancia propinquitati: et sic de aliis. Quo dato, secuntur multa inconveniencia; et con- 10 sequencia prima patet ex hoc quod illa proposicio: *in quantum aliqua convenient, in tantum differunt*, expresse parificat comparata secundum convenientiam et differenciam. Et quod ex illo secuntur inconveniencia, patet ex hoc quod pari evidencia qua aliqua talia opposita sunt 15 equalia, et quelibet; et tunc sequitur quod nulla talis denominacio suscipit magis et minus. Si ergo omne magnum sit ita parvum sicut magnum, et econtra, tunc omne magnum est infinitum magnum et infinitum parvum; et per consequens, proporcionaliter ut est maius 20 est minus, et econtra; et per consequens non esset possibile maiorari vel minorari, vel aliter moveri substantium aliquod, cum nichil possit fieri intensius vel remissius, distancius vel propinquius. Prima consequencia probatur, dando oppositum de A pedali: quantumcum- 25 que parva est aliqua pars A, ita parvum vel magis parvum est A. Sed infinitum parvum est aliqua pars A; ergo infinitum parvum est A; et omne parvum est ita magnum sicut ipsummet est parvum. Per datum ergo infinitum magna est aliqua pars A, et per consequens A 30 est infinitum magnum, et infinitum parvum. Argumentatur ex hoc quod A est magis magnum quam aliqua eius pars, et precise tam magnum est quidlibet, sicut est parvum; ergo A est magis parvum quam aliqua eius pars.

Et idem argumentatur de qualibet magna vel qualicunque denominacione susceptible maius et minus denominato; ut, si infinitum sit aliquis numerus, tunc infinitum parvus est; si infinitum remissum est aliquod, tunc infinitum intensem est; et sic de aliis, eo quod omne tale 40 est precisely ita magnum sicut parvum; et per consequens,

35

B 65* si est magis magnum, tunc est magis parvum. Ex quo palam sequitur quod repugnat quicquam se habere pro porcione | maioris inequalitatis ad aliquid, eo quod ex cedens aut excellens vel plus denominaretur positivo quam 5 privativo.

Hic audivi multas fugas sophisticas. Illi enim qui ponunt omne ens absolutum, ponunt quod omnis privatio et suum oppositum comparantur sicut termini vel conceptus aut subiecta taliter se habencia; cum omnis 10 privacio vel sit terminus privativus vel subiectum privativum; et sic concedunt quod illa privacio est pedalis vel tanta, sed non est tanta privacio. Alii dicunt quod si parvitas augmentabitur ad suum duplum, tunc erit in duplo maior quando est subdupla quam est modo. Et 15 ali i dicunt quod talis privacio privativa intellecta est tanta, et positive intellecta est tanta, ita quod ipsi faciunt ex sua consideracione ens extrinsecum esse tantum vel tantum. Sed falsificant se ipsos, et distinguunt ignoranter inter esse positive et esse privative. Tales ri- 20 mas circumpalpitantes excogitabant, qui per ignoranciam distinctionis encium tenebantur.

Supponatur ergo quod loquimur de entibus ex parte rei non causatis ex consideracione hominis; et tunc patet quod stat difficultas querens sub quo gradu est 25 ista parvitas; utrum secus sit tanta magnitudo sicut parvitas vel non; aut, sub aliis verbis, utrum subiectum sit tantum sub ratione qua magnum, sicut predicatum est sub ratione qua parvum. Idem enim est querere utrum tanta sit illa magnitudo, sicut est illa parvitas, 30 et querere utrum hoc sit tam magnum sicut ipsum est parvum. Nam iuxta primam responcionem, non sequitur A est tanta parvitas: igitur A est tanta res; quia parvitas proporcionaliter ut est maior parvitas est minor res, ut dicunt. Multum ergo differunt magnitudo et par- 35 vitas, cum est dare maximam magnitudinem et non est dare maximam parvitatem; et duplare parvitatem est subduplare magnitudinem et nichil duplare. Ymmo fa- cere parvitatem sic quod fiat et incipiat esse quantumlibet magna parvitas, non est facere sed destruere magni- 40 tudinem. Aliud ergo est rem esse magnam, et aliud rem esse parvam. Quod tantum sonat ac si diceretur:

There are many answers that attempt to elude the difficulty. Some say that a privation of size is *so great*, but not so great a privation of size.

Others that smallness, to be doubted, would require to be halved.

Others that smallness and magnitude are both equally great, but one understood positively, the other negatively.

But we are speaking of things as they are, not as created by our mind. What we want to know is if greatness and smallness are equal or not.

The first answer says that as smallness becomes greater, entity decreases. There can be a maximum of magnitude and not of smallness; to double smallness is to halve a magnitude, and not to double at all. Smallness being thus distinct

18. se ipsas B. 25. sg B. 36. duplæ B.

4. A word is probably wanting after *vel*.

from magnitude aliud est magnitudo et aliud parvitas. Loquimur ergo de tali privacione secundum rationem sue magnitudinis, qua privatur, et ut distinguitur a magnitudine: et tunc patet quod nec prima responsio nec 2^a tangit difficultatem logicam illius materie. 5

touches the difficulty.

The question is: "How can that privation have magnitude?"

It is a flat absurdity to say that at the same instant it is double and half of itself. If the smallness of A = 4 and will be twice as great when A = 2, this is merely calling things by contrary names.

Thus the third answer avoids the difficulty too; for magnitude, positively or negatively understood, is still magnitude.

Less logically wrong than the two former answers, it is more erroneous than they are.

Every negative quality for which no medium degree can be assigned, becomes infinite by the very fact, like certain positive qualities.

And if the medium degree of a positive

magna est illa privacio; et non solicitatur de subiecti magnitudine. Patet ergo quod claudit contradictionem in terminis apud quaecunque bene intelligentem dicere quod hoc erit in B instanti duplum ad hoc quod illa est; et tunc erit in duplo minus quam illa est. Si enim loquimur de magnitudine privacionis, ut distinguitur contra magnitudinem positivi, utamur terminis numeri ad denominandum maiorem gradum privacionis. Quando ergo dicunt quod parvitas A corporis iam est ut 4, et 15 infinite erit in duplo maior quando erit ut duo, vel mensurant parvitatem secundum equalitatem subiecti, vel aliter, gratis vocant maius, minus.

Et patet ex eadem consideracione quod 3^a responsio fugit difficultatem, quia queritur utrum magnitudo positive intellecta sit tanta magnitudo, sicut est parvitas, vel privacione intellecta. Et supponatur quod in qua cunque denominacione maius et minus sit signandum proporcionaliter maiori termino numerali, ut ipsum est maius. Est ergo illa responsio, ponens quod omnia 25 privative opposita sub mediis gradibus correspondent, et proporcionaliter ut gradus positivi supra medium gradum sunt intensiores, sub gradus privacionis remisiores; et econtra. | Ista autem responsio minus peccat B 65^t in logica quam priores, cum respondit formaliter iuxta 30 veritatem sermonis; sed magis peccat in sentencia, cum per alias non devenitur ad aliquam difficultatem propter proterviam. Improbatur autem ista posicio per hoc quod cum latitudinum privativarum non sit dare medium gradum, eo ipso quelibet talis in infinitum procedit in 35 quibus positivum infinitum procedit; ut patet de motu et raritate. Ymmo, secundum magnificantes potentiam dei, omnis species denominacionis positive in infinitum potest procedere. Et si gradus medius in actu alicuius positivi sit semper par privacioni correspondenti sibi, 40

13. utantur B. 19. patet quod B. 34. latitudinū B. 36. in aliquo B; ib. zifz^m pro infinitum B.

sequitur quod quemicunque gradum positivum possibile quality is equal
esset parificari privacioni sibi correspondenti. Et cum corresponding
tales gradus nunc equales non possent fieri inequaes, negative one,
sequitur quod omnes tales gradus correspondentes sunt then the same
5 equales. Sive ergo latitudo positiva ponitur procedere takes place in
in infinitum, vel non, semper procederet altera in every degree.
in infinitum, cum cuilibet parti finite terminante ad non If we posit a
gradum de una latitudine correspondet latitudo infinita de quality
suo opposito; ut magnitudini a gradu ut 4 usque ad extending from
10 non gradum correspondet in infinitum magna latitudo o to 4 in
parvitas. Et sic invenies in aliis. intensity, this o corresponds
to infinite intensity of smallness; thus we shall always find the infinite in such cases.

Similiter videtur quod repugnat certe calculacioni ut, It is impossible
posito quod A calidum sub medio gradu ut 4 sit pre- to admit that a
cise ita intensem sicut ipsum est remissum; tunc, ipso body can be
15 remisso ad suum subduplicem uniformiter in hora, intens- equally hot and
detur remissio uniformiter ad suum duplum, eo quod cold; if
proporcionaliter ut aliquid est magis intensem quam sub heat = 4, then
medio gradu est ipsum minus remissum, et econtra. In becoming half
medio ergo instanti erit intensio A calidi ut tria, et re- as hot, cold becomes
20 missio erit ut sex; et per consequens infinitum velocius. double; between the two, we have Heat = 3,
Et non proporcionaliter acquireretur remissio quam de- and Cold = 6; cold having
perderetur intensio; cum tamem quantumcunque velociter fiet aliquid magis intensem, fiet ipsum minus remissum, increased
et econtra, cum illud sit motus utriusque. Vel aliter 25 infinitely faster.
25 oportet ponere processum in infinitum in motibus; non enim gradum finitum motus infinitum velocem motum consequi, et per consequens omnem motum velociter in infinitum velociter moveri.

Ex isto videtur quod non sit possibile idem esse precise It is, therefore,
30 [ita] intensem ut remissum; quia tunc, acquisita remis- evident that no
sione dupla, deperderetur precise intensio subdupla, et quality can be
cum tantum deperderetur de intensione sicut acquirere- equally intense and lax; for if
tur de remissione, patet calculanti quod sequitur intensi- its laxity
tionem fuisse duplam ad remissionem in principio. Non doubled, only
35 enim stat aliquod ens crescere ad suum duplum propter half of its
tantam latitudinem acquisitam, quantum reliquum de- intensity would
pendendo decrescit ad suum subduplicem, nisi primum be lost, and we
fuerit subduplicem ad secundum, eo quod oportet sic should see that the intensity
was from the beginning double of the laxity.

22. intensio above remissio B. 30. it: deest. 36. acquirendam;
acquisitam above B.

5. Here Wyclif enters into mathematical calculations on a subject which is perhaps not to be dealt with thus, and at a time when mathematics were hardly able to grapple with questions concerning the Infinite.

What increases, increases by the whole of its intensity; what diminishes, only by the half.

The third answer denies that positive and negative intensities are comparable.

But this is false, since privations can be compared with positive qualities as to their good or evil results.

No two things can bear the same specific name, unless they are in so far comparable,

at least analogously: which the very answer implies, by saying that positive and negative qualities differ;

for to differ supposes comparison.

They are besides properly comparable, for their magnitude is of the same nature.

And when we say that each has v. g. an intensity equal to 2, we mean that it really has this intensity.

All doubles being equal, the magnitude A is to its half B to its half; which makes a regular proportion.

augmentum acquirere tantum quantum ipsum est; et diminutum non oportet deperdere nisi medietatem sue latitudinis. Repugnat ergo illas latitudines esse pares.

3^a responsio negat omnem comparacionem privacionis ad habitum; et istam opinionem tenent aliqui (de quibus miror), qui ponunt omnem privacionem esse rem privatam. Ista autem responsio excedit, cum stat privacionem comparari quo ad bonitatem vel maliciam positivam; et sic de causacione et multis aliis. Nam habitus facit plus boni, et per consequens est religiosior data 10 privacione; sicut et una denominacio talis est reliqua durabilior, potencior, remocior, propinquior; et sic de B 66^a quibuslibet denominacionibus extrinsecis. Ymmo, claudit contradiccionem aliqua esse, quantumcunque dispara fuerint, nisi sit comparacio inter illa secundum con- 15 veniem et differenciam, in aliqua denominacione specifica generali vel analoga. Et hoc invenitur in responsione, cum dicitur privacionem et habitum tantum differre quod neutrum est compossibile alteri. Omnis enim diferencia vel est comparacio, vel ad eam secun- 20 tur infinite comparaciones.

Item, videtur quod ille forme sunt proprie comparabiles, quia eadem est magnitudo utriusque, cum utrumque capit magnitudinem suam a subiecto preter eius subiecti magnitudinem; non est illis alia, quia aliter ad 25 omnem punctum, quam talis infinitum magna esset magnitudo parvitatis, et per idem ad omnem punctum mundi infinitum magna intensio.

2^o confirmatur illud per hoc quod utramque significatur vere habere magnitudinem ut duo, et unam esse 30 causatam in genere suo, sicut reliqua est in suo; cum ergo omnia quorum magnitudines vere significantur, cum eodem termino materiali sunt equalia, sequitur quod omnis privativa denominacio sit equalis denominacioni positive.

3^o sic: proporcio A magnitudinis ad eius medietatem est equalis proporcioni B parvitatis ad eius medietatem, quia omnes proporciones duple sunt equales. Ergo illa 4 sunt proporcionalia ad invicem secundum 6 genera proporcionum, de quibus in 5^o elementarum Euclidis. 40

10. religior B. 12. diuturnior; corr. below B. 13. q, l3; and so very often throughout the MS. 25. e ill a^r B; ib. ar B. 26. q, B.
29. q, utraq³ vtrq³ B. 39. ad 5^o B.

Aliter enim non esset verum quod proporcionaliter ut privacio est maior est eius oppositum minus, et econtra.

4º sic; posito quod A et B in principio illius hore fuerint eque bona cum suis habitibus et quod habens 5 A sit frustratum ab illo, salvo B eque bono suo habenti, patet quod tam mala est privacio A quam bonus est habitus B, et per consequens malicia privacionis est par bonitati habitus. Et sic non solum malicia et 10 bonitas, sed carencia et habitus sunt equeales. Et per idem in quacunque proporcione maioris inequalitatis 15 sunt comparabiles. Et idem patet de privacione privacionis; ut quam bonum est habere visum, tam bonum est carere cecitate, quia tantum proficeret (eo quod sunt proprie idem); sicut tantum nocet carencia rei, sicut proficit habitus eiusdem; et sic iuvamentum et 20 nocumentum, carencia et habitus, erunt quomodolibet proporcionalia.

Pro responsione ad istam difficultatem, suppono quod omnis privacio differt ab habitu et econtra. 2º suppono 25 quod aliqua sunt comparabilia immediate per se, ut due substancie comparantur in perfectione essenciali, due quantitates in equalitate et due qualitates in intensione. Quamvis enim talia formaliter comparantur relacionibus distinctis a comparatis, non tamen habent accidentia 30 absoluta subiectata in illis et per que fundamentaliter comparantur; 2º comparantur aliqua per accidentia eorum absoluta, ut homo et asinus eque proprie comparantur in quantitate et figura et qualitate et aliis accidentibus, que univoce participant, sicut homo et 35 homo, quamvis substancie magis differunt. Et 3º comparantur aliqua secundum accidentia respectiva extrinseca; ut due albedines sunt eque proprie michi, quia subiecta quibus insunt sunt ita proprie michi. 3º supponatur quod aliqua comparantur in denominacionibus certi generis univoce particularis; ut, *Sor est melior lapide*. Aliqua autem in denominacionibus analogis extra genus; ut dicitur: *deus est sapiencior Sorte; Affirmatio est melior quam privacio vel negacio*. Tales enim denominaciones secundum quamdam analogiam insunt 40 vel circumeunt multa genera analogica. Et 4º supponitur quod aliqua sit comparacio vel proporcio proprie dicta, qualis est proporcio numeralis quantorum eiusdem

Again, it is evident that it is as bad to lose a good quality as it is good to have it; therefore goodness and badness are equal here, and also the 'having' and the privation.

To solve the problem, we must make a few assumptions.
1. That privation and possession differ.

2. That some things are immediately comparable with each other, and others by means of their absolute or relative accidents.

3. That some things are univocally, others analogically comparable.

4. That there is a kind of comparison properly so-called, as

among quantities of the same species, whether rational or irrational; and another sort of proportion, that is not mathematical but universal. It is obvious that all beings are comparable according to this universal proportion.

No negation is by itself and properly comparable with a positive quality; not even by means of an absolute accident, for they can be the subject of none such.

But they are comparable, even properly, if the comparison is founded on some extrinsic relation.

Some privations, especially worthy of the

speciei, sive sit rationalis, que in immediate denominatur ab aliquo certo numero, sive sit irrationalis, sicut est medietas dupla, ut proporcio diametri ad costam quadrati. Alia autem est proporcio communiter dicta, que non est numeralis; sed ad illam sufficit habitudo. 5

Istis premissis, patet quod omne ens secundum proporcionem communiter dictam est comparabile alteri cuicunque. Patet ex hoc quod quidlibet habet se ad quidlibet aliud in quadam habitudine. Sic enim homo sapiencior est, deo similior, lapide perfeccior; et erit affirmacio negacione melior; et tamen non oportet in talibus dare proporcionem numeralem, quia similitudo, perfeccio, bonitas, et magnitudo analogice ampliata ad magnitudinem molis et magnitudinem virtutis, circumeunt omne genus. In omni enim genere contingit reperire 15 similitudinem, perfeccionem, bonitatem, unitatem, magnitudinem, prioritatem etc., que convenient transcedent.

2º dico quod nulla negacio vel privacio est positive proprie proporcionaliter, vel per se vel per absolutum accidens quod subiectat. Primum patet ex hoc quod nullum genus est illis commune; ergo non per se sunt talia proprie proporcionalia vel comparabilia. Consequencia tenet ex illa suppositione; et 2ª pars patet ex hoc quod privaciones et negaciones non possunt subiectare aliquod accidens absolutum, nec forme illis 25 opposito; patet ergo quod non sunt secundum se proprie comparari, nec secundum quantitatem nec secundum qualitatem quam subiectant.

Et 3º, dico quod tales forme opposite possunt tam communi comparacione quam comparacione proprie 30 dicta fundata in accidente extrinseco ad invicem comparari; ut contingit dandas privaciones esse datis habitibus, in quacunque proporcione volueris, plures aut pauciores, diuturniores vel breviores; et sic de aliis que insunt illis per accidentia suorum subiectorum vel alias respectus. Et patet quid generaliter sit dicendum de comparacione privacionis ad habitum.

Sed pro ulteriore declaracione notandum quod aliique sunt privaciones que non suscipiunt magis et minus;

3, 4, 4º B. II. aff'maor B.

3. *Irrationalis.* Irrational quantities, or surds; as $\sqrt{2}$ (proporcio diametri ad costam quadrati). But what Wyclif means by (I. 4) *medietas dupla*, unless it be *the square root of two* I cannot imagine. Mr. Matthew suggests *aut* for *ut*, on I. 4.

- ut quies et cecitas, et breviter omnia que non compa- name, do not
rantur in eodem subiecto aliquid positivi sibi oppositi. admit of
Et ille proprie et simpliciter privaciones sunt. Omnes increase or
tamen dicunt aptitudinem subiecti ad formam et nega- diminution; but
5 cionem habitus talis forme. Sicut ergo omne privatum only the denial
visu est quod non habet visum, sic omnis cecitas est of a quality but
cuilibet alteri cecitati par; et sic de talibus similibus. the aptitude of
Alii autem dicunt quod tales privaciones sunt eo maiores only the subject to
quo forme quas privant forent maiores; de quo alibi. receive that
10 Alii autem sunt privaciones communiter dicte, et se- quality.
cundum quid, que ponunt sua subiecta et aliquid de All these are
forma, et alicuius gradus forme carenciam, ut parvitas, equal to each
remissio, etc. que ex opposito correspondent suis posi- other by reason
tivis. Ista autem non proprie privative opponuntur suis of their
15 positivis; sed quodammodo relative, ut duplum et di- absoluteness.
midium; et de istis est nobis sermo. Others are not
so absolutely opposed to
their contrary qualities, but
rather relatively; it is
with them that we have to do.
We deny that any of these
privations is greater or smaller than its positive quality, or equal or unequal; to grant this would
be to admit many absurdities.
- De istis ergo dicitur quod nulla talis privacio est suo
positivo maior vel minor, nec inequalis secundum essen-
tiam, vel equalis. Illud patet ex 2^a conclusione; quia,
20 si aliqua talis esset reliqua maior vel minor, aut finite
aut infinite. Si finite, tunc contingere aliquia talia pari-
ficari. Per idem non est causa dicenda quare non om-
nia forent paria. Si infinite, tunc omne magnum foret
infinite magis magnum quam parvum, vel econtra; et
25 quecumque pars detur, sequitur inconveniens. Si enim
omne quantum foret infinite magis magnum quam par-
vum, tunc infinitum parvum foret in tanta proporcione
B 67^a magis magnum quam parvum, sicut maximum in mundo;
et cum infinitum crescit parvitas alicius talis super-
30 parvitatem maximam, sequitur quod minus, in quantum
minus, foret maius. Et idem patet, dato quod quelibet
parvitas sit infinitum maior magnitudine.
- Ultimo dico quod omnes tales forme proporcionaliter But they
et non secundum equalitatem ex opposito correspondent; correspond one
35 ut si magnitudo corporis fiat in duplo maior, parvitas with another
eius fiet in duplo minor, et econtra; et sic de quacun- symmetrically,
que proporcione signanda. Ex quo sequitur quod si and not as
una talis forma acquiratur uniformiter, reliqua deper- equals;
deretur difformiter; et econtra. Et pro tempore quo una so that, as one
40 velocius acquireretur, reliqua tardius deperdetur et quality increases
econtra. Ut, maiorato A uniformiter ad sui duplum in faster, the other
decreases slower; as
one increases more, the other decreases less, but always
in proportion.

6. ^{est} ep, pro est quod B; ib. ^{hinc} above habet B. 12. ^{dimittit} primit (?) B.

30. maxi^mB. 39. after econtra three lines crossed off B.

hora, tunc in prima mediate maiorabitur, ad sui sexqui-alterum et in 2^a mediate ad suum sesquitercium et parvitas econtra in prima medietate diminuetur ad suum subsesquitercium, et in 2^a ad suum subsesquialterum. Et sic invenies omnia talia opposita in suis denominacionibus et condicionibus valde dispariter se habere; ut, si una illarum quantumcunque tarde remittatur ad non gradum in situm, celeriter intenderetur reliqua, quia semper infinitum magno de uno infinito parvum correspondet de reliquo; et sic est de multis proprietatibus, iuxta quas possent multiplicari quotlibet conclusiones. Et patet responsio ad omnia argumenta, preterquam ad ultimum cum suis confirmacionibus.

To the first difficulty we reply that privation has no magnitude, nor parts.

Two shadows may make one doubly intense: but they are not the parts, but the cause of that new shadow.

If privations had parts, why should they not be extended like positive qualities?

Ad primum dicitur quod privacio non est mole magna; quia si sic, tunc infinitum modica eius pars 15 quantitativa foret quantumlibet infinitum maior suo toto. Infinitas tamen parvitates in quocunque continuo est signare quantumlibet maiores parvitatem tocius, quarum quelibet presupponitur adesse parvitatis tocius; et tamen non sunt eius partes, cum nulla talis privacio 20 habet partes. Unde, quamvis due umbre causant per idem medium umbram magis intensam, neutra tamen est eius pars intensiva, sed causa suppositiva. Aliando non posui parvitatem habere duplices partes, sicut motum; utputa partes magnas mole et partes intensivas; 25 et sic proposui tales privaciones esse dupliciter magnas proporcionaliter ad illas partes, ita quod pars infinitum parva quo ad molem esset quantumlibet maior suo toto quo ad intensionem; quia grave videtur quod talis privacio sit continue magna sine hoc quod habeat partes. 30 Nec est explicabile qualiter parvitas partis principiare parvitatem tocius, nisi causacione intrinseca, tanquam pars componens. Si enim cecitas habet partes secundum extensionem subiecti, sicut et quies, et alie privaciones, quare ergo non extenderenter alie privaciones 35 que plus ponunt? Sed grave videtur fundare partes intensivas parvitatis vel principiare illas secundum disparem individuationem ab individuatione aliarum parciuum.

1. sex B. 4. ses B. 11, 12. gones B. 23. *Above supp.* p B;
ib. alii; *alii above* B. 24. possunt; posui *above* B. 33. sic (?) B.
 35. q̄r pro quare B.

Quomodo cunque ergo de hoc sit, certum est quod opposito modo est de talibus privacionibus et aliis positivis; quia in quantis positivis maius minus presupponit tanquam eius partem; sed in privativis minus presupponit maius et minimum est dandum; ut patet de parvitate mundi. In proporcionibus autem conservantur maior proporcio maioris inequalitatis, et minor proporciona-
liter minoris inequalitatis; ita quod deperdita proporcione maioris inequalitatis usque ad equalitatem, infinitum cresceret proporcio minoris inequalitatis; et maiorata in infinitum proporcione maioris inequalitatis, infinitum diminueretur proporcio minoris inequalitatis;

B 67^b sic quod infinitum | magnam proporcionem maioris inequalitatis, si detur, consequitur infinitum modica proporcio minoris inequalitatis et econtra: minima tamen proporcio, a qua alie procedunt, est proporcio equalitatis. Cum ergo magnitudo magnitudinis non sit, nisi illa magnitudo, sicut magnitudo parvitatis est vel ipsa parvitas vel eius passio, ne sit processus in infinitum, vel nugatorie replicetur eadem sententia: patet quod falsum est quod eadem est magnitudo magnitudinis et parvitatis. Nec est inconveniens, extendendo nomina intensionis et magnitudinis, concedere quod infinitum intensa magnitudo et intensio sunt ad quemlibet punctum mundi; sicut theologi concedunt de potentia dei. Ista tamen anologa per se supposita communiter intelliguntur de magnitudine molis et intensione qualitatis: magnitudo tamen parvitatis non est magnitudo, sicut nec intensio remissionis est intensio, si non equivocetur.
30 Ad secundum dicitur quod minor est falsa, quia, ratione certitudinis, in numeris qui sunt prime mensure rerum, signantur exemplariter per eundem numerum qui non possunt equari; ut perfeccio hominis vere designatur suo genere, gradu ut 8, et perfeccio asini gradu
35 ut 8, sicut magnitudo temporis, magnitudo corporis, et velocitas motus signantur gradu ut 8. Et tamen dicere quod illa sunt equalia est pure demencie. Et si argumentatur sic: A est tantum in suo genere, sicut B in suo genere; ergo A est tantum sicut B, eo quod quantum-
40 cunque est aliquod ens in suo genere tantum est:

In positive quantities the greater implies the less; in negatives, the less supposes the greater, and as the one increases the other must diminish.

Now as there is no magnitude of magnitude, so there is no magnitude of smallness: and to say that both have the same magnitude is false; for we either mean nothing by that term, or else greatness and smallness in themselves: which are evidently not identical.

The second argument is met by denying that, if the same numbers are employed to designate things that are not homologous, they are therefore equal. Though 8 may stand for the perfection of a man in his species, of an ass in its

3. "mig psupp^t "maig B. 6. gnt se; above gfernr B. 10, 11. et — inequalitatis bottom of page B. 15. nūā B. 23. iſit^t B. 32. veris (?) B. ib. signant^r; s,^r above B. 33, 34. designatur B.

species, of a
length of time,
a volume, or a
movement, if
were folly to
say that these
are equal.
This may
apply to all
similar cases.

And it does
not follow
that two things
being great, and
neither greater
than the other, they are equal.

The third
argument is
valid; but
Euclid
understood
quantities of
the same sort.
These quantities
may be
proportional
with each
other, even
though neither
equal nor
unequal.

Thus the world
is as much
greater than
a grain of
millet, as it is
less small than
the same.

If not, we could
neither assign
a minimum nor
a maximum of
size,

dicitur quod argumentum non est verum de virtute sermonis; sed A est ut 8 in suo genere et B est ut 8 in suo genere. Et sic in consimilibus proporcionibus se habent ad gradus suorum generum eisdem terminis numeralibus signatis. Cum enim non cognoscimus gradus talium magnitudinum nisi ex suppositione, nec habemus dispare numeros proporcionatos ad denominandum omnes dispare magnitudines. Nec mirum, si magnitudines diversorum generum mensuremus eodem termino numerali; nec sequitur: *utrumque istorum est magnum 10 et neutrum reliquo maius: ergo, utrumque est equale alteri;* quia oportet ad equalitatem esse convenientiam specificam fundamenti.

Ad 3^{cum} conceditur quod argumentum est verum; sed quo ad illos sex modos argumentandi Euclidis, 15 dicitur quod ipse intelligit illas in quantitatibus eiusdem generis (quamvis aliqui illorum possunt habere locum) eciam quantumcunque disparatis. Conceditur ergo quod proporciones aliquorum sunt proprie comparabiles et proporcionata, nec sunt equalia nec inequalia per se, 20 sicut patet de proporcione temporis ad tempus, et spaci ad spacium, et similius discontinue proporcionarium quibus proporcionantur proporcione communiter dicta. Unde non sequitur: *proporcionaliter ut magnitudo est maior, parvitas est minor, et contra; ergo, parvitas 25 et magnitudo sunt equeales vel inequeales;* sed sufficit quod proporciones excessum sint equeales, vel ex opposito correspondentes. Ex ipsis enim probabiliter infertur quod omne finite denominatum aliqua tali denominacione participat proporcionaliter suo opposito: ut mundus 30 situ sic finite magnus, est eo minus parvus quam milium, quo est magis magnus.

Aliter enim non esset dare | minimum gradum quo B 68^a aliquid est parvum, nec maximum quo nichil est parvum. Ymmo nulla foret subdupla parvitatis ad parvitatem 35 medietatis mundi; quia, dato quod sic, mundus foret in duplo minus parvus sicut est in duplo magis magnus. Non enim est verisimile quod addicio unius puncti ad istum mundum induceret parvitatem ad omnem eius punctum, postquam per ante non fuit usquam eius 40

7. quando above cum B. 11. utr^e q. B. 17. p^t above com^t B.
18. despate B. 23. cp porat^t cppore^t B. 31. sc^t pro situ; very
illegible B. 37. mi^t underlined B.

aliqua parvitas; et ablacio puncti tolleret parvitatem a remanente, cum unum talium oppositorum non possit auferri, nisi per oppositionem reliqui. Sicut ergo est dare maximam magnitudinem, sic est dare minimam but there must be a limit both to magnitude and smallness.
 5 parvitatem, quia aliter mundus infinitum maioratus successive non esset minor in aliquo instanti quam in quolibet instanti; et per idem posset in tantum diminui ad non quantum sine hoc quod minoraretur et non minoraretur, nisi pro instanti *foret* parvus; et per con-
 10 sequens, nisi fuerit ita quod est parvus.

Probabile ergo est dicere quod parvitas mundi est minima, sicut eius magnitudo est maxima; et sic gra- We may affirm that the world is at once the greatest and the least small of metrum et mensura omnium aliorum illius generis; ut possible beings.
 15 alia sunt eorum minora, que ab illo sunt plus distanca, et gradus magnitudinum mensurantur penes distanciam a non quanto; et sic principium magnitudinis non communicat in illa denominacione cum suis principiatis, sicut principium parvitatis communicat in illa denomi-
 20 nacione cum suis participiatis: quia perfectionis est participare positivum et non communicare cum illo in denominacione imperfectionis. Primum ergo principium est indivisible et tamen inmensum virtute, sed non mole; et ipsum principiat utramque denominacionem
 25 ultimate. Mundus ergo est parvus, non secundum comparacionem ad maius ymaginatum quod non est, sed in comparacione ad magis parvum; et alia sunt parva in comparacione ad maius. Et proporcionaliter dicitur de remissione, propinquitate, et similibus. Tales ergo 30 denominaciones que non sunt similiter denominaciones quo ad aliquid habent se positive, et quo ad aliud privative; ut densitas quo ad quantitatem privative se habet, sed quo ad multitudinem materie positive; et econtra de raritate. Et sic est de sompno et vigilia, que 35 suscipiunt magis et minus, sed non proporcionaliter ut alie privaciones nunc citate.

Et si queritur quid est talis privacio, dicitur quod est forma denominans subiectum formaliter huiusmodi; et sunt de eodem genere in quo sunt sua positiva oppo-
 40 sita; sed per reduccionem; ut parvitas est in genere quantitatis, et cecitas in genere qualitatis. Non enim

The first principle of all things is infinite, but without dimensions, because indivisible: the world is not infinite since something exists greater than it, not in magnitude but in smallness. The like may be said of remissness, propinquity etc. but some qualities are positive from one point of view, and privative from another; as density, rarity, sleep and waking, etc. If asked, what this privation is, we answer: A form

5. minoratus above B. 6. maior above minor B. 27. pun B.

36. nc citate.

intrinsically causing its subject to receive a certain name, and belonging to the same genus as the positive quality to which it is opposed.

There is a question whether that which increases or diminishes can be called a privation or not; some admit this; some call privation the property of an accident and some, a mere want.

Privations are either of something already possessed, or to be possessed, or that might be so; or of a merely intelligible form that cannot be possessed v. g. to be deprived of infinite size is to be small.

My opinion is that smallness is a property of quantity, not a privation of infinite size. Though not so properly as in the case of substances, accidents may have the five predicables; but the accident, difference or property of an accident belongs to the substance.

As to the fourth argument, the conclusion may be granted. Opposite forms can be properly compared, though not in

oportet ponere privacionibus, negacionibus, futurionibus, pretericionibus et possilibus, nova genera; quia de ratione generis est dicere positivam quidditatem substantie vel accidentis, que est veritas de presenti in substancia, fundata per formalem inherenciam. ⁵

Utrum autem illa que suscipiunt magis et minus sunt privaciones vel non, est dissensio. Aliqui enim vocant ipsas | quantitates vel qualitates, alii melius vocant illas passiones vel proprietates accidencium, non per se in genere. Et alii vocant illas privaciones carencias et ^{B 68^b tunc illa verba *privari* vel *carere* etc., non mobilitant terminos. Sed idem esset hoc, *carere quantitate* et *quantitate carere*. Unde aliqua est privacio forme habite de predicato, ut cecitas, vel visus debilitas; aliqua privacio est forme habende, ut privacio principians generacionem ¹⁵ compositi naturalis; aliqua est privacio forme possibilis, ut inpotencia infantis qui moritur in prima eius etate. Et aliqua est privacio vel carencia forme intelligibilis que non potest esse, sed subiectum habet formam talis speciei; ut omne quantum est parvum, et omne intensum ²⁰ est remissum, ipso carente infinita quantitate et infinita intensione. Si ergo esset aliquod tale infinitum magnum vel intensum simpliciter, tunc esset non parvum et minime remissum.}

Videtur autem michi quod parvitas est proprietas ²⁵ quantitatis et non carencia quantitatis infinite. Et sic de ceteris que suscipiunt magis et minus. Ad alias enim consequuntur carencie, sed non formaliter sunt carencie. In omni enim genere accidencium est dare genus et speciem, differenciam, proprium et accidens, quamvis ³⁰ non ita proprie sicut in cathegoria substanciali. Omne tamen accidens accidentis est accidens substanciali, sicut omnis differencia vel proprium accidentis inheret substantie per accidens cui per se inest; ut parvitas quantitatis est *subiectum, sic quantum, esse parvum*; et sic ³⁵ illa parvitas potest separari a subiecto, sed non ab illa quantitate. Non tamen est possibile quod accidens habeat sic per se, posterius illo quod ipsum accidens posset esse non inherens et subici tali posteriori.

Ad 4^m dicitur quod in casu posito est conclusio pro- ⁴⁰ babiliter concedenda, cum tales forme opposite comparantur in suis denominacionibus ab extrinseco causatis;

4. quod above que B. 5. sūta B. 11. mota B. 17. e⁹ e¹⁰ B.

et in talibus sunt ipse proprie comparabiles, iuxta 3^{am} conclusionem. Quod autem talis forma sit bona vel mala, hoc est per comparacionem ad utilitatem subjecti et ad multa alia; et ita de malicia est dicendum.

5 Omne enim bonum est quodammodo bonum debile; ut res quecumque est precise tam bona alicui alteri quam utilis est eidem; et tam mala est res alteri quam inutilis vel impediens est ab opposito alterius indebite.

Ex quo sequitur quod non proporcionaliter est res bona alteri sicut est bona in se, ut habere centum solidos est bonum virtuoso indigenti; et prodigo forsitan esset malum. Ymmo, cum diversis circumstanciis potest vicissim esse magis bonum vel minus bonum habere centum solidos, sicut patet de valore usibilium que sunt eo alicui valenciora quo utiliora: ut panis valeret in tempore necessitatis famelico quodlibet magnum aurum, ubi non valeret denarium solidi pro loco et tempore quibus posset habere illum pro obula. Et sic gladius valeret iniuste obsesso centum guldensis; et tamen eidem furioso esset alias malus. In omnibus ergo talibus, ubi agitur de valore vel bono sub ratione qua utile, attendendum est ad indigenciam alicuius cui est bonum, et ad commodum quod cum paribus sibi inferret; quia valde relativa est racio talis boni.

25 Bonum autem nature est eo maius quo ens habens illud est naturaliter perfeccius, sicut fines perfecciores sunt hiis que sunt ad finem. Homo enim, qui est finis omnium | aliorum sublunarium, daret in casu iuste pro salvacione sua quotlibet talia bona. Ideo est quantumlibet melior illis; sicut deus est sic optimum quod potest esse, et quamvis omnis res naturalis absolute sit taliter bona, omnis tamen res naturalis est bona primo modo, quia aliter talis. Ymmo probabiliter potest dici quod quelibet pars mundi est cuiilibet indigenti utilis; 30 et de facto prodest cuiilibet homini ut quelibet pars celi, causando celum, prodest michi, cum ipsum celum causatum conservat me secundum corpus. Et sic invenies de bonis accidentalibus quibuscumque. Vicia autem et peccata sunt occasionaliter bona, cum prosunt

themselves. Their goodness or badness proceeds from a comparison with outside objects, to which they are useful or the contrary. Intrinsical and extrinsical goodness (utility) are not the same.

Money may be a good for a poor but honest man, and an evil for a spendthrift. According to circumstances, the same thing, equally good in itself, changes its extrinsical value; as bread in a famine; or a sword in the hands of a warrior or of a madman.

In these things demand is an important factor.

Physical goodness depends on the perfection of that being which possesses it. The salvation of one man is worth more than the whole world.

But natural good comprises in every case usefulness to some one;

and even vice and sin have their uses.

18. s^t B. 19. g^e pro guldensis B.

18. *Obula*. Cf. Lafontaine, Le Serpent et la Lime: "Seulement le quart d'une obole."

Nothing can non solum in exemplum aliis, sed et ipsis peccantibus exist that is not good in some way. quod peccaverunt. Unde impossibile est esse ems, nisi fuerit quodammodo bonum.

The third sort of good — 3^m vero genus boni, honestum est utile; ut omni moral good — virtuoso prosunt virtutes et actus virtuosi; ymmo tanta 5 it is impossible to put virtue to a bad use. est de illis virtutibus honestas quod nemo potest uti male virtute morali, sicut potest abuti virtute naturali, But things morally good are sometimes equally so, sometimes more, sometimes less; their utility also varies so much that at times very slight external advantages outbalance it. Evils in like manner are threefold: unserviceable, injurious, immoral. Nothing is of use to God; because he has need of nothing.

He is unserviceable to none, since He preserves all nature in being, and punishes only for the good of the universe; so that the punishment He inflicts is not an injury. Moral evil can in no case be committed by

Him.

Thus God cannot make a man sin, though He can make his sin to be good,

3^m vero genus boni, honestum est utile; ut omni virtuoso prosunt virtutes et actus virtuosi; ymmo tanta 5 est de illis virtutibus honestas quod nemo potest uti male virtute morali, sicut potest abuti virtute naturali, et forte intellectuali. Unde virtutes anime valent multa bona naturalia et extrinseca. Et quo ad rationem boni honesti, sunt quedam eque bona, quamvis quo ad rationem bona utilis quandoque plus prosunt et quandoque minus; ymmo quandoque superantur a parvis bonis extrinsecis. Cum ergo tot modis dicitur unum oppositorum esse, sic et reliquum.

Patet ergo quod 3^x est racio mali. Divicie enim 15 quandoque actualiter sint male, eo quod alicui inutiles. Peccata nature et morum sunt mala nature; et actus viciosi sunt mala inhonesta. Ex quibus patet quod sicut nichil est bonum deo primo modo; sic ipse nulli est malus primo modo, sed cuiilibet alteri nature est 20 ipse bonus primo modo, sed nulli tam bonus quam bonus est in sui natura. Prima pars patet ex eo quod deus non potest alio indigere. Cum ergo utile dicit indigenciam, nichil potest esse utile vel commodi-ferum sibi. Et 2^a pars patet ex hoc quod ipse pre-25 exiguit tanquam necessarius observator et dans omne bonum cuiilibet tali nature; et per consequens nulli tali est inutilis; quia si puniat aliquos, hoc est misericorditer, et ad universi honestatem, et ad eorum utilitatem. Ideo non nocet vel impedit aliquos, etsi infligat illis 30 malum pene, quod est malum et nocens nature secundum quid. Malum autem moris non potest principiari, quamvis illud bonum non formaliter.

Ergo deus potest facere hoc esse bonum quod Sor peccat, et tamen non potest facere Sor peccare. Et sic 35

4. honeste B. 16. accar B. 28. qui sic above B. 33. vd bom
nō for B.

32. *Malum moris* is here taken evidently in the sense of *sin*; I think that *peccata morum* (l. 17) may mean a bad habit. Scholastics divided good into *utile*, *delectabile* and *honestum*, evil into *inutile*, *molestem*, *inhonestum*. On l. 15, 16, we have *inutile*; on l. 16 *molestem* and on l. 17 *inhonestum*. Now only *inhonestum* corresponds to moral evil; and if we take *peccata morum* as sin, it would not necessarily be malum nature (i. e. *molestem*).

ista [conclusio] est bona: *Sor peccat*: ergo, *bonum est vel verum est quod Sor peccat*; et deus facit consequens et non antecedens. Racio, quia antecedens non est in ordine nature, sicut consequens; quia *Sor peccare est de 5 ordine nature*. Et primo conclusio probatur: *Sor peccat*; ergo *verum est quod Sor peccat*; ergo *ens est quod Sor peccat*; ergo *bonum*. Similiter: *Sor peccat*; ergo *iuste punitur*; deus facit consequens et non facit antecedens in sequela logicali, ut est hic. Et sic licet facit *10 posterius*, non tamen facit prius in sequela logicali; licet in sequela reali semper faciens posterius, facit prius, dummodo illud prius non sit suppositum in ordine nature. Nec facit consequens et antecedens nonfacit, quia ipse non est naturaliter prius, cum non sit in ordine nature.

B69^a 3^a autem pars patet ex 2^a; nec obest res eternas habere God is good to all His creatures. indigenciam alicuius quod semper habent et appetunt sed non indigent aliquo quo eternaliter carent vel sperant, cum habent inamissibiliter quo indigent vel declinant.

Et quarta pars patet ex hoc quod tam bonus est deus 20 cuiquam quantum prodest illi, ut patet de virtute sermonis; sed nulli tantum prodest quam bonus est in se; ergo, etc. Nec sequitur quod deus infinite concurrit ad actum essentie create; quia necessario libere concurrit ad omnem talem actum causate essentie, quante iuvat 25 ad illum; ideo proporcionaliter concurrit ad actum ut ipse est magnus; et hoc est melius quam esset, etsi infinite concurrerit ad quantumlibet actum. Et hoc est impossibile, quia tunc prima mensura immoderate haberet, quia nullum haberet motum ipse deus; quia ad 30 agendum magis vel minus equaliter se haberet. Et si infinite concurret illi, non esset modus vel moderacio. Nec potest probari quod deus est, tante concurrit, vel est alteri similis vel dissimilis. Minima enim differencia possibili differt primum suppositum a 2^a.

35 Et si arguitur sequi: *illo modo deus agit similatur vel differt ab aliquo quare deus est sicut est causa*: ergo *illo modo est*, dicitur quod non est color in argumento si non equivocetur; quia tunc esset respectus accidentalis causa, qualiter similatur vel differt ab aliquo; et cum

1. conclusio *deest*; que B. 11, 12. *dñō* B. 14. 2a^a B. 26. *actus sit underlined after ipse; est above the line* B. 27. *actum underlined; q,; above* B. 28. *m̄sa* B. 31. i^a B. 36. q̄ *quare, qualiter) ergo in marg.* B. 39. q̄ *deus est sicut est causa underlined before q̄* B.

taking the ablative case in different senses. causa formalis sit eadem forma que est causatum, sequitur quod talis respectus foret essentia divina. Quod si equivocetur in relacione ablative casus, intelligendo in antecedente, "isto modo deus differt a me" ablativum regi ex vi cause formalis, et in consequente "isto modo deus est" ipsum regi ex vi accidentis, tunc est impertinens sensui concludere, quia *quante deus est* quod *tante differt a me*. Non enim est subiectum tante quante est accidentis, sed plus. Nec est verum quod differencia qua deus differt a me est par deo vel infinita, quia terminatur ad duo extrema, et non convenit deo in magnitudine.

It follows that many things that we call evils are good; for instance, punishments and misfortunes. Patet eciam ex dictis quod multa sunt bona que dicimus mala; et alia plus valent quam estimamus, alia minus valent, cum omne tale imperfectum tantum valet quantum iuvat ad perfeccionem universitatis. Prima pars patet ex hoc quod penalitates et alia que dicimus infortunia, sicut generaliter cuncta que nobis displicant, dicimus mala, cum tamen iuste ex divina providencia ad bonitatem universi eveniunt; et sic nobis placencia dicimus bona, etsi de facto sint mala; sicut patet de ignorantibus et viciis corruptis.

Also, that our estimate of values is often mistaken. Dearth raises prices; we can never exactly regulate supply and demand. Sometimes man's wickedness makes the estimate to err notably; sometimes it approaches truth; but it is Nature and not the estimate that really fixes the worth of things. Et ultima pars patet ex hoc quod *valere vel esse bonum utile* dicit habitudinem ad id cui est utile. Et cum universitas sit a deo cathereta participando quo-cunque tali bono, patet quod participacio utilitatis ab universitate est mensura valoris rei. Nec obest rem cuius non est usus actualis valere, quia ipsa iuvat quiescendo; be not actually licet avarus | quandoque impedit rem iuvare. Summe B 70

3. re^{no} B. 16. pena^a B. 18. et ex summa above ex divina B.
22. venialia B. 24. veniat above valit B. 29. scilicet B. 30. iustitia B.
36. cathēta B.

ergo inter creaturas valet humanitas in Cristo, de qua non est nostrum scire quantum valet, sed relinquatur consideracio illius subtilioribus theologis.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditur quod est dare habitum rei tam bonum quam mala est alterius rei privacio; et sic bonitas et malicia sunt denominacionibus extrinsecis pares, sicut sunt habitus et privacio: sed hoc est impertinens ad concludendum magnitudinem et parvitatem esse pares; quia iste denominaciones sunt per se quante, et secundum se non possunt parificari, modo bonitas habitus rei et malicia privacione rei capiunt suam magnitudinem ab extrinseco, sicut a prodessencia vel utilitate universi quam ponunt vel privant. Et ideo generaliter tam bona est res corruptibilis quam mala esset, cum paribus, eius privacio. Et isti termini *tam* et *quantum* dicunt parvitatem proporcionum et non parvitatem illorum proporcionatorum secundum sua intrinseca; ac si diceretur: tante est magnitudo illius minorata quante est eius parvitas maiorata; vel econtra. Et sic de similitudine et dissimilitudine et cunctis similibus. Et si aliquis inferret ex illo exemplo quod magnitudo et parvitas parifcentur, negatur; quia illa *tanta quanta* dicunt paritatem proporcionem solum et non paritatem magnitudinis et parvitatis ab intrinseco.

Nota tamen quod dupliciter intelligitur inter aliqua esse similitudo vel conveniencia, et dissimilitudo vel disconveniencia: vel quo ad sua accidentalia, vel quo ad sua essencialia. Et utroque modo tripliciter, vel secundum speciem, et sic Sor et Plato sunt similes in humanitate et accidentaliter similes in albedine; vel generaliter, et sic homo et asinus sunt similes in animalitate et accidentaliter similes in colore; et analogice, sicut motus et color sunt similes in *esse*, et accidentaliter sunt similes in calefaciendo. Et correspondenter de dissimilitudine.

Unde patet quod impossibile est quidquid produci nisi a sibi simili. Nam quodlibet est simile cuilibet, ut homo melior est deo similior, proporcione communiter dicta, fundata in similitudine analogica. Stat ergo infinitum dissimilem alicui in uno accidente esse, quantumvis sibi similem in alio. Ymmo stat illud quod non est simile alteri in genere vel in specie, sive substancialiter

Christ's Humanity is of all creatures that which has most worth. Thus to have may be as good as to want is evil;

but this does not prove that magnitude and smallness are equal.

Tam and *quantum* indicate of proportion, not intrinsic equality.

Similarity and unlikeness are either in accidental or essential qualities; and either specific, generic, or analogous.

Nothing can be produced except by its like; but likeness can be understood in many ways, and is not contrary to difference.

13. aq^o descendē B.

sive accidentaliter, esse quantumlibet sibi simile similitudine analoga. Ex quo patet quod simile et dissimile non sunt contrarie nec privative opposita. Nam duo summe calida sunt in caliditate simillima; ita quod sunt calida infinitum simillima, et tamen sunt finita⁵. et ceteris accidentibus valde dissimilia. Similia ergo possibilia sunt supposita increata.

We say of help and hindrance what has been said of the useful and the useless; God, hindering one species from being another, does not properly hinder, but helps. Some say that everything is as much a hindrance as a help; but this is an abuse of terms.

De iuvamento vero et impedimento dicitur correspondenter sicut dictum est de utili et inutili; ut deus summe iuvat, nec potest impedire vel nocere. Impedit¹⁰ tamen ne homo sit asinus, et ne mundus vel eius partes deficiant; sed hoc non est impedire sed iuvare. Unde abutuntur terminis qui dicunt quod quodlibet tantum impedit sicut iuvat, et quodlibet equale cuilibet, ne peccet. Ipsi autem dicunt quod omne impeditum est infinitum impeditum, et tantum adiutum, ut omne mobile impeditur ab infinito motu, ab infinita magnitudine, et sic de ceteris infinitis, et iuvatur ne idemperietur cuilibet; et sic de ceteris denominacionibus²⁰ infinitis, unde, iuxta sic loquentes, deus tantum vel plus impediret hominem fieri quam potest iuvare, quia quodlibet impedit ne faciat infinita bona.

As the privation of a privation is not a privation, neither is to hinder from evil properly to hinder, nor is the magnitude of smallness anything but smallness. *Hindrance* may, therefore, be a thing positively good; and thus God may hinder some from attaining eternal happiness.

Dico ergo, sicut privacio privacionis non est privacio | sic impeditre rem a malo non est impeditre sed iuvare. B^{70b} Nec magnitudo parvitatis est magnitudo, sed pocius parvitas. *Impedire* tamen quandoque accipitur largius quam obesse, et iuvare quam prodesse; ut omne habens naturalem inclinacionem ad finem et prohibitum ab illo fine vel execucione dicitur impeditum; et isto modo³⁰ grave impeditur a descensu, et leve ab ascensu. Sic autem loquendo de *impedire*, quod sonat in bonum et naturale, non est inconveniens deum impeditre; et sic forte impediret aliquos eternaliter a sua beatitudine. Sed de limitibus huius impediti, et aliis huiusmodi³⁵ superficialiter solutis, sunt difficultates plurime; quas transeo, tam propter impedimentum ignorancie quam gracia brevitatis.

14. *die after* quodlibet B. 35. *delibg* B.

34. *Beatitudine*. This looks like a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the 'Presciti', or foreknown. If God prevents any from attaining eternal bliss, it is in order to further the accomplishment of the Divine Plan of predestination.

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.

Consequens est ad dicta superaddere in capitulo de comparativis sentenciam de maximo et minimo. Voco autem propositionem comparacione yppothetica et nota

5 comparandi denominatam, ut hec, *Sor est ita sapiens vel magis sapiens quam est Plato*; et sic de comparativa vera. Nam ista species yppothetice multum accedit, ut dictum est, ad condiciones kathegoricarum; cum idem sit dicere, *Sor est melior Platone et Sor est melior quam 10 est Plato*, nec perfecte intelligitur altera pars sine coin- telleccióne alterius partis. Ideo possunt dici tam quante quam quales, ut kathegorice. De exposicione vero talium ratione termini comparativi gradus, dictum est superius, et quomodo refert dicere, *Sor fuit melior Platone 15 et Sor fuit melior quam fuit Plato vel quam Plato iam est*. Si enim *Sor fuit melior Platone* tunc *fuit ita quod Sor est melior illo*, et econtra. Sed si *fuit melior quam fuit Plato*, tunc *fuit melior quam unquam fuit Plato*. Nec requiritur quod simul fuerunt, sed requiritur quod 20 aliquando fuit ita quod *Sor est melior quam fuit Plato*, vel quod est melior quam erit *Plato*, et ita [ad] dandum instans.

Comparativa ergo, sicut quecunque alia proposicio, tunc est vera quando est signum primarium veritatis, 25 et falsa quando deficit veritas quam primo significat. Supponatur ergo ex ante dictis quod nichil vere comparatur alteri, nisi in aliquo communi univoco vel analogo, quod utrumque participat; et hoc sive sit essentiale comparatis sive accidentale. Patet quod omne sic 30 comparatum alteri vel comparatur sibi secundum magis vel secundum minus; aut aliter secundum equalitatem,

They very
much resemble
categoricals.

The way of
exounding
them and
pointing out
their different
meanings, has
already been
shown.

The truth of
these
propositions
depends on
their
comparisons
being true.
Comparison
must be made
respecting some
other thing
common to
both, and
concerning
excess
or deficiency or

2. Blank space for initial C. 4. comparacionem yppotheticam B.
20. al η B.21. zit ω ; ad deest B. 26. parte pro ante B.

7, 8. Ut dictum est. See *Logica*, Vol. I, p. 30, l. 27—37.

equality of
that thing
which is
common.

Every power is limited by the utmost that is possible to it; and this is not only true of active power, but of every sort of potentiality.

All there proceed from the first active power, which is purely Act, and the term of Divine power is the limit of actual possibility.

Thus we must in every proposition presuppose the power of the First Entity. Those who sustain that a negative proposition cannot be absurd, put logical potentiality before Divine Power; at the same time they lose the meaning of the word.

God's being is absolutely necessary. If God is possible, He exists. But God's existence is possible;

et sic equale vel inequale, que proprie competit quantitati, transumuntur ad denominandum quemcumque excessum vel paritatem in quacunque denominacione signanda.

Et hinc dicitur quod quelibet potencia terminatur affirmative vel negative maximo vel minimo in quod potest, nec solum restringitur potencia ad potentiam activam, que est accidens de 2^a specie qualitatis, sed ampliatur ad omne posse logicum respectu cuiuscunque denominacionis predicabilis, ymmo respectu cuiuscunque entis possibilis, cuiusmodi sunt tales potencie cum suis contentis: posse esse substanciam, posse esse quantum discrete vel continue, posse esse quale, posse esse ad aliquid, agens vel paciens; et sic de potenciis respectu privacionum, potenciarum, pretericionum, futuriciorum, et negacionum. Omnes ergo tales potencie procedunt a prima potencia, que sic est actus purus quod sibi non inest potencia respectu sue denominacionis absolute, nisi quam habet i necessario actualiter coeterum; et ideo, cum omne posse causati procedit ab illa potencia que est actus, potest dici quod quilibet terminus alicuius potencie terminat potenciam activam.

Ex isto patet quod omnis potencia logica vel naturalis presupponit potenciam primi actus. Si enim potest esse quod nichil sit ab alia potencia, potest sic esse. Aliter enim non quelibet affirmativa poneret significatum sui verbi; sicut fantasiantur illi qui dicunt quod nulla negativa includit repugnanciam. Ipsi enim preponunt posse logicum posse dei; sed nesciunt exprimere quiditatem illius potencie, sicut nec sciunt huius verbi potest significacionem declarare.

Secundo patet quod absolute necessarium est deum esse; eo quod, si aliqualiter potest esse, deus est; sed absolute necessario aliqualiter potest esse; igitur etc. Maior patet ex nota proxima; minor patet per deducens ad impossibile. Si enim potest esse quod non aliqualiter potest [esse] tunc potest esse quod nichil potest esse; et cum iuxta opinionem nichil potest esse

27. fantasiat B. 37. esse deest B.

19. From the beginning of f. 71^a there is another hand, much more cramped than the former, up to f. 82^b. After which, and until f. 122^c, there is again another.

impossibile, nisi claudans formaliter contradiccionem, sequitur quod potest claudere contradiccionem quod aliquid sit quod nichil simul est et non est; quod si homo est, animal est; et sic qualitercumque proposicio nata est significare. Et cum nichil potest claudere repugnanciam nisi quod claudit repugnanciam, sequitur quod claudit repugnanciam aliqualiter posse esse: quod est impossibile.

Tercio patet quod omnia citra deum que dicuntur possesse, dicuntur possesse a potentia aliena. Sicut enim homo potest vinci a potentia aliena, sic qualitercumque potest esse ipsum; vel suum antecedens potest esse a potentia prima. Actus enim principians est simpliciter prior potencia, sicut esse est naturaliter prius possesse; cum omne posse sit esse. Patet ergo quod ad unam simplicem que est actus primus possibilis habet reduci quelibet alia potentia, cum quelibet talis sit causata.

Sed hic obicitur. Videtur enim quod potentia dei terminatur ad eundem terminum ad quem terminatur quelibet alia potentia, quia usque ad illum terminum potest deus cum tali potentia, et non ultra. Et sic non distingueretur posse dei absolutum a posse ordinato, sed omne potens tantum posset quantum posset cum concurso prime potentie et sic quodlibet foret cuiilibet eque potens, quia vel ad eundem terminum terminaretur eius potentia usque ad quem deus posset cum illo et non ultro, vel aliter non terminaretur.

Ad illud dicitur quod potentie sunt distincte respectu dei secundum formalem distinctionem ab invicem et ab eius essencia; et quelibet talis potentia terminatur ad deum ut ad eius subiectum. Et preter hoc est dari extrinsecum in quod potest et non in aliud, cum tot posse sunt in deo quot res possunt causari ab eo; nec est tale posse alia essencia, sed veritas ponens deum esse, et tantum causatum causari ab eo. Nec est inconveniens deum deperdere quotlibet tales potencias per lapsum rei in preteritum quam impossibile est redire; sicut patet de motu, tempore, et multis aliis. Et in talem distinctionem dei incident qui verbaliter illud negant, dum ponunt quod aliqua deus potest a

9. cfr dm B.

38. Quam. Rem understood.

otherwise nothing would be self-contradictory.

All powers below God imply another power that gives them movement for act is simply prior to power, and all powers have their source in Act.

Objection. The power of God goes no further than any other power; thus absolute and ordinate power are not distinct in Him; every power does all it can with His concourse.

Answer. There are as many powers in God as there are things able to be caused; and these powers are formally distinct from each other and from His essence. When a thing becomes past, God loses that power, it is true, but this makes no change in Him.

An eternal accident may exist in God, if independent of all but Him.

Thus active power merely expresses the fact that God can act thus and thus; like the visual power of the eye.

And such power can be lost, but not acquired, by God.

God's power of producing things is anterior to their potentiality of being produced.

Why should this power be called an accident?

Because it inheres in a subject and qualifies it. Active power does so formally;

passive power does not, though it is also in God as in its cause.

It has been denied that there are relations in God, on account of there being no foundation of such relations.

But logical (not real) relations are generally admitted, which imply only the existence of the First Essence; and I am willing to grant that they are such.

potencia absoluta que non potest de potencia ordinata. Nec est inconveniens accidens eternum esse in deo, cum non dependat ab essencia extra ipsum. Nec est talis potencia activa, quia ipsa potest quicquid agere, sed quia ipsa denominat formaliter deum posse agere: 5 sicut virtus oculi visiva dicitur, et qualitates potencie active, quia per ipsas potest subiectum agere. Tales ergo potencias potest deus deperdere sed non acquirere, sed cum sint relaciones, habent possibilidades passivas ad quas dicuntur. Et, ut ego credo, prius est deum 10 posse in hoc, quam hoc posse fieri, non quoad consequiam, sed quoad perfectionem. Nec repugnat veritatem eternam que non est accidens obiective terminare accidens eternum in deo secundum rationem obiecti, esse quodammodo prius posse dei sibi relato. 15 Sic enim tam non potest facere deus me esse asinum quam non possum esse asinus, quam econtra.

Et si queretur quare deum posse agere est accidens et non rem posse agi ab illo, dicitur quod ideo quia de ratione accidentis est inherere subiecto quod pre- 20 supponit et determinat modo. Non dubium, conciliante alias veritates, quin deum posse producere B actu, sicut est veritas, sic est in deo, et denominat ipsum formaliter id posse; et cum idem accidens potest desinere esse per causacionem B actus, patet quod a divina 25 essencia quam presupponit. Sed B actum posse produci, quamvis sit in deo causaliter, non tamen denominat ipsum formaliter, nec per consequens aliquod aliud subiectum. Ideo non habet rationem accidentis. | B 71^b

Et, si dicatur quod auctores negant esse relationes 30 in deo propter defectum fundamenti absoluti, dicitur quod communiter ponunt auctores relationes rationum esse in deo, et non dicere mobilitatem subiecti, nec requirere accidens absolutum pro suo fundamento; et tales ponunt in predicacione modali esse illam primam 35 essenciam, quia nullam aliam ponunt. Sed non est dubium quin tales distinguuntur formaliter a subiecto, si aliqua distinguuntur. Et placet michi quod sint relaciones rationis. Modicam enim vel nullam realitatem ponunt aliique relationes preter realitatem sub- 40 ictorum. Et, si dicatur quod multe tales positive

13, 14. t're B. 14. fone B. 18. qf' B. 21. cōciū as B.

superfluunt, cum nunquam procedunt in actum, dicitur quod non sequitur; sed videamus quid valet quod deus potest *hoc* producere (demonstrando unum quod nunquam producetur). Ad hoc valet prima potencia; et 5 sic facit multa bona, sicut privaciones et negaciones, cum omne *causare*, extendendo terminum, sit facere; nichil tamen agit proprie nisi essentia absoluta, cuiusmodi est substantia habens propriam inclinacionem naturalem, a qua procedit accio extrinseca, ut sepe 10 dictum est, quod alienum est a quocunque accidente.

Dicitur igitur quod nec potencia dei nec alicuius alterius terminatur ad aliquod non existens. Ideo, si maxima quantitas quam possum habere non est, tunc nulla potencia terminatur ad ipsam. Si autem illa 15 potest esse, tunc sicut ad illam possum maiorari, et non ultra. Sic unum posse dei usque ad illam potest me maiorare et non ultra. Et ad illum intelligentibus dicitur communiter huiusmodi potencias ad tales terminos terminari. Ad quam sensum concedendum est 20 nullius potentiam terminari ad aliquid non inseparabiliter malum, quin potencia dei terminetur ad illud. Talia enim mala non sunt in deo, sicut nec causantur ab illo, sed sunt in rationibus eternis que causantur a deo.

25 Ulterius per distincionem potencie absolute a potencia ordinata est notandum quod illos terminos magistrales et consimiles diversi diversimode concipiunt. Aliqui enim large intelligunt, per potentiam absolutam, essentiam rei sub ratione qua absolute est potens, non 30 considerando possibilitatem vel impossibilitatem termini in quem potest per alicuius posterioris ipsa potencia; et 2^m talem potentiam Filius dicitur producere alium Filium, infinitos modos, et ipsos infinicies annichilari. Ipse enim, ut prius dictum est, habet suffici-

35 entem potentiam ad omnia illa, si illa possent esse. Et ad illum sensum dicunt auctores quod potencia absolute potest multa facere que non possunt fieri: ut post lapsum operis mei, manente potencia eadem, sum ita potens sicut fui in principio; ideo non est 40 defectus in potencia absoluta mei quod non possum

To say that a power that will never be exercised is superfluous, does not include these;

for the real agent is God's essence.

No power can have the non-existent for its term. If there is no maximum of quantity, nothing can produce it; if there is, it can increase so far and no farther, and God's power is limited by that maximum.

Likewise, God's power extends to every act, however evil, it not inseparably so, by means of the eternal laws of things.

Absolute and ordinate power have different significations; some understand by the first the essence of a being, as having power, distinct from that on which it has power.

In that sense it is said that God can do things that cannot be done:

For instance it is impossible to do the same thing twice, yet the power to do is not gone.

16. dei B.

26. mgraes B.

27. cōciat B.

31, 32. ip pō B.

32. fig dr B.

33. fīm B.

facere illud opus, sed impossibilitas est ex parte factibilis. Sicut non est defectus in visu meo quod non possum videre remotissimam arenam in oceano, sed ex impossibilitate proporcionate applicacionis; ideo potencia absoluta est potencia, sed deficit potencia respectiva que ponit, et agens posse facere productibile, et illud posse esse; et illud vocatur potencia ordinata.

Others say:
All that can be
done by God's
ordinate, can
also be done by
His absolute
power; and
vice versa.

But I follow
this opinion:
that a past
thing must
have existed,
and many
things future
do not exist.
The distinction
between the
two powers,
though
practically
useful, would
imply a power
(absolute)
that is never
exercised unless
with the other
(ordinate).

And the loss of
such power
merely on
account of the
want of
receptive power
in the subject
is no defect.

I grant that
every being can
act in so far as
it is able with
the concourse
of the First
Cause.

In so far as
God can give
aid, in so far
it is possible
to act.

How far?
I do not know;
but God
knows.

Alii dicunt quod omne quod deus potest facere de potencia ordinata potest facere de potencia absoluta, et econtra, et solum que ordinavit fieri de potencia ordinata potest facere. Et ista via ponit omne quod fuit vel erit esse deo presens, et sic nullam potentiam a deo deperdibile; ut dicetur capitulo ultimo.

Hic tamen prosequor prius dicta quod rem pretertam impossibile est non fuisse, et quod multa erunt que non sunt; et sic de aliis que sunt magis famosa. Oportet enim gradatim ascendere in subtiliora. Quamvis autem illa distincio descrivit pro auctoribus concordandis, videtur tamen michi quod nullum potens potest in aliud, nisi posset in ipsum de potencia ordinata. Illud patet ex hoc quod omnis potencia activa dicitur comparative ad potentiam causabilem; ut, si posset facere hoc, hoc posset fieri. Nec propter deperdicionem potencie respective materie potencie absoluta dicitur aliquid simpliciter minus potens, sicut nec Pater 25 est potencior Filio, quamvis potest producere quod Filius non potest producere; eadem enim potentiam absolutam habet uterque, cum illa sit essentia communis trinitati. Quamvis ergo tertium suppositum non potest tantum producere sicut alterum priorum, est 30 tamen *id quod* potest tantum producere.

Ulterius conceditur consequenter quod omne agens tantum potest, et usque ad tantum, sicut potest cum B 72^a concursu vel iuvamine prime cause. Et sic, si deus potest facere me causare quocunque opus ad quantum-35 cunque intensivum gradum, et ego possum usque ad illum gradum in illud opus. Striccius tamen sumitur quandoque potencia pro sufficiencia quam potens habet; sicut dicitur puerum non posse in actus viriles antequam acquisiverit potentiam naturalem. Si vero queratur a me usque ad quantum potest talis potencia, deum contestor ego ignoro de quacumque, sed bene credo

quod est dare terminum quem deus satis noscit. Ideo damus nos per modum peticionis vel suppositionis termini talis potencie, quis, queso, non ignorat gradum magnitudinis, intensionis, vel alterius singularis accidentis subiecti? Nec est cura de talibus individuis corruptibilis, cum non sit sciencia habitualis de illis ut de subiecto prime sciencie propter confusionem et rectitudinem. Ideo iubent populo quiescere a talibus et intendere utilibus.

10 Iстis ergo premissis plus pro fundamento declaracionis materie quam pro fructu sciencie qui exinde patefecit pueris, videndum est quomodo regulariter ponendum est tales potencias terminari. Et quicquid moderni dixerint, videtur michi probabile 2^m sentencias antiquorum, 15 quod respectu cuiuscunque potencie terminabilis est dare cuiuscunque speciei denominacionis maximum in quod potest; ut est dare maximam quantitatem sub qua homo potest esse, maximum gradum quantitatis et cuiuscunque alterius accidentis sibi possibilis; et pro- 20 porcialiter de aliis potentias.

Et suppono quod ille terminus *maximum* dicat superium vel excellentissimum in quod potest talis potencia. Probatur ex hoc regula: quelibet talis potencia dicitur esse maior, que cum similibus paribus in plus potest; sed cuiuscunque talis potencie est dare maximum gradum possibilem; igitur etc. Maior patet ex hoc quod quelibet talis potencia eo est magna quo in magnum potest; ergo est eo magis magna quo in magis magnum potest. Aliter enim non diceretur in qua proporcione est potencia que 30 precise in duplo plus potest quam A, maior quam A.

Sed hic dicitur quod non est dare quantum precise potest, et per idem non est dare precise duplicatam vel in quacunque proporcione rationali proporcionatam ad illam. Sed illud videtur michi nimis mirabile quod 35 data sit potencia finita et non sit dandus gradus magnitudinis sue. Aliter enim foret mirabiliter magnum, si nichil posset cognoscere quam magnum ipsum esset. Ymmo, per exponentes sequitur quod hoc est precise tam magnum sicut ipsa est; et per idem sequitur quod

7, 8. v'etia^m B. 8. pl^o B. 21. t^m B. 26. et maximum gradum possibilem pro etc. B. 32. dupla^m B.

2. *Ideo.* To give this sentence a reasonable sense, it would be necessary to supply too many words wanting. Perhaps *non* is superfluous. At any rate, the text is corrupt.

The foregoing questions being elucidated we come to the main point, and affirm that every power is limited by a maximum: v. g. that there exists a maximum size possible for a man, &c.

The word *maximum* implying the highest stretch of possibility, we affirm this, because the more anything is able to do, the greater its power is said to be; and there is a *maximum* of anything that can be done.

It may be said that there is no precise limit to power, and therefore our proportion does not hold. But if the power is finite it is limited, and the limit is precise. The very meaning

of the proposition proves that two things can be precisely equal; if not, there would be no equality, and if a power can be doubled or halved, it is exactly half its double and double its half.

Every power is as great as the sum of its parts:

it can diminish to zero and increase again.

If the power of a given subject increases uniformly from a given instant to another until it is four times as great, then, when exactly half the time has elapsed, it must be exactly twice as great as at first.

illa potencia potest equari alteri, quod possibile est alteram et ipsam precise esse equales, cum contradiccionem includit equalia non esse precise equalia, eo quod qualitas consistit omnino indivisibili. Et per idem, si aliqua potest esse dupla vel subdupla, aut in qua-⁵ cunque alia proporcione ad illam, tunc stat quod aliud sit precisely duplum vel subduplicum ad illam; nec magis quam duplum, nec minus quam duplum, est duplum. Ideo omne duplum ad aliud precisely est duplum ad idem. Et sic invenies de quacunque proporcione ¹⁰ rationali. Si enim millecuplum foret duplum ad suum submillecuplum, et per idem esset sesquialterum, et equale; et omne magnum esset sub quocunque gradu parvum, quo alia esset pars, esset parva: quod non est opinabile.


¹⁵ Quelbet ergo talis potencia est precisely dupla ad eius medietatem et quadrupla ad eius ^{4^{am}}; et sic de aliis proporcionalibus. Et per idem sine dubio est precisely tanta quantam eius partes ipsam constituant. Et confirmatur ex hoc quod potencia, cum sit debilis, potest ²⁰ remitti ad non gradum, et iterum crescere; vel saltem subiectum potest intendi vel remitti in potencia. Pono ergo quod subiectum intendatur quousque fuerit in ^{4^{lo}} magis potens; et sit A totum temporis per quod erit in duplo potentius quam est modo. Et sit B tantum ²⁵ temporis per quod erit minus quam in duplo quam est modo. Talia enim tempora sunt danda, cum iste proposiciones sint primarie significantes; A est plus quam in duplo potentius quam fuit in F instanti, et A est minus quam in duplo potentius quam fuit in F instanti, ³⁰ maneabunt vere in suis adequatis temporibus. Sit ergo C medium instans inter illa duo tempora, et patet B ^{72^b} quod in C erit subiectum precisely in duplo potentius quam est modo; quia, si excederet, tunc non esset datum tempus totum per quod subiectum erit plus quam ³⁵ in duplo potentius. Et per idem si deficeret a potentialitate dupla, non esset datum tempus totum per quod erit minus quam in duplo potentius. Nec potest dici quod illa tempora non erunt immediata, quia tunc esset dare medium inter contradictoria. Relinquitur ergo quod pro ⁴⁰ C instanti erit precisely in duplo potentius quam est modo.

29. ffup B. 31. ad^o tib^g B.

Dicitur quod forte est dare quanta est quecunque If it be objected
potencia, sed non est dare quante potest. Sed contra, that every
illud est primo illud quod superius tangitur, quod po- power has
tencia non dicitur magna quo ad molem, sed eo maior its magnitude,
5 potencia quo plus potest. Sic enim dicit potencia but no
relationem ad suum potenciale, iuxta dicta. Cum ergo maximum of
potencia capit suam magnitudinem per comparacionem powers having
ad potenciale et non nisi ad maximum, sequitur quod their magnitude
tunc, data magnitudine respective potencie, dandum esset and that
10 maximum posse. Ymmo illud posse est illa potencia. maximum are
identical.

Similiter, cum posse plus vel minus sit denominacio Again, to be
consistens in latitudine, est dare gradus et proporciones more or less
in illa latitudine. Et per consequens est dare unum able, implies a
quod precise tantum potest sicut illa potencia, unum certain breadth
15 quod precise in duplo plus; et sic de quacunque pro- of power; if so,
portione: et stant raciones superius facte. Ut ponatur there are
quod A sit in quadruplo plus potens quam B et re- degrees in that
mittatur quousque precise tantum possit sicut B; et sit breadth
C tempus maximum per quod poterit in duplo plus and it may be
20 quam B et D tempus per quod non poterit in duplo exactly the
plus quam B; patet quod in medio instant inter illa double &c. of
precise in duplo plus poterit A quam B. Et patet iuxta another.
superius arguta, cum non sit latitudinem dare subito If A, four times
acquisitam vel deperditam, quod in medio instanti pre- as powerful
25 cise poterit in duplo plus A quam B. Sed, iuxta op- as B, loses
nionem adversam, est dare potencias indefectibiles, its power
respectu quarum est dare maximum in quem possunt. uniformly until
Et cum infinitum modica sunt, sit aliqua potencia talis: both are equal,
sequitur quod est dare potentiam defectibilem et poten- then when
30 ciam indefectibilem equales. Ergo sic ut est dare exactly half
maximum in quod potest prima, sic et de reliqua. Non enim est possibile quod, duarum potenciarum the time is
equalium quo ad posse, una plus potest quam reliqua. Nec valet dicere illas potencias esse incomparabiles past, A = 2 B.
35 propter differentiam corruptibilitatis et incorruptibilita- It is admitted
tis, quia talia sunt propriissime comparabilia: ut patet by all
de qualitatibus et quantitatibus eiusdem speciei sic that certain
differentibus, et patet de quantitate partis celi et quan- forces do attain
tate hominis, que sunt eiusdem speciei, et tamen their utmost
40 differunt corruptibilitate et incorruptibilitate. Nec limit; but there
nor does the length of time
make no difference;

3. car^r B. 26. indebilis B. 28. tlis^r B. 29. debilem B.
30. indebilem B. 36. ppigflic^r.



during which
they are active,
make them
to differ.

capiunt potencie suam magnitudinem a diurnitate temporum per que possunt esse, quia potencia non consistit in sucesione, quia tunc quelibet defectibilis foret infinitum minor [in] defectibili, cum tamen aliud sit posse ad diurnitatem et aliud posse quo ad maiorem causabilem.

Nor can we
call a negative
limit a limit
properly; what
cannot be done
is not the
limit of what
can.

A stone that
is too heavy to
be carried by
me is no more
the limit of my
strength than
any greater
weight, unless
it be — which
can never be
known — the
least weight I
cannot carry:
The proposition
is therefore
proved.

Objections:
1. This theory
would destroy
all difference
between active
and passive
power.

2. It would
make all power
— even God's
omnipotence —
to be limited
by some
extraneous
bounds.

3. If a given
power can
carry a
maximum of
weight for a

Similiter, per deducens ad impossibile, patet quod non est dare terminum negativum, ut communiter signatur; quia si terminus temporis est, tunc non potest esse ad terminandum potentiam, cum illa potencia non potest in illud quo non plus illud est finis termini illius quam quodlibet aliud. Ut, si non possum ferre A lapidem, que racio quare ille plus terminat potentiam meam quam quodlibet reliquum quod non possum portare? Non enim illud potest esse signum noscendi magnitudinem potencie mee, quia nemo potest cognoscere quod illud sit minimum quod non possum, cum non possum tantum nisi sicut possum. Exponentes enim talium negativarum sine putacis sunt incompossibles. Sequitur ergo quod proporcionaliter ut potencie ad potencias, sic posse potentiarum habent se ad invicem; illud patebit particularius in processu.

Sed contra illud arguitur primo: Aut sequitur quilibet potentiam esse activam, cum passiva potencia differt ab activa in hoc, eo quod activa eo ipso quod potest in maius potest in minus, et potencia passiva econtra eo ipso quo potest in minus potest in maius. Sed vix ^{2^m illam viam est dare maximum in quodquecumque potencia potest.}

Similiter, quantumcumque potencia debilis proporcionatur passo, potest melius proporcionari ab extrinseco; ergo nec est dare per maximam potentiam resistivam in quam potest, nec maximum gradum actionis possibilis. Sic enim ex proporcione equalitatis proveniret motus, vel accio; vel aliter unum excedit aliud per indivisible, et deus terminaretur maximo iuvamento quo posset iuvare agens.

Similiter, cum facilius sit difficillimum facere parem per minus tempus quam per maius tempus, sequitur

4. in *deest* B. 5. *art⁹* B. 19. *putac⁹* B.

28. *Maius.* There is probably a sentence missing in this paragraph, somewhere about this place.

quod si potencia debilis facit difficultatem per A tempus, per partem illius temporis posset facere maiorem. Ymmo potencia minor sufficeret ferre tantam difficultatem per tempus minus, et illud communiter tangitur 5 deportacione. Et per idem non est dare maximum temporis per quod corruptibile sufficit durare; et sic universaliter de omni accione quam debile sufficit ferre.

Similiter non est dare maximam quantitatem sub 10 qua potest esse homo, sicut nec maximam parvitatem sub qua potest esse: ergo regula falsa. Antecedens patet ex hoc quod, signatis ²bus hominibus, quorum unus sit maximus possibilis, et alias minimus possibilis, neuter sufficeret ferre aliquam lesionem, cum maior 15 propter quamlibet tensionem, ab ictu vel punctione desineret esse; et minor propter quamlibet ablacionem partis superflue corrumperetur; et sic esset dare ultimum instans hominis et in infinitum debilem hominem.

Similiter non est dare maximam multitudinem 20 habituum quos quis simul potest habere; quia Sor habens illos ipse, esset habilior ad ulterius discendum. Aliter enim impediret plenitudo sciencie Sortem ad quid- 25 quid discendum a sensu; et sic esset habitus de infinitum facili mobilis. Et idem argumentatur de cumulo mixtorum que possunt per homines congregari, de gradu et de multitudine caliditatis vel frigiditatis, quos potest homo simul habere. Videtur enim quod, sicut non est dare difficillimam penam quod potest tollerari, sic nec in maximum gradum quantitatum nocivarum.

30 Similiter de potenciis passivis, videtur quod non sit dare minimum quod data virtus sufficit videre; tum quia infinitum modicum sufficit cum alio confuse videre, tum quia, visuidente illud, possunt 8 circumstancia concurrentes ad visionem vel aliqua illarum meliorari, 35 et per consequens videns sufficeret minus videre. Ymmo, cum non sit dare remississimum gradum visionis, nec acutissimum pyramidem radialis, sequitur quod minus visible sufficeret videns confusius et sub apparenzia minoris quantitatis videre aliquod visibile. Tales quot- 40 libet evidencie se offerunt deducendas in quibus materie difficiles possunt introduci.

certain times,
it could carry
double that
weight during
half that time,
the quadruple
during the
quarter &c.;
so there is no
maximum.

4. The biggest
or smallest
man possible
is impossible;
the first could
not receive
a *blow*, nor
could the
second lose
any part of
himself,
without ceasing
to be a man.

5. There is no
maximum v. g.
in learning;
the more one
learns, the
more
one becomes
able to learn.

6. So also of
passive powers:
a minimum
visible is
absurd.
We see
(confusedly)
even the
infinitely small.

1. difficultis B. 4, 5. fatigatioe B. 15. tuo^j B; ib. puccoe B.

General Answer: Not only is there a most perfect substance of all, but every substance is as perfect as it can be; there is a maximum in the possible number of points in any continuous body; also a limit to the velocity of movement, action and passion; to the number of possible men, &c.

Ad illud dicitur sicut prius, tenendo generaliter partem affirmativam in talibus dimensionibus, ut est dare perfectissimam substanciam que potest esse, sicut et quelibet substantia est tam perfecta essencialiter sicut potest esse; et sic est dare maximam multitudinem punctorum et punctualium que possunt esse, sicut patet de punctis mundi et maximam quamlibet continuitatem que potest esse; ut patet de corporeitate, de loco, et de duracione mundi. Est eciam dare velocissimum motum, actionem et passionem, que possunt esse; et sic generaliter de omnibus aliis, tam simpliciter quam respectu speciei. Est enim dare maximam multitudinem hominum qui possunt, simul vel successive, esse; et sic de aliis speciebus; quia, signata minima multitudine hominum possibilium que non potest esse, patet quod auferendo unitatem ab illa multitudine foret residuus numerus maximus sub quo homo posset esse. Et sic generaliter, cum omne continuum sit compositum ex non quantis, dato numero negativo, patet quod, auferendo ab illo vel vel addendo ad illud unum indivisible, foret residuum maximum vel minimum respectu talis potentie.

Confutation of objections:
1. Every power must be active, in so far as ease of dissolubility is impotence, not power in the form that disappears.

The potentiality of primordial matter is only extrinsically passive; and as it cannot receive one form while it has another, its power has a maximum — the maximum of the form that it can receive.

Ad primum dicitur quod impossibile est signare rem absolutam quin sit potencie active, nam posse faciliter vinci vel corrumpi non attestatur super magnitudine potentie, sed super impotencia minoris potentie; quia aliter ad omnem punctum mundi infinitum magna foret potentia, et infinitum minoris potentie cuiuscunque corruptibilis pars, quam ipsum totum; sicut communiter argumentatur quod omne corpus sit infinitum potens B 73^b ratione materie sue prime, que videtur infinitum potens passive; quia infinitum passivior quam forma vel compositum. Potencia ergo materie prime est potentia passiva denominacione extrinseca, et est finita, cum terminatur ad maximum in quod potest; quia capacitate eius repleta, sive forma substanciali sive forma accidentali, non potest ulterius recipere formam illius racionis, stante illa, quia recipiens oportet denudari a natura rei recepte. Unde, si aliquod subiectum haberet secundum ultimum sue capacitatatis formam innatam, non recipieret super illam formam eiusdem racionis.

3. *fa^m* = figuram? B. 19. *mb^o* nevo B. 34. *infinita* B.

Et hinc est quod intellectus non habet species innatas eiusdem rationis cum speciebus quas recipit. Nec materia prima formas substanciales, nec primum organum sensus recipit species ducentes in distinctam noticiam qualitatis sensus conformis gradus cum gradu quantitatis sui organi; sicut supposuerunt philosophi tanquam per se notum. Sicut enim subiectum habens 2^m ultimum sue capacitatibus formam quamcumque, non recipit super illa novam consimilis rationis; sic subiectum cognitum, i. e. animal secundum partem corpoream non gignit distinctam noticiam per receptionem similitudinis ab aliquo simillimo, sed confunditur noticia sensus per notabilem fixionem speciei in suo primo organo extranei accidentis.

15 Prima pars patet de racione, cum recipiens formam ulteriore non habuit capacitatatem prius saciatam; et 2^a pars patet experimento, quo scimus visum non noscere dyaphanum quale est in xpo elayde, que est primum subiectum visus; nec auditu sonus percipitur in 20 crystallo connaturalis aëris in miringa; nec olfactu, gustu, vel tactu qualitatis connaturalis primi sui subiecti: ut tactu non percipitur distincte qualitas sub illo gradu sub quo est organum sensus tactus. Sensus autem interiores sunt multiplicate per organa spiritualia, quia 25 per sensus alentes, et tamen non illis distincte cognoscuntur quantitates sui organi. Et 3^a pars patet ex hoc quod intritus vel habens fortem impressionem visibilis, confuse iudicat de aliis visilibus; habens tinnitus auris, vel forte sonum extraneum, permixtum discernit de 30 aliis: et sic de habente fetorem narium, de ethico, de habente gustum infectum (ut febricitantes); de ethico non percipiente propriam inanicionem propter calorem occupantem diutine nervos tactus; et conformiter stupecent sensus propter fortem sensibilis extranei impressio- 35 nem. Ymmo ymaginativa in sompnis movetur ad apprehendendum secundum impressionem humoris complexionati; ut melancolici sompniant de nigris; et sic de aliis, sine hoc quod species primo recepte sint in sensu

Digression on the forms received by intellect and sense; if either had any 'innate' forms, they would be incapable of receiving any others.

Sense impressions become confused when the organs are very strongly impressed in one particular way.

Both reason and experiment teach us this. The first subject of vision, hearing &c. must be quite free from any quality perceptible by those senses.

If not, both sight, hearing, taste, feeling and smell are apt to judge wrongly of their impressions.

10. ài B. 12. 9fur B. 18. xo *above* xpo B. 24. spualia B.
25. ales B. 27. tr'tus B. 32. īanīco B. 36, 37. coplexiōti B.

18. *Xpo elayde*. Of *xpo* I can make nothing; but *elayde* seems to stand for *hyaloide*, the vitreous humour; which would very well agree with the sense.

This proves that intellect, which perceives all beings distinctly, has no organ; and that wherever there is a receptive faculty there is a maximum of reception, both as to number and intensity of the forms received.

Return to the main subject: the distinction between active and passive power is at fault. Whether active or passive, the power is in any case a form.

The stronger a man is the more work he can suffer. Sight is active and passive at once.

The essence of these powers is identical, but the point of view from which they are considered is different. And as a fact, the world is the maximum of our sight, and also of our power of producing change.

There must be some limit — though unknown to us — to the aid given to the power of any creature. Whether, v. g. pigs can fly miraculously, is but a small thing;

particulari. Et per illam consideracionem probatur intellectus cuiuslibet entis distincte perceptivus non esse organicus. In quibus omnibus patet quod, data capacitate, danda est maxima multitudo forme quoad partes quantitativas et quoad diversas species; maxima etiam intensio et maxima diuturnitas temporis per quod materia prima potest taliter transmutari. Ideo materia est omnimode potentie finite. Sed non obest partem plus esse passivam suo toto.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, dicitur quod non bene distinguitur potentia activa a potentia passiva per differenciam recitatam. Sed potentia activa est forma qua substancia est formaliter activa. Et potentia passiva est forma qua substancia est formaliter passiva. Et talis vocatur habitudo ad agendum vel paciendum. Nota tamen quod in omni obiecto quo substancia est possibilis, potest agere et econtra; ut fortis homo potest plus pati laborando quam datus debilior, et idem homo qui potest oculo plus diaphano recipere speciem visibilis potest plus active videre ipsum idem. Virtus enim visiva est tam activa quam passiva, sicut materia prima habet actionem manentem; raciones autem illarum potentiarum, sicut et ipse potentie, formaliter et abstractive intellecte, distinguuntur, quamvis essencia sit eadem: multe ergo sunt potentie active que, si possunt in minus possunt in maius, ut potentia videndi, potentia transmutandi; et sic de multis similibus. Est enim dare maximum quod quis potest videre, ut patet de mundo; et maximum quod alteratum potest alterare | ut mundum vel eius materiam ^{B 74*} 2^m partem. Est etiam dare potentiam passivam que, si potest in maius, potest in minus; ut potentia portandi, potentia recipiendi, et sic de multis aliis. Non ergo in hoc dicuntur potentie supra dictae.

Ad 2^m dicitur quod est dare optimam applicacionem possibilium, et maximum iuvamen possibile ab extrinseco, quod nobis vanum est venari sive supponere. Utrum autem possibile sit porcos volare, muscas arare, et plumbum natare, cum iuvamine extrinseco, [est] alterius negotii. Talia enim creduntur deo valde possibilia 2^m acciones quas nostri vocant miracula. Non tamen potest [facere] lapidem posse intelligere vel

12. ^{dm} B. 16. ^{abtō} B. 27. ^{trnsdī} B. 37. ^M^{suppoē} B.
38. est *deest* B. 41. facere *deest* B.

sentire: et sic de accionibus appropriatis speciebus. on the other hand, God could not make a stone think.
 Suspendere tamen nisum gravis ad inferius vel levis ad superius; vel iuvare nisum porci plumbati ad volandum in aere, vel musce trahentis quodlibet trahibile videtur

5 deo satis facile. Nullum tamen istorum sufficit in ista de sui natura; sed si deus potest ista iuvare ad talia, tunc est dare maximum gradum iuvaminis deo possibilem et maximum gradum motus vel accionis cum tali concursu dei. Nec est ymaginandum quod una pars 10 accionis tribuatur deo et alia pars intensiva vel extensiva agenti; sed tota accio tribuenda est utriusque, cum nullum tale agens 2^m potest sine deo iuvante et agente communiter totam accionem, quidquid agere.

Nec sequitur ex isto quodlibet esse tante potencie 15 sicut aliud, etsi possit cum deo iuvante tantum agere, quia non habet in se tantam potentiam vel sufficienciam ad sic agendum, sed hoc potest potencia activa. Essentialiter tamen quantum potest quicquid cum iuvante, tantum potest. Et si amplietur potencia ad posse logi- 20 cum, tunc conceditur quod tantam potentiam habet quodlibet tale agens sicut aliquod, sed non est ita sufficiens nec ita activum vel passivum, quia isti termini dicunt dispositionem actualem potentis. Unde deus con- currens miraculose cum tali agente 2^o infundit sibi po- 25 tentiam, quia aliter non ageret totam accionem. Ideo creditur non esse possibile deum sic insoliter agere, nisi adaugeat potentiam cause cum qua concurrit. Non enim potest concurrere ex equo ut unus homo iuvat alium sine augmentacione sue potencie; et credere 30 quod talis potencie sit absolutum quod per se esse po- test, quamvis sit qualitas, non est sani capit. This does not prove that all things have equal natural power; for God, making one being to do more than it can do naturally, gives it an augmentation of power. If we mean by 'power' mere absolute possibility, one may have as much as another; but this is not the proper signification of the word. And thus, for one being, to equal another in act, its power must be increased by the help of God.

Ulterius dicitur quod stat unum exceedere aliud minima proporcione maioris inequalitatis; et per consequens minus habet se ad maius in maxima proporcione mino- 35 ris inequalitatis. Est ergo dare motum velocissimum possibilem, ut motum equivocalem, vel cuiuscunque quod in quolibet [instanti] oppositi motus acquirit unum indivisiabile materie motus 2^m eius indivisible. Et quando supponitur motum [in] infinitum velocitari ex subtiliacione There is both greatest and a least possible inequality between two things; and consequently the most rapid movement possible, sudden or

18. quod quantum B. 19, 20. 10^e B. 28. bonus B. 31. q^o B.

36. eq'voc^o B. 37. instanti *deest*. 38. m^e B. 39. in *deest*;

ib. velo^r B.

infinitely rapid movement is either not properly a magnitude, or is impossible; as in the case of movement *in vacuo*, in which there would be a successive change of place, but rapid in the highest possible degree.

If it be asked what cause could produce such a movement, it is to be answered that there would be present only the aptitude of the motive power.

In movements that are violent, the cause is a proportion of greater or less inequality between the activity of the motor and the resistance of the thing moved; and the greater the inequality, the more considerable the movement is.

But there are also natural movements, in which the thing moved does not resist, but the influence of the motor may be greater or less: as in the movement of the heavens. But it is often impossible to say by how much such an

cione medii, vel capitur hoc ex dicto, sicut fecit Aristoteles, vel supponitur impossibile, gracia argumenti. Potest enim aliquid subito moveri et multiplicari per quotlibet loca, sed nullum tale subitum est magnum, sic nec aliquid indivisibile est quantum. Posito ergo 5 vacuo, per summum impossibile, simpliciter mobilietur successivo motu in illo motu naturalissimo 2^m ultimum sui appetitus, pro quolibet instanti acquirendo quilibet eius indivisibili situm indivisibilem.

Et si ponitur partes eius laterales non resistere toti 10 (sicut tamen communiter ponitur, proper appetitus earum per lineam rectam brevissimam); et si queritur de proporcione ex qua talis motus causaretur; dicitur quod proporcio ex qua talis motus causatur non est nisi ydoneitas vel sufficiencia moventis ad movendum 15 mobile. Unde in motibus quodammodo violentis vocatur proporcio maioris inequalitatis, maior ydoneitas moventis ad motum quam est resistive ad impediendum. Unde, quamvis minus potens agat in magis potens, propter bonitatem applicacionis, propter iuvamentum 20 extrinsecum, vel propter difformitatem passi, potentiarum, aut aliam talem causam, non tamen ex proporcione minoris inequalitatis | provenit motus, sed ex propor- B 74^b cione maioris inequalitatis, que est maioris sufficiencie moventis ad movendum quam est resistencie ad resi- 25 stendum.

Alii autem sunt motus pure naturales, qui causantur ex proporcione maioris inequalitatis, que est dominium moventis super motum, sine eius reclamacione vel probibitione. Taliter enim proporcionatur motor celorum 30 ad quascunque partes eorum motas; et taliter proporcionatur anima corpori. Sed in multis proporcionibus istis non est dare excedens et excessum; sicut in proporcionibus quantitatuum. Nec sunt ille proporciones racionales; ideo non abutitur terminis qui vocat 35

1. car^r B. 19. motum B. 21, 22, poz^r B. 28. dm^m B.
34. qu^r B.

1. *Velocitari*. Aristotle demonstrates as follows the non-existence of a vacuum: If the resistance of the medium in which a given body moves is halved, quartered, &c. the velocity must be doubled, quadrupled, and so on: thus a vacuum being absolutely unresisting, movement would be infinitely rapid.

proporciones (quas motus consequitur) nec proporciones maioris inequalitatis nec proporciones minoris inequalitatis. Sed una proporcio est 2^{la} vel quomodolibet magna ad aliam, sine hoc quod ista proporcionata proprietas 5 comparentur. Quis, queso, scit signare proportionem 2^{lam} maioris orbis ad eius partem, vel fundare illam proportionem in fundamento debito? Unde est ordinatum quod intelligencia proporcionetur uni parti orbis ad movendum illam certo gradu motus? quem ex supp*o*sitione mensuramus termino numerali, ut 2 vel ut 4. Sed quod illa proporcio sit 2^{a} vel alia numeralis, non est docibile.

Ulterius, pro ultimo verbo nota quod solum loquimur pro presenti de iuvamento quod deus potest naturaliter 15 vel ordinare 2^{m} possibilitatem cursus naturalis facere, et non de illo quod deus potest facere de potentia absoluta. Sed revera illud verbum non solvit, cum quicquid deus potest facere cum agente 2^{o} , potest facere de communi cursu nature, et de naturalitate agentis 2^{i} . 20 Ymmo, iuxta dicta, deus nichil potest facere de potentia absoluta, nisi quod potest de potentia ordinata; quia quotquot miracula deus potest facere, potest ipse ordinare potentiam ad illa faciendum. Ideo stultissimum est verbum modernorum quo dicitur deum 25 non posse de lege vel potentia ordinata talia facare; quia si intelligunt quod repugnat isti ordinacioni et legi qua deus voluit eternaliter universitatem ordinare, certum est illi legi vel ordinacioni [repugnare] quod [ne] quicquam boni fiat preter illud quod fit vel fiet, cum 30 eternaliter ordinavit quod solum ista vel aliqua illorum fient. Et si intelligunt de parte legis ordinata, illa esset explicanda, sicut repugnancia illius ad illud quod deus potest facere. Et non assignabitur repugnancia; quia talem contingit assignare inter aliam partem ordinacionis 35 dei et potentiam cuiuscunque preter illud quod de facto erit. Dicendum ergo est de talibus, utrum potentia eorum repugnat ordinacioni dei vel non. Si ergo loquimur de potentia que potest esse ordinata, a qua talia possunt fieri, tunc certum est quod nichil potest facere 40 nisi de potentia ordinata.

influence may be greater or less; and so these proportions might even be said to be neither of greater nor of less inequality. We can indeed suppose, but not prove, that a greater orb has influence on the movement of a smaller, as 2 to 1. The present question concerns the aid that God gives naturally and ordinatorily to His creatures, not that which he can absolutely give. But there is no real distinction between absolute and ordinate power. If God can work a given miracle absolutely, there then can be an ordinate power for the miracle to be wrought. To say that such and such an act is against God's ordinate power, either means that it is contrary to the eternal law of what is and will be; or that it is opposed to something that God can do: in the first case the act is impossible; in the second, no such opposition can be proved. So God can do nothing but by His ordinate power.

8. mte^a pporect^o B. 17. rena^a B. 28. repugnare deest; ib.
ne deest B.

Speaking, therefore, of this latter power, there must be a maximum limit to it. For if there is a limit to causability, there must also be a limit to causing power; and, therefore,

there is a maximum in both cases.

If God was indefinitely able to create, we should have to admit an infinite vacuum, because beyond the limits of this world, God could create still.

This vacuum would be necessary, and more able to receive bodies than God to produce them; unless we suppose that God could create a world as large as this vacuum; it would again be coeternal, with God, not to be annihilated or changed in any way.

And God could not accelerate to an infinite degree the speed of the world; because all movement supposes a new accident (of position) successively gained and lost; but here there would be no succession at all.

Supposito ergo quod loquamur de posse dei relativo, ponente possibilitatem factibilis, tunc videtur valde inconsonum quod non sit dare quam causativus sit deus alicuius causabilis. Posita enim sua causabilitate, oportet ponere causabilitatem causabilis sibi parem; quibus 5 datis, oportet dare maximum in quacunque specie produccionis quod deus potest producere; sicut patet ex superius deductis. Nam causativitas est eo maior quo plus potest; ergo, data maxima causativitate vel causabilitate, est dare quante ad maximum deus potest active 10 causare, et quante causabile potest passive causari.

Similiter, si cuiuslibet speciei effectus sit deus infinitum causativus, tunc necessario est vacuum undique infinitum; quia si versus aliquam differenciam terminatur, tunc extra eius terminum deus posset producere 15 mundum, cum non posset producere mundum nisi in vacuo. Sequitur: si vacuum potest esse, necessario est vacuum undique infinitum. Et quod illud sit passive susceptivum corporis plus quam deus est productivus caret omni apparenzia. Si ergo ipsum potest suscipere 20 tantum corpus sicut ipsum est, tunc deus potest producere tantum corpus. Sed non dabitur quod ipsum est tante susceptivum quante est, nec quod [pars] suscipiens sua sit per totum tanta precise quantum est totum, nisi ipsum possit suscipere precise tantum corpus quan- 25 tum est ipsum terminis.

Similiter, cum illud vacuum sit a deo, et tam utile sibi quod non posset producere mundum sine illo dato, patet quod est necessario coeternum, sic quod deus non posset ipsum annichilare, vel unam partem eius 30 cum alia coextendere. Si enim posset, tunc non requiritur vacuum recipiens rem corpoream, | ut dicitur, et B 75^a tunc sine dubio deus non infinitum velociter posset movere mundum versus occidens, ut communiter conceditur quod omnis motus successivus ponit formaliter ali. 35 quod accidens aquisitum mobili, et aliquod deperditum; quia aliter non est fingenda causa quare mundus tam infinitum velociter movetur versus omnem differentiam,

12. effus B. 23. pars deest B. 26. t'p B. 36. acci^{as} B.
38. dram B.

19. *Plus quam.* Because the vacuum would be actually infinite; and God, however able to create new worlds, would never fill it up successively.

eo quod nullum ens foret aquisitum mundo, si de possibili sic moveretur, quia iam aquiritur; et sic de deperdito.

Ponendo ergo vacuum, ut nostri senciunt, oportet 5 ponere ipsum esse ens positivum, specificans motum et eius accidencia. Si ergo vacuum sit tante permanencie et necessitatibus, patet ex ratione substancie quod esset substancia, etiam ordinata valde. Sed quomodo hoc, for no one part 10 si, infinitum multas et magnas partes eius auferendo, residuum sufficeret? ideo est servicium ad quod totum deservit. Frustratorium ergo esset vacuum ad omne eius punctum, et huic sine dubio non esset a deo bono conservatum.

Similiter, iuxta modernos ponentes potentiam terminari 15 exclusive ad infinitum quod non potest deus, non tantum potest producere quantum potest, cum non potest cognoscere quantum potest producere, et per consequens non potest cognoscere quam potens precise ad quid- 20 quam producendum sit, et per consequens est plus causativus vacui quam substancie corporee, et sic non omnium specierum est eque causativus. Causat enim vacuum, et contradiccionem claudit quod tante esset corpus, cum exclusive et non inclusive usque ad tantum potest causari corpus. Potencia ergo qua deus 25 causat vacuum per indivisibile excedit producibilitatem corporis. Vel aliter sequitur quod due sunt concausantes eiusdem rationis, et una earum non potest tantum cau- 30 sare sicut reliqua, cum tamen ille potencie dicuntur pares, quia illis paria possunt causare. Corpus ergo per indivisibile excessum a vacuo foret maximum in quod deus posset.

Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod unum infinitum sit reliquo maius; quia rectificaret deus lineam girativa (cum sit secundum se totam rectificabilis) et pre- 35 tendat ipsam in infinitum versus oriens, servando a punto continue fixo Oxonie; quo facto, pono quod in qualibet parte proporcionali illius hore deus protra-hat A, totam lineam, versus occidens, et deuento ad finem hore noto lineam terminatam ad situm Oxonie, 40 ubi finit A punctus in principio, et signo illam per AB, sive fuerit finita ad reliquum extremum linee girative, in Oxford, God was to make line AB being If, one end A of an infinite line AB being turn on B, sive non. Circumducatur ergo deus AB lineam, fixo B the whole line

To posit a vacuum is to posit it as a real being, nay as a substance; and yet it is useless; of it is necessary.

The moderns admit that God can do all things, except create what is infinite; then God can do more than He is able; since He is not able to know all the objects to which His power extends; and at any rate He would conserve vacuum in being, rather than substance.

And the maximum of God's creation would be a body infinitely small, surrounded by an infinite vacuum. One infinite would be greater than another. Example to demonstrate this.

we should have puncto, et patet quod in vacuo causabitur circulus infinitus, quo circumducto super polos, et axe quiescente, causabitur spira infinita; et per idem contingit inscribere vel circumscribere quadratum et habebitur que-⁵ cunque figura superficialis vel corporea infinita in va-⁵ cuo: quod claudit contradiccionem in terminis. Patet ergo quod [ad] nullum tale est deus infinitum [potens], cum ipse cognoscit ubi sit quilibet eius punctus et quante pedale confert ad eius magnitudinem; et sic per consequens in qua proporcione se habet ad pedale, et ¹⁰ ad quamcunque eius partem proporcionalem: et per idem deus scit ubi terminabatur A linea in principio versus oriens; quia aliter, circumducendo A, stante extre-¹⁵ mo eius fixo et circumducendo B lineam infinitam versus oriens excessam ab A per pedale, sic quod tam B quam A fiat infinita versus occidens, foret B maius quam B per pedale sine alterius maioracione vel mino-²⁰ racione: et sic de infinitis quorum primum excedatur a B per pedale, ^{2m} per 4rupedale, et sic in infinitum.

Refutation of
certain weak
answers to this
difficulty.

1. Denies that
that the
Infinite is not
great, because
it is not small.
But in this case
it would really
be smaller than
a part of the
infinite
vacuum;
besides, the
idea of quantity
includes that
of magnitude.

2. Considers
each
proportional
part of such a
line as equal to
the whole; but
there can be
no proportion
between
equals.

Thus an infinite
line must have
a half, a
quarter, an
eighth, &c.

Hic sunt responsiones inutiles. Prima dicit quod tale quantum infinitum magnum, partem habet, sed ipsum non est magnum quia non est parvum. Sed hic non valet, tum quia est minus parte vacui infiniti, tum etiam quia ad esse quantum sequitur omne magnum sive ²⁵ immensum, ut videtur de vacuo sive finite | magnum, B ^{75b} sicut est de linea girativa. Quid, queso, componerent magnitudines parcium A linee, nisi magnitudinem? cum pars, ut huius[modi], requirit suum totum.

Secunda responsio dicit quod quelibet pars propor-³⁰ cionalis linee A est ita magna sicut A. Sed contra illud est descripcio proporcionis multiplicis que non potest esse inter equalia. A ergo habebit se ad eius medietatem, ^{4am}, ^{8am}; et sic in infinitum in proporcionibus multiplicibus correspondet. Alter enim non fieret alia ³⁵ pars finita ipsius ad eius quantitatem, nec per consequens ad eius esse. Cum enim tantum sit residuum sicut est hoc totum, quomodo habet hoc totum esse partibus in A et totidem in B, sic quod prima in A ⁴⁰

2. axem quiescentem B. 4. 4^m B. 7. ad deest; ib. potens deest.

26. imfū B. 29. modi deest. 32. multo B. 35. a^a pro alia B.

38. ē₃ B.

sit dupla ad primam in B, 2^a sit dupla ad 2^{am}, et sic Yet one of its
in infinitum; patet quod totum aggregatum ex primis parts taken
est duplum ad totum aggregatum ex 2^{is}, ut patet away, it
11^o elementorum Euclidis, prima conclusione. Nec remains as
great as before.

5 refert sive illa fuerit finita sive infinita. Et evidencia An infinitely
ad illud est quod non quantum additum finito quanto small added to
facit totum maius: ergo per idem, quodlibet finitum, a finite quantity
pars infiniti, facit totum maius. Et ad illud valet quod makes the
10 genere superficie vel corporeitatis. Non ergo foret pars whole greater;
linee per se causa sue magnitudinis, nisi, illa ablata, finite added to
residuum foret minus. quantity should make if greater
too.

Tertia responsio negat deum taliter posse movere 3. Denies that
vel causare substanciam vel accidens infinitum, ut in God is able to
15 infinitum potest movere lineam, rare facere corpus, et cause a
sic de aliis; sed repugnat quod illa maneat in fine. substance or an
Illud non valet isti vie, quia in vacuo infinito est linea accident that
infinita, vel extremum simillimum linee, cum vacuum is infinite; a
sit quasi quantitas abstracta. Nec dubium quin, si deus body infinitely
20 potest protrahere illam lineam vel rarefacere illud expanded
potest protrahere illam lineam vel rarefacere illud would cease to
corpus [in] infinitum usque ad finem illius hore, vel aliter exist.
continuare recte lineas pedales ad invicem, ipse potest But for those
omne tale finitum conservare in fine, eo quod non who admit an
corrumperetur nisi ab eo; et ille libere contradictorie infinite vacuum,
25 rumpit illud, cum tamen non necessitaret se ad corrumpendrum this answer is
illud, propter producciones precedentes, cum of no use.
sit tam conservativus rerum talium, sicut est productivus. If God can
Nec deest sibi locus ad conservandum, quia est expand a body
vacuum undique infinitum, cui deus non potest quid in vacuo
30 quid addere vel quidquid auferre. Deus ergo, in infinitum so that it
rarefaciendo mundum usque ad finem illius hore attains the
exclusive, repleret illud totum vacuum, quia cuiuslibet infinite in a
partis illius repleret aliqua parte. Ideo replecio totalis, given time, He
sicut rarefaccio totalis, erit ita magnum sicut vacuum. can also
preserve it from ceasing to exist,
being as much the preserver as He is the cause
of everything; nor would room be wanting for this expanded body, since the vacuum is also infinite.

35 Et, ut breviter dicam, non est aliquod inconveniens Thus the
deducibile ex admissione corporis infiniti, quin conforme hypothesis of an
deducibile sit ex posizione vacui infiniti. Quelibet enim infinite vacuum
pars eius superflueret; et cum nullum eius punctum entails as
foret sursum vel deorsum, ipsum non posse circum- many difficulties
40 duci, nisi pro quolibet instanti transiret infinitum mag- as that of an
num spaciū, sicut patet ymaginando lineas concur- infinitely large
body.

4. 9^{ene} B. 12. maius B. 16. maneat B. 18. x^{m̄} filiū B.
21. in deest B. 26. per B.

supposing an infinite space traversed; for however small the angle made by the lines that meet in the centre of revolution, still they are at last at an infinite distance.
Other difficulties.

That there is a limit to God's power can also be proved by arguments leading to absurdities. If there was no limit He could make one part of the world as large as the whole, together with many other impossibilities.

rentes in centro, causando quantumcunque acutum angulum infinitum. Namque magna basis terminaret aliquem angulum conatum in centro. Ideo infinicies infinitum spacium transiretur, antequam una parva linea deveniret ad situm in quo est reliqua. Nec posset deus 5 alterare, movere localiter, augmentare vel diminuere aliquam partem vacui, cum sit per se quantum et immutabile. Ymmo tunc deus posset movere se, cum quiescit in vacuo tenebroso, visibili per totum, ut tenebra videtur et infinitum taccio. Cum ergo quotlibet 10 talia inconveniens sequuntur ex posizione vacui, et necesse sit ponere vacuum ad hoc quod deus posset talia mirabilia mobilia facere, videtur quod deus non potest facere talia.

Similiter per deducciones ad inconveniens videtur 15 idem probari. Videtur enim quodlibet tantum posse sicut aliquid; sed nichil tantum quantum ipsum potest. Deus enim potest facere quodlibet secundum tantum causare sicut aliquod ut formica, et quelibet pars mundi potest esse tanta sicut totus mundus potest esse. Et 20 per idem tantam difficultatem facere |, et cum difficul- B 76^a tas attenditur penes gradum proprie potencie, sequitur quodlibet habere tantam potentiam sicut deus, cum quilibet habens tantam potentiam sicut deus, haberet corpus infinitum magnum, quod foret deo par in potentia. Et si dicatur quod omnis talis est potencia dei, et non potencia rei tante potentis, vere sic posset dici nullam substanciam habere potentiam, inclinacionem vel actionem; sed totum fit, aliis solum passive se habentibus. Ymmo, non essent raciones inmobiles secundum quas partes mundi ordinantur, eo quod contingentissime posset esse ita ordinatum quod terra locketur in supremo mundi et sol in infimo, et quod minima species corporum foret maxima species, et sic de anathomia hominis et cuiuscunque partis mundi; ymmo 35 inclinaciones et proprie acciones rerum possent in toto

3. conatū B. 6. altar' B. 9, 10. teneb^o vi^r B. 10. tctio B.
18. ḡn^o B. 24. habet pro habens B. 31, 32. gtm^{me} B. 35. antho^o B.

16. *Idem probari.* This evidently makes the present paragraph a mere sequel to the preceding one. I have not been able to see the sequence, and not understanding this paragraph clearly in any sense, have been very sparing of marginal notes.

communicari. Omnes ille leges dependent ex voluntate dei contingentissima, secundum quam posset facere quamlibet partem mundi esse totum mundum, ut hominem posset constituere ex terra vel parvis accidentibus, cum anima, ita magnum sicut iam est mundus, sine aliquo corpore alio preter eius partem. Et sic periret substancialium certitudines, raciones eterne et incorruptibilitates rerum.

Posset ergo philosophus dicere quod deus in omnibus talibus terminat se ^{2^m raciones eternas maximo in quod potest; quia aliter esset imperfectus; nec est solum infinite potencie durative, ut alie partes mundi, sed tripliciter excedit alias potencias. Primo in hoc quod quilibet alia potencia habet finem extrinsecum finientem ipsam; sed nichil potest finire deum. Et ad illum sensum demonstrat Aristoteles deum esse potencie infinite ex hoc quod eternaliter movet celum, tanquam finis ultimus. ^{2^o excedit potencias quascunque alias infinite, in hoc quod eternaliter gignit actum vel intelleccionem sibi equalē, et nichil potest causare tam perfectum causatum, nisi fuerit infinitum. Tercio, in hoc quod ipse potest creare sine materia preiacente, et hoc claudit contradiccionem aliud facere.}}

Et ex istis sequuntur multe proprietates in modo causandi independenter et ultimate sumendi; et sic de ceteris, que solum sibi possunt competere. Nec est alicuius potencie intellective, nec proporcionaliter sufficit facere maius opus, nec est plus potens, nec est modo minus potens quam quando produxit mundum, etsi nunc non possit mundum producere. Nec sequitur quod prius potuisse produxisse mundum, nec forte posterius, nec maiorem nec minorem, et sic libere contradictorie produxit mundum. Et conformiter est dicendum de aliis factis ^{2^m ultimum sue factibilitatis. Nec probatur ex operibus que deus fecit, vel ex auctoritate sufficienti quod ipse possit taliter facere. Nec valet protervia qua dicitur, quod deus tante potest quanto potest sustineri ipsum posse. Sed potest faciliter sustineri quod ipse potest [in] infinitum perficere et operari cum quocunque, igitur etc. Taliter enim arguunt aliqui, induendo habitum responsalem, quando deficit illis}

God's power, thus terminated by a maximum, differs in three ways from that of His creatures; ^{1^o because He alone has only Himself for end;}

^{2^o because He eternally begets an Act which is infinitely perfect; and ^{3^o because He can create without any previous matter.}}

Many other consequences flow from these principles. Though God cannot create the world now, He is just as powerful as when He created it.

Nor could He have created the world before or after the fixed time, nor larger nor smaller than He did.

To say that God can do as much as He can be maintained to be able to do, is idle obstinacy. It consists in merely shifting the burden of proof upon other shoulders

10. terrat B. 23. actute B. 35. aucte B. 39. in deest.

We do not however deny that God, if He quolibet, chose, could render any being indefinitely perfect.

III. It must be admitted that there is a limit to the difficulty that can be overcome by any given power.

To deny this would be to deny both the totality of any force and the limit attained by its highest act, and the maximum of difficulty to be overcome by it.

It is quite certain that every *suppositum* can produce another equal to itself, and this is the highest act of all, similar to the begetting of the Word in God's essence. There are also certain actions in which a maximum of difficulty is overcome; but in reckoning this, we must not say that these actions are greater in proportion as they last longer,

nor that the difficulty is in direct ratio with the effect produced;

difficulty may be overcome without any external effect being produced.

probacio. Non ergo infinite potest deus concurrere cum quilibet, sed mensurate cum agentibus secundum proporcionem ad eorum potencias. Posset tamen, si vellet, ut superius dictum est.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod est dare maximam difficultatem 5 quod quecumque potentia sufficit facere, et multitudinem et magnitudinem, que communiter attenditur 2^m eius ultimum virtutis. Et sic locuntur (quamvis inconveniente) illi qui negant potentiam terminari maximo in quod potest. Ipsi enim nec darent totalem potentiam, nec maximum 10 nisus eius possibile, nec maximam difficultatem eius possibile fieri a data potentia; ita quod grave plus posset niti, sicut omne divisibile per comparacionem suarum parcium posset melius applicari 2^m partes que propter distanciam ocliantur, non tantum intendentis sicut intenduntur propinquius posse. Sed quomodounque sit de

hoc, claret michi quod quelibet essentia habet unum suppositum, 2^m quod producit aliud suppositum par priori; et illa est accio immanens perfectissima possibilis tali nature, 2^m aliquod eius suppositum; ut perfectissima et difficillima accio quam deus potest agere est produccio ad intra, et proporcionaliter de aliis essentiis.

Est eciam dare acciones et facciones ad extra perfectissimas et difficillimas possibles | respectu talium B 76^b agencium; que acciones non sunt eo maiores quo per maius tempus durant; quia sic infinitum modice difficultatis esset portare maximum lapidem per tempus, cum portare ipsum per horam sit tantum finita difficultas, et nisus minor esset portare ipsum per infinitum 30 minus tempus. Et sic in infinitum magna difficultas esset portare quamlibet leve per tempus eternum, et per consequens nulli difficultati finite proportionalis. Nec attenduntur tales difficultates penes magnitudinem effectus extrinseci producti; quia tunc semper ad maiorem 35 ritatem motus consequitur maioritas difficultatis, et per consequens quantumlibet magnum difficultatem sufficit quantumcunque movens facere. Nec in aliquo conseruentur se magnitudo potencie prime agentis difficultatem et difficultas facta. Ymmo stat "facere difficultatem" univoce cum "producere effectum extrinsecum"

2. misitate B. 17. a3 (03?) pro claret B. 30. nisi B. 41. producente B.

solum conservando productum vel resistendo produccioni, sicud patet de conservante lumen vel quemcunque effectum alium, et de portante proporcionale vel prohibente actionem agentis.

5 Videtur ergo quod hoc nomen, "difficultas", sit nomen equivocum, sicut et hoc concretum, "difficile", et termini illis oppositi. Quandoque enim quecunque res difficultis dicitur difficultas, sive sit accio, sive obiectum circa quod est accio; et ista accepcion est 10 valde extensa; ut sic loquendo: *omne difficile est difficultas*. 2º modo accipitur pro illo quo res formaliter denominatur difficultis, quod est accio vel passio circuens multa genera: ut res varie dicuntur difficile. Dicitur enim aliquid difficile, quia est ens circa quod est 15 agencia requirens certam potentiam. Et cum omne ens sit taliter intelligibile vel conservabile, qualiter a sola potencia infinita potest conservari vel intelligi, patet quod cuncte res sunt summe difficiles, inseparabiliter quoad aliquem actum: ut puta actum intelligendi vel 20 causandi. Sed 3º modo dicitur res difficultis propter eius perfeccionem; penes hoc enim uno modo mensuratur difficultas causancie. Et sic est maior difficultis producencia qua deus producit animam quam producencia qua producit lignum. Et forte non est una difficultas 25 respiciens illas ambas, si non aggregative. 4º modo dicitur aliquid difficile, quia infert fatigacionem vel debilitacionem exercendi potentiam circa illud.

Et ita tripliciter dicitur difficultas formaliter. Prima respicit perfeccionem potencie causantis subiectum 30 difficulter. 2ª respicit perfeccionem causati. Sic enim duobus modis dicitur causancia bona. 3ª vero difficultas respicit fatigacionem vel debilitacionem causantis subiectum illius difficultatis. Ut summe difficile, tam primo modo quam secundo, est producere deum; et 35 quoad primum modum eque difficile est intelligere vel causare quidquid finaliter. Omnis autem causancia pure naturalis excludit difficultatem 3º modo dictam, cum omnis talis respicit penam vel debilitacionem potencie. Nec video quod ille 3 dicuntur univoce difficultates; sed forte omnes fundantur in causanciis.

Different acceptions of the word difficult:
1. The thing itself that is difficult is called a difficulty.

2. That by which it is difficult; requiring a certain power either to be made or preserved in being, or understood; in this sense all things are difficult.

3. The perfection of one thing above another, requiring a greater display of power to produce it.

4. The tendency to tire or weaken the force that produces it.

Only the three last kinds express difficulty properly so called:
1st as requiring a cause,
2nd as implying perfection in the effect,
3rd as implying that the effect makes the cause deteriorate.

The 3rd sort of difficulty is to be first discussed. Nothing is in this sense difficult to God or to purely natural agents, only to things that act by material movements.

The same thing may be more or less difficult to different agents; it follows that

there is no sense to the word "difficult" unless we determine the agent.

It follows also that the magnitude of the difficulty is in direct ratio to the deterioration or fatigue caused by it.

Also that it cannot increase infinitely, since

that would totally destroy the agent that is to overcome it.

Conclusions.

1. If it be asked how difficult it is to carry a bean, we must, to answer, first know, who carries it, how long, and in what way.

2. But speed or slowness makes no difference; and the carrying it for one instant or for a longer period bears the same proportion as one instant to the same given time.

3. The length of time only accidentally affects the fatigue, and consequently the difficulty;

De tercia autem fiat nobis primo sermo. Et patet quod sic loquendo nichil est deo vel aliis pure naturaliter agentibus difficile, sed mobilibus physicis que continue modo moventur, et sic sicut idem uni est bonum, et alteri est magis bonum, et 3^o non sic bonum; sic 5 eadem accio uni est difficilis, et alteri est magis difficilis, sed 3^o facient illam est ipsa non difficilis; ut de deo et homine et eius factis, faciendo idem opus. Nec 10 est oracio perfecta qua dicitur difficultas sic magna, vel res sic difficilis, nisi explicetur illud respectu cuius ultime dicitur; ut imperfecta est locucio dicere quod aliquid est simile, nisi explicetur cui est simile. Sic ergo, loquendo de difficultate, patet quod est eo maior quo maiorem penam vel maiorem fatigacionem vel debilitacionem infert, sive agenti, sive patienti, sive 15 quolibet aliter accidentato; ut uni est magna difficultas comburendi, alteri est magna difficultas stare vel sedere, vel esse in tali loco per tantum tempus etc. Nunquam tamen | crescit talis difficultas in infinitum, cum nichil B 77* in infinitum puniri, fatigari, vel debilitari potest, sed 20 in omnibus talibus est dare maximum terminum possibilem.

Unde querenti quante difficultatis est portare fabam, querendum est econtra difficultatem cui, qualiter, et per quantum tempus; uni enim esset maior difficultas 25 et alteri minor uno modo portandi; ut velociter movendo esset maius difficultas, et alio modo portandi minor; per maius tempus portare esset maior difficultas quam conformiter portare per minus.

Ex quo 2^o patet quod velocitas vel tarditas motus 30 est impertinens tali difficultati; et difficultas instantanea, vel aliter indivisibilis, est taliter comparabilis difficultati temporanee vel aliter divisibili, sicut instans est comparabile tempori; vel continuare res 2^m puncta tantum non est simpliciter infinitum facilius quam continuare 35 ipsas 2^m lineas vel superficies; sicut nec superficies infinitum excedit lineam, nec accio corporea, actionem superficialem vel linearem.

Patet eciam quod difficultas non est eo maior quo diuturnior, quia magnitudo debilitacionis vel fatigacionis 40 accidentaliter respicit diuturnitatem; sicut nec motus

12. aliud B. 20. infinitū B. 34. q̄t̄o B.

(ut aliiquid habens magnitudinem maiorem a diuturnitate vel longitudine) est eo maius quo longius, ut patet de corrupcione et de aliis multis. Tempus tamen et linea, cum sibi similibus, sunt eo maiora quo longiora. Pena ergo eterna non erit infinitum magna, sicut nec gaudium eternum sibi oppositum; sed videndum est quantum bonum ponit vel privat, et penes hoc mensuretur eius magnitudo. Dampnatus tamen semper fatigatur et debilitatur, semper fit fatigatus et debilis, etsi non successive 10 perdat potentiam.

Patet 4º quod non penes proporcionalem deperdicionem potencie attenditur difficultas, quia tunc omne deperdens potenciam in agendo usque ad non gradum infinitam difficultatem faceret. Ex quo sequitur 15 quod nulla pars corporis maiorem difficultatem facit quam suum totum; et per consequens stat aliquid continue debilitari et fortificari 2º diversas partes sicut simul fit forte et debile. Non enim, si aliiquid calefit, incipit esse calidum, sed satis est quod nova caliditate 20 vel intensione fiat calidum: et sic de impedimentis denominacionum que videntur contrarie. Unde patet quod forte agens facit maiorem difficultatem, que tamen est sibi insensibilis, et debilius facit sepe minorem debilitatem, que tamen est sibi sensibilis, quia equalis 25 ablacio a minori est sibi sensibilior quam a maiori.

Quinto, patet quod summa difficultas huius generis est peccare moraliter, quia patet sic: nullo modo pro aliquo bono possibili servando vel acquirendo, et per consequens pro nullo malo possibili evitando vel 30 evadendo [homo] committeret aliquid huiusmodi, unde deus offenderetur: quod non esset, nisi omne tale peccatum esset peius pene sensus; et sic de ceteris. Et maior patet ex hoc quod, si commutaret aliquid huiusmodi pro obtentu alterius, offenderet contra summam 35 iusticiam, sicut patet explicato; sed quilibet debet non

movement is not always greater in proportion to its length of duration; e. g. corruption; Thus neither damnation nor eternal bliss is infinite; both are to be considered according to the amount of happiness lost or gained.

4. Difficulty is not to be appreciated by the loss of power occasioned by an act, or a man would overcome an infinite difficulty by exhausting himself completely. If a man is exhausted in one part of his body, and not in the whole, it does not follow that that part has overcome a greater difficulty than the whole; so also in the case of a strong and a weak agent.

5. In this sort of difficulty, mortal sin is the greatest of all, since it should not be committed for the sake of any possible good. The reason why mortal sin is never licit, is that God is thereby offended; and

3. corpore? 17. fortis B. 24. difficultatem before debilitatem B.
27. mortali? B. 30. homo deest B. 32. &c pro et sic de
ceteris B. 33. gmittar3 B. 34. altius B. 35. explicato (sic?) B.

3. *Corruption*, or decomposition, was counted by Aristotle as a sort of *movement*, meaning *change*. 26. *Difficultas*. We must remember that Wyclif speaks of that which, if done, tends to make the agent deteriorate. Mortal sin is in that sense a difficult thing.

as we should always choose the lesser of two evils; mortal sin is the greatest possible; and what is true for sin in general is true for individual sins.

There is also a maximum difficulty in the other two senses of the word; difficulty may be greater or less, just as the perfections of things, or the powers of causes are greater or less.

These three senses are not opposed.

Most sophists only speak of difficulty as to external effects; but the word means something to be mastered; and what is more masterly than

God's preservation of the world? In the second sense, difficulty does not imply any particular effort of the agent; God, a spirit, our soul, and a material body can all produce the same given movement without any difference of effort;

taliter commutare: igitur maior vera. Et minor patet ex hoc quod semper de duobus malis minus malum est eligendum, si oportet alterum habere: in malo vero moraliter non potest esse eleccio. Sicut ergo in privativis est dare maximum genus difficultatis, sic est de esse et individuis.

Et quo ad difficultatem primo modo vel 2^o modo dictam, patet ex dictis quod sicut perfeccio difficultis, vel potencia causantis ad accionem, sic difficultas ad difficultatem; et sic aliqua sunt univoce comparabiles, et aliquae equivoce; aliqua proporcione proprie dicta, et alia proporcione communiter dicta. Omnes autem ille difficultates sonant in bonitatem, sicut omnes priores in maliciam pene vel culpe. Nec distinguuntur illa difficultia ex opposito, cum puniri sit tribus difficultatibus difficultile, sed non peccare moraliter. Hoc enim consequitur penam maximam 2^m genus. Communitas autem sophistarum non loquitur nisi de difficultate actionis ad extra. Certum est tamen quod tunc omne ens predicamentale est difficultas. | Nam difficultas, positive B 77^b intellecta, sonat in magisterium et subtilitatem. Sed quis dubitat magnum esse magisterium servare mundum in quantitate, bonitate, proporcione, situ, tempore, posicione, et habitu suarum parcium?

2^o patet quod 2^a difficultas non consequitur nisum aut multitudinem potencie secundum se totalem agentis, quia contingit animam movere corpus proprium vel alienum localiter et alteracione; et parem difficultatem contingit agens corporeum facere, et deum per se, sive intelligenciam cum communi influencia. Et certum est 30 quod talia non apponunt certos nisus vel potencias. Ideo non oportet ad huiusmodi paritates difficultatem rerum productarum esse equalitatem nisum vel potenciarum. Non enim includit difficultas ista fatigacionem vel debilitacionem causantis, ita quod maior sit difficultas rem fieri a debiliori quam a potentiori. Nec

1. commutari B. 9. a⁸; B. 16. h^c B. 17. g^g B. 19. e⁸ B.

19. 20. p^e B. 21. m^{grm} B. 22. m^{grm} B.

21. *m^{grm}*. This form occurs three times; *magisterium* does not agree well with the sense each time; but I can find no similar word that is on the whole preferable.

includit ista 2^a difficultas generaliter paritatem prime difficultatis in gradu, sed communiter oppositum, cum omne ens primo modo sit summe difficile.

Tercio patet quod omnem difficultatem concomitatur difficultas summa; nam si quidquid ego facio, deus conservative, ultimate, et omne opus meum facit; et hoc non posset aliquid facere preter deum. Unde patet quod infinitis modis contingit facere opus. Cum modo facere illud est facilis, et alio modo facere illud est difficilis; ut cultellum facere opus artificis, quam hominem qui dirigit; quia ipse multas difficultates coefficit quarum nullam cultellus potest facere; et per idem longe difficilior et artificialior est facienda dei. Faccio autem passiva est eadem, eque difficilis, causata ab omnibus. Aliquas autem faciencias reservat sibi deus 2^m totam speciem, ut creare, finaliter gubernari, iustificare etc. Et alias communicat creaturis, ut patet de operibus nature que sunt communia deo et nature, et alias operaciones nature malas moraliter, ut [deus potest hec] facere sed non approbare, quamvis approbet bonum consequens ex illis: ut patet de blasphemia, mendacio, furto, homicidio, luxuria, et cetera. Talia enim dicitur deum velle esse permissive, approbando sua convertibilia et non illa. Unde, sicut passio aliqua bene placet deo et agencia secum convertibilia non sic placent; ita econtra bene deo placet facere actionem moraliter malam, et non sic placet sibi illam actionem fieri, quoniam si genus eius placet deo, sic et convertibile sequens ex eo. Videtur ergo tantam difficultatem esse mouere fabam, quantumlibet tarde, sicut facere mundum; quia deum sic mouere est summum magisterium; sed distincio solvit.

Quarto patet quod stat idem equivoce, et univoce respectu diversorum, esse sub quibuslibet gradibus esse difficile et per consequens facile; ut idem opus est unius agenti facile et alteri difficile; et respectu unius agentis summe difficile et respectu alterius minoris potentie facilis secundum equivocationem dictam. Unde non oportet, si tante sit difficultatis quo ad potentiam requisitam, quod sit simpliciter tante difficultatis. Et ita dicitur de perfectione denominacionis et multis

but it does not follow that the difficulty is the same, only that it does not cause the agent to deteriorate. Nor is the necessity of an equally perfect agent always implied in the idea of an equally perfect effect.

In every act, owing to the concourse of God, the highest possible degree of difficulty is overcome. A thing may be done in various ways, unequally difficult; but 'to be done' is of equal difficulty in all. Creation, providential government, justification &c. are acts that God reserves; the rest He communicates to His creatures, so that He makes the sin which a man commits, without approving it, but only the good that comes of it; if, therefore, God wills sin, it is only permissively. Thus God is pleased with His own share in a bad action, though He is not pleased that the action takes place.

And in one sense (the action of God) there is as much difficulty in moving a bean as in making a world.

13. *facia* B. 15. *aboibg* B. 16. *finar* B. 19, 20. *deus — hec deest* B.
31, 32. *magm* B.

It is clear that similibus que augentur ex denominacionibus et con-
in these
different senses, sequentibus; et acciones dei, relaciones, et multa alia
and in the same
sense relatively
to a different
being, the same
thing may be
difficult and
easy at the same
time, or more
and less
difficult.
There is thus a
maximum to
any difficulty
that can be
overcome; there
is also a
maximum of
duration to all
decomposable
things.

Et per ista patet aliqualiter quod est dare maximam
difficultatem quam agens sufficit agere vel causare; 5
sicut est dare maximum tempus per quod corruptibile
sufficit durare; cum sequitur: Usque ad finem illius
temporis sufficit Sor durare; ergo per totum illud
tempus sufficit durare. Sic enim durabit motus et alie-
res per tempora, ex hoc quod exclusive durabunt usque 10
ad eorum terminos; quia aliter nullum successivum
posset durare per tempus, et per consequens non esset
longum vel breve, nec aliquam partem posset habere.
Nec dubium quin pari evidencia qua ille motus per
totum tempus *illud* durabit (demonstrando *illud* quod 15
ponitur minimum tempus per quod sufficio durare) ita
ego per totum illud tempus possum vel sufficio durare,
quia continue a principio usque ad finem possum
durare, et sic precise tamdiu possum durare quamdiu
durabit ille motus; quia tamdiu, et quandocunque erit 20
aliquid instans intrinsecum motus huius qui erit per
totum tempus.

Nec aliter posset aliiquid deperdere potentiam durandi
successive, nec senescere; sicut nec aliiquid posset in
proporcione rationali esse reliquo durabilius. Et sic 25
nichil haberet periodem naturalem; ut si tempus centum
annorum sit minimum per quod non possum durare,
et nunc sit medium instans, ita quod precise medium
duracionis deperdi posset, patet quod adhuc sufficio
durare per dupla instancia. | Aliter enim non esset B 78*
homo magis durabilis quam homo, et continue successive
decresceret, quoisque fuerit minus durabilis; et cum
inde quam fuerit durabilis ut homo cum tamen dura-
ciones sunt eiusdem racionis; et tunc sine dubio deus
non posset scire in qua proporcione unum est dura- 35
bilis reliquo, nec aliiquid tale posset tamdiu durare
sicut posset. Nec esset dare maximam durabilitatem
mei; et sic partes sine toto vel totis. Quamdiu ergo
erit ita quod ego sufficio vivere in instanti quod est
presens, certum est ergo quod cuiuslibet corruptibilis 40

1. dno^o B. 16. por^r B; ib. per quod non B. 21. intu'ca B.
23. a'd B. 29. pos^z B. 30. 2n, pro duplia B. 33. n, pro inde.
38. ps B.

sive permanentis sive successivi quod natum est durare per tempus est signare maximum tempus per quod potest durare.

Et conformiter est dare maximam difficultatem que possunt facere quo ad diurnitatem temporis, quo ad intensionem difficultatis per instans et quo ad minucionem difficultatis per minimum tempus compositum ex ^{2bus} instantibus. Et conformiter dicitur quod est dare maximum grave quod per totidem sufficit portare.

10 Pro quo est notandum quod *portare* est equivocum. Quandoque enim sumitur generaliter pro *sustinere* vel *conservare* cuiuscunq; effectus. Et taliter princeps dicitur portare illius onera regni et deus totum mun- dum. Quandoque capitur striccius pro *prohibere grave* 15 a *descensu*; et isto modo equus portat hominem succur- sando pro declino montis, quamvis aliquando sit alior et aliquando bassior, sicut homo gradiens portat cibum. Et sic loquendo aer sufficit portare quocunque grave, quia impedit ipsum a descensu. Sed 3º modo sumitur 20 portare pro *impedire grave ne descendat*; et hoc dupli- citer, vel per se, vel cum alio ex equo concurrente, quod nec est ipsum portans nec aliquid eius. Quamvis enim ad portacionem hominis concurrat terra suppor- tando, deus eciam gubernando partes hominis, et 25 alia iuvando; et tamen dicitur homo per se portare, quando portat cum ipsis adiutoriis sine aliquo eius con- currente ex equo; ut aere existente indifferenti, et quo- cunque alio comportante quod non est illius hominis extrinsece causa portacionis sue. Unde impertinens est 30 portacioni sue quod portans moveat localiter vel allevet pondus portatum.

Ex quo patet quod abutuntur termino qui restringunt if we restrained *portare* ad *per se vehere per tempus*. Sic enim, iuxta its meaning to principium illorum non esset possibile quicquid portare movement in time, a column would no longer bear up a building.

6, 7. mi^o B. 11 gñalit^r B. 13. 14 pro illius B. 24. et cetera
pro eciam B.

3. *Durare*. The whole of the preceding paragraph, especially from *Aliter to Certum est* is not easy to understand, for me at least. I have a note on the transcript that it is not very illegible; so perhaps the text is corrupt. But I cannot see why Wyclif strives to prove at such length that all things have a limit of duration, nor how his arguments prove it.

Thus a weaker columnna et cetera quiescencia nichil portant, cum quicunque may bear a stronger one; escant. Patet etiam quod stat in potentia portare a plank or a potencius; ut lignellum vel lapillus portat fortissimum stone may bear a strong man; hominum. Ymmo tenuis aer interceptus inter duos so also of the air between two stones at the foundation of a castle. lapides planos in fundo castri, vel quantumlibet gravis 5 edificii, portat per se totum edificium suppositum; et sic sine dubio sufficit stupa pluma vel lana, ymmo omne corpus quod potest per se subici cuicunque gravi.

It does not follow, however, that any body can bear any weight, nor that all can bear equally well; for some can do so for a longer time, and thus their mode of bearing is more perfect.

Nec ex hoc sequitur quod omne portativum sit eque portativum; quia unum excedit aliud quo ad sufficien- 10 ciām diuturne portacionis, quantum ad modum portandi, erecte vel decline, alcius vel bassius; et sic de multis modis portandi. Non ergo sequitur; si [A] sufficit tantum portare sicut B; ergo A est tante potencie portative sicut B; quia quamvis quoad illud sunt pares, 15 tamen B excedit A in aliquo modo portandi, non ut simpliciter portativus. Nota tamen quod applicatio multum iuvat ad portandum; ut quantumlibet gracile uniformis continuatatis et grossicie sufficeret portare quomodounque grave erecte, cum non foret racio quare 20 pocius ad unum signum deficeret quam ad quodlibet; et ex indifferencia non potest fieri accio. Et idem contingit de tractu uniformis continuatatis et grossicie, dum sit par violencia ad quemlibet eius punctum. Et

Besides, the way of application of the weight makes much difference; a straight perpendicular rod can stand under any weight without bending, because there is no reason for it to bend on one side rather than another.

cum isto concordat experientia de velo, ad modum 25 arcuacionis oneris finiti que propter indifferenciam vel prope indifferenciam diu durant: sicut ovum inter duas manus 2^m dyametrum longitudinalem quantumlibet fortiter constrictum non frangetur propter indifferenciam deficiencie ad unum punctum pocius quam ad reli- 30 quam. Et sic contingit elevari per elongacionem brachii libre quantumlibet grave, et multa alia mirabilia facere, si quis cognosceret aptare instrumenta.

This is seen in the sails of ships, in pressing an egg lengthwise, and in experiments with a balance (or lever).

The least weight that a man cannot bear for a given time is identical with the greatest weight that he can bear for the same time; quod illud et non gravius sufficit Sor portare so here again we find a

Ymmo, signato minimo ponderoso | quod non sufficit Sor portare per tempus, sed per instans, iuxta ad- 35 versarium, ex hoc tam contingit eum levefieri, vel plus contingit, quam Sor debilitatur ex eius portacione. Se- quitur quod illud et non gravius sufficit Sor portare

13. A deest B. 16. est pro ut B. 19. g*fficie B. 21. sigm B.
26. artua* B. 26. finitis B. 27. oim B. 29. fūget B. 30. et
deficiencie B. 31. ele* B.

26. *Arcuacionis.* This sentence, of which I can make nothing, is the exact reading of the MS.

per tempus. Et ita undique tenenda est pars affirmativa, iuxta regulam Aristotelis. Et si argumentatur quod est dare gravissimum portable, cum spera terre non est portable et non est dare eius maximam partem 5 quantitativam, dicitur quod deus portat terram, primo modo loquendo, sicut et mundum qui est maximum portable; sed aliis modis loquendo non portatur, sicut nec celum, eo quod terra non potest esse inferius, nec celum esse grave. Et portacio ^{2^{bus}} posterioribus modis 10 dicta includit violenciam tam ex parte portantis quam ex parte portati. Unde, sicut inclinacio ferri ad deorsum suspenditur per attracionem adamantis, sic et naturalia, terra, et quelibet eius pars caret nisu ad inferius. Sicut ergo aqua constituta cum spera totali non est 15 gravescens, sicut patet expertis subversis in aquis, ita credo esse de partibus spere terre. Et si obicitur quod partes spere terre violente cadunt ad putoes perpetua violencia, et per consequens habent inclinacionem ad esse inferius, et ita ad omnem punctum elementi esset 20 perpetuo violencia, cum cuiuslibet partis terre violentatur aliqua pars: dicitur quod haberet in tali casu appetitum descendendi pro ordinando aere inclusu in putoe supra terram, sicut aque pro illo fine descendant ad quantumlibet ynum locum. Existente autem corpore 25 naturaliter locato in illo situ, non sic appeteret. Ideo talia inanimata, pro universi ordine servando, mirabiliter mutant appetitus suos ex regimine et inclinacione prime nature portantis omnes partes mundi in suis sitibus.

Est ergo dare maximum portable, sive sit lapis, sive 30 terra, sive aggregatum ex talibus gravibus; et valde modice potens sufficit illud portare cum iuvamine virtutis regitive universi, a qua orbis terre movetur, motus localiter, etsi pars terre levefiat vel auferatur. Nec est verum quod spera terre moveatur circulariter vel recte 35 propter partes exalatas a sole, et ipso facto conteratur; quia vel circumdatur virtute regente et supplente per aliquid intrinsecus ad oppositum, vel proporcionando unum orbem terre pure in medio mundi, cui tanquam fixo et immobili innitatur, tota terra, sicut omne mundo tum, innititur fixo; et sic partes circumferenciales terre

12. alteracionem (?) B. 14. qstn^{ta} B; ib. tōli B. 19. eū B.
28. fitbg; ti very illegible B. 32. movet B. 35. qte'ar B. 36. vel
quia B.

its central parts stat tremere et alterari propter suam porositatem, non autem illud purum. Nec est vis, sive idem numero sit eternum, sive idem in specie, corruptis individuis. Et quamvis sit mobile naturalitate prima, tamen naturalitate 2^a repugnat legi eterne quod moveatur. 5

IV. Every thing has a limit both as to possible magnitude and littleness. Ad 4^m respondetur negando assumptum, cum cuilibet speciei corporum et qualitatum corporearum sit distincta magnitudo usque ad quam inclusive potest integrum esse magnum, et parvitas usque ad quam potest tale per se existens esse parvum; et illa vocantur apud 10 philosophos minima et maxima naturalia, non quod continue sunt in tali specie, sed quod sic per se existentia in tali specie. Infinitum namque modicum homogeneum creditur esse inexistens parcialiter suo toti in quantacunque specie corporeitatis porosi. Evidencia 15 autem phisicorum est talis: natura ordinata procedit in omni eius causacione; sed non sic procederet, nisi ordinaret individuis relaciones magnitudinum et parvitudinum; igitur etc. Maior patet ex hoc quod, si natura [non] ordinata procederet in causando, tunc deus non 20 esset deus: quod est summe impossibile. Ideo maior est evidencia phisico, et una de nocioribus conclusionibus sequentibus ex *deum esse*, quod est primo notum phisico in perfectissimo genere cognoscendi, cum nichil aliud potest perfectissima noticia philosopho possibili 25 cognosci (propter quid), nisi precognito *deum esse*. Ideo noticia huius conclusionis est prima et principium tocius noticie conclusionis propter quid, que est perfectissima noticia nobis possibilis. Minor patet ex hoc quod oportet esse | debitam habitudinem inter partes B 79* maioris mundi, sicut inter partes minoris mundi; sed cum mundus maior, constans ex tota materia sua possibili, non potest maiorari, patet quod ad debitam proporcionem suarum per se parcium ad invicem et ad se ipsum, oportet ipsas proporcionari et diffiniri in 35 magnitudine et parvitate. Et per consequens sic oportet de accidentibus corporeis ipsas consequentibus. Sicut ergo incongruum esset quod oculus hominis esset in talo, cor in capite, lingua fracta ut manus, cerebrum sicut venter, aut dentes tanti ut tybie; sic periret ar- 40 monia mundi, si sol esset in polo arctico, aut in

Proof: Nature proceeds with order in all her works; this implies a definite relation between each individual and its possible size.
Not to admit order in nature is to deny God's existence, which is one of the first principles of *a priori* cognition.

As the whole world, composed of all its parts, cannot be made greater, so each of its parts must have a definite and certain size.

Order must prevail in the world as in the human body;

13. teme' B. 4. nātē B. 7, 8. dt̄t̄s B. 12. q̄ pro quod B.
16. philosophorum (?) B. 20. non deest. 24. in in B. 28. gg'oq B.

centro, aut quadrangularis figure, protensus ab uno polo ad alium, vel quodlibet astrum tantum sicut orbis, vel totus mundus esset lucidus sicut astrum. Ideo non dubium quin natura ordinat pro partibus maioris mundi, quoad numerum suarum parcium, quoad appetitus mundi vel pondera tendendi ad certos fines, ut locaciones et naturales acciones, et quoad instantias in quantitate, figura, potencia, et ceteris accidentibus, non solum pro sempiternalibus aut incorruptibilibus, sed pro naturalibus, pro terre nascentibus et suis seminibus, pro animalibus, et breviter universis conservatis quoad singula corporum accidencia naturalia.

Nec valet dicere quod iste terminantur exclusive ad suos terminos, quia nichil potest terminari ad terminum quem non potest attingere. De terminis autem corporum naturalium aliqui possunt sensu et experientia convinci, ut termini corporum eterogeniorum et seminum. Sed aliorum parvitates excedunt sensus et experiencias, ut parvitates lapidum, mineralium, elementorum, et talium simplicium. Certum tamen est quod est dare cuiuscunque talis speciei simpliciter minimum quod potest per se existere.

Contra hoc tamen argumentatur. Primo sequitur quod sit generacio subita, sicut et corruptio subita minimi numeralis; et sic, tam subita generacio quam subita corruptio cuiuscunque generis accidentis; quod est contra rationem proporcionis agentis ad passum. Racio satis patet ex hoc quod ignis, applicatus passo carente igne, subito inciperet inducere minimum naturale. Et sic ex minori proporcione velocius ageret.

Similiter, tale minimum non esset alicuius potentie active vel passive per se, cum quodlibet contrarium superdurans subito corrumperet ipsum, et per consequens cum ipsum non posset pati, non posset natura-liter agere. Cum tamen tam perfecta sint minora sicut maiora eiusdem speciei, ymmo perfectissima sunt non quante; quomodo ergo derogaret perfectio proporcionum mundi ad eius partes? quia quantumlibet perfectum foret simplex aggregatum cum aliis, tamen tantum figuratum constitueret, sicut contingit de arena.

Similiter, capto igne duplo ad minimum naturale per se existens, videtur quod contrarium subito ipsum

and if so, no doubt this order extends to everything, and consequently to the accident of quantity, both in things incorruptible and corruptible, and inanimate and animated.

It is ridiculous to say that these limits are never reached; a limit that is never reached is not a limit. In some cases we see that in fact this limit is reached; in others, as in stones and minerals &c., the smallness of their parts exceeds our powers of sense.

Arguments to the contrary.

1. If there is a minimum of size, we must also admit instantaneous combination and decomposition, which is impossible.

2. There would be a want of unity and stability in all bodies composed of such parts, since every thing possessed of a contrary activity would destroy the compound, and the whole body would be a mere aggregate, like a heap of sand.

3. If two bodies of different sorts are mixed in

unequal quantities, the greater quantity will meet with no resistance at all from the smaller. corrumperet, quia non posset inducere de contrario per se, nisi par minimo igni, ad cuius induccionem sequitur minimi ignis corruptio. Et ultra, cum accio contrariabitur propter facilitatem, ex induccione talis minimi sequitur quod subito corrumperetur totus ignis: 5 et per idem quantumlibet magnum simplex, cum continue post erit agens melius dispositum ad agendum, et subiectum ita capax sicut in principio fuit. Ymmo tunc infinitum facile esset corrumpere totaliter tale simplex, cum per divisionem in minima naturalia subite 10 cederet in continuis, et per consequens motus in nullo consequitur proporcione.

Answers. 1. We admit the possibility of instantaneous combination and decomposition in these cases; but it would take place according as circumstances allowed, just as a full bottle empties itself only when the air penetrates.

Ad primum dicitur quod minimum naturale est subito generabile et subito corruptibile, ut assumitur; et sic de accidentibus ipsum consequentibus. Nec sunt 15 tales minores partes motus successivi; sed termini motuum successivorum. Non desunt illis motibus proportiones ex quibus causantur; aliter agunt cum quibusdam circumstanciis et aliter cum aliis, propter motum et ordinem universitatis servandum: ut, plano existente 20 inmediate plano, natura non sinit unum elevari a reliquo, nisi tali modo quo corpus potest subingredi pro pleno servando. Sicut nec liquor exit fialas vel alia vasa, orificio eorum subversis, nisi aliunde aer posset B 79^b subingredi, supplendo locum liquidi exeuntis. Et sic de 25 multis exemplis naturalibus in quibus certum est naturalm occulte facere talia, vel per se, vel supplendo sufficienciam agentis sensibilis. Et alia est proporcio cum talibus paribus. Alia autem erit cum aliis paribus proporcio. 30

2. It does not follow that the minimum in size is also a

Ad 2^m negandum, cum tale potest esse minimum per se possibile in quantitate et non in virtute; quod si

2. eius B. 11. 9*tit^{is}* B. 32. v^{te} B.

19. *Circumstanciis.* I can very doubtful as to Wyclif's meaning, but it is perhaps this: Each movement of combination or of decomposition of two atoms (minimum naturale) must be instantaneous, but as a vacuum is impossible (pro pleno servando) such movements can take place only when other atoms are so situated as to fill up the vacant space which their movement occasions, and thus the combination or decomposition of the *whole* must take place in time. Wyclif two pages later (p. 166, l. 32) distinctly uses the term *atoms*, which are probably identical with his bodies that occupy *only two points in space*, as we shall see towards the end of *Logica*.

utraque insit alicui corporis, tunc ipsum est minime potencie per se possibilis, et talia minima iuxta potentiam, 2^m proporcionem debitam constitueret maximum, cuius forma superaddita servaret illa minima in tempore et operacione. Nec est verum quod inanimata omogenia minora sunt tam perfecta sicut maiora eiusdem speciei; eo quod non solum perfeccio accidentalis, sed essencialis perfeccio componitur ex suis partibus integralibus. Omne tamen individuum alicuius speciei 10 habet perfeccionem debillimam speciei ad minimum; sed unum in perfeccione individua maiori, et aliud in perfeccione individua minori, 2^m quod contingit universitati. Ideo, ex dacione perfeccions specificae, implicatur minimum naturale. Nec obest quod perfectissima sunt 15 non quanta, quia illud quod est perfeccions in uno foret imperfeccions in alio; ut habere magnos oculos est in equo bonum signum perfeccions, in homine vero signum stoliditatis. Indivisibilitas ergo est simpliciter prestancor divisibilitate, sed non potest competere 20 corporalibus; ideo non sequitur quod essent perfecciora vel eque perfecta propioribus divisibilitati. Ymmo, cum deo sit quodammodo cura de omnibus, ut dicit commentator, non sineret tam modicum corpus per se esse quod ipsum non sufficeret in operacionem, nec servaret 25 per successionem debitam speciei. Utrum autem simpliciter non quanta de corporibus homogeniis possunt integrare mixtum, et sic per se esse sine inmediacione corporum speciei sue, est dubium. Sed de arena, de partibus metalli calcinatis, de carnibus, et aliis mixtis 30 ceteris, patet quod sunt quantitative divisibles, cum aliter non servarent formam mixti. De elementis vero in mixtis est credibile quod multa non quanta sunt coniuncta. Certum tamen est quod continuacio vel adnascencia talium in mixtis est de perfeccione universi, 35 eo quod inordinacio esset, si omnia mixta essent catenata, eciam minima naturalia non adnata.

Ad 3^m dicitur quod non sequitur; sed posito igne duplo ad minimum, tam quantitate quam virtute, subducta sensibili conservacione, contingeret ipsum 40 corrumpi subito. Ideo de elementis non sunt minima

minimum in active power; but if it were so, then there would be a superadded form to bind those minima together and preserve them.

Every individual of a species has precisely the minimum of the perfection of the species; but considered individually one is more or less perfect than another. This fact of having specific perfection implies a minimum. It is quite true that size is quite wanting in the most perfect beings; but it does not therefore follow that the parts of a body are more perfect than the whole; what is perfection in one being is imperfection in another, and indivisibility is a quality that bodies cannot possess. Whether there is or is not in every homogeneous body, something indivisible that gives it unity, is a doubtful question.

3. In the given case, i. e. fire applied to a minimum of quantity, the fire itself would go out.

4, 5. $\widehat{\text{te}}\widehat{\text{ce}}\widehat{\text{de}}$? pro tempore B. 18. scollit^{is} B. 21. ppriorib^g B
34. aduasc^q B. 36. ec^p B.

And for that reason there are no such minima in the elements, but only in compounds.

Yet we admit that

division is in many cases favourable to chemical change.

Alchemists calcine the imperfect metals in order to dispose them for the reception of more perfect forms.

This, however, is great labour and does not reduce the metals to their smallest parts: for that reason, if they succeed, it is by chance.

Thus bodies that form a continuous whole vary both as to continuity and as to the forms that make them so; first the forms of the elements,

then the superadded forms of the compound, and so on; but each form is extended through a number of its subjects sufficient to make up the whole; as c. g.

if stone requires 1000 elementary parts, the form is diffused through all.

So of plants and animals, one form of plant or of animal

naturalia nec solum dupla ad minima, nisi in mixtis, ubi conservantur ex armonia commixtorum. Nec est difficile nature, gracia mixti producendi, subito producere quotilibet minima naturalia in medio contrario, sicut contingit distanter infra terram et aquam et ignem 5 et aerem a celestibus generari ad mixti constitutionem. Nec sequitur quod continuabitur subita elementi produccio, quia deficiet proporcio recta, gracia cuius sic fieret. Conceditur tamen quod per divisionem contingit mixtum celerius consumi, sicut noverunt Alchimiste, 10 calcinantes metalla imperfecta, et postmodum per mediantes, disponentes calcinata, purgata, et coagulata, ad formas perfecciores. Verum tamen sic dividere per ignem est labiosum; nec scit artifex per sublimacionem dividere talia omogenia in minima naturalia, cum excedunt 15 iudicium sensus. Ideo errant artifices in istis operibus; quod si perficiunt est prope casuale, cum execucio practica huius sciencie deficit propter materie subtilitatem.

Ex quo patet quod sunt multi gradus in continuacionibus corporum, et formarum quibus fiunt continuaciones; | et simplicia sunt fortissime continuata, et post gradatim modis suis extenduntur forme mixte, secundum quod sunt propiora elementis. Nulla tamen forma superaddita extenditur per subiectum par vel minus 25 subiectum quam sufficit corpus illius speciei per se esse; ut si ad esse lapidis requiritur adnascencia mille non quantarum de elementis, tunc quotquot sunt tales milenarii debite proportionati, sive continuitates, sive non continuitates, tot precise sunt forme lapidum et 30 per consequens lapides. Et sic, notatis numero et modo atomorum requisitorum ad esse causans plante arboris vel cuiuscunque alterius mixti, tot sunt forme et individua quo sunt tales numeri; et ad omnem punctum talis numeri est causa, forma indivisibilis, multiplicata. 35

Ideo differt extensio forme superaddite cuius pars indivisibilis est multiplicata, et extensio forme elementaris cuius pars indivisibilis est punctualiter situata. Et in prima specie sunt multi gradus; ut patet de mixtis inanimatis, de plantis, et anulosis, quorum forme 40 extenduntur modis suis. Nec est omne continuum

divisibile in infinitum, cum sit status ad numerum indivisibilium, ut postea dicetur. Verumptamen ultra hoc quod nos sufficimus cognoscere est quodlibet tale divisibile; ideo ponitur tale mixtum omogeneum, cum nulla pars eius quantitativa sensibilis sit disparis speciei a toto. Manifestum tamen est eterogeneum, cuius una pars quantitativa est ignis, alia aeris. Unde non infinitum est parvum tale mixtum, sed ad omnem eius punctum quelibet species elementi, sine earum extensione vel continuacione, ut alias dicetur. Sed, si fuerit aliquod individuum per se quantumlibet magnum, et non habuerit multas partes non communicantes, quarum quelibet componitur ex atomis sufficientibus 2^m numerum et modum principiandi tale individuum, tunc forma illius est multiplicata per totum, sicut est de hominibus et bestiis que requirunt membra simplicia, et componi in debita qualitate, quantitate et proporcione; et ex nulla tali forma cum parte sui corporis componitur adequate aliquod unum, vel qualitative; quia sic quilibet homo foret quodlibet eius pars, sicut communiter tangitur de Sor. Anima tamen inest, continue actuabit illam, sed diversimode cum fuerit pars materie, et cum fuerit completa materia ex qua adequate fiet totum animal. Si ergo tales due materie non communicantes adunatae, tunc sunt duo animalia, sicut patet de monstro habente duo corda et duo capita, cum aliis membris sensibilibus duplicatis, et cum toto residuo inferiorum membrorum ac si esset unici animalis. Tale autem aggregatum esset duo animalia communica et non per se individuum alicuius speciei; sed esset unum, continuum, animatum, vivum etc. et tamen nec substancia nec accidens etc.

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditur quod maximus homo possibilis non posset augeri per assimilacionem alimenti, stante habita materia. Sed continget ipsum tumefieri 2^m partes, sine eius maioritate; quia magnitudo corporis attenditur penes multitudinem suarum specificarum parcium non quantitivarum. Unde non sequitur ipsum maiorari, si pars eius maioraretur; nec haberet minimus homo possibilis partes superfluas. Nec est inconveniens, sed verum, quod est dare tam

life is multiplied in each atom. Each elementary form occupies only one point; each superadded one is diffused through many. In the lower beings, stones, plants, and annelida, the superadded forms are also to some degree extended. No continuous being is infinitely divisible, but far beyond all we can conceive. The forms of men and of the higher animals require all their organs to be properly disposed; and thus these forms belong indeed to each part, but only partly, and not in the same way as to the whole body.

As for monsters with double organs joined together, they are simply two animals and not one individual of any species, having no one common form. To return to the question: the biggest of all possible men could not become bigger by assimilating any food, so long as his body remained that maximum of size. But a part of his body might swell up, provided it was not a specific part.

16. *mb⁹* B.21. *coſt⁹* B; *ib. car⁹* B; *ib. inc⁹* B.

There is a first
and a last
instant of
man's being;
he would not
then be
infinitely weak,
though his soul
might actuate
his body less
intensely.

V. The
assumption of
the fifth
objection is
false; the
blessed will
enjoy Heaven
to the utmost
of their
capacity.

Grosseteste
says that they
will know all
things.

The soul has
a natural
disposition
to know all
truth, whether
complex
relations or
simple facts.

But the
intellectual
habit, or actual
exercise of this
faculty is
required, in
order to know.

And it actual
knowledge is
acquired by
contemplation
without labour,
it is called
*knowledge in
the Word*,
and implies
that the soul,
tending towards
God, is
enlightened by
Him.

It may,
however, be
denied that the
soul has a
separate

primum quam ultimum instans *esse* hominis. Nec foret talis homo infinitum debilis, cum posset tam agere quam pati. Verumtamen anima potest sub remissiori gradu disposicionis materie actuare materiam in quam est inducta, quam potest noviter induci. | Nec ideo desi- B 8o' neret homo incipiens esse propter indispositionem incepionis sue materie. Nec foret materia incipiens indispositionem in tali gradu disposicionis in quali inmediate ante hoc fuit.

Ad 5am obiectionem dicitur quod assumptum est ¹⁰ falsum, cum beati habebunt habitus 2^m ultima suarum capacitatum. Et 2^m Lincolnensem, quilibet talis cognoscet omnia, cum anima eius non fuerit mole corporis prepedita nec aliunde accidente extraneo occupata, sed primo lumine 2^m ultimum irradiata. Nec est hoc in- ¹⁵ credibilis quam quod unum punctuale lucis diffundat infinitas lineas radiosas, manifestando distincte omnia que prius confuse videbantur in humine radioso. Anima ergo habet in se naturalem disposicionem ad cognoscendum quamcunque veritatem sue noticie possibilem. ²⁰ Et illam disposicionem, habilitatem, pronitatem, vel potentiam naturalem ad complexe comprehendendum, vocant habitum aut scienciam innatam; sicut pronitatem naturalem ad incomplexe comprehendendum vocant speciem innatam vel noticiam innatam. Sed ad actua- ²⁵ liter et distincte noscendum veritatem requiritur naturalis exercitacio; et disposicio ab illa acquisita vocatur habitus intellectualis, ut habitus, sciencia intelligibilis, ars vel prudencia. Et correspondenter dicendum est de speciebus aquisitis, respectu apprehensionis incomplexe. ³⁰ Quod si quis, contemplando veritatem primam secundum omnes raciones suas causandi cognoverit sine proprio labore singulas alias veritates, tunc vocatur illa noticia apud theologos noticia in verbo, noticia matutina vel meridiana, noticia facialis vel intuitiva clara. ³⁵ Et illa non est res absoluta, sed ponit animam non extranea impeditam, tendendo in deum, inclinari ab ipso ad taliter clare noscendum huiusmodi veritates.

Utrum autem anima habeat tot habitus correspondentes, dubitatur a multis. Et videtur quod non, tum ⁴⁰ quia tunc infinitum perficeretur per infinitos habitus,

14. ¹⁵ pedita B; ib. ut pro nec B.

35. *Facialis*. Face to face. "Now we see as in a glass, darkly."

tum quia obiectum primum sufficit ad illam noticiam actualem, sine habitu inclinante. Videtur tamen michi quod ex illis fortibus impressionibus causantur 2^m ultimum tam species quam habitus, quorum primum in-
 5 clinat ad apprehensionem incomplexam, et 2^m ad complexam; sic quod anima per impossibile impedita ab impressione felici, adhuc posset recolere de actibus preteritis et per consequens de veritatibus obiectis illis actibus. Et pronitatem derelictam voco speciem vel
 10 habitum; quia, cum anima nunquam ociabitur a talibus actibus, ideo communiter ponitur quod non intelligeret in habitu. Omnem ergo huiusmodi actualem apprehensionem consequitur vel precedit disposicio vel habitus inclinans ad talem actum, et per consequens species.
 15 Actus autem est prius causacione quam species vel habitus ab illo generatus; sed habitus est prius quo ad consequenciam, et talis habitus intellectivus vocatur apud theologos lumen glorie; et habitus voluntatis vocatur caritas. Nec potest deus sine talibus beatificare
 20 hominem, sicut nec potest sine actu.

Unde frivoli sunt casus, quibus ponitur deum supplere vicem speciei vel habitus sine posicione talium, quia claudit contradiccionem quod sic faciat. Sed magis frivolum est credere quod talia possunt per se esse,
 25 sicut aliqui arguunt de disposicione, causata in corpore circumducto. Nec sequitur deum correspondenter qualificari, quia non potest aswefaccionne disponi. Nec sequitur quod anima sit in infinitum perfecta accidentaliter propter infinitatem talium accidencium, sicut nec subiectum | est infinitum perfectum propter infinitos modos et infinitas relaciones, vel talia accidencia; nec est subiectum proportionaliter perfeccius, ut plures tales qualitates habet, sicut infinite partes subiecti perficiunt ipsum omnes equaliter: et tamen ex illis resultat una perfeccio
 35 finita, sicut deus scit ex quot partibus tale componitur.

Alia ergo est perfeccio essencialis quam claudit contradictionem augeri vel minui, quia, si posset, esset accidentalis et non essencialis subiecto; et alia est perfeccio accidentalis, sive ex substanciis sive ex acci-
 40 dentibus resultans; et sicut deus scit numerum principium talum, ita scit gradum perfectionis et quante unus numerus dictus a nobis infinitus excedit alium

disposition for each object of cognition; these being infinite, the dispositions would be so too.

Possibly the powerful impression of God's being causes both the images and the dispositions towards them; so that if the Saints could be without the actual sight of God, they would still enjoy its remembrance.

This tendency taken by itself, I call the cognitive image or disposition. It is the light of glory in the intelligence and charity in the will; both are necessary.

It would be self-contradictory to suppose cases in which God dispenses with these dispositions; or to fancy that they can exist by themselves. It does not follow that the soul is accidentally infinite; a substance may be qualified by infinite modes without being infinite on that account.

There are two sorts of perfection; one essential, that can in no wise increase or diminish; the other accidental, resulting from

42. datus *above* dictus B.

different causes, of which God knows the number, and the degree of perfection they give.
 No being is infinitely perfected in the sense of good, God alone is infinitely perfect.

numerum finitum nobis vel infinitum. Et per consequens scit quante beatus est accidentaliter perfeccior non beato. Nichil enim est infinite perfectum, nisi forte intelligatur ille terminus *perfectum* nominaliter pro bono et non participialiter pro plene perfecto. Sic autem 5 deus dicitur infinite perfectus, hoc est, bonus. Et ex istis patet quod impossibile est aliquid esse in proporcione rationali perfeccius quam prius; quia vel oportet perfeccionem essentialem crescere, vel perfeccionem accidentalem parificari perfeccioni essenciali; quorum 10 utrumque est impossibile. Nec sequitur: *Sor beatus est infinitum perfeccior accidentaliter quam Plato est accidentaliter: ergo, Sor, est infinitum accidentaliter perfectus.*

Sicut non sequitur: *virtus est infinitum melior dominio coactivo: ergo, illa virtus est infinitum bona.* Quando- 15 cunque ergo dicitur substanciali esse ita perfectam, intelligitur de totali perfeccione aggregata ex substanciali et accidentalii; et ita de perfeccione accidentalii vel perfeccione generis accidentis, semper intelligitur de totali huiusmodi perfeccione. Et hinc non sequitur quod 20 ultimate felices sunt infinitum perfecciores nobis, quamvis infinitum perfeccius cognoscunt et delectantur quam nos.

Though the blessed in Heaven may have infinitely more both of knowledge and of happiness, they are not infinitely more perfect than we.

Two senses to A exceeds B infinitely; one, as the number of points in a surface and in a line, i. e. infinitely to us, but absolutely capable of equality; the other implies no equality possible. Thus, though a being is twice as perfect in science (or any accident) as another, we cannot conclude that it is twice as perfect simply.

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Nota tamen quod aliud dicitur infinitum excedere aliud quoad nos, aliquando cum aliqua deo finita parificarent unum alteri; ut patet de numero punctorum 25 superficie, et numero punctorum linee. Et aliqua non sic; ut comparando virtutes fortitudini, felicitatem delectacioni sensuali, noticiam intellectivam sensacioni; et sic de aliis. Unde non sequitur: *A est in duplo perfeccius accidentaliter quam B: ergo est in duplo perfeccius B.* 30 Nec sequitur: *A est in duplo perfeccius quo ad scienciam, vel aliud genus accidentis, quam B; ergo, A est in duplo perfeccius quam B;* quia non est possibile subiectum esse tam perfectum accidentaliter quam perfectum est simpliciter, aut econtra. Nec sequitur: *ille 35 due intellecciones perficiunt in duplo plus subiectum quam faceret altera illarum per se: ergo, subiectum per illas est in duplo perfeccius quam fuit, quando solum unam habuit.* Sed bene sequitur quod in duplo perfeccius intelligit et est in duplo perfeccius intelligens per illas 40 quam per alteram solam intellexit.

Sunt autem multa dubia contingencia hanc materiam; utputa si una sit perfeccio composita ex accidental i et essenciali, aut una accidentalis perfeccio composita ex perfeccionibus diversorum generum aut diversarum spe-
cierum. Et videtur quod sic, quia aliter nichil possit crescere in perfeccione. Vel aliter; substancia posset esse perfeccior quam prius fuit, sine hoc quod habeat maiorem perfeccionem quam prius habuit. Ideo videtur esse una perfeccio unitate aggregacionis vel unitate subiecti; et illa crescit per adventum accidentalis perfeccions, salva perfeccione priori.

B 81^b 2º. Videtur quod omne accidens perficit subiectum, quia privaciones, ut peccata morum et nature, faciunt substanciam iuste pati. Et in hoc, pulcrificant universum, et per idem imperfeccio perficit subiectum efficienter et non formaliter, cum solum perfeccio perficit subiectum formaliter.

3º. Videtur quod omne accidens subiecti facit ipsum tam perfectum sicut aliiquid; quia aliter esset quelibet substancia corporea infinitum modice perfecta et per consequens quelibet eius perfecta cuilibet. Nec aliud posset esse minus perfectum quam est, et per idem omne quantum esset infinitum parvum vel remissum. Sicut ergo musca contrahit navem, sic quantitas perficit subiectum ad gradum totalis perfeccions. Sed precise tante perficit quam perfectum accidens ipsum est, loquendo de perfeccione quam ipsum per se facit, et non de perfeccione quam ipsum conficit. Unde non sequitur; *sub illo gradu accidens perficit subiectum: ergo, sub illo gradu subiectum perficitur*, cum aliud sit perficere et aliud perfici. Et ad antiquas reduplicativas quibus solet concedi quod subiectum, *ut quantum*, est sic perfectum, et, *ut sciens*, est perfeccius, dicendum quod intelligende sunt de quantitate et sciencia quod ille sunt sic perfecte, et illa perfeccio attribuitur subiecto; quia nullam aliam essenciam ponit tale accidentis.

Nota tamen quod aliquod dicitur per se, excludendo actualiem inherenciam, et aliud, excludendo parcialem inexistenciam; quomodo completa accidentia sunt per se, cum non sunt partes aliquorum sue speciei. Unde

Several minor points.

1. There is one single perfection consisting of accident and substance, and one likewise consisting of the different sorts of accident.

2. Every accident renders its subject more perfect; for every sin makes the sinner suffer, thus rendering the universe more perfect;

3. accident gives a real quidditative perfection; if not, bodies would have very little perfection indeed.

Quantity helps towards perfecting substance, as a ship helps in dragging a ship; and every accident aids in so far as it is perfect itself.

19. aliquod B. 23. musca B; ib. nāne B.

Remark that by itself may either mean the negation of 'in another', or of 'part of another'.

37, 38. *Inherenciam . . . parcialem inexistenciam*. The former word is used by Scholastics to denote an accident as distinguished from a substance; the latter to denote a part as different from its whole.

The whole of a nota quod dupliciter dicitur bonitas reliqua maior; vel given accident in the latter sense by itself. Again, a thing is called better than another either because it has a superior degree of goodness by itself, or belonging to a subject. In the second sense many accidents are superior even to reasonable substances. Quantity, however, and material accidents cannot be thus superior.

qui sic perfectum per se habet bonitatem cui reliquum non habet per se parem vel excedentem; et illo modo quelibet substancia infinitum excedet quodlibet accidens in perfeccione; 2º modo dicitur unum participative reliquo perfeccius; et illo modo virtutes, et felicitates, et multa alia accidencia, nedum excederent substancias inanimatas et vegetabilia et irrationabilia, sed homines; ut perfeccius et melius est hominem esse virtuosum vel felicem (quod est virtus vel felicitas) quam est 10 habere quotlibet divicias; ymmo quam est hominem esse absolute, cum preexigit esse hominem, et superaddit finem eius perfectum. Ista autem perfeccio vocatur participativa vel relativa, quia nichil valeret nisi, communicando cum perfeccione substancie, suppperadderet 15 bonum modum, qui non potest per se esse, nec uniri vel parificari perfeccioni per se. Sed quantitas et alia accidencia corporea non sunt sic perfecta, quia tunc subiectum, ex hoc quod sic quantum vel accidentatum, esset sic perfectum; et per consequens omne sic acci- 20 dentatum est sic perfectum. Omnis ergo essencialis perfeccio accidentis est per accidentalem perfeccionem substancie, vel pars talis perfeccionis.

Thus it may be maintained that a blessed soul has at the same time infinite acts, relative to the infinite objects it knows, all clearly seen in the First Sight. Even now the fact of sight proves that we have an infinite multitude of acts; we do not, it is true, see all distinctly; but

God can strengthen our mental vision.

All other visions merely follow upon the sight of God.

Unde videtur michi probabile quod aliquis ultimate felix habeat infinitos actus, terminatos ad veritates 25 cognitas, qui omnes causantur et clarificantur a prima luce, in qua felix clare videt omnia que ego uno actu transeunte confuse. Possible enim est animam simul habere infinitos actus; ut patet ex intuacione visibilis; et quamvis nunc non sufficio in tot obiecta simul di- 30 stincte tendere, facile tamen est illi luci prime disponere animam meam ut distincte in tot tendat. Et tunc in ipsa et per ipsam viderem omnia, et ab ipsa terminaretur omnis talis visio mea; sed non obiective ad ipsam, cum idem sit obiectum sic terminare visionem, 35 et illud obiectum esse illa visione visum. Ad visionem ergo felicem qua videtur deus terminans illam obiective consequuntur omnes alie visiones quas et ipse terminat ad obiecta visa. Visiones vero in proprio genere possunt excidere, stante felicitate, | per desinacione veritatum intuitarum, et non aliter, sic quod anima langueat desiderando videre ignotum; et per consequens non esset

B 82*

plene felix. Ideo ponitur beatitudo essencialiter consistere in visione et amore summe boni; et alie visiones vel alia bona contingencia ponuntur ipsam concomitari accidentaliter, que vocantur quandoque beatitudines accidentales, intensibiles et remissibiles. Quotquot ergo veritates beatus voluerit recolere, tot promptitatem vel habitus habet quot sunt ad prompte cognoscendum illas veritates; et, cum omnem veritatem potest cognoscere, sicut et homo hic, verisimiliter omnem veritatem distincte cognoscit in actu vel habitu; ut cognoscendo deum clare sub ratione qua creatus est A rei, cognosco causabilitatem A rei, et A rem, tam in verbo quam in ratione ydeali. Et sic, quotquot cogniciones consecuntur cognitionem claram dei, quam non stat esse sine illis, nec illas sine illa, cum noticia dei et eius passionum de necessitate inducit in noticias ydearum et exemplatorum.

Utrum autem oportet felices omnes sic habere tot actus, ego ignoro, sed credo me scire quod omnes sic felices necessario clare intuuntur deum, et tot alias veritates quot desiderant videre, sive uno actu sive distinctis actibus, et quot erunt gradus capacitatum animarum, sicut et claritatum noticiarum, quibus omnia erunt cognita. Ideo non sequitur: *A perfecte et clare cognoscit omnia: ergo, ita perfecte sicut deus.* Nec sequitur: *ista sunt individua eiusdem speciei: ergo eque capacia et eque activa.* Sed ille qui limitavit animas ad diversimode appetendum uniri corporibus, et ordinavit substantias individuales multiplicatas diversarum specierum de facili potest ordinare animas eiusdem speciei diversarum capacitatum. Et forte homo, discendo et amando deum, potest augere capacitatem suam, sed non obediencialem potentiam recipiendi felicitatem. Semper tamen est dare maximum ad quod terminatur, sive universale sive singulare, in quacunque denominacione. Unde felix taliter sciens omnia nichil disceret, sicut nec aliquid ignoraret, cum ad generacionem veritatis desineret scire eius futurionem, et inciperet scire eius esse vel pretericionem; et ita semper, si homo incipiat scire unum, desinit scire reliquum, et econtra; vel si remisse, beatus multa ignorat que sunt impertinencia ad sui beatitudinem, ut patet de conclusionibus doctrinalibus et peccaminosis operationibus, tunc non desinat

The blessed can lose sight of a truth only in so far as that truth itself ceases to be, otherwise they would desire it and not be fully happy. The essence of beatitude is the sight of God; all the rest is accidental, and may be greater or less. The clear cognition of God in all His relations probably implies the distinct sight of all in Him.

Whether it be so as a fact, I know not, but only that the blessed see God, and in Him all that they can desire to see. Knowledge of all would, therefore, make a man as perfect as God. God can easily give different degrees of capacity to different souls. Man can also perhaps increase his capacity up to a certain point; but that point is the maximum. The blessed thus, if ignorant of anything, are yet perfectly happy.

9. visibiliter B. 16. pa^{ro}nū B. 43. p^{ro}c^{on}e oponib^g B.

However, this secondary knowledge may proceed not from the sight of God, but from previously known truths; and such may also be the knowledge of the blessed. illa cognoscere, et potest tantum discere quod vel ignorat vel si, aliqua ignorando, fuit felix, tantum sciens sicut potest; tunc huiusmodi aquirendo noticiam unius deperdit noticiam alterius. Potest tamen esse quod adquirat illam noticiam sine hoc quod deperdat reliquam,⁵ sicut communiter sophisticantur in materia de fortitudine solius mulieris derelicta de specie humana impregnata. Semper ergo felix habet noticiam claram deo; et replecio capacitatis sue impedit ipsum in casu ad discendum; quod non est proprie impedire. Non ¹⁰ tamen est possibile quicquid discere vel scire, nisi discatur vel sciatur in verbo vel per verbum. Sed si noticia fuerit imperfecta, et per mociones veritatum scientiarum ignorato verbo, tunc vocatur noticia vespertina rerum in proprio genere. Et forte habitus tales ad-¹⁵ quisitos habebunt ultimate felices sicut et noticias ab illis causatas.

Leaving this point, we say that there is a limit to the size of a pile that can be made by men, and to which no addition can be made without diminution on another part. As its building progressed, the powers of the human race would be exhausted.

Sed relinquendo illa theologis, | conceditur quod est dare maximum cumulum possibilem fieri ab hominibus; quo dato, repugnat quod cumuletur ulterius, nisi ali-²⁰ unde fiat diminucio. Nec est hoc incredibile filosopho, quia antequam fierit talis turris, valde debilitaretur tota multitudo hominum qui forent habiles ad agendum opus. Ita quod, vel propter inpotenciam illorum, vel propter carenciam vel indispositionem materie, vel ²⁵ propter vetacionem virtutis regitive universi non sufficienter ulterius, ymmo data minima quantitate sub qua non potest esse talis cumulus. Iuxta opinantes contrarium tam incredibile esset plebeo, postquam cumulus non deficeret nisi per ^{4^{am}} pedis a tali quantitate, quod ³⁰ omnes homines mundi non sufficerent addere ille quantitati ^{4^{am}} pedis.

Nature thus imposes a limit to men both in respect and as regards curious instruments,

Certum ergo est quod est dare quantum regula nature sinit homines inordinate vagari in talibus edificiis et curiositatibus instrumentorum, indumentorum, vel ³⁵

6, 7. *fortine* B. 10. *ad discendum* B. 13. *mocoes* B. 22. *tris* B.
27. *gute* B.

6, 7. *De fortitudine*. This example occurs at more length in other works. Mediaeval philosophers, debating the question whether, if the whole human race perished, except one woman in a state of pregnancy, she could possibly die or miscarry, decided it negatively, because she would be necessary for the existence of the species.

quorumcunque aliorum artificiorum. Immo quantum sinerentur inordinate procedere in destruccionem politie, superhabundanter augendo agricolas, vel bellatores, vel artifices, vel mercantes, vel qualescunque ritus ecclesiasticos: et sic de bonis que sibi accumulant. Sicut enim ex ordinacione politica nature prime universum est dispositum in numero, in qualitate et quantitate ac posizione suarum parcium, ita non dubium quin deberet esse in arte regendi policias imitante naturam; 10 et cum pars policie tantum hodie excedunt in multis nominatorum, verisimile est quod aliqua pars policie cito pacietur eclipsim; ymmo, cum homo sit quodammodo dominus et finis aliorum que sunt in mundo, iusticia exigit quod illa que homini subserviunt sint 15 proporcionata suo fini et dominio, cum a fine impidente necessitatem rebus, limitantur modi mediorum ad finem. Et hinc credo homines proporcionabiliter puniri ad sua vicia. Relinquendo ergo illa moralibus conceditur quod est dare maximam penam vel indispositionem 20 quam quis potest subire, tam quoad intensionem quam quoad extensionem vel monstracionem.

Ad 6^{am} obiectionem conceditur quod est dare maximum et minimum quod quecunque data virtus visiva sufficit videre. Nota tamen quod duplex est visio, scilicet 25 licet sensitiva et intellectiva; et utraque duplex, scilicet distincta et confusa. Distincta, qua excluditur a vidente ignorancia primo visi; ut cognoscendo per visum quod hoc sensibile est video illud distincte. Sed visio confusa non excludit ignoranciam primo visi illa visione; 30 ut, videndo a remotis silvam vel acervum, video confusa multa individua illius multitudinis, que tamen B 83^a ignoro; ita quod, quesito | a me utrum sint, dicerem quod nescirem, nisi forte in universalis. Et in utroque membro visionis sunt quotlibet gradus; utrumque eciam 35 membrum subdividitur in 3^a; ut aliqua est visio recta, aliqua reflexa, ut visio ad specula, et 3^{cia} est visio refracta, ut visio per media diversarum dyaphaneitatum. De visione eciam intellectuali sunt proporcionabiles distincciones.

garments,
numerous
husbandmen,
soldiers,
artisans,
merchants, or
ecclesiastic
rites and
possessions.
Government
ought to
imitate nature
in these things.
And as men
are punished
proportionately
as they are
wicked, I
believe there is
a limit to the
greatest
punishment
of all.

VI. There is a maximum and a minimum that the visual faculty can see; but both intellectual and bodily sight are either distinct or confused. Confused sight does not exclude ignorance.

There are infinite shades dividing these two extremes; and each of them belongs to direct, or reflected, or refracted sight, physical or intellectual.

2. *indestruicōn* B. 4. *agri col fices* B. 21. *mra^o* B. 23. *visiva in marg.*

5. *Ecclesiasticos . . . accumulant.* Note this.

The minimum of intellectual sight is the union of two mathematical points.
There is also a minimum of bodily vision; for nothing can be seen confusedly that could not be seen distinctly; thus the composition of quantity out of mere points could not be seen; for this minimum must be the basis of a pyramid whose apex is in the eye.

Some details about the eye.

i. The eight varying influences: light, distance of the object, its position, its size, its density, its shape, the transparency of the medium and the sanitary state of the eye, are all factors in the act of vision.

Compositum ergo ex duobus non quantis est minimum quod potest intellectualiter videri. Est autem videre in communi apprehendere visibile immediate virtute visiva; et sic est dare minimum visibile sensu exteriori, ut superficiale circulare. Et probabiliter potest dici quod nichil videtur aliqua virtute confuse, nisi quod a virtute talis speciei sufficit videri distincte; et sic visus corporalis non potest videre non quantum, nec compositum adequate ex non quantis nobis finitis; sed minimum sic visibile videtur 2^m pyramidem radialem, cuius basis est in viso et conus in centro oculi. Et consequenter ponendum est quod est dare remissimum gradum cuiuscunq[ue] 8^{to} circumstanciarum ad visionem concurrencium, et optimum gradum possibilem, et per consequens remississimum gradum confuse vel 15 distincte videndi, qui gradus est subito generabilis: et patet responsio ad 6^{am}.

Nota tamen quod nec organum nec sensus videt, sed animal organo et virtute, nisi forte *videre* sit equivocum ad recipere speciem visibilis et ad apprehendere virtute 20 visiva dandum visibile. Sed quia visio corporalis est medium ad visionem ymaginativam et intellectualem, necnon et subtilior inter alias sensaciones ac propinquior intellectui, ideo perstringam aliquas paucas notas in ista materia. 25

Primo dico quod ad visionem respondent octo circumstanciae, 2^m quarum variacionem variantur gradus visionum et erroris in visione contingencium. Circumstantie vero sunt iste: lux, distanca, situs oppositionis, magnitudo visibilis, densitas visibilis, figura visibilis, 30 dyaphaneitas medii, tempus conveniens, et sanitas oculi. Cuiuslibet autem istorum est dare gradum summe conveniente ad visionem, et gradum minime conveniente ad visionem, et 2^m variacionem graduum in istis variantur gradus apparenciarum visibilium. 35

2^o nota quod 20 sunt sensibilia communia; ut, remocio, magnitudo, situs, corporeitas, figura, contiguitas, separacio, numerus, motus, quies, asperitas, levitas, dyaphaneitas, densitas, umbra, obscuritas, pulcritudo, deformitas, consimilitudo, et diversitas. Omnia 40

2. intbar (?) B. 9. fit^r B. 11. coug B. 13. ccufuciar^r B.
23. subtilior^r B. 26, 27. ccūfatiæ B. 37, 38. ḡtitas B.

autem istorum visiones presupponunt visionem lucis vel coloris; et aliqua istorum subtilius videntur et aliqua difficilius; aliqua subito et aliqua successive, aliqua con-
 B 83^b fuse et aliqua distincte. | Ad omnia tamen ista con-
 5 currit virtus distinctiva vel sensus communis, eliciens diversos actus de istis, 2^m modum presentandi speciei per se sensibilis sine specie illorum acta per medium.

Tercio, nota compositionem oculi ex tribus humoribus; scilicet, ex humore crystallino vel glaciali, ex 10 humore vitreo, et ex humore albugineo. Primus humor est sperula in medio oculi constituta, ad subiectandum virtutem visivam, habens in anteriori parte compressio-
 15 nem superficialem ad modum lenticule. 2^s humor est inter primum et cerebrum, subrubens in propinquā dispoſitione, ut ex illo fiat humor glacialis. Sed 3^s hu-
 20 mor est quasi sex primi in anteriori parte oculi, con-
 ſtituens cum vitreo quasi unam speram continuenter primum humorem. Duo ergo nervi exeunt a lateribus exterioris ventriculi cerebri directe ad ambos oculos,
 25 qui sunt primum par nervorum concavi pleni spiritibus, et statim canallitant se eversim, exeundo piam matrem, hoc est pelliculam tenuem involventem cerebrum contextam ex venis et arteriis deferentibus a corde vitam et spiritum, et ab eppate nutrimentum. Et per illos nervos
 30 vocatos opticos deferentur species ad intra. Ex optico-
 rum ergo substancia oritur in oculo tela aranea vel retina 2^m unam eius partem, separans humorem 1^m a 2^o, et 2^m aliam centuram utrosque primos humores, dividendo illos a 3^o. Deinde nervi predicti, antequam
 35 subintrant duram matrem, coniunguntur, constituentes unum nervum concavum; deinde obviant dure matri et accipientes ab ea pellem unam exeunt craneum. Ex substancia ergo pie matris accipiunt nervi optici tenuem pelliculam ex qua producitur in oculo 2^s tunica que
 40 vocatur uvea vel etina, circumdans tercium humorem, sed cum nigra, viridi vel glauca, perforata rotunde ad anterius, ut per pupillam species ingrediantur. Sed de

have each a limit favourable and unfavourable to this act.

There are 20 common objects of sensation perceived by sight, by means of colour, its primary object, some more, some less easily: but the inferior sense is needed to distinguish them.

Anatomical description of the different parts of the eye;

of the crystalline lens, of the vitreous and the aqueous humours, of the optic nerves, that cross each other, traverse the pia mater, and widen out into the retina which separates the crystalline from the vitreous and both from the aqueous humour.

They take from the pia mater a their pellicle which, in the eye, becomes the iris,

and from the dura mater

21. canallant B. 28. cetur; B. 35. z¹na B.

5. *Sensus communis*. This is the sense which, according to medieval philosophers, receives the impressions of the different external senses, and also those feelings that arise within the body.
 21. *Canallant*. Perhaps a mistake for *cancellant* (see pag. 180, l. 27) but I understand one word as little as the other; unless *cancellare* means "to cross".

a membrane
that thickens
into the cornea.
The whole is
covered with
a membrane
called the
conjunctive.
All this is
wonderfully
contrived by
nature to
enable us to
see.

Location of
different
sensitive
faculties in the
brain: The
interior sense
resides in the
first lobe of
the first
ventricle; the
imaginative in
the 2nd; the
estimative,
together with
fancy, is in the
middle
ventricle; the
memorative
and the motive
faculty is in
the last (the
cerebellum?).

substancia dure matris producitur in oculo tunica,
vocata cornea sive sclerotica, que est alba, operiens
foramen uvee ad anterius. De substancia autem panni-
culi involventis craneum, cui per commissuras alligatur
dura mater immediate intra craneum procedit 4^a tunica, 5
vocata coniunctiva vel consolidativa, que continuatur
cum cornea, constituens orbem oculi; et ista est cornea
interius alligata in concavitate ossis, vocati orbita oculi.
Complexiones autem, qualitates, quiditates, et posiciones
istarum parciuum oculi sagacissime sunt ingeniate a 10
natura pro visione complenda.

4º nota | quod sensus communis viget in prima parte B 84º
primi ventriculi cerebri, sicut ymaginativa in 2^a, et
correspondenter estimativa et fantastica in medio ven-
triculo, et in postremo ventriculo memorativa et virtus 15
2^m locum motiva. Et sunt omnes recte virtutes multi-
plicate per sua organa, sicut visiva virtus multiplicatur
per crystalloidem et locum concursus opticorum. Visiva
ergo virtute elicitur actus videndi, que non est mole
magnus, sicut taccio, sed obiective magnus, habens 20
quotlibet partes 2^m differenciam basium pyramidis ra-
dialis, et tactus ille est quodammodo inextensus in
illo visu, sicut et virtus visiva. Formaliter tamen et
subiective solum est actus vel virtus in vidente. Et hinc
posuerunt antiqui visionem fieri per extramissionem 25
virtutis, et animam vel hominem esse quodammodo
cum illo cui afficitur. Et defectus noticie terminorum in
tali materia, et defectus admissionis modi loquendi, facit
multas dissensiones ab opinionibus antiquorum. Cer-
tum tamen est quod visio est de genere actionis, de 30
pendens essencialiter a viso et a parcialibus visionibus
dependentibus a suis obiectis ad que terminantur. Nec
terminarentur ad illa, ut ad suas causas, nisi aliqualiter
essent in illis. Ymmo, in medio est actus videndi, ubi
non est terminative; sicut patet quando, propter 35

8. of. B. 9. \tilde{q}^{tes} \tilde{q}^{ptos} B. 22. $\widehat{\text{icxndi}}$ B.

14, 15. *Estimativa - memorativa.* These must not be confounded with judgment and memory; the former belong to man in common with the more perfect animals, and exclude any idea of abstractive cognition. 16. If by *postremo ventriculo*, Wyyclif really means the cerebellum, then he is in singular agreement with recent physiological experiments as regards the motive faculty. The cerebellum has certainly a good deal to do with the motor apparatus.

dislocacionem oculi vel aliam rationem, de uno continuo
apparet quod sint duo distanca localiter. Vanum tamen
est credere quod actus tales possunt per se esse vel
conservari sine obiecto; et sic de multis que loquentes
5 nostre legis fabulantur.

Omnis ergo actus anime ponit formaliter animam
agere, et imprimet dispositionem vel habitum; et sic
est in alteracione, et arguit animam mobilem. Ymmo,
habita prima noticia primi veri 2^m intellectum et plene
10 amore 2^m voluntatem et scienciam perpetuo sic ma-
nendi cum summa dotacione corporis et infringibili sub-
ordinacione completarum virium inferiorum ad supe-
riores, resultat naturaliter felicitas, que est qualitas
inseparabilis. Et iste dispositions prime quandoque
15 vocantur partes beatitudinis; et beatitudo vocatur aggre-
gacio omnium istorum bonorum. Quandoque vero
materialiter loquendo, unum istorum vel multa vocan-
tur beatitudo particularis. Actus ergo denominat sub-
iectum quale, sed non formaliter.

20 Per istas 4^{or} notas posset naturalis dare causas om-
nium erronearum apparitionum in visione; utputa
quare uritur nebula a longinquu et non de prope;
quare latent anguli et supereminencie visibiles a lon-
ginquu; quare propter velocem giracionem tictionis
25 appareat cudentem circulum in noctibus causari, et
quare de quiescentibus appetet quod moveantur, et
econtra. Et sic de multis aliis. Dubia tamen copiose
B 84^b pulcerrima circumstant ista dicta: | utputa, quomodo
distanca vel magnitudo visibilis est pertinens visioni,
30 cum per media diversarum dyaphaneitatum contingit
quantumcunque parvum ad quantumlibet magnum di-
stanciam apparere quantumlibet magnum distincta vi-
sione. Ymmo, homo videt acervum et tenebram, sicut
audit silencium infinitum, si esset: ubi non videtur
35 virtutem egredi, cum non percipitur talis privacionis
distanca. Ymmo, cum eadem visio non potest esse in
diversis locis, hic confusa et ibi distincta (et sic de
quotlibet gradibus) videtur quod visio sit extensa per
medium habens in aere partem confusam, sicut et in
40 tenebra per quam videtur visible, et in obiecto partes
dispariter distinctas. Aliter enim esset quelibet anima

Every act of
the mind
supposes a
new state
of mental
movement.

And when this
act is an act of
perfect
knowledge
and love of
God with the
certitude of
never changing,
it is a state of
bliss, the
necessary
dispositions to
which are
called parts of
bliss, or
particular bliss.

The preceding
observations
enable the
natural
philosopher to
explain the
cause of all
errors in sight:
the red clouds
of sunset, the
invisibility of
angles and the
conspicuous-
ness of heights
at a distance,
and why a
brand whirled
round seems a
circle; also,
why motionless
things seem to
move and
vice versa.

Some very
interesting
questions are
e. g. in what
way distance
affects the
sight;
how we can
see darkness,
whether sight
is not
extended in the
object and in
the intervening
air,
whether, as a
body at the
greatest

5. nre B. 8. ar^t B. 9. pleno B. 10. sc̄ent³ B. 22. v'r^r B.
23. an^u B; ib. visi^l B. 39. a'e B.

possible distance would appear as a point, the slightest change for the worse in the conditions would render it invisible; whether a piercing sight cannot see what a weak sight can; whether there is a limit to human merit; whether our eyes deceive us as to the position of objects.

Waiving all these questions, we may say that the perpendicular ray penetrates to the centre of the nerve common to both eyes; the others are refracted in the same direction, so as to coincide with the perpendicular ray; if they did not, they would cross each other in the centre of the eye, and form an inverted image.

There are thus four pyramids of rays; two based on the object and with their apices in the centre of each eye; and two based on the surface of the vitreous humour, with their apices

ubique, cum omnia intelligit. Videtur eciam quod remocio facit ad noticiam; quia, posito B visibili in fine maxime distancie possibilis videri, cum aliis optimis circumstanciis videndi, videtur quod ibi apparel indisibile; et quantumcunque modica elongacio vel debilitas circumstancie perciperetur a visu, cum tamen non a maxime proporcionato propinquō perciperetur quodlibet tale crementum vel decrementum. Et idem videtur de acie visus penetrantis et non videntis medium quod visus debilior satis videt. Videtur eciam quod homo possit tantum mereri hic, quod non possit promereri ulterius. Et sic terminaretur potentia dei respectu cuiuscunque effectus ad maximum in quod posset; cum homo in ultimo instanti sue promeracionis non posset ulterius convalescere merendo. Videtur eciam quod continue erratur, videndo propter partes oculi diversarum dyaphaneitatum ad quas oportet radios visibilis, frangi.

Sed dimissis illis, gracia brevitatis, dicitur quod perpendicularis, que est axis pyramidis radialis, penetrat refracte usque ad centrum nervi communis; et alii radii obliqui franguntur declinantes a perpendiculari propter humorum vitreum, quia est maioris dyaphaneitatis quam glacialis; et cum species visibilis in concavitate sit quasi conformis dyaphaneitatis, multiplicat species 2^m congruam posicionem, usque ad nervum communem. Aliter enim cancellarent se in centro, et eversim intendentes, signarent posiciones eversas sensibiles. Patet ergo quod sunt 4^{or} pyramidis per quas visio compleetur, quarum duo bassantur in visibili et conantur in centris oculorum, et due alie bassantur in anteriori superficie vitrei et conantur in centro nervi communis, ratione cuius concursus appetit una res, non obstantibus ambobus oculis. Ibi enim fit individuum 2^m posicionem et figuram duarum proximarum pyramidum. Et conformes sunt pyramidis virtutes egredientes ab oculo, que vocantur pyramidis visuales; et punctus, ubi concurrunt in basi visibili, vocatur | punctus coniunctionis et axis communis vocatur linea recta protracta a centro communis nervi, stans perpendiculariter, connectens centra foraminum; et quando punctus coniunctionis est in axe communi, tunc est optima opposicio

B 85

possibilis. Et semper per axem pyramidis radialis fit joining at the
distinccior visio, et indistinccior ut, cum paribus, radius common nerve;
est ab illa axe remocior. Unde, ad iudicandum uni- the pyramids
formitatem rei, oportet punctum coniunctionis rotari of visual force
5 super superficiem visam; quia videtur quod axis pyra- being similar to
midis radialis, quantumcunque debilis, penetrans re- the former.
fracte, sit forcior ad certificandum quam radius obli- Sight is more
quus, quantumlibet fortis. or less distinct
according as the ray is more or less in the direction of the visual axis.

Si autem delectat videre particulariter istam materiam,
10 notetur Alacen et liber tercius Vitulonis etc.

7. *Alacen* is Alhazen, an Arab philosopher; *Vitulonis* is
Vitellion (Ciolek), a Pole, who lived in Cracow in the XIIIth cen-
tury. His works were printed at Basle in 1572.

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.

This chapter deals with conditional propositions; i. e. all such hypothetical propositions as imply a condition.

The particle *if* differs from others that suppose causation, in that it merely implies necessary sequence.

If is sometimes taken to mean *because*; sometimes a mere link of sequence, either existing for the present,

or eternally, or from all eternity till now.
It may imply that the consequence must exist so long as the condition exists;

Sequitur de condicionalibus pertractandum.

Et primo supponatur omnem hypotheticam subordinatam actu condicionato, esse condicionalem; ut est talis: *Si tu es homo, tu es animal*, et cetere que vulgariter vocantur consequentie, quamvis 2^m vim vocis habitudo veritatis posterioris ad priorem sit consequentia qualis est in significato cuiuscunq; condicionalis vere, inter antecedens naturaliter prius et suum naturaliter consequens. Et hinc patet quod differunt iste note consequenciarum, *si, ergo, igitur*, et forte omnia synkategorica que nos ponimus synomina. Nam iste coniunctiones *ergo, ideo, igitur*, et si que consimiles, connotando causacionem, ponunt consequenciam nec in materia nec in forma peccantem: Sed non sic condicionalis: cum hoc sit necessarium, *si tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis*. Et sic differunt note consequenciarum 2^m genera causandi.

Sed, relictis istis altercacionibus signorum grammaticis, notandum quod *si* quantocunque ponitur pro *quia*, quandoque dicit simpliciter necessariam veritatem condicionatam. Et hoc 2^{ter} variatur; vel sic quod sit veritas condicionis tenens ut nunc: ut hic: *si ego sum Rome, falsum est verum*. Nam veritati eterne repugnat quod nunc sim Rome, nisi quidlibet sequatur. Istam tamen significacionem communiter abiciunt sophiste. Vel 2^o quod sit veritas condicionata tenens pro omni tempore eterno; ut: *si deus est, ipse wult mundum esse*. Vel pro tempore eterno a parte post; ut: *si ego non sum, nichil fuit*. Et talium per accidens consequenciarum aliqua ponit quod impossibile est veritatem condicionaliter assumptam esse pro aliqua mensura temporis pro qua non sit veritas condicionaliter deducta. Ut: *si*

deus wult tempus esse, tunc tempus est. Aliqua autem solum ponit quod impossibile est veritatem condicionaliter assumptam esse, nisi veritas condicionaliter deducta sit pro aliqua mensura. Ut, *si deus wult me esse, ego sum;* nam antecedens est eternum, et consequens temporale. Semper tamen fuissest tale signum verum; *ego sum;* quia sufficit ad veritatem talis signi quod suum primarium significatum aliquando sit, ut patebit capitulo ultimo. 4° vero modo sumitur nota Again, it may have its condition under the imperative form; or the subjunctive form;

condicionalis de condicionato extremo, quandoque copulans imperativam: ut hic; *si vis vitam ingredi, serva mandata;* quandoque coniunctivam, ut hic: *domine, si fuisses hic, frater meus non fuissest mortuus;* quandoque copulat oraciones imperfectas in proposicionibus non tentis condicionaliter; ut hic; *tu es quicquid essem, si essem asinus.* Omnes tamen tales implicant condicionales. Unde videtur michi quod sicut hec oracio individua non est propositionaliter vera: *fecistine hoc?* ita ratione coniunctionis est hec proposicio condicionaliter vera: 20 *si Judas decessisset in gratia, fuissest salvatus.*

Ex istis patet quod 3^{ter} est conditionalis vera. Primo simpliciter et absolute; 2^{o} per accidens, et 3^{o} ut nunc, Et omnis conditionalis vera convenit in hoc cum quilibet, non solum quod primarie significat veritatem, sed quod impossibile est veritatem condicionaliter assumptam esse, nisi sit veritas eius condicionaliter deducta; et econtra. Et hoc est quod principaliter solet dici quod signanter tunc est consequencia bona quando impossibile est antecedens illius sic primarie significantis esse verum, nisi suum consequens sit verum.

Et ita tripliciter dicitur *impossibile* et *necessarium:* scilicet simpliciter, per accidens, et 2^{m} quid. *Simpliciter necessarium* est quod de nulla potencia potest non esse. *Necessarium per accidens* est veritas quam ordinacioni eterne repugnat pro aliqua parte dati temporis eterni non esse. Et *necessarium 2^m quid* quidem solum temporaliter est, sed legi eterne repugnat ipsum non esse. Et correspondenter de impossibili per accidens et 2^{m} quid. Unde, sicut omne necessarium per accidens aut 2^{m} quid potest non esse, sic omne impossibile per accidens aut 2^{m} quid potest esse.

28. signum (!) B.

Rules:
 1. As a 'conditional' is true, so it is necessary; as it is false, so it is impossible.
 This is not generally admitted now, unless for absolute necessity and impossibility; so it is no wonder if our rules present some discrepancy.
 From what is absolutely necessary may follow what is so contingently; and thus all that happens, happens necessarily; though not absolutely so.
 2. Truth may follow from falsity, but not vice versa.

In things contingent, however, what is false may become true, what is necessary, false and what is true, impossible, at a different time, but it does not follow that *this will be false implies this will be*. Some say that falsity is true in so far as it is an object of thought; others that what is true (at one time) is false (at another).

And thus falsity follows from truth: If God wills that the day of Judgment be, *it is: it is*, false now, will be true at a given time.

Ex istis patent quedam regule. Prima quod proporcionaliter sicut condicionalis est vera, sic necessaria; et sicut ipsa est falsa, sic est impossibilis; et econtra. Communitas tamen sophistarum non admittit condicionalem esse bonam, nisi fuerit absolute necessaria. Ideo 5 non mirum si regule eorum dissonant ab ampliantibus *necessarium* et *impossibile*. Nam ex absoluto necessario sequitur necessarium per accidens: ut ex *deum esse* sequitur *ipsum velle mundum esse*, et per consequens *mundum esse*; et breviter omne aliud verum, quantum- 10 libet contingens. Ex quo sequitur quod omne futurum necessario eveniet, non quidem necessitate absoluta, sed necessitate ex suppositione. Sequitur etiam quod consequencia sit ponibilis et de impossibilibus, cum talis impossibilis per accidens potest esse vera. 15

2º patet ex falso, tam signo quam signato, sequi verum; sed nunquam ex vero sequi falsum ex parte rei, pro mensura pro qua est falsum. Pro omni enim tali mensura, ipsum non est. Potest tamen falsum contingens esse verum, et per consequens necessarium 20 aliquo modo. Unde in talibus que sunt per accidens, nedium ex falso fiet verum, sed necessarium erit falsum et verum erit impossibile. Hoc enim potest esse necessarium: *Iste lapis occidit Sortem*; et hoc potest esse impossibile post corrupcionem lapidis. Idem ergo in re 25 est, *falsum fore verum et illud quod aliquando non est aliquando fore*: quia, si hoc nunc non est tunc *hoc esse* est falsum, et si illud est, tunc *illud esse* est verum. Nec est color, si *hoc tunc erit falsum vel impossibile* | B 86- 30 quod *tunc erit*; cum oppositum sequitur.

Unde aliqui dicunt quod verum converteretur in falsum et impossibile, et ipsum falsum habebit esse possibile vel intelligibile. Alii autem dicunt quod verum est falsum; quia quod pro uno tempore est, pro alio non est. Unde non sequitur: *hoc est falsum vel im- 35 possibile; ergo, non est*; sed bene sequitur quod pro aliqua mensura repugnat necessario illud esse; non tamen simul et semel est verum et falsum; et sic ex vero sequitur falsum ut ex *deum velle diem iudicii esse*, sequitur *illum esse*; quod adhuc est falsum, sed in 40 tempore suo verum. Et illud reputo esse probabile.

14. ponit B. 26. al η B. 27. a η B. 35. esse B.

40. *Illum*, i. e. *diem*.

Alii autem dicunt quod si *hoc esse* sit falsum, tunc pro nulla mensura est, quia aliter quelibet creatura esset impossibilis, cum in eternitate sit falsum et per consequens impossibile illam esse; et ita de veritate et falsitate signi sunt opiniones. Ego autem voco signum verum, si suum significatum primarium est aliquando.

Alii autem dicunt quod non est verum pro mensura, nisi suum significatum sit pro eadem mensura. Et iuxta primum modum dicendi foret illa copulativa nunc vera:

10 Primum instans mundi est, et dies iudicii est.

Alia via dicit quod, sicut signum non est falsum, quamvis deficiat pro aliqua mensura temporis a veritate significata, sic nec ens ex parte rei est falsum, quia aliquando fuit falsum; quia *esse falsum* est simpliciter *non esse*; et ista tollit multas conclusiones concessas que male videntur sonare. Tota tamen ista difficultas stat in significacione termini. Ideo eligat logicus viam plus placitam. Dimissis ergo istis usque ad ultimum casum, fiat restriccio veritatis condicionalis ad

20 absolute necessariam.

Et tunc patet 3º quod quicquid sequitur ad tale consequens, sequitur ad suum antecedens; et per consequens, quicquid antecedit ad antecedens antecedit ad consequens.

25 4º patet quod quidquid repugnat consequenti, repugnat antecedenti; et si quid steterit cum antecedente, ipsum stat cum consequente. Sed non oportet in altero quod econtra.

5º patet quod ex opposito consequentis sequitur 30 oppositum antecedentis, et non generaliter econtra; et per consequens, quicquid antecedit ad oppositum consequentis, antecedit ad oppositum antecedentis; sed quicquid sequitur ad oppositum antecedentis sequitur ad oppositum consequentis; sed in neutro oportet gene-

35 raliter quod econtra.

6º patet quod ex omni simpliciter impossibili sequitur quodlibet concludendum, sicut ex omni antecedente sequitur quodlibet absolute necessarium assignandum.

Si enim impossibile est te esse asinum, non potest esse **40** quod tu es asinus, nisi deus non sit; quia si posset esse cum hoc quod deus sit, tunc potest sic esse, et per

Others maintain that what is false never can be true; for then the existence of every creature would be false from all eternity. Others think that what is true at any time is true now.

Finally others affirm that not to be completely true does not exclude some truth; to be quite false would imply not to be at all; and this view avoids many ill-sounding conclusions.

3. The consequent of a consequent is the consequent of its antecedent;

4. What contradicts the consequent, contradicts its antecedent but not *vice versa*.

5. What contradicts the consequent, is the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent; but not *vice versa*.

6. From any absolutely impossible proposition any conclusion whatever may be drawn; and any absolutely necessary proposition may follow from any antecedent whatever.

6. *alη* B. 18. *placidam* B.

consequens non est impossibile sic esse: quod tamen datum est. Et eodem modo probatur 2^a pars regule.

7. In the latter case God's existence is supposed; in the former, it is denied.

Every true proposition posits the existence of truth, and the latter the existence of God, on whom all truth depends.

Objections.

1. The old rules of logic say that no conditional posits anything.

2. According to this doctrine no irrelevant truth could flow from an impossible proposition, which is also against the old rules.

Answers:

1. This, not being strictly true, cannot be a rule. Yet it is partially true, if understood of contingent conditionals.

2. From the absolutely necessary or impossible no irrelevant proposition can be deduced, since the former follows from any truth, and the latter contradicts all truth.

And a proposition is relevant to another, either because it follows from or because it contradicts it. There can be no good

7^{mo} patet quod omnis talis consequencia ponit formaliter *deum esse*, et econtra; et per consequens necessitates sunt sic concathenate, quod posita una, impossible est quod reliqua destruatur; sicut, posito uno impossibili, formaliter sequitur quidlibet concludendum. Si enim quelibet talis ponit aliqualiter esse, utputa, veritatem significatam primarie per eandem, sequitur quod quelibet talis ponit primam veritatem esse, ex qua posita sequuntur due partes residue. Medium autem ad probandum istas regulas est descripcio consequencie bone superius posita, et lex contradictiarum. |

Sed contra illud argumentatur *primo*, per hoc quod, B 86^b iuxta antiquas regulas, nulla condicionalis quidquid ponit; ergo non ex qualibet tali sequitur *deum esse*. 2^o sic nunquam, nisi materialiter, sequitur impertinens ex impossibili, sicut antique regule sumant; addentes, quod nunquam sequitur necessarium nisi materialiter ex impertinenti. [3^o] multe necessitates possunt non esse, quia aliter non esset ordo inter illas; sed, posita una veritate, poneretur quelibet veritas possibilis.

Ad primum dico quod assumptum non est regula, cum obliquat a veritate. Verum tamen cum antiqua sententia communis non sit in toto falsa, intelligitur isto modo: nulla condicionalis de contingentibus extremis ponit alterum illorum; ut non oportet si *tu movearis te currente* quod *vel curras vel movearis*; quodlibet tamen talis condicionalis ponit suum primarium significatum et omnem eius causam. 30

Ad 2^m dicitur quod nichil est impertinens simpliciter necessario vel impossibili, cum omni tali impossibili repugnat quodlibet assignandum; et omne sic necessarium sequitur ad quidlibet. Et ex istis duobus modis dicitur proposicio pertinens alteri; vel quia, 35 antecedit ad illam, vel quia repugnat illi. Si enim A est pertinens B, quia sequitur ad B, per idem B est pertinens A, quia antecedit ad A, cum pertinencia sit relacio equiparancie, eque fundabilis in antecedencia sicut in consequencia. Ulterius dicitur quod tam repugnat consequenciam esse bonam et non de forma

20. et sic(?) pro 3^o B.
34. 3^{bas} B.

23. argumentum? B; ib. r'a=vera? B.

quam repugnat materiam esse informem. Nam ista est consequence if not in due form, according to this principle: *If A cannot exist without B, then if A is posited, B is so too.*

veritas et forma exemplaris per quam quelibet alia condicionalis tenet: *si duarum veritatum unam impossibile est esse cum hoc quod non sit reliqua, tunc, si illa est, reliqua est.* Verumptamen est dare aliquas formas, substanciales, syllogisticas, entimematicas, et induciones; quia tenent aliisque consequentie que vocantur formales; sed non iste vocate materiales. Non tamen est possibile quod aliqua consequentia teneat, nisi teneat ad minimum per hanc formam. Sufficit ergo ad investigandum bonitatem formalem cuiuscunque consequentie logice, quod sit consequentia; et demonstratis primarie significatis per suum antecedens et suum consequens, sit impossibile hoc esse, nisi hoc sit.

Nec aliud intendit logicus per huismodi consequencias; ut quando dicitur: si ego sum asinus, tunc baculus stat in angulo, idem est ac si diceretur: non potest esse quod ego sim asinus nisi baculus stet in angulo. Quod patet ex hoc quod contradictoria istorum sunt contraria. Ista enim proposicio repugnat tanquam contradictorie conditionali signatae: potest esse quod ego sim asinus, cum hoc quod nullus baculus stet in angulo; ideo communiter, negata consequentia, ponit logicus communiter quod oppositum stet: quod sibi tantum valeat ac si dicatur: detur oppositum consequentie negate. Et hinc dicitur illam notam sic mobilitare terminum subsequentem, more negacionis. Unde sequitur: si homo currit, animal currit; ergo, si iste vel quicunque alias homo currit, tunc animal currit. Nec oportet capere constanciam subiecti, sicut nec in negativis; quia quilibet talis includit contradictionem negacionem de possibili: ut idem est dicere: | Si tu es asinus, tu es animal, ac si dicatur: Non potest esse quod tu sis asinus, nisi tu sis animal.

B 87^a *Et constat michi quod vulgate sentencie in illa materia sunt infundabiles; utputa quod nulla negativa includit repugnaciam, sed quod possibile est nullum ens esse, cum hoc quod non antecedit ad affirmationem; ymmo quod possibile est quod si deus est, tunc, qualitercumque potest non esse, est. Hoc enim iuxta sic fantasiantes est possibile, cum non includit repugnaciam. Sed procul a philosopho ista sentencial Ad*

No consequence, can be good unless based on this principle. In fact consequence means that the contrary is impossible. Example.

If like no renders the following term universal. It is not even necessary that the subject should be the same; the fact is that every conditional includes a negative: If A is B, C is B means: No A can be B, without C being D. The common opinion on this subject seems to me quite unfounded, viz. that no negative includes impossibility. It leads to many absurd consequences, and is to be rejected.

6. spales; in marg. tales B. 23, 24. logicus communiter in marg. B.

3. Necessary truths are coordinated by the dependence of one upon the other, which their essential connection does not destroy. A truth may be necessary, and yet not exist actually; it may also be at the same time contingent, in the various senses of the word.

3^m dicitur quod necessarium est quod sit ordo inter necessitates, quarum nulla potest esse sine reliqua; ut prius naturaliter est *nullum hominem esse asinum* quam est *me non esse asinum*. Et prius naturaliter est consequens esse, si antecedens est quam est *animal esse*, 5 *si homo est*. Et sic de infinitis similibus. Ideo non est color concludendi quod non sit ordo prioritatis vel dependencie inter aliqua, si unum non potest esse sine reliquo. Nec est inconveniens quod multe necessitates possunt non esse, que non possunt destrui, corrumpi, 10 vel desinere esse, ut tales: *ego fui quadragenarius, ego predicavi* etc.; et multe veritates que iam non sunt possunt esse, sed non possunt incipere esse; cum, si sunt, eternaliter fuerunt, ut sepe dictum est de talibus: *ego fui predicturus, Sor fuit episcopandus*. Nec est in- 15 conveniens, necessarium ex suppositione et impossibile per accidens, esse secundarie contingens natum in maiori vel minori vel semper.

We must remember that the signification of the present sense can be extended to the past and future.

From a proposition that is false now we can draw any conclusion that is false at the same time; and contrariwise for true propositions.

Moving my hand, I produce a new truth, and consequently a present necessity, throughout the world. On account of this extension of meaning, we must define the

Determinate as that which must exist at a certain time; the Contingent ad utrumlibet as anything caused by an agent that is quite free not to cause it;

Et ad cognoscendum dicta hominum in ista materia multum confert cognoscere quomodo verba presentis 20 temporis ampliantur ad quodlibet tempus, preteritum, presens vel futurum, ut postmodum docebitur. Admittendo autem consequenciam ut nunc, conceditur quod ex omni nunc falso sequitur quidlibet ut nunc, sicut omne nunc verum sequitur ad quidlibet ut nunc. 25 Et ulterius patet ex dictis quod sicut movendo manum meam facio ad omnem punctum mundi veritatem, sic facio universalem condicionalem necessitatem. Unde, propter ampliacionem temporis verborum, oportet aliter loqui quam in proximo tractatu locutum est; ut deter- 30 minatum potest dici *omne quod necesse est esse pro aliquo tempore*; et per consequens omnis veritas est alicui esse determinata. Contingens vero ad utrumlibet potest dici *omnis effectus agentis libere, quod pro omni mensura qua causat eundem eque potest ipsum non causare*. Ex 35 quo patet quod omnis creatura est contingens ad utrumlibet quo ad deum. Ymmo [sunt] quotlibet voliciones dei eterne que possunt non esse, sed non incipere vel desinere. Unde libere contradictorie causare, est causare causatum voluntarie pro omni mensura pro 40 qua eque potest non causare illud; ut est omnis volicio

1. q. t. pro quod sit B. 12. pui B. 15. plurg B; ib. epandus B.

37. sunt deest B.

dei ad extra. Contingens vero semper est *effectus habens causam ex qua sequitur*; et huiusmodi est omne contingens; ut voliciones dei ad extra sequuntur ex esse dei contingenter. Et omne aliud contingens sequitur 5 necessitate condicionali absoluta ex voluntate dei. Contingens in maiori est *effectus habens causam ex qua naturaliter sequitur*. Contingit tamen casualiter causam illam poni, et effectum illam non sequi. Contingens in minori est *effectus preternaturaliter sequens ex causa illud non intendente*. Ex quo patet quod dicta contingenter non opponuntur contrarie, sed relative. Nec obest equivocantes in temporibus verborum sic varie loqui, et cognoscere utrumque modum loquendi; ut, communicando cum iuvenibus, loquamur primo modo, 15 et cum proiectis, modo secundo.

Dubium autem est si pretericio, futuricio, volicio, et posse logicum (ut sunt iste veritates: *A fuisse, fore, non esse, posse esse*, etc.) individuantur a tempore. Et videtur quod sic: nam alia est futuricio Sortis, alia 20 Platonis, quamvis utraque sit futuricio hominis; quia aliud est unum illorum futuronum quam erit reliquum; ergo, per idem, alia est futuricio A cursus mei, alia futuricio B cursus mei, quamvis utrumque istorum sit veritas que est *me esse cursurum*; et sic de pretericio- 25 nibus. Nam pretericio cursus mei incipit esse, me desinente currere, etsi millesies prius desii currere; et per consequens sunt tales quandalitates communes tam a subiecto quam a tempore, continentes sub se alias infinitas; ut per quot tempora ego durabo, tot sunt veritatis, quarum quelibet est *me esse duraturum*. Videtur 30 eciam quod necessario individuantur a tempore; ut, me non sedente postquam sedi, est alia necessitacio sessio- nis quam fuit ista eterna que precessit *esse* mei; quia aliter eadem veritas potest infinities redire. Ymmo 35 videtur quod necessitacio potest incipere esse propter incepionem nove per se cause, etsi eternaliter fuerit talis necessitacio, ut, me incipiente esse, verum est quod non sum extra B situm qui de facto continet me; et hoc fuit eternaliter verum. Cum ergo existencia mei 40 in B situ sit sufficiens causa ad faciendum me non esse

10, 11. *qtin^v* B. 26. *millesius*; *ib.* *desiit* B.

26. *Millesius* is probably a corruption of *millesies* for *millies*. Wyclif speaks of a series, A, B, etc. of *runs*.

extra illum situm, et illam potencia non impedita, videtur quod facit unam talem negacionem preter illam eternam.

Reasons contra.
If this were so,
all things
would
continually be
new,
according
to Heraclitus,
for it the
individuality
of such truths
is caused by
time, their
essence is
succession;
and every
necessary
truth is
composed of
successive
parts;
so also of all
accidents; and
this is
inconceivable.
Again, if there
can be an
infinite number
of individual
negations under
the same form,
there must be
as many
affirmations;
and this would
destroy
individuality.
Again, all
things would
be eternal.

Nothing
 commences
 without its
 opposite
 ceasing.

Wyclif's own
opinion.

Every
 individual takes
 its individuality
 from its proper
 cause;
 but God is the
 supreme
 principle of
 individuation.
 Accidents, such
 as time,
 movement, &c.
 are principles
 of cognition, of
 individuality,

Sed contra, ista videtur esse opinio Eracliti, ponentis omnia continue esse nova. Nam si veritates recitate 5 individuantur a tempore, tunc consistunt in successione, sicut tempus. Et per consequens tam necessitatibus quam pretericiones et futuriciones, habent partes successivas, quod non est sane intelligibile. Ymmo, multo magis, omnia alia accidencia individuantur a tempore. 10 Et sic, moto uno, omnia mobilia moverentur.

Similiter, iuxta illud oportet ponere infinitas aut communes synonimas, quod est summe nugatorium. Et consequencia patet ex hoc quod tot modis ponitur unum oppositorum quot et reliquum; ergo, si infinite 15 sint tales negaciones, *me non esse extra B situm*, infinite forent tales affirmaciones, posita una, quarum quelibet esset *me esse extra B situm*; et sic non esset dare ultimum singulare; sed omnia essent communia, cum accidens posterius subiecto individuat subiectum. 20

Similiter, cum nulla necessitacio potest incipere esse sine desinicieione sui oppositi vel econtra, videtur quod *me generato in B situ*, ratione cuius generacionis incepit necessitacio, que est *me non esse extra B*, desineret ista affirmacio; *ego sum extra B*, et per con- 25 sequens, ista affirmacio fuit ante esse mei; et tunc non esset possibile aliquod ens incipere esse, sed omnia essent eterna. Et tamen prius deductum est omnia esse nova.

Quantum ad istam materiam de individuacione rei 30 videtur michi pro presenti quod omnis substancia B 88^a individua individuat a qualibet sui per se causa, sicut est a qualibet tali. Deus autem, extra genus, et per consequens carens individuacione, est principium individuandi omne individuum. Accidencia etiam principium 35 piance substanciam sunt cause cognoscendi et regulariter individuandi omne suum causatum, ut mensura temporis in qua generatur res corruptibilis, motus, accio, potentia etc. que per accidens causant rem talem, individuant ipsam; ut existente eadem materia et eodem 40

1. iam B; ib. pos (por?) B. 13, 14. a'coes pro aut communes B.
 16, 17. illicit B. 17. a'coes actuaciones B.

agente respectu B ignis quod sint respectu A ignis, alia tamen est forma et per consequens alias ignis: quod cognoscitur ex alietate temporis in quo producitur, ex alietate producencie et multorum consimilium 5 accidencium que concousant productum; quia aliter rediret idem ignis in numero, quo ciens eadem materia susciperet formam eiusdem speciei. Est autem aliqualis idem p^titas in talibus circa ydemptitatem specificam, que vocatur ydemptitas 2^m materiam. Et maior est 10 ydemptitas qua corpus laceratum vel divisum 2^m partes aliunde continuatas, nulla penitus corrupta, maneret idem corpus, quam prius; quia est idem 2^m materiam primam et 2^m partes quantitativas, que sunt materia propinqua. Unde sicut unio materie cum forma in ista, continuacio 15 parcum materialium est de essencia ultimi singularis. Rediret autem idem homo quamcunque materiam anima actuaverit, quia anima vere est persona hominis. Et sic rediret quodammodo idem corpus.

Omne ergo accidens individuatur a suo subiecto, cum 20 sit ab illo, ut situs individuatur a mundo et eius quantitate et figura, et situs individuat motum, et modus in communi individuat tempus, et tempus individuat omnem motum singularem, et omne aliud successivum; cum ad unitatem motus, unitas mobilis, unitas tem- 25 poris, et unitas materie motus requiratur. Et corre- spondenter, futuriciones, pretericiones, et potencie, principiantur a suis causis a quibus individuantur talia a tempore: ut si alia eveniunt futura, alie erunt futu- 30 riciones, et si alie fuerint res preterite, alie sunt earum pretericiones. Et sic alie possunt esse res producte, alie sunt potencie ex quibus possunt produci. Nec individuantur talia a tempore, nisi sui termini individuentur a tempore. Et sic, eo ipso quod aliquid non per se substancia, successivum vel permanens, pro aliquo in- 35 stanti 2^m se totum incipit esse, non solum pretericio instantis iniciantis, sed ipsum instans est principium sue individuationis: ut si sessio mea, actus anime, habitus, et quecunque forma accidentalis vel substancialis mate- rialis non potest fieri ante vel post idem instans in 40 quo fit; quia existente alia generacione, non foret illud ultimum singulare. Et forte sic est de omni generali.

and are accidental causes. If the same matter and the same agent produce fire in two cases, the form is different; and this is known by the difference of time &c., in their production. There is identity of species, called identity according to matter.

Thus every accident is individuated by its subject.

Things future and things past individuate futurity and pretension; things possible, their possibility, &c. The instant at which any successive or permanent substance commences to be, is the principle of their individuation;

^{14.} 9th ed. B. ^{17.} r' between and above anima and actuaverit.
30. res rs' B. 38. fal B. 40. fit B.

Successiva tamen individuantur 2^m suas partes continuas a novo tempore; sed permanencia a primo sui instanti, et ab aliis quorum ipsum est principium. Ex quo videtur quod impossibile est aliquod ultimum singulare fieri prius atque posterius quam sic. Successiva 5 autem non possunt corrumpi prius aut posterius quam corrumpuntur, sed permanencia bene possunt et hoc. Sed impossibile est aliud recreari; et per idem videtur nichil posse annichilari.]

Re-creation
is self-
contradictory;
so is
annihilation.

It is absurd to suppose that after dissolution the same form can return again; or that negative qualities are individuated by time.

These consequently have no real existence.

This solves the second objection, as to the infinite multitude of negatives; for it is eternally true that one negation is true at certain times, and in that there is no succession, as in created things.

There is a third action by which God produces a thing instantaneously; which action is also to be found in second causes.

Et patet impossibilitas casuum quibus ponitur quod B 88^b idem ultimum singulare forme substancialis vel accidentalis absolute vel respective redeat post sui corruptionem; et per consequens non redit eadem negacio in numero, potissime cum nulla potest incipere vel desinere. Ex quo videtur quod nulla negacio individuatur 15 a tempore, tum quia non potest esse individua respectu sue speciei, tum eciam quia omnis negacio videtur esse communis in finitis a tempore. Ergo videtur nullam negacionem habere esse, cum quelibet sit eterna, quamvis vicissim habeant diversas causas per accidens. 20

Et patet responsio ad 2^m, superius suadens multitudinem talium negacionum. Unde, si sto postquam sedi, non est verum quod non sedeo, sed est eternaliter verum quod non nunc sedeo, quamvis habeant diversam causam. Talia enim fiunt continue, et si non consistant 25 in successione, sicut omnia creata sunt de quanto conservantur in esse; ut Sor facit Platonem fore episcopum; sicut et multa alia prius fecerant et facient in futurum. Unde deus simpliciter facit quamlibet partem mundi, non solum quia eternaliter vult illam esse ad 30 intra, sed quia facit illam esse ad extra, dum ex eterna voluntate necessitat illam esse.

Est tamen dare 3^{am} faciem quia Deus subito facit opus, que facienda desinit esse quando opus incipit esse. Et tales facientes est dare in causis 2^{is}, tam 35 respectu affirmacionum quam negacionum. Unde miro modo negacio eterna fit, nunc ab uno corruptibili et nunc ab alio, sicut contingit successivum fieri et quodlibet corruptibile. Unde existencia mea in B loco facit me non esse extra B; et tamen illud fuit factum eternaliter ab illo qui fecit me non esse. 40

8. si pro sed B. 36. mi's B.

Et ex istis patet quid tenendum est, ^{2nd} meum *videre*, in dubio, et quomodo respondendum est argumentis. Non enim est inconveniens, sed verum, quod idem commune potest redire, intendi, et remitti. Nam ⁵ quecunque veritas primo significata per oracionem infinitivam est communis ad infinita; ut *me currere*, vel *esse calidum* est commune ad *me currere* isto cursu, vel isto, vel isto; et sic de similibus; et *me esse calidum* ista caliditate, vel ista; et sic de similibus. Est ¹⁰ tamen dare singulare significata per abstracta; quibus accipiunt infinita actu; que omnia ponuntur de infinitiva oracione contracta.

Sed pro individuatione privacionum, notandum quod individuantur a suis privativis, ut a subiecto et tempore, ¹⁵ et a quibuscumque suis principiis, saltem ^{2nd} esse intelligibile: ut alia est privacio A materie et alia privacio B materie, propter diversitatem subiectorum; et aliud est materiam carere B forma et aliud est ipsum carere C forma, quia B forma differt a C forma ^{2nd} esse possibile; et per idem individuantur a tempore sicut sua positiva. Ex isto videtur quod quies habet partes successivas ^{2nd} quas mensuratur tempore, sicut motus. Nam unaqueque pars motus nata est opponi sue proprie quieti; ut motus B tempore mensuratus ²⁵ non potest opponi, nisi quieti pro eodem tempore. Unde B 89^a opposicio vel repugnancia inter significata non ponit illa ambo simul existencia; sed unum ponit et aliud destruit. Ex quo patet quod quies est longa ^{2nd} longitudinem temporis, habens partes successivas temporis ³⁰ correspondentes; et per consequens impossibile est quietem esse sine tempore, si non equivoce sit quies. Sed istis satis.

Contra predicta de bonitate consequentie arguitur. Videtur enim sequi ex dictis, quod homo sit asinus, vel ³⁵ quodlibet volitum, probari. Nam si *ista consequentia est*

Such is my opinion in this matter.
It is quite true that the same universal quality can return again, and become more or less intense in its individuals.

As for the individuation of privative qualities, its principle is in that which they deprive— subject, time, &c.; in different subjects, what is called the same privation is really different; rest as well as movement as measured by time. Every movement has its opposite rest; so movement in a certain time is opposed to rest in that same time. Rest, properly so called, must take place in time.

Objection to the preceding doctrine.

35. This argument, as Wyclif himself says, serves to bring in the question *De Insolubilibus*, one of the most difficult points in logic at that time, and for which he proposes a special solution. It may be stated thus: *If the present proposition is true, you are an ass*; the defender must either deny or grant it. If he denies it, it follows that even if the proposition is true, he is not an ass; and thus he would at the same time be and not be that animal. If on the contrary, he grants it, he grants a very inconvenient proposition indeed.

If this consequence is good, you are an ass; meaning by this, the consequence of the present proposition and by consequence, either the power of concluding from one proposition to another, or the conclusion itself.

bona, tunc tu es asinus (et demonstro per subiectum eandem consequenciam quam facio); potest enim consequencia duplíciter significare vel pro habitudine qua veritas posterior formaliter sequitur ad priorem, sive inter signa, sive inter signata; vel pro illis veritatibus,⁵ sive sint signa sive signata. Et sic dicunt sophiste quod consequencia est proposicio antecedens et proposicio consequens cum nota consequentie. Et illa est bona, quando primarie significat necessitatem condicionalem. Et si suum significatum non fuerit talis necessitas, tunc¹⁰ dicitur talis consequencia non valere. Quibus modis loquendi suppositis, patent argumenta ad utramque partem; quia, si consequencia sit impossibilis et non valens, tunc cum paribus est antecedens impossible; et sic, iuxta predicta, ipsum infert quodlibet consequens¹⁵ concludendum. Si dicatur quod ista consequencia est bona, tunc, cum veris, sequitur quod antecedens est verum, et sic consequens. Et conformiter argumentatur ad quodlibet volitum probare.

This introduces the grand question *De Insolubilitate*, to which there are very many answers, but six principal ones.

I. The first denies that any such proposition is either true or false. But can it be said to have no meaning? and if it has, it must be either true or false.

II. The second maintains that such propositions are true, but

Et hic introducitur materia de insolubilibus, in qua²⁰ sunt tot opiniones, quot sunt fuge invenibiles movende in eadem; quod sine dubio attestatur super difficultatem materie.

Sunt ergo opiniones sex in ista materia plus famose, quorum prima dicit quod nullum insolubile est verum²⁵ vel falsum. Sed ista tollitur, querendo de significato insolubilis, utrum sit vel non. Ut in communi casu: *utrum Sor dicit falsum vel non?* et cum nemo dubitabit divisionem datam per contradictoria, patet quod stat difficultas, etc. Si enim hec sit omnino individua,³⁰ congrua, significans primarie sicut non est, tunc est falsa. Vel si negatur consequencia, supponatur illa significacio termini, vel queratur utrum hec: *Sor dicit falsum*, sit signum tale vel non. Potest enim cuiuslibet insolubilis materia trahi ad divisionem regulariter factam³⁵ per contradictoria.

2^a via dicit quod omne insolubile est verum et falsum, falsificando se; sed illa tollitur, sicut prior, supponendo

1. tunc *in marg.* B. 17. vi's B. 21. mode B. 28, 29. negabit *in marg.* B. 30. *Idius* B. 35. *di'os* B.

28. Wyclif explains this further, pp. 167, 199. Socrates (or Sor) is supposed to be the only man of that name, and to utter this one proposition: *Sor dicit falsum*.

existenciam vel non existenciam significati primariae sufficere, et exigi ad hoc quod sit vera aut falsa. ^{2º} supponatur experientia certa quod insolubilia, sicut aliae proposiciones primarie, significant iuxta extensionem terminorum; et tunc patet contradiccionem sequi, querendo si ex parte rei sit ita in communis casu quod Sor decipitur vel non. Et patet per communem deductionem quod, quecunque pars detur, sequitur oppositum: ut, si decipitur et solum credit quod ipse decipitur, ¹⁰ ut pono, tunc non est ita quod decipitur; et si non decipitur et credit precise quod decipitur, tunc credit sicut non est; et omnis talis et solummodo talis supponitur decipi: et ita contingit argumentare in aliis.

Tertia opinio ponit nullam partem supponere pro ^{B 89º} toto cuius est pars. Et sic dicit quodlibet insolubile significare exceptive: ut, posito quod ista solum sit proposicio: *Nulla proposicio est vera*, sic primarie significando tunc dicit quod illa significant quod *nulla alia ab ista est vera*; et correspondenter dicit in aliis casibus quibuscumque. Sed contra illud est veritas quod pars supponit pro continuo, et per consequens pro toto cuius est pars. Ymmo in ista, *omne ens est*, supponit subiectum pro omni quod potest esse, et per consequentiam pro se quam pro tota propositione. Terminus universaliter supponens supponit pro omni quod significant, ut alias declaravi. Cum ergo multe partes supponentes significant naturaliter se ipsas et sua tota, quare non supponerentur pro illis? Sicut ergo hec proposicio scripta, *hoc est falsum*, potest significare se esse falsum, ²⁵ sicut nullus dubitat; ita potest subiectum specialiter supponere pro ipsa propositione, cum significant illam; sicut quelibet pars significans significant suum totum. Nec dubium quin contingit in universalis intelligere subiectum huius proposicionis, *propositio est falsa*, sine ³⁰ contracta connotacione, eque ipsa sola existente propositione, sicut multis aliis existentibus cum illa. Ymmo si sic significaverit: *omnis proposicio alia ab ista est falsa*, tunc subiectum significant et supponit pro ista exceptione, cum proposicio exceptit *illam esse falsam*. ³⁵ Non enim consonat huic vie quod subiectum supponat pro illis solummodo, pro quibus proposicio verificatur;

falsity themselves.
But again have they any meaning? if so, they cannot be both true and false.

And, e. g. a man must either be mistaken or not; if he is mistaken and thinks he is, he is no longer so; and if not mistaken and thinks he is, he is mistaken.

III. The third affirms that a part cannot stand for the whole; that every 'insoluble' accordingly has the meaning of an exceptive proposition. No proposition is true, must mean except this very proposition. But this part stands for a universal whole, and therefore it also stands for itself.

The proposition: Whatever is, is stands for itself too. In the written proposition, This is false, this may mean the proposition itself.

And the words, *propositio est falsa*, have quite a universal meaning,

2. adhc B; ib. et B. 10. pō B. 20. vīs B. 25. uā3 B.

13*

and do not
signify that
every
proposition, but
the present one
is false.

It is impossible
that the subject
should stand
only for such
individual cases
as would verify
the proposition.
And in such a
case A is A
would be false,
for A (subject)
would no
longer be the
same as A
(predicate).

It is, moreover,
quite possible
to affirm what
is false, the
falsity being in
the mind alone,
and at the same
time to believe
that no such
thing can exist
in the mind.

IV. The fourth
denies that in
such cases there
is any
signification
that agrees
with the terms;
thus there is a
primary
signification
different from
what the words
imply, and
impossible to
be known by
them.

This is a mere
sophistical
evasion;
that alone is
false which is
false,
and if I do not
know it to be
so, I cannot
affirm it as
such.

quia sic dicto, *falsum est*, supponeret subiectum huius proposicionis false in casu communi, non pro falso quod *est*, sed pro falso quod *non est*; quod contradicit rudimentis de suppositione. Ymmo, sic dicto, *propositio est proposicio*, predicatum non esset possibile esse 5 synonymum cum subiecto, quia pro una parte proposicionis significat, pro qua reliqua non potest significare. Et tamen potest significare pro se et vero, que sunt illa proposicio pro qua negatur posse supponere. Nec dubium quin contingit terminum fieri proposicionis 10 partem prius apprehense per illam, ignorante apprehendente. Unde ergo non significaret sicut prius? Contingit eciam hominem componere quod falsum est, ipsa sola existente ad intra, cum hoc quod credit nullam talem rem esse in anima, sicut vulgus et multi 15 clerici credunt. Sed quis dubitat quod sit contingens ut, sic concipiendo, appropriate apprehendit illam proposicionem? non enim cogitat de hoc. Non ergo oportet multum insistere ad refellendum hanc fugam.

4º via dicit quod repugnat insolubile significare 20 precise primarie sicut termini pretendunt. Ideo sequitur in communibus casibus quod insolubile significat primarie aliter quam pretendetur de famosa significacione, sed casus non certificat quomodo aliter. Unde concedit insolubilia, sed negat illa esse vera, quia quamvis significacio communis talium insolubilium sit vera, tamen habent aliam significacionem falsam, sicut sequitur ex casu. Ideo sunt concedenda esse falsa propter illam ignorantiam significacionem. Et tamen sunt concedenda propter significacionem cognitam. 30.

Sed ista via, inter alias, est pure fuga sophistica. Gradus certe experientie, qua scimus quod solum primarie concipimus per talem, *falsum est quod falsum est*. Ymmo non esset possibile illam significare primarie michi aliter, nisi innotescat michi quare sit aliter, cum 35 significare sit "movere veritatem appprehensivam"; et appprehensio hominis est sibi notissima, cum actus anime sint per se noti, et potissime actus connotandi. | Quo- B 90º modo, rogo, exponerem distincte copulative quod *Sor dicit falsum*, et uno alio modo, cum hoc quod non 40 haberem experientiam de significacione alia? Oportet

13. ḡphone' B.

37. Ē pro cum B.

39. coꝝ B.

enim sub quadam habitudine illud absconditum significatum significari; et habitudo copulandi est maxime pertinens cum, propter illud significatum, est insolubile falsum. Sed utrum possibile vel impossibile, hoc nescit 5 sic opinans. Si enim disiunctive significaret, vel condicionaliter, vel alio modo ypotetico, tunc non respondendum esset regulariter, sicut docet hec posicio.

Caret eciam omni ratione quod propter propositionem desinentem esse Rome, me latente, ero coactus ad 10 eliciendum novum actum apprehendendi distinctum, quem ego ignoro; ut opinio concedit, posito quod A sit ista proposicio: *homo est asinus*, Rome impossibilis, et B: ista: *in mente mea falsum est*, sicut precise significans ipsis solis existentibus; tunc, si cum paribus 15 corrumpatur A proposicio Rome, manente solum B in mente mea, naturaliter significante, significabit, me invito, aliter quam prius. Unde, queso, principium movens ipsam ad sic faciendum? Multi eciam sunt casus insolubilium in quibus non satisfacit illa evasio.

20 5^a via fingit diffuse quod nulli tali termino 2^e impositionis, verum, falsum, proposicio, terminus etc. correspondere potest intencio universalis; sed compонendo quod *Sor dicit falsum*, oportet singulariter in- 25 dicere; ut sic: *Sor dicit illam propositionem: homo est asinus, que significat primarie aliter quam est.*

Sed revera ista fuga non minus contradicit experien- 30 cie quam proxima, cum caret omni ratione diversitatis ponere quod terminis prime impositionis possunt cor- respondere intenciones reales, et non terminis 2^e impositionis. Quis enim non credit quod multe sunt proposiciones in mundo quas ipse ignorat esse? iuxta illud wulgatum sophisma: *tum scis aliquam propositionem esse veram quam ignoras esse veram*. Et certum est quod 35 hoc non posset sustineri, nisi ponendo actus ac inten- ciones universales, correspondentes talibus terminis 2^e impositionis. Nemo eciam dubitat quin contingit hominem credere quod alterum illorum contradictiorum

We must make a copulative proposition out of this 'insoluble' one, of which we grant the first part and deny the second; but it is impossible to expound it thus, if we do not know the second sense, nor even whether it is possible or impossible.

V. The fifth says that terms of the second imposition (true, false, proposition, &c.) have no meaning, but in particular instances.

But this evasion contradicts experience as much as the former one. There is no reason to deny a general meaning to these terms. And there are many propositions of which a man may be ignorant; so there must be a universal signification to the word.

7. r'z'ct' B; ib. pō B. 12. roune B. 17. alit' alr' B. 28. du'r' B.
33. for(or fo?) B.

8. *Caret.* The whole of this proposition seems so unintelligible that I fancy the text is corrupt, though the grammatical construction does not appear very faulty.

And when we say that of two contradictories, one is true; we do not give a precise individual meaning to 'one'.

contingencium est verum: *rex sedet vel nullus rex sedet*, quamvis nec sic credit illam, *rex sedet*, esse veram, nec reliquam. Nam, sciendo me sic habere illas significantes, puto me scire quod altera illarum est vera, et de neutra illarum sic scio quod illa est vera,⁵ cum utramque illarum dubito, sicut dubito que illarum est vera. Ubi patet sic componendo: *altera illarum est vera*, nec singulariter compono pro prima quod illa sit vera, nec singulariter pro 2^a; quia tunc non assentiret compositioni mee.¹⁰

Aristotle and Boctius give general rules for propositions; so the word 'proposition' has a general meaning.

The very enunciation of this theory implies this belief in a general meaning.

Similiter, auctores tradunt regulas universales de propositionibus; ut patet per Aristotelem et Boecium, describentes propositiones: ubi nemo dubitat quod ipsi non intendebant singulariter propositiones suas describere, sicut nec sic opinans, ponens pro conclusione quod nulli¹⁵ propositionum correspondet intencio simplex, nec simpli- citer negat pro illa que est in mente sua, nec pro illa que est in mente mea; quia sic non esset conclusio alicuius efficacie pro intento. Et si dicatur quod sic componit, non illa proposicio: *deus est in mente mea*,²⁰ habet intentionem simplicem sibi correspondentem, nec aliqua proposicio sibi similis. Quero qualis intencio correspondet | subiecto secunde propositionis; si uni- versalis, contradicit regule impositionis; singularis, non probatur nisi de illis^{2bus} quod non correspondet illis²⁵ intencio universalis. Et cum isti termini, nomen, verbum, etc. sint termini^{2e} intentionis, repugnat quod illis correspondeat talis universalis intencio.^{B 90^b}

Again logicians dispute as to what a proposition is, some saying that every sentence is one, another that it must signify something true or false.

In each case there would be contradiction, if there were no such thing as a proposition in general.

Similiter est dissensio apud logicos quid requiritur ad esse propositionis, cum unus ponit propositionem³⁰ quam reliquus non ponit esse propositionem; ut unus ponit quidlibet esse propositionem, alias quamlibet oracionem individuam veram vel falsam ponit propositionem; et sic opinans ponit omne connexum in anima et solum tale esse propositionem. Modo quod-35 libet illorum clauderet contradictionem, si non posset esse intencio communis de propositione. Nam sic dicto, *quodlibet signum in anima, significans verum vel falsum, est proposicio*, elicetur iste sensus; *quodlibet tale signum significans deum esse vel hominem esse asinum est hoc*;⁴⁰ quia iuxta istam viam sequitur: utrumque illorum est proposicio; ergo, utrumque illorum est hoc.

7. alta B. 8 fin^r B. 31. n^o; np^t in marg. B.

Unde talia sunt incongrua vel impossibilia: *Omnis proposicio est, multe sunt proposiciones, ego credo quod tu habes proposicionem in mente tua*; et sic de similibus. Sed ista haberent concedere in casu: *omnis proposicio est omnis proposicio, quamvis proposicio tua differt a proposicione mea, ego habeo omnem proposicionem*, et sic de multis frivolis, quarum deduccio esset stulcior quam est posicio.

Nimis ergo profundaret se sic opinans pro fundamento solucionis insolubilium stabiliendo, quia negando intenciones universalium fluctuaret in respondendo in propria materia, sicut edificium constructum super aquas. Singularia enim, propinqua divisioni, et incerta sicut aqua, non fundant scienciam propriam obiective. 15 Sexta via ponit in quolibet insolubili 3 concurrere, primo, casum facti; 2º, antecedens vel causacionem: et 3º consequens ex 2º. Ut, posito quod unus Sor sit omnis Sor qui dicat solum quod ipse non est albus, hoc totum est casus facti; et quando adiungitur quod 20 quicunque dixerit verum quod sit albus, hoc est antecedens vel causacio ad esse album, quod est naturaliter consequens causacionem illam; tunc tenet ista posicio pro regula generali quod *omne naturale antecedens est prius pro aliqua mensura quam suum consequens*; ut esse 25 album, in casu positivo, sequitur in fine prolationis sicut talis motus ipsum consequitur. Et ita dicit insolubile esse verum post causacionem et falsum ante causacionem, et per ista tria inventa in quolibet insolubili solvit generaliter insolubilia. Nam primo sunt falsa, vel 30 neque vera neque falsa, et in fine erunt vera. Ideo oportet diligenter notare mensuram pro qua opponens querit utrum insolubilia sunt vera vel falsa.

Contra illud sunt multe instancie. Primo enim videtur 35 talis proposicionis, sicut et impossibile est solam obviam esse causam libertatis. Et sic generaliter in omnibus

There are also other absurdities.

This opinion can, therefore, give no stable foundation to explain the 'insolubles', because singulars have no coherence, and no theory can be based on them.

VI. The sixth distinguishes in every such proposition the fact itself, its antecedent and its consequent.

Ex. gr.
1. Whoever speaks the truth is white.

2. A says he is not white;
1. is the antecedent;
2. is the fact;

and to be white is the consequent.

These propositions are false or doubtful, considered before the antecedent is applied, and afterwards true.

Objections:

13. di'oni B. 34. pp dice' B.

32. The first conclusion is: *A says he is not white; if so, he does not speak the truth.* The second conclusion is: *If he does not speak the truth, saying he is not white, then he is white.* The solution would consist in asking the opponent how he understands the proposition? As merely containing the first conclusion, or as containing the second too?

1. This theory makes the mere meaning of a proposition to be the cause of its objective truth or falsity: which is impossible. casibus insolubilium implicatur pro causa quod non potest esse causa; et per consequens omnes casus insolubilium negarentur tanquam impossibilis, cum tamen nec vis videtur, nec argumentantes intendunt generaliter talem causacionem. Ut *dicere* istius proposicionis: *Sor 5 dicit falsum*, non implicatur per communem casum esse causam quare illa sit vera; quia tunc esset *vera* sine correspondencia veritatis significate. | B 91*

2. The antecedent successively enunciated, is never together with its consequent;

so at the end the cause of the consequent exists no longer, and, therefore, can cause nothing, and if we take an indivisible instant and ask if the 'insoluble' is then true or false, this theory can give no reply, for its upholders do not admit that continuity is composed of things without magnitude.

3. If this proposition be at a certain time neither true nor false, it must be neither granted nor denied; and yet at this time its meaning disagrees with reality. Suppose time composed of instants: we can conceive a case in which the proposition, according to

Similiter, iuxta responsionem, tale *dicere* successivum pro nullo instanti temporis simul erit cum suo causato 10 consequente, eo quod nullum successivum potest esse in suo fine temporale, et per consequens non pro instanti tali determinato erit proposicio vera postquam fuit falsa, vel econtra: et per consequens in fine non erit causa quare proferens est albus. Non enim est 15 possibile quod illud quod non est quicquam causet. Loquamus ergo de eodem instanti temporis, mensurante causam et eius causatum; et queratur si pro illo instanti sit insolubile verum vel falsum, et stant tunc raciones communes insolute. Et ex isto patet quod 20 distinccio quam ponit de *dicere* nichil facit. Ponit enim quod aliud est *dicere* successivum principale quali vocaliter dicitur proposicio et aliud est *dicere* consecutivum quali in finem dicetur proposicio quando erit vera. Nam 2^m illam viam nullum continuum componitur 25 ex non quantis in fine; ergo non erit illud successivum, quia tunc erit dictum, factum, vel causatum. Ergo tunc non erit aliquod eius *dicere* vel aliqua eius causacio. De vocali ergo proposicie, et non mentali, tunc primo genita est nobis sermo, retorquendo omnes responsiones 30 ad illud instans pro quo est talis proposicio sic quante significans.

Ulterius dicit ista responsio in particulari quod proposicio insolubilis pro tempore sue causacionis nec est vera nec falsa, et per consequens nec pro tunc cedenda vel neganda, quamvis pro tunc significat aliter quam est. Ymmo, ut dicit, si tempus per yimaginacionem componeretur ex instantibus, et maneat per illud idem tempus talis proposicio in anima, *ego concipio falsum cum tali negativa: "hoc non est verum"*, foret continua 40 eius mutatio de veritate in falsitatem, et econtra; quia

4. vis B. 6. cam 2| cā B. 31. quod factus B. 38. maeāt B.

omnis talis negativa in priori instanti foret vera et in proximo instanti falsa; et omnis talis affirmativa econtra in priori instanti foret falsa et in proximo instanti vera; sic quod continue per idem tempus alternatim 5 esset mutatio a veritate in falsitatem, et econtra.

Et addit responsio, quod si pro signando instanti ponitur talem propositionem, *A non est verum*, fore verum, non sequitur ex hoc *A* pro illo instanti significare sicut est, sed pocius oppositum, cum “significare sicut est” est causa quare *A* est verum. Et sic est in proximo instanti precedentis; et conformiter si pro hoc instanti significat aliter quam est, non ex hoc est falsum pro illo instanti, sed incipit esse falsum pro instanti proxime futuro.

15 Istud autem dictum est multum extraneum; primo, in hoc quod ponit ordinem prioritatis naturalis causare successionem. Nam tota prioritas naturalis est simul pro eodem instanti temporis, sicut prius et posterius in natura; aliter enim non esset possibile quod pro 20 aliquo instanti temporis causatum simul sit cum sua causa. Et tunc vel pro hoc instanti deus et quelibet alia causa non esset, vel pro eodem instanti nullum causatum esset. Sequitur eciam quod nulla successiva proposicio potest esse vera vel falsa; quia “significare 25 sicut est vel sicut non est” antecedit per instans denominacionem esse rei; ut *dicere* et taliter significare concomitantur illam toto tempore sui esse.

Videtur eciam quod anima, eadem propositione permanente, omni motu subducto, caret successione; quia 30 prioritatem et posterioritatem temporis continue uniformiter componendo sic ex integro falsum; ubi non est fingenda racio diversitatis instantium, nec racio quare in uno illorum instantium foret talis proposicio pocius vera vel falsa quam in quolibet illorum. Nam 35 proposicio, solum manendo per instans, foret vera vel falsa cum “significare precise primarie sicut est vel sicut non est” sit sufficiens causa talis denominacionis.

1. falsa *pro* vera B. 26. veri *pro* rei(?) B. 29. subducta B.
37. fffus B.

31. The text as it stands has no sense. This, if owing to missing words, is all the more regrettable because the words would perhaps have given a clue to the rest of the paragraph, which I have failed to understand.

the hypothesis,
would be
continually
changing from
true to false.

A further position of those who answer thus is that if a given proposition, *A* is not true, is supposed true at a certain moment, it would not follow that *A* would signify according to reality at that moment, that would entail its falsity only for the succeeding instant. All this is beside the mark and implies that natural priority causes succession; it may well exist without succession at all; as in the case of cause and effect.

Quomodo ergo explicaretur denominacio usque ad non esse subiecti? Habita ergo continue tali causa non foret differenter nunc vera et nunc falsa. | Et ex eodem B 9^a^b videtur quod non stat eandem propositionem manere per tempus neque veram neque falsam, et tamen per⁵ idem tempus primarie significare sicut est vel sicut non est; specialiter cum instans temporis contineat tam prius quam posterius in natura.

There are other manners of eluding the difficulty.
1. By saying that a man *is* not, but is only called Socrates &c.

2. That successive speech or motion is impossible.
 3. That, there being no succession, nothing can move, though it is possible to be moved.
 4. That every proposition, as it primarily signifies itself, is true.
 5. That no meaning of a proposition can be reflected upon itself at the same instant as it is considered separately.
 6. That every negative signifies an affirmative negatively; and that an insoluble proposition is one of them.
 7. That there is no truth at all in negatives.
 8. That some such are true, and some are false.
- Preter istas vias audivi multas evasionses; ut prima dicit quod non est possibile hominem esse Sortem vel¹⁰ Platonem, quamvis vocetur taliter. 2^a dicit quod non est possibile loqui vel moveri successive. 3^a dicit quod non est possibile movere aliquo motu, quamvis possibile sit moveri sine motu, quia non est possibile successivum esse: et multo magis non est possibile propositionem¹⁵ vocalem esse, cum tunc forent distincte voces que non possunt pro eodem instanti proferri. Et ille sunt fuge sophistice interrupentes doctrinam. 4^a dicit quod omnis proposicio significat seipsam primarie et sic verum. 5^a dicit quod non sunt responsiones vel denominaciones²⁰ propositionum retorquendo ad idem instans, cum hoc non sit possibile. 6^a dicit quod quelibet negativa principaliiter et primarie significat affirmacionem, ut ista: *homo non est*, primarie significat *hominem esse*, sed negative, sicut ille terminus “inintelligibile” significat²⁵ intelligibile, sed privative; et per hoc evacuat insolubilia negativa. Ymmo dicit quod quelibet talis proposicio, *hec non est vera*, *hec non habet primarium significatum*, etc. primarie significat illam propositionem, et per consequens primarie significat illam esse: 7^{ma} negat³⁰ omnes veritates negativas; nec est possibile quod proposicio precise primarie aliqualiter significet, nec quod proposicio nunc significet uno modo et alias alio modo; quia significacio propositionis est eius forma. 8^{va} dicit altercando quod aliqua talis est vera, et aliqua talis est³⁵ falsa; et, posito quod una talis sit omnis talis, tunc vel dubitat quam opponens proponit, vel dicit quod repugnat casui aliquam talem esse propositam, vel 3^o distingwit infinite quamlibet talem.

Tales innumerias responsiones potest quis audire,⁴⁰ quas oportet cum solertia excludere, inmutando casus

35. alitado B. 37. *ut* B; *ib.* *m̄l* B.

successionis in casus de permanentibus; ut, posito "Sor videat vel intelligat *istam*, sic primarie significantem: *Sor videt vel intelligit falsum*", et sic de similibus. Vel aliter petatur concorditer, gracia noscendi veritatem, talis modus loquendi; vel tertio directe vel oblique destruatur fundamentum evasionis, utendo veris verbis; quod est in pluribus onerosum.

Relictis istis ergo viis volentibus per ipsas incedere, suppono aliqua alibi declarata. Primo quod cuiuslibet propositionis vere pro suo significato significatum primarium est veritas. Istud patet; quia aliter non foret significatum propositionis ipsam esse veram.

2º suppono quod ad contradiccionem, convertibilitatem, vel equipollenciam propositionum, non sufficit habitudo signorum, sed requiritur habitudo in modo significandi. Contradiccio enim non est nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis. Unde in multis talibus homo non intelligit, etsi voluerit, sensus equivocas sub eadem habitidine; ut nemo simul intelligit illam: *nullum A videt B*, intelligendo distincte subiectum vel predicatum tam in nominativo quam in accusativo. Ideo non contradicunt talia, equivoce intellecta: *nullum A videt B*, et *aliquid A videt B*.

3º, supponatur quod cuiuslibet propositionis vere pro suo significato significatum primarium est veritas significata per suum verbum principale, in comparacione ad eius suppositum: ut ista proposicio, *Sor est*, primarie significat esse Sortem, quod est essencia Sortis, et per consequens ipse Sor. Et hoc, *Sor moverit*, significat primarie *moveri Sor*, quod est accidens priori; quia eius motus. Et sic de aliis verbis adiectivis, significantibus accidentia inexistencia subiectis significatis per verba substantiva. Et ex istis patet quod omne verbum significat substantivum copulacione, quia aliter aliquod esset verbum singulare, et per consequens eius participium esset pronomen.

4º, suppono quod omnis veritas 2ª mensuretur a prima, que deus est, et in latitudine illarum veritatum sunt tot gradus defectuum vel falsitatum quot sunt gradus deficiencie a prima veritate. Et sic omnis veritas creata est vera, quia prime veritati conformis, et falsa,

Wyclif's solution of the difficulty: preliminaries.

1. The primary signification of every true proposition is truth.
2. Two propositions cannot contradict each other in form alone; the sense must be contradictory too.

3. The primary signification of every true proposition is the meaning of the verb together with its subject, and every verb is a compound of the verb to be.

4. All created truth is to some extent false, because, compared with the first truth, which is God, it falls short of it to a certain extent.

14. *e'clia* B. 19. *n̄* B. 34. *s̄m cone* B. 35. verbum singulare
very illegible B; *ib. pp̄m* = *pauperum* (!) *pro* participium B.

There are thus three degrees in the truth of a proposition; it is true, ist, in the vaguest sense, because it is what it is, i. e. a proposition, and consequently a being, and thus true. And the falsest proposition is true antecedently to its falsity.

The opposite of truth in this sense is falsity as a mere negation, and every false proposition is true in this sense, falsity being grounded on truth.

A second meaning of truth implies that the proposition must agree with the meaning given to it, whether that be the proposition itself, dependent upon it, or wholly independent. This proposition is, merely affirms

16. layco (sic!) B. 17. istato B.
17. *Layco*. I have sometimes met with the same word, evidently signifying *loyco* (*logico*). This would agree with the sense pretty well, if not for the *literato* which follows. 22. See Logica I, pag. 77.

propositionum solum in hoc superaddit quodlibet ens significandum, ut ipsa sit proposicio vera, et non quodlibet reliquum quod ipsa ex ordinacione hominis significat suum significatum. Sed ista causa est exilis, cum ordinacio nature sit prestancior ordinacione hominis. Vero autem isto modo dicto opponitur contrarie falsum, quod significat complexe primarie significatum quod non est, ut sunt tales; *homo est asinus, hec proposicio non est*, etc.

that it is something distinct from anything else. The opposite of truth in this sense is falsity as a contrary, in which the signification is affirmed wrongly.

¹⁰ Sed 3º specialiter dicitur proposicio vera, quando habet primarie significatum independens ab ipsa, ut sunt tales: *deus est, sol movetur, etc.* Et isto modo locutus est Aristoteles de propositione, dicens: in eo quod res est vel non est, quam proposicio primarie significat,

³ A proposition is true in the third sense, only when it has a primary signification that does not depend upon it.

¹⁵ est ipsa vera vel falsa, et non propter mutationem factam in propositione. Et cum isto famoso modo

intelligendi propositionem concordat ethymologia, qua proposicio dicitur a *pro alio posicio*. Unde intelligentes

In this sense, therefore, the proposition stands for what is neither that proposition, nor depending upon it.

²⁰ propositionem significative et propositionaliter intelligunt ipsam significare significatum quod nec est ipsa proposicio nec ab ipsa dependens; quia aliter non esset

The opposite of truth is here its contrary; falsity; i. e. the absence of any meaning independent of the proposition itself.

²⁵ proposicie vera dicta relacio, que est adequacio significati primarii ad suum signum vel intellectum intelligentem. Nec aliter foret racio quare hoc foret proposicio: *hoc est* (demonstrando se ipsam) quin per idem

This falsity is truth in the two former senses; and truth in the third comprises truth in the second sense.

quelibet res significans se ipsam esset proposicio. Et vero isto modo dicto opponitur contrarie falsum carens pri-

³⁰ marie significato, quod non est ipsum significans nec ab illo dependens, sicut sunt talia: *hec proposicio est, significat, et movetur, et similia que materialiter signifi-*

I say that every 'insoluble' is both true and false.

cant pro se ipsis. Et ex istis patet quod falsum isto modo est verum tam primo modo quam 2º. Patet eciam

'Insoluble' is a contradiction in terms, unless it merely signifies 'very difficult to solve', or 'insoluble for such and such persons'.

³⁵ quod si quicquam est verum 3º modo, tunc est verum 2º modo; sed non econtra.

Istis premissis, dico quod omnia vocata communiter insolubilia sunt tam vera quam falsa. Claudit enim contradiccionem quod aliqua sit proposicio insolubilis; sed sicut illud cuius magnitudo est de difficiili noscibilis dicitur infinitum, ut profunditas maris, ita quecunque

⁴⁰ proposicio de difficiili solubilis, quam quis nescit solvere,

dicitur sibi insolubilis, et specialiter proposicio signi-

ficans affirmative vel negative pro se ipsa, ex cuius

15. pp B. 23, 24. int̄m intellige B.

If we take
'true' in its
transcendental
sense, then
this sign is
true: . it is a
true sign is no
longer a
sophism.

The general
solution is that
these
propositions
are false in the
third sense, and
true in the
other two;
for they have
no meaning
whatever that
does not
depend upon
the proposition
itself.

Aristotle
says that a
man who
swears that he
is committing
perjury swears
truly; for there
is produced by
a reflex
influence, some
thing of
truth in these,
so that they are
verified in their
significations.
Again, take the
case of a
hypothetical
proposition;
the antecedent
is true in the
first and second
sense; but, as
the consequent
is impossible,
the whole
proposition is
false in the
third.
If an attempt
be made to
urge the matter
sylogistically,
we merely deny
that the
consequence is
good,

veritate sequitur illam esse falsam, et econtra. Nec est hic sophisma, *hoc signum est verum et est signum verum*, intelligendo istum terminum *verum* transcendentaliter quia in talibus non est sophisma, nisi accidentaliter coniungantur. 5

Per hoc patet solucio in particulari ad communia insolubilia. Nam, posito quod unus Sor sit omnis Sor, et quod solum istam propositionem dicat vel eius partem: *Sor dicit falsum*, sic primarie significando, patet quod Sor dicit falsum 3º modo, quia propositionem 10 carentem significato primario independente ab illa; et in tanto habet rationem falsi vel vacui carencia talis significati. Manente ergo illa falsitate, gignit ipsa per suam significacionem quandam denominacionem que est vera 2º modo. Et correspondenter dicitur de illis: *hoc 15 est falsum*, seipso demonstrato; *ego cogito vel percipio falsum*. Et [sic] de hypotheticis ex talibus compositis.

Unde Aristoteles solvens talia 2º quid et simpliciter dicit quod qui iurat se esse perjurum bene iurat, iurans hoc solum, quia non dubium quin talia reflectant super 20 se quandam denominacionem esse veri, propter falsitatem presuppositam. Ideo dicuntur 2º quid vera et 2º quid falsa; unde ex suis significacionibus verificant se.

Conformiter dicitur quod ista conditionalis est impossibilis: *Si ista consequencia est bona, tu es asinus*, 25 quia antecedens est verum non solum primo modo, sed etiam 2º modo, et consequens est impossibile. Omnis enim consequencia est bona, sicut et omnis res. Et sic tam hoc antecedens quam hoc consequens est bonum et verum, sed non est bonum vel verum quod tu es 30 asinus; quia non potest esse. Quod si queris utrum illa consequencia sit bona vel vera 3º modo, dicitur quod non, sicut patet ex supradictis. Non enim est dare veritatem independentem ab illa quam ipsa primarie significat. Et si isto modo formatur consequencia: 35 *Ista consequencia est bona 3º modo: ergo, tu es asinus*, negatur consequencia, cum antecedens sit possibile et consequens impossibile. | Potest enim esse quod illa B 93º

4. acci^r B. 17. sic deest B.

2. *Signum verum*. This is Aristotle's class of fallacies, *dictum simpliciter* and *dictum secundum quid*, as: *This shoemaker is good*: . he is a good shoemaker.

consequencia materialis aliter significet tam pro antecedente quam pro consequente. Ideo antecedens significat primarie de facto qualiter non potest esse. Nec valet responsio que ponit significacionem signi esse eius formam, cum sit illa [tam] accidentalis signo quam accidentale est michi quod sedeo. Non tamen est possibile quod ista consecuencia sic primarie significans sit vera ^{3º} modo. Ideo bene sequitur: *ista consecuencia sic primarie significans est vera 3º modo: ergo, tu es asinus.*

¹⁰ Sed antecedens est inprobabile.

Et conformiter responderetur, negando istam consecuenciam tanquam impossibilem: *Sor decipitur et Sor credit quod ipse decipiatur: ergo, non est ita quod Sor decipitur;* quia sic credendo clauderet contradiccionem ¹⁵ quod non deciperetur, intelligendo terminus ut logici communiter intelligunt tales. Sicut in simili non sequitur: *Sor periurat, et Sor iurat se periurare: ergo, non est ita quod ipse periurat.* Et excludantur eciam dubietates in Sor, cum hic forte diceretur quod aliquis ²⁰ iurans verum, dum tamen dubitaret, illud male iuraret. Et adverte denominacionem veri in hiis, super se reflexam ex falsitate presupposita, in eis tunc est leve [dicere quod] Sor decipitur, nisi ipse decipiatur; quia tunc claudit contradiccionem quod non deciperetur, ²⁵ intelligendo terminos ut logici communiter concipiunt.

Unde, posito quod Sor precise primarie credat quod aliquis homo decipitur, nullo alio homine aliqualiter existente, et quod omnis homo primarie credens falsum decipiatur, et solum talis; patet quod Sor decipitur, ³⁰ cum proposicio credita ab illo careat significato independenti ab illa, cum illa sit causa quare Sor credit illam, et sic quare Sor decipitur. Unde non conceditur ista consecuencia de materia et forma, sed gracia terminorum: *iste homo credit quod aliquis homo decipitur,* ³⁵ *ergo, aliquis homo decipitur.* Et, si ponatur quod nullus homo decipiatur qui credit verum, dicitur quod hoc repugnat casui, cum magna decepcio est vagari in propositionibus carentibus significatis independentibus ab eisdem. Unde quomodounque ponatur istum terminum, ⁴⁰ *deceptor,* significare, multos homines possibile est decipi

the antecedent having an impossible signification here;

or we may admit the consequence, taken with this signification, but deny the antecedent.

The answer to the question: *Can a man be deceived and believe that he is deceived?* is the same;

likewise to the question: *can a man be forswn by swearing that he is forswn?* setting aside the case of doubts that would render the oath a perjury.

The fact of Socrates believing that some man is deceived loses all independent signification if we suppose that there is no other man but he; and therefore is false.

If it is said that no one who believes the truth can be deceived, we reply that to be misled by propositions that have no sense independent of themselves is a great deception.

3. \neg potest B. 5. tam *deest* B. 15—16. intelligendo — intelligunt punctis deleta; talis B. 22. lev^a B. 23. dicere quod *deest.* 28. credente vero existente B. 30, 31. *idepnū* B.

It is quite possible to be deceived without actually believing anything; what is necessary is a disposition to believe what is false.

Case of a tyrant ordering that those and only those who speak the truth, shall pass over a bridge; what is to be done to a man who says: "I shall not pass it?"

The case is impossible, for it implies contradiction.

et esse deceptos, cum hoc quod nichil actualiter credant: ut omnis male agens est deceptus, quia movetur assentiendo alicui tanquam bono quod non est sic bonum; et ista est magna decepcion. Nichil tamen decipitur nisi habeat dispositionem ad credendum falsum: ut incontinentes credit vel in actu vel in habitu quod expedit prosequi delectabile, cum omnis sic malus sit ignorans.

Et per ista patet responsio ad casus quibus ponitur condicionaliter quod, *si quis dixerit verum, pertransibit pontem, et aliter non;* et quod *Sor solum dicat primarie quod ipse non pertransibit pontem;* talem enim deordinationem posset tyrannus possessor pontis constitue et casualiter veniens sic dicere. Verumptamen conditionalis est impossibilis, sicut universalis ponens quod quicunque dixerit veritatem pertransibit pontem. Est enim impossibile quod omnis transiens hodie per hanc viam, et dicens propositionem veram 3º modo, pertransibit A ponte et solum talis, et quod Sor transiens hodie per hanc viam dicat solum primarie quod ipse non pertransibit A pontem. Hoc enim tacite includit B 93^b

So, if God should ordain the first part, it would be impossible that the second should take place.

Either any ordinance of the first part is impossible, or merely not forthcoming, or no man will speak the above words.

As for the execution of the decree, the man should simply be made to pass over the bridge.

Case of a master who decrees of his slaves, A and B, that A is to be free if the first person he meets is a slave; B is to be free if the first person he meets is free;

ideo, si deus ordinaverit universalem primam partem casus, repugnat quod Sor sic veniens ita dicat. Ideo, vel est impossibile quod deus sic ordinet, propter impossibilitatem et irrationabilitatem ordinationis; vel 2º quod deus [non] sic ordinavit et potest esse quod deus sic ordinavit, vel 3º quod talis ordinatio impediret Sor ad sic veniendum et dicendum. Sed primum istorum est michi probabilius. Et si queratur quid procurator tyranni faceret cum Sor in casu superius posito, dico quod exequendo vim vocis sive statuti faceret Sor pertransire pontem, cum Sor dicat verum. Et si gravetur casus quo usque fiat impossibilis, dico tunc quod utendum est epykeya.

Et ex ipsis patet quod impossibile est tyrannicum dominum ordinare de Sor et Platone servis suis, quod si primus cui ipse obviaverit fuerit servus, tunc Sor erit liber et aliter non: et econtra de Platone; si primus cui ipse obviaverit fuerit liber, tunc Plato erit liber, et

4. n^o in B. 25. non deest B. 26. non sic B. 27. dd^o B.
34. tyc^o B.

8. *Et per ista.* This paragraph and the following may throw some light on the allusions in *De Apostasia* (pag. 34, ll. 23—31) which I did not then understand very well.

aliter non: et obvient isti sibi ipsis primo in B instanti; and it happens
tunc, si in B instanti cum istis paribus Sor fuerit liber, that A and B
sequens est ex posito quod Plato pro illo instanti erit meet each other
servus. Et sequitur ex opposito cum illo dato, quod first,
5 Plato tunc erit liber, cum tunc obviaverit primo libero.
Sed quamvis 2^m logicum non sit possibile quod talis the case is
sit ordinacio, sicut nec est possibile quod talis logically
quis ex sola carta fiat liber vel servus: tamen difficultas impossible;
est quid fieret 2^m legem politicam, tyranno manu- but the legal
10 mittente illos servos sub illa condicione et residuo difficulty
contingente, ut positum est; dicitur quod logico non should be met
est difficultas, quia condicionalis est impossibilis, vel by setting
casus gravatus habebit partes incompossibilis, sicut free both
proximus. Secundum vero ius humanum racionabile A and B,
15 videtur quod uterque fiat liber, eo quod iura faveant because the
libertati et domino deficiet probacio ad detinendum law is in
eos in servitute; cum, domino affirmante quod pro primo favour of
instanti obvie alter fuerit servus, redarguetur ex propria liberty, and the
confessione evidente quod ex hoc tunc uterque erit master has no
20 liber. Quecunque ergo pars probaverit partem suam convincing
induceret oppositum. In tali ergo casu utendum est proof of a
epykeya, quid racio iudicaret pro utilitate reipublice; right to
et illud est faciendum. keep either of them.

Patet eciam ex hiis dictis et tractatu proximo quod Case of three
25 satis possibile est te scire sciencia actuali solum istas propositions
tres proposiciones, *deus est*, *homo est*, *animal [est]*, et actually known
omnem propositionem quam nunc scis per horam post at a given time.
hoc scies, istis sic primarie significantibus. Nam iuxta
prius dicta falsum scitur, sicut cognoscitur; sicut enim
30 scio hominem falsum, sic scio vel cognosco quod hoc
est signum falsum. Verumtamen eius significatum non
scio, quia non est; et quod non est non scitur; et si
ponatur cum casu. *Nullam propositionem sciri nisi cuius*
significatum primarium scitur, patet scientibus obliga-
35 ciones quod post impositionem stabit responsio sicut
prius, cum ad esse rei est respondendum. Ymmo
sophista diceret quod claudit contradiccionem sic scire
3^{am} propositionem, que sit C, sicud clauderet contra-
diccionem quod eius significatum maneat per tantum
40 tempus. |

38. q. tuo B. 22. epybeya? B. 26. est after animal deest B. 30. ho B.

Note that there
are many sorts
of propositions,
according to
what they
denote.

Some cannot
be true in their
primary
signification,
although
another with
the same
meaning may
be true.

Some cannot
be false, and
yet a
convertible
proposition
may be so.

And thus
insoluble
propositions
are not
absolutely
convertible with
others, for *This is
false* (meaning
this very
proposition)
cannot be true;
and *This is
false* (meaning
the preceding
proposition)
may be quite
true.

Their diversity
proceeds from
their mode of
signification,
the second
referring to an
object
independent of
itself.

But it is not
every difference
as to the mode
of signification
that causes this
diversity; a
proposition
may be true for
many men, and
yet false, if
meant for me
and not
corresponding
with its
meaning: as:
I see this,
(written down)
may be
understood in
the first person
or in the third
by one who
reads it.

Unde nota diligenter quod sunt multe manieres pro- B 94*
posicionum pro suis denominacionibus capescendis. Ali-
qua enim est proposicio que non potest esse vera pro
suo significato primario, sed sua convertibilis bene
potest; ut patet de ista in mente mea: *Ego non sum*,⁵
et de ista: *hec proposicio non est* (seipsa demonstrata);
et sic de similibus, quarum significata non possunt esse,
nisi ipsi non sint. Et econtra aliique sunt propositiones
que non possunt sic significando esse false, sed sue
convertibilis bene possunt; ut patet de tali in mente mea,
ego sum; et de talibus, *hoc est*, vel *significat*, vel
est verum (ipsomet demonstrato). Et hinc bene dicitur
in materia insolubilium quod insolubile significans pro
se ipso non in toto convertitur cum alio consimili de
terminis synonymis; ut hec proposicio, *hoc est falsum*,¹⁵
est vera primo modo et 2^o, et est falsa 3^o, cum solum
significat pro se ipsa, quod est falsa, et vera alia de
similibus terminis, *hoc est falsum*, foret vera simpliciter
pro priori, cum significaret veritatem que esset inde-
pendens ab illa; et tamen primaria significata propter 20
oposiciones non essent diversa, sed modi significandi.
Utraque enim esset vera et convertibilis cum reliqua;
sed prima esset falsa qualiter 2^a non esset falsa. Nec
est inconveniens, duorum simpliciter convertibilium,
unum esse simpliciter verum et aliud falsum, dum 25
significando pro se ipsa careat veritate independente
ab ipsa, reliqua significans primarie illud idem, habeat
suum primarium significatum independens ab ipsa.

Verumtamen non omnis variacio in modo significandi
causat diversitatem talem, sicut facit variacio in signi- 30
ficando materialiter, vel significative. Nam stat A esse
propositionem que quotlibet hominibus potest signi-
ficare, et tamen esset falsa, significando cuicunque
sicut modo significat, si non michi taliter significaret;
ut patet de ista scripta: *ego video hoc* (me demon- 35
strando per subiectum). Quilibet enim aliis, intelligens
subiectum sub habitudine prime persone, intelligeret
aliud per subiectum quam ego intelligo. Et quilibet
intelligens ipsam sub habitudine 3^e persone habet alium
modum intelligendi subiectum, eo quod pronomen ideo 40
est prime persone quod singulariter significat ipsum

apprehendens sub habitudine qua ipsum apprehendit. Sequitur enim: *Iy* “ego” significat me singulariter et est prime persone: ergo, ego apprehendo ipsum. Verbum autem ideo est prime persone, quia subiectatur propter nominis prime persone. Stat ergo in talibus modum loquendi variari, stante idemperitate significati cum convertente; ut patet de istis: *ego sum*, et *hoc est*; et stat modum significandi manere conformem, variatis significatis et equivalencia. Et patet de istis duabus:

10 *ego sum, ego sum*; quarum prima est michi prime persone et 2^a Sorti.

Thus, though the form is the same, the sense changes, so that *I am*, becomes equivalent to *This being is*. And *I am* has a different sense on the lips of different men.

Aliqua autem est proposicio possibilis cui nec est alia secum convertibilis; potest esse vera pro dato significato, ut patet de talibus: *Nulla proposicio est, nullum signum alicui significat, omne apprehensivum actualiter differt ab actualiter apprehendente, nichil cogitat per dispositionem sibi accidentalem*; et sic de similibus, quarum significata posita tollunt veritatem propositionis. Unde, si sophista velit cognoscere deum 20 suum, capiat pro regula quod solum illud quod omnem veritatem potest cognoscere est deus. Nam 2^m theologos potest esse verum quod nulla creatura sit, quod solum deus est intelligens, qui nichil intelligit nisi distinete, sine actu distincto vel iuvamine alterius. Talia enim B 94^b non potest aliud | a deo cognoscere propter repugnanciam.

Certain propositions that cannot be converted into others may be true in a certain sense, even though that sense destroys their truth; v. g. God's eternal act, if understood in that way.

Quocunque ergo nostrum significato, est dare quotlibet veritates quas non possumus cognoscere; ut ego non possum distinete cognoscere quod oblitus sum 30 omnia que scivi, quod nichil scio, quod cesso ab omni actu intelligendi, et sic de similibus. Et hoc sine dubio arguit imperfectionem intellectus; quia nos indigemus tot yrcaciis ad nostram noticiam, quod multas veritates non possumus cognoscere, nisi destrueremus illas. Noticias vero dei ex parte sui solum ipsum ponit, et ideo 35 omnia potest cognoscere. Unde multa eternaliter cognoscunt omnem veritatem, que non omnem veritatem possunt cognoscere, et 2^m theologos aliquis homo omnem veritatem potest scire, et tamen infinite veritates non possunt sciri ab illo homine, nisi fuerint

There is an indefinite multitude of truths that we cannot know, as to know what we forget, &c. which argues imperfection in our minds.

God's knowledge in the infinite simplicity of its objects, comprises all.

A man may know all truth, and yet all truths cannot be known by him.

2. significans B. 10. m^o pro michi B. 12. que pro cui B. 16. n^o B.
9. d'm B. 33. ycc^{ys} B. 35. non solum B.

chymera nescia, quod verificatur de exemplo quod ponunt: posse desinere esse hominem, etc.

And though God teaches all truth there are infinite truths that He cannot teach or reveal to me; for instance, that I shall be damned; and there are truths that neither God nor man can know; to know them would be the total destruction of everything.

Yet God can know all truth; and, therefore, it is false to say that absolute non-existence is conceivable. It is equally absurd to suppose a time in which nothing begins to exist, even in the absurd hypothesis of annihilation.

So that time and succession, once posited, must continue to exist.

Some truths are to be known only at a given instant, if we do not take the wide sense of the words; this happens particularly for the truth of propositions in the second and third sense. Some truths, to be known, require to be experienced, and are conditional, like a bribe given

Infinitas veritates deus non potest revelare vel docere, quamvis necessario docet omnem veritatem; nam ipse non potest revelare quod nichil revelat vel docet, sicut nec revelare michi quod non sum; quod nichil revelatur michi, quod dampnabor, etc. sicut nec possum sic cognoscere quod privor omni distincta noticia. Est eciam dare veritates quas possum cognoscere. Et, si homo vel deus ipsas vel alteram earum cognoscit, tunc quidlibet annichilabitur; ut patet de talibus contradictioriis: *incipio perpetuo oblivisci me fuisse in hoc instanti*, et, *non sic incipio oblivisci*. Contradiccionem enim claudit alteram illarum fore, sicut repugnat primam rememorari vel docere. Deus tamen omnem veritatem potest cognoscere, quamvis aliqui false dicant quod potest esse quod nichil sit. Hoc enim claudit contradictionem deum cognoscere, cum tamen equa passio entis sit cognoscibilitas. Ideo puto me scire quod claudit contradictionem "nullum ens esse", aut "tempus fuisse et nullum ens incipere esse"; quia, si per impossibile omnem creaturam deus annichilaret, adhuc infinite negaciones incipiunt esse de qualibet creatura, vel saltem incipit esse quod solum deus nunc est, quod ipse est sine A, sine B, et sic de aliis infinitis. Ex quo videtur quod necessario sunt tempus et successio; quia pro primo instanti annihilationis foret magna successio, et illud semper maneret.

Aliqua autem est veritas quam nemo potest cognoscere nisi pro instanti, 2^m restringentes verba; ut talis: *hoc instans est*, et talis: *omnem propositionem quam nunc scio, per horam post hoc sciam*; quia aliter posset hoc instans manere per tempus; et breviter ita est de denominacionibus quo ad *esse verum* 2^o modo vel 3^o modo, sicut est de suis primarie significatis. Unde vere dicitur quod non possum cognoscere quod gratus sum deo, nisi fuero in gratia vel caritate; aliquam veritatem non possum cognoscere, nisi fuero cesus; et sic quotunque possibilia volueris de me vel quocunque alio

15. docv' B.

q. *Est eciam.* This sentence is evidently wrong, as appears from the context.

enunciare. Unde aliqui eliciunt quod reliqui cognoscant veritates, ut prebendarius dat superiori magnam pecuniam ut sciat se esse beneficiatum in tali pingui beneficio: quod caret racione.

by a
prebendary to
his superior.

5 Redeundo ergo ad propositum: iuxta restriccionem predictam dicitur quod repugnat me cognoscere tales veritates, et cum hoc cognoscere quod omnem veritatem quam nunc cognosco, per horam post hoc cognoscam.

I say that it is
impossible for
me to know
at the end of
an hour every
truth that I
know now, i.e.
only at this
instant;

Ymo, vocando omnem talem veritatem propositionem, cum significet seipsam, concedendum esset aliquam propositionem veram esse in me, quam impossibile est me distincte cognoscere; sicut dictum est de talibus:

at least
distinctly.

ego nichil apprehendo, omne quod nunc distincte cognosco

B 95^a *per horam post hoc distincte cognoscam*, posito quod

15 solum cognoscam distincte A vel B, et quod continuem illas noticias per horam, tunc illa C veritas est in me, etsi distincte cognoscerem C, tunc cum paribus cognoscerem C per horam futuram. Ex quo sequitur quod

For the fact of
my knowing
the truths A
and B at the
end of an hour
is another
truth, C.

20 et sic est verum quod distincte cognosco; ergo illud C distincte cognoscam per horam, et per consequens manebit per horam. Et tunc sine tubio C eternaliter manebit, cum in instanti medio hore erit futura per horam, et in medio instanti istius hore; et sic in infinitum,

If I know C
distinctly at the
beginning as at
the end of the
hour,
it would be an
eternal, not an
instantaneous
truth.

25 sicut communiter arguitur in ista materia.

Unde multe sunt responsiones in ista materia; ut illa prima que negat partem supponere pro suo toto, negat consequenciam factam in *Darii*. Et alia dicit quod bene credo C propositionem veram sine hesita-

There are many
answers to this
difficulty, either
denying the
consequence of
the argument,
or saying that
I merely believe
(not know) the
truth of C at
the beginning
of the hour;
but the latter,
denying all
knowledge of C,
contradicts
the hypothesis

30 cione, sed repugnat me aliter scire illam. Hoc tamen videtur falsum, eo quod cognosco quod C est verum, et cuiusmodi C verum est. Cui ergo repugnaret me scire C? nam, negato quod scio C, non stat aliquid scitum a me, nisi A vel B; et cum utrumque istorum

and the
consequence
as well as the
antecedent is
true; so is the
consequent also.

35 cognoscam per horam futuram, sequitur quod omne distincte scitum a me cognoscam per horam futuram.

Cum ergo sum certus de ista consequencia et de isto antecedente, ut suppono, relinquitur certitudo de consequente. Argumentum enim est racio rei prius dubie

40 faciens fidem, hoc est, certitudinem. Nichil ergo impedit hoc argumentum a produccione sui naturaliter causabilis. Ymmo de illa veritate quam scio stat difficultas.

1. *e^{veni}t* = eximunt or eveniunt B. 30. alig B.

If we keep to the strict sense of the words and admit a general knowledge of being, it is impossible to know anything for more than one instant; but I can know what it is to cognize during time.

I may know distinctly A and B at the beginning, and at the same time know confusedly my knowledge of A and B at the end; also that this knowledge cannot be distinct at the beginning.

If we give a wide sense to the tense of the verb,

we can admit that C is (i. e. is or will be) distinctly known together with A and B. Thus it does not follow:

I know C now;
 $\therefore C \text{ is now};$

but: C is now about to be in its time.

It is possible for me to know C, but many things here can be known only in general; my cognitive act is confusedly known to me.

There are thus numberless truths that I know in general; if I distinctly knew

Relictis ergo istis novis invencionibus sophists, suis auctoribus, dicitur sicut prius, restringendo verba et admittendo noticiam confusam quod omne ens cognosco confuse, et per consequens, cum nichil possum cognoscere, ignorando ens esse in communi, patet quod claudit contradictionem me vel aliud cognitum esse quod nunc cognosco per tempus cognoscere, saltem si nichil sit extra presens instans. Possibile tamen est me esse, quod distincte scio vel cognosco quod illud est per tempus cognoscere. Sed hoc creditur esse impossibile deo. Sic ergo posito quod distincte cognoscam solum A vel B que sic per horam cognoscam, cognosco confuse me esse cognitum per horam omne quod nunc distincte cognosco; et, si reflexero actum apprehendendi distinctum super illo, sicut oportet ad eius distinctam noticiam, inveniam in 2º actu reflexo quod impossibile est me distincte cognoscere illam, sicud impossibile est deum qui solum distincte potest cognoscere continuare per tempus omnem eius noticiam.

Sed patet ampliantibus verba de presenti quod deus omne quod unquam novit vel noscet semper noscet, cum non potest incipere vel desinere quicquam scire. Et sic semper noscit omne instans esse pro mensura sua, et hoc distinctive. Sed secus est de homine. Verumptamen iuxta ampliacionem conceditur quod homo potest distincte cognoscere C cum A et B, sicut iam cognosco omne instans quod fuit vel erit esse tempore suo. Et sic, posito quod simus in medio instanti hore sequentis instans demonstratum, concedunt in principio quod omne pro nunc scitum a me per horam, post hoc sciām semper, demonstrando uniformiter; sed non sequitur: *nunc scio C; | ergo, nunc est C.* Et istam responsionem approbo. Concedo quod est possibile me scire C; semper tamen, dum sum in via, ignoro multa in particulari. Unde in omni noticia mea remanet aliquis actus meus confuse cognitus, quia aliter reflecterem actus super priores in infinitum.

Unde infinite sunt veritates quas non possum nisi confuse cognoscere, ut est confusa noticia; et multe alie ignorancie mee; infinite enim sunt conclusiones quas ignorō. Et si distincte cognovero quod ignorō illas,

18. q̄t̄re B. 26. non pro iam.

tunc non ignorarem illas. Ignorare enim dicit, ultra nescire, existenciam ignorati. Quando ergo sic arguitur *omne quod distincte scio per horam post hoc sciam; sed C veritatem distincte scio; ergo etc.*: conceditur conclusio, sicut minor in casu. Nam si *ego distincte scio quod ignoro C, ergo distincte scio C esse verum antecedens*: patet ex hoc quod videtur michi deductum evidencia infallibili quod ignoro C. Et consequencia facta patet, ex hoc quod distincte scio illam consequenciam esse bonam: *si ignoro C, C est verum et distincte scio antecedens, ergo et consequens.* Sed constat repugnare aliquem distincte scire datum singulare quod ignoravit. Ideo, si in casu posito credo distincte absque formidine contraria quod scio distincte, scilicet C, tunc scio C: quod conceditur. Et patet ex dictis responsio ad instantiam superius positam; et illa est una evidencia inter multas ad laxandum verba de presenti.

Ulterius patet, cum viator, sciendo in universalis veritatem aliquam, scit eius singularia confusa, quod ignorat ab eo scitum; nisi forte de illis sit aliunde scientia specialis, excludens ignoranciam. Tenendum est eciam quod principaliter scitur vel cognoscitur veritas apprehensa, et ^{2^arie} signum. Unde multi laici sciunt multas veritates, et tamen ignorant signa esse; sic ut versatur tamquam dubium inter doctos si sunt talia signa in anima. Et hoc fortificat quod oportet ponere tales veritates, cum aliter foret sciencia sine proporcionali scito (ut tactum est tractatu *de scire*); quoniam sciencia universalis et sciencia singularis non repugnant.

Septimo restat videre quomodo in particulari sint solvendo insolubilia negativa. Ipsa enim videntur habere maiorem difficultatem, ut sunt talia: *hec proposicio non est vera; Sor non dicit verum sicut est; non est ita sicut ego cogito; non est ita sicut ego principaliter credo.* Et sic de similibus. Primam autem claudit repugnaciam esse veram pro isto supposito, cum quelibet proposicio est vera, eo ipso quod est. ^{2^a} eciam est falsa, cum impossibile sit quicquid dicere, nisi dicatur necessitas eterna, sequens ad omne dicibile. Quelibet ergo creatura dicit quotlibet veritates. Et sic dicitur ad

12. scire datum twice B. 30. quo B. 31. maiorem twice
34. ppter B.

28. Cf. Logica, Vol. I, pag. 179. "Secundo patet", etc.

that I did not know them, I should know them.
We may thus admit that we know confusedly a distinct act of cognition of C.

If I do not know C, C is a truth; I distinctly know the antecedent and, therefore, the consequent. This is one of many proofs in favour of extending the present tense to more than one instant.

To know confusedly is tantamount to ignorance.

We know firstly the truth and then the sign that denotes it in our mind; for unlearned men may know many things, and nothing about their signs; and even the learned dispute as to whether they exist at all. The negative insoluble propositions, being particularly difficult, are to be dealt with now separately.

"This proposition is not true" is false in the sense given. "A does not speak the truth as it is", is also false, for the act of speaking is true. "It is not as I

think", is also 3^{ciam}, cum nemo potest cogitare, nisi aliquando principi paliter cogitet deum esse. Sed in 4^a et similibus modis stat difficultas. Et ut brevius loquamur, restri-
think we imply God's existence.
"It is not as I believe" gives greater trouble; 2^o modo; et restringatur *significare, dicere, et cogi-*
but we must employ the words *true* and *satos* etc. ad tales primarios actus ex impositione cau-
false for the second sense of sunt 2^m primariam impositionem huiusmodi. Quamvis enim illud sit in multis onerosum, tamen potest, gracia argumenti, in multis amicaliter admitti, et responsio 10 aptari ad proporciones, | ac si termini modificantes illos sensus essent expressi utrobique. Tunc dicitur quod talia insolubilia negativa sunt falsa simpliciter.

A proposition may be adduced, for which we must deny that there is any signification except what naturally belongs to it.

Or we may say that negotiations have no reality. Or we may note that, though to signify, to be true, and to signify the thing that is, come to the same, yet they may be very different if one is taken to mean something independent of itself.

Sed tripliciter variatur responsio; primo, capta illa propositione: *non est ita sicut hec proposicio primarie* 15 *et ex impositione significat*. Dicitur quod non habet significacionem ex impositione, cum nichil ex impositione significat simpliciter seipsum, eo quod talis impositione superflueret, cum hoc habet quidlibet ex natura. Nec est hoc nomen, *proposicio*, impositum ad significandum, nisi signa veritatum independencium ab eisdem. Et sic talia communiter vocata insolubilia non habent 2^m omnes suos terminos significata primaria ex impositione resultancia. 2^a responsio evadit insolubilia negativa per hoc quod nulla negacio potest esse ex parte 25 rei. Sed pro 3^a responsione, consequente ad dicta de impositione ac laxacione propositionem ac veritatibus negativis, notandum diligenter quod licet hec 3^a convertantur, *hec proposicio significat, hec proposicio est vera vel significat sicut est, hec proposicio est*, et sic de 30 quotilibet cum istis convertibilibus, in quibus propositione principaliter significat pro seipsa; ista tamen convertibilitas est gracia terminorum, cum propositiones consimiles significantes pro significatis extra ipsas sunt valde dispares. Probatur per deducens ad impossibile. 35 Nam si ista non convertuntur, *hec proposicio significat et hec proposicio significat sicut est eadem inceptu denominata*, tunc esset possibile quod hoc significaret cum hoc quod non significaret sicut est; quia certum est quod reliqua coniugacio non est possibilis. Sed contra; 40

4. *dcta* B. 18. *fmter* B. 37—38. *dta* (= demonstrata?) B.
40. *giugō* B.

si C primarie significat sic, tunc C est verum, et tunc significat sicut est: ergo, si C significat precise *se significare*, tunc est ipsum verum significans sicut est.

Et ex isto patet quod in qualibet tali idem est significatio et significatum: ut significatum huius, *A significat*, est *ipsum A significare*, quod est eius significatio. Et ita est de istis: *A significat sicut est*. Nam hec convertuntur: *A habet significatum vel significacionem que est*.

⁵ 2º patet quod quelibet talis negativa, significans pro se ipsa, *hoc non significat sicut est*, significat seipsam non habere significacionem et per consequens falsificat se, cum in significando facit se ipsam habere significacionem.

Et ex istis patet 3º quod sicut proposicio significans se esse verum est vera pro veritate extra ipsam, et sic significans primarie, idem est falsum 3º modo; sicut B proposicio, significans primarie quod *non est ita ut A significat*, est vera pro A, et ipsum A sub conformibus vocibus significans est simpliciter falsum.

¹⁰ 20 Ex quo patet quod B significat dispariter ab A, quia A significat quasi manenter pro se vel suo actu, cum actus significandi sit absolutus, non transiens in extrinsecum, ut actus significandus. Et ista oportet diligenter notare. Nam sicut conceditur quod A est falsum, ita

¹⁵ conceditur quod non est ita sicut A significat; quia non est ita quod A non habet significacionem, quod valde est disparatum a significacione A. Ideo patet quod talis consequentia non valet: *A precise significat se non esse verum et ipsum non est verum: ergo, A primarie significat sicut est*; sicut patet in suo convertibili. Nam non sequitur: *non est ita quod A non habet significacionem et A primarie significat quod A non habet significacionem: ergo, A primarie significat veritatem que est*; sed directe sequitur oppositum.

²⁰ 35 Et si dicitur quod sequitur A significare modo quo est, conceditur; sed ex hoc non sequitur A esse verum, cum omne significans significat modo quo est; sed non significat, saltem precise, ens quod est, quod tamen requiritur ad esse verum. Unde patet ex dictis quod

B 96^b ista non repugnat: *A significat sicut est* (hoc est, modo quo est) et tamen *ipsum non significat sicut est*

12. *se in marg.* B. 15. *c pro se*. 16. *precise above* primarie B.
20. *disparit.* B. 21. *accidente pro actu* (?). 27. *desparatum* B.

In some cases
these meanings
make one.

For instance:
*It is as C
signifies*
contains both
meanings of as.

C cannot here
be taken as a
general term
implying being.
What C means
is purely its
own
signification,

as we see by
turning any
proposition into
the infinitive.

So if C
signifies, it
signifies both
the thing that
is and as it is.

Such
propositions
are true in the
first, and
second and
false in the last
sense of truth.
It is plain that
a proposition
having the
same form as A,
and meaning A,
might not be
convertible
with it.

*It is not as A
signifies would
not mean A has
no signification,
but the thing
signified by A
is not.*

(*hoc est, modum vel veritatem que est*). Iste enim terminus, *sicut*, potest intelligi equivoce sub habitudine accusativi casus, vel sub habitudine ablativi casus. In aliquibus autem, significantibus materialiter pro se ipsis, non differunt isti sensus; quod sic declaro. Sit C ista 5 proposicio: *ita est ut C significat*; tunc patet quod C confertur cum qualibet tali: *veritas vel eus est, quod C significat; C significat modo quo est vel modum qui est vel veritatem que est vel habet significacionem vel significacio C est*. Omnia enim talia convertuntur gracia 10 terminorum. Nam *C est verum*; tunc suum significatum est, et non potest poni ens in communi, quia sic converteretur C cum tali necessario: *ens est*. Ideo non superest quid sit significatum ipsius C aut eius actus, quod est sua significacio; quia nec a subiecto nec ab 15 obiecto vel fundamento distingwi potest significatum C ab eius significacione. Sicut ergo hec proposicio: *A moveretur, significat motionem A, ita hec: C significat sicud est* denotat C significacionem esse vel C habere significacionem. Sicut enim idem est gaudere vel dolere, 20 et habere dolorem vel gaudium, sic idem est significare vel habere significacionem, vel habere significacionem que est, vel significare significacionem que est. Nec dubito quin advertens diligenter satis inveniet illud verum.

Ex quo patet quod idem est C significare et C significare ens quod est, vel veritatem que est, vel modo quo est; et sic de aliis recitatis. Cum enim talibus convertitur hoc: C habet significacionem.

2º patet quod quelibet talis est vera 2º modo et 30 falsa 3º modo. Et per consequens sua contradictoria est falsa 2º modo et 3º modo, et vera primo modo.

Et patet 3º quod proposicio de similimis terminus cum A, significando pro A, non converteretur cum A. Nam A, significando quod *non est ita sicut A significat*, 35 convertitur cum illo: *A non significare*, propter hoc quod in suo contradictorio idem est significatio et significatum. Seil B, significando pro A quod *non est ita sicut A significat* non convertitur cum illo: *A non significat*, sed cum isto: *significatum a non est*; quorum 40 primum est falsum et 2º verum. Ideo in A proposizione est hoc verbum *significat*, quasi absolutum vel

14. acc* pro actus B. 18. hoc pro hec B. 42. v̄ pro verbum B.

reciprocum, cum comentitur cum illo *non est ens quod est primario significacio A*. Sed B, significans immanenter et transitive pro A, est verum significando quod *ens significatum per A non est*.

5 Et si dicatur quod possibile est B precise convertibiliter significare cum A, et tunc stat racio: dicitur quod repugnat casui A et B significancia sic primarie convertibiliter significare, sicut repugnat quod ista in mente mea: *ego sum homo*, primarie significet sicut ista in mente tua: *ego sum homo*. Denominaciones autem pronominum prime persone erunt diverse; sed sicut oportet mutare personas pronominum ad convertibiliter significandum, ita oportet mutare terminos B ad primarie significandum convertibiliter cum A; cuius 15 racio est, quia A significat negative materialiter pro sua significacione, et B significat significative pro A. Ideo, si B esset talis proposicio: *non est ita quod A habet significacionem primariam*, tunc converteretur cum A; sed utrumque foret falsum.

20 Et si ultra dicatur quod eque possibile est A contrahi ad significandum convertibiliter cum B, sicut econtra, conceditur: verumptamen non est possibile A primarie significare ut ponitur, nisi significando quod *nullum ens est eius significatio: ymmo sic dicto: nullum 25 ens est extra A quod A significat, foret eius significare*.

Sed B, significando quod nulla est veritas extra A quam A significat, foret falsum transitive, negans A habere significatum extra se; cum tamen eternaliter |

B 97^b ante A esse fuit illa negacio: *nulla est veritas extra A 30 quam significat*. Et certum est quod perpositionem A non extingwitur ista negacio; quia extingwendo illam poneret illam. Ideo manet illa negacio sicut prius.

Scio tamen quod maior pars logicorum mirabitur de significacione imposita insolubilibus negativis. Cuius 35 admiracionis causa est hoc quod intelligendo insolubilia, intelligitur per disparatas propositiones que inmaterialiter et transitive significant. Ideo videtur illa significacio esse contra experientiam qua experimur propositiones nostras significare pro significatis extra se. Certum est 40 tamen quod ita significant insolubilia negativa, et alios

Objection:
1. B may be made to signify absolutely the same as A. This is impossible; as much so as to say that I am a man in the mind of two different persons, signifies the same. Personal pronouns, in order to conserve the same sense, have to be changed in form.

2. A may be made to signify the same as B.

True; but then B would become false.

15. \tilde{m}^r mutabiliter (?) B. 16. $t,^m$ B. 36—37. \tilde{t} $\tilde{u}lrl'z$ B.
37. $\tilde{u}lrl'z$ B. 40. aliter B.

We must know to which of the two propositions we ought to reply.
 "It is not as I primarily conceive" = "Nothing false is my primary concept"; which we admit.

Or it may mean: "There is no being that is my primary concept;" which we deny.
 "It is not as I believe" should be explained likewise;

also all other negative 'insolubles'.
 We must note that many propositions are only apparently negative insolubles. Examples.

proposiciones quas proferimus ad eorum similitudinem. Et ideo rationabiliter querit sophista certificacionem de propositione ad quam responderet. Et per hoc patet quomodo respondendum est ad talia: *non est ita sicut ego primarie concipio*. Nam negative tales exemplata sunt concedende propter insolubilia negativa falsa. Unde hoc insoluble negativum significat primarie quod *nullum ens est primaria concepcion mea: quod est falsum*. Ideo concedendum est quod *non est ita sicut ego primarie concipio*; sed significatum primarium insolubilis negativi est negandum, cum sic significet *non est ens quod est primaria concepcion mea*. Et sic tale impossibile: *ego primarie credo sicut non est*, significat primarie quod *ego credo credulitate que non est*. Et sic decipior; et causa quare talia sic significant est ista, quia significatum et res verbi affirmativorum est idem: ut idem est *credo sic sicut est* et *credo credulitate vel credulitatem que est*. Et suum oppositum repugnat esse verum sic significando; tum, quia impossibile est me credere credulitatem que non est, et per accidens est quod talis significat me credere credulitatem que non est, tum [quia] principalis significacio sua sit talis: "me credere ens quod non est;" sed cum actus credendi non transit in distinctum, sed absolute terminatur in se ipso, ideo idem est ac si poneretur "me credere 25 credulitate etc." Et, ut puto, omne insoluble negativum est 2^m istam viam satis solubile.

Ulterius notandum est quod multe sunt proposiciones que apparent insolubilia illius rationis, sed non sunt. Ut puta, quando ponitur condicio per effectum consequendo, et additur casus de scripto aliquo ad denominacionem dependentem ex condicione vel effectu futuro: ut patet de transicione pontis, de liberacione servorum, et similibus 2^m infinitas circumstancias valde confusas variatas. Ubi nunc prodest ars obligacionis 35 pro evasionibus, et nunc tantum gravantur casus, quod sunt impossibilis.

A common case in the exercise of obligations: Whoever denies that he is refuted is so by the very fact, is put and granted.

Unde communiter argumentat sophista ad probandum socium esse redargutum, vel cuiusmodi voluerint, ponendo quod quicunque negaverit se esse redargutum, 40 et solum talis, sit redargutus. Et illa est condicio. Tunc

6. pp B. 19. tamen B. 22. cum B; ib. quia *deest*. 29. i^{le} B.
 30 - 31. q*sed*^o B. 41. q*d*^o B.

post istam proponitur probandum: tu es redargutus; Then; You are
quod est negandum, quia falsum et impertinens. Et cum refuted, is put
non sit intencionis sophiste probare nisi manifeste falsum, and denied.
generaliter sunt talia 2º loco proposita falsa. Negato Lastly, a
ergo illo, arguitur: *Quicunque negaverit se esse redar-* syllogism
gutum est redargutus; sed tu negas te esse redargutum; joining these
ergo tu es redargutus. concluding from them, is formed.

Hic est 3º responsio. Prima negat antecedens tan- There are three
quam falsa et impertinens, et concedit utramque eius answers.

10 partem. Sed in isto non est efficacia, cum ad hoc or-
dinatur posicio, ut sustineatur positum cum omni con-
cesso, et sequentibus ex illis. Ideo consonancius esset
negare totam copulativam tanquam impertinentem, et

B 97^b concedere primam partem tanquam positam, et | negare
15 2^{am} partem tanquam repugnantem bene concessis, vel
oppositis bene negatorum. Nec est inconveniens negare
proprium actum vel eius pretericionem, quia commu-
niter, quando opponens proponit responsali proposicio-
nem de proprio actu, non est ille actus; et per acci-
20 dens necessarium frequenter est negandum tanquam
repugnans. Sed quia idem potest tolli mutando casus
sic: *quicunque negaverit in ista hora in anima vel voce*
se esse A fit ipse A, tunc tercia responsione conceditur
positum; et post conceditur tamquam verum et imper-
25 tinens, quod tu sic negas te esse A; et 3º conceditur
conclusio tanquam sequens, scilicet, quod tu es A.
Probacio tamen conclusionis, subducto casu, nullius est
efficacie, cum non plus concedit nisi quod falsum nega-
tum extra casum est concedendum in casu post bonam
30 concessionem antecedencium ad ipsum. Ideo idem est
ac si intendens probare quod *tu es episcopus*, post eius
negacionem ponat *te esse episcopum.*

Et ex istis patet quod negandum est tanquam im-
possible quod *quicunque negaverit se esse asinum sit*
35 *asinus.* Ymmo, cum necessario quelibet res mundi negat
se esse quod non est, quasi omnes tales casus sunt
impossibilis. Variantur autem tales casus multipliciter;
ut ponitur quod *quicunque concesserit, dubitaverit, vel*
negaverit primum sibi proponendum sit talis et post
40 *proponatur unum impertinens concedendum, dubi-*
tandum, vel negandum, et 3º, facto argumento ex

1. To deny the
antecedent.
But this would
be against the
rules of
Obligations;
the antecedent
has to be
admitted.

2. To deny the
whole of the
last syllogism,
granting or
denying its
parts, as the
case may be;
for a past act
may be denied
in the present,
since it exists
no longer.

But the
difficulty may
be formulated
so as to render
this impossible.

3. To admit
everything, and
say that the
conclusion
means no more
than that a
falshood has
here to be
admitted on
account of the
case put.

Most of such
cases, besides,
are to be
denied as
impossible.

They are often
varied in many
ways.

18. *missali B.*

19. See Logica, Vol. I. Introduction p. p. XXVIII, XXIX.

condicione et facto responsali, concluditur intentum. Et eodem modo variatur casus, ponendo quod "quicunque aliter responderit ad istam: *tu es A*, quam respondet Sor affirmative respondens ad illam, sit A, et solum talis." Et sic de infinitis intricacionibus que plus indu- 5 cunt sollicitudines quam profectus.

But these subtleties only give fruitless trouble.

There are also many subtleties concerning the commandments of God v. g. if

God had commanded, under pain of mortal sin, to have sorrow for no sin but one's own, and you, having never sinned before, have sorrow for sin in general: is this a mortal sin or not?

It may be answered
(i) that sorrow for sin in general includes sorrow for one's own sin, even though it be only possible and not existing.
The difficulty here is that sorrow must have some object able to cause it; which mere possibility has not.

Or (2) that such cases imply an absurd condition; for God cannot make it a sin to have sorrow for the sin of our neighbours; and if it be said that they only imply the mere fact of sin happening concomitantly,

the whole argument is destroyed.

In aliis autem materiis sunt intricaciones plurime de obligacione legistarum; ut ponatur quod deus precipiat taliter sub pena peccati mortalis quod non doleas de peccato, nisi dolendo de peccato proprio; quod nun- 10 quam ante hoc peccasti, sed quod solum doleas de peccato in communi, sicut faciunt illi qui dolent quod multa peccata sunt in mundo, nec aliunde pro nunc pecces. Tunc videtur quod nunc infringis preceptum; quia si cum istis paribus peccas, non superest unde 15 peccares, nisi contraveniendo precepto. Et ex hoc sequitur cum veris quod non peccas, cum in universali doles de peccato proprio et sic compleas preceptum. Et si dicatur primo quod non peccas, tunc oportet quod doleas de peccato proprio, et per consequens peccas. 20

In isto vero diceret sophista quod stat te dolere simpliciter de peccato possibili, etsi non actualiter sit; et sic in casu posito tu doles de peccato proprio, non contraveniendo precepto. Contingit enim dolere de impossibili; multo magis ergo, de quolibet seu quo- 25 cunque possibili. Et sic doles de quocunque peccato dolendo de peccato in communi; et sic de peccato proprio, licet illud non sit. Sed quia videtur quod omnis dolor habet aliquod tristabile pro obiecto, ut preteritionem, futurionem, negacionem, vel aliam quamlibet 30 veritatem; non satisfacit ista responsio casum paululum.

Ideo dicit 2^a responsio quod solucio talium exigit noticiam condicionis, quia ablative casus, gerundiva, ista coniunctio, *nisi*, et similia, implicant condicionales, quarum maior pars est impossibilis: ut, deus non potest 35 obligare hominem quod, si dolet de peccato proximi et non de peccato proprio, quod eo ipso peccet. Et sic de aliis condicionibus simpliciter et absolute intel- lectis. Si autem condicionales non dicant causam com- B 98^a pletam, sed teneantur specificative, tunc non superest 40

1. r̄niali B. 9. m̄rlis B. 10. n' B. 13. aliū de p̄nc pro aliunde vro nunc B. 22. fin^{ter} B. 22 simp^{ter} in marg. B. 29. t'stat^o B.
31. nec B; ib. paululum (sic!) B.

argumentum ad probandum quod peccat, si dolet de peccato proximi et non suo, cum stat oppositum. Et ista responsio potenter enervat casus huiusmodi. Unde non est in potestate hominis vel dei statuere quod similiter et absolute, si homo sic dolet, peccat, vel si sic obviat, liberabitur; et ita de ceteris.

Sed quia admissa est conditionalis bona, ut nunc, sicut et conditionalis necessaria ex suppositione vel ordinacione divina, potest ^{3^s admitti casus, et concedi quod pro dato instanti doles de peccato proprio quod haberes post modum, te adhuc manente innocentia. Et sic cessat obieccio, scientibus ampliaciones verborum, quomodo omne preteritum vel futurum est presens tempore suo. Si autem gravetur casus quod continue maneras innocens, si non sic dolendo peccaveris, stante residuo casus: certum est quod casus est impossibilis, implicans inconvenienciam in ordinacione divina; ut puta quod deus ordinet te perpetuo innocentem et cum hoc ordinet te elicere talem actum ex quo cum obligacione sequitur te peccare. Ideo, si deus ordinat tibi te habitum perpetuam innocentiam, vel preservabit te ne elicias talem actum, vel faciet quod non obligaberis sub forma ex qua sequitur te perplexi.}

Conformiter dicitur quod, deo precipiente michi negatione sub pena peccati mortalis, quod per istam horam non diligam eum, vel cogitem de eo actualiter, sed vacem praxi quod expedit, aliquando non esset possibile solvere illud mandatum quo ad partem negativam, cum non possit solvi quo ad illa, nisi faciendo affirmacionem negacioni oppositam que est diligere deum. Et certum est quod claudit contradiccionem, diligendo deum peccare. Et conformiter dicitur ad talia precepta negativa, *non diligas deum ultra gradum ut 4^{or}.* *non incipias peccare non inciendo per posicionem de presenti;* et sic de similibus. Nam primum mandatum non possum infringere, nisi diligendo deum ultra gradum ut 4^{or}. Et certum est quod non peccarem, sic faciendo. Et quo ad 2^m, patet quod si infringerem illud pro hoc instanti primo, ego inciperem peccare per posicionem

3. potest B; ib. enusat B. 6. sic B.

6. *Liberabitur.* Allusion to the case of setting two slaves free under certain conditions. See above, pag. 209.

If it be objected de presenti, et non ut sic solverem illud. Et incipiendo solvere hoc mandatum, vel aliter, peccarem; per remociem de presenti non solviter hoc mandatum. Ideo patet quod talia mandata de virtute sermonis essent insolubilia. Et si argumentatur quod deus, obligans hominem solum ad illa, faceret eum impeccabilem, dicitur quod claudit contradiccionem hominem solum obligari ad talia, cum necessario, si homo est, obligatur naturaliter multis obligacionibus inseparabilibus. Qui-cunque ergo fuerit taliter obligatus potest faciliter pecare aliunde. Ex istis ergo notatis credo quod exercitatus cum deliberacione dicta habebit viam solvendi quecunque talia insolubilia proponenda.

Wyclif's opinion with the six former ones. Ultimo patet in quibus hec posicio convenit et discrepat a singula de sex opinionibus supradictis. 15

a) As regards likeness. Convenit enim cum prima in hoc quod ponit multa insolubilia nec simpliciter esse vera nec simpliciter esse falsa.

It is like the 1st, as it says that no 'insoluble' is simply true or false: Like the 2nd, affirming that the same proposition is diversely true and false: Like the 3rd, denying all significatio- 20 n to such propositions except in so far as they signify themselves: Like the 4th, denying that they have the same meaning as other propositions having exactly the same form, and standing for them: Like the 5th, admitting that many examples of 'insolubles' imply an absurdity; and like the 6th, denying that any such proposition is really insoluble,

Convenit eciam cum 2^a in hoc quod ponit eandem propositionem esse veram et falsam diversis modis. 20

Et convenit cum 3^a in hoc quod ponit quodlibet tale insolubile in quo pars supponit pro toto suo insolubili manere vacuum, et nullum debitum vel distinctum sensum gignens, nisi in quantum antecedit se ipsum et ex sua significacione reflectit quamdam denominacio- 25 nem pro illo insolubili vel causato suo. |

Convenit autem cum 4^a in hoc quod ponit repugnare aliquod insolubile significare primarie in toto conformatiter sicut significant proposiciones de similibus terminis significantes immanenter et transitive illis insolubilibus; ut patet de solucione insolubilium negativorum. Ymmo, omne insolubile, sive affirmativum, sive negativum, est resoluble in tales terminos per quos non est exprimenda sua significacio, sed per alias disparatos ut *credo quod decipior, credo quod credo primarie sicut non est*, et sic *credo quod credo credulitate que non est*: et sic de similibus.

Convenit autem cum quinta in hoc quod ponit multos casus positos in materia de insolubilibus esse impossibilis; ut patet de condicionibus superius notatis. 40

Et convenit cum sexta in hoc quod ponit nullum insolubile non posse solvi; sed veritatem esse de se

34. desperatos (sic!) B.

cognoscibilem, licet de diffcili. Nec stat solucio in negacionibus casuum vel principiorum logicorum, quibus innitantur responsiones priores; sed specialiter in noticia denominacionis signorum quo ad esse verum vel falsum, 5 et in distincta noticia significacionis proposicionis solvende.

Discrepat autem hec posicio a prima in hoc quod ponit insolubilia affirmativa duplicitate esse vera, et unice esse falsa; et insolubilia negativa 2^r esse falsa et 10 unice vera; et significatum primarium cuiuscunq;e insolubilis concedit simpliciter esse vel non esse.

Discrepat autem a 2^a in hoc quod ponit nullam proposicionem posse esse veram et falsam denominacionibus contrariis; quia tunc significatum primarium 15 proposicionis esset et non esset.

Discrepat autem a 3^a in hoc quod ponit partem supponere pro suo toto; ut hic: *hec proposicio est, mundus est*. Ymmo, sicut pars integralis significat communiter suum totum (ut patet de partibus superficialibus 20 ostendentibus suum integrum) ita supponit partes. Nec dubium quin contingit me ymaginari singulariter unam talem proposicionem posse scribi: *hoc scriptum est proposicio*, et me oblivisci illius ymaginati; contingit illud interim soribi et obici michi, faciendo me re- 25 minisci de tota priori ymaginacione et ymaginato, et ita significabit se ipsum. Et si obicitur quod prius naturaliter intelligitur pars proposicionis antequam intelligitur tota proposicio, et sic proposicio esset prior se ipsa: dicitur quod illud argumentum peccat 3^{ter}. 30 Quis enim dubitat quin eque primo intelligitur per subiectum huius proposicionis, *ens est*, ipsa tota proposicio, sicut et eius subiectum, cum, significacione ex imposicione causata (de qua solum est nobis sermo), omne singulare intelligibile eque primo significat? Nec 35 obest proposicionem prius intelligi sua parte. Nec sequitur, si ista pars prius naturaliter intelligatur a me, quam intelligitur esse pars, vel quam intelligitur esse hec proposicio noticia tali connexa et distincta, quod exinde idem sit prius se ipso. Nam de eodem possum 40 habere multas noticias. Nec obest proposicionem prius intelligi sua parte.

b) *As regards difference.*
It differs from the 1st in asserting that affirmative insolubiles are true in two senses and false in one, and that negative insolubiles are false in two and true in one. It differs from the 2nd in denying that the same proposition is true and false in the same sense.

It differs from the 3rd in not denying that a part can stand for the whole.

Objection.
1. The part must be understood before the whole; which is absurd if it signifies the whole.

Denied.
When we say: *Something is*, the subject includes the affirmation; the part, the whole.
It is one thing to know a part, and another to know it *as a part*.

It differs from the 4th in stating clearly what meaning the insolubles have, and not shirking the question sophistically, like a man who despairs to find the true solution.

It differs from the 5th, in admitting that not only the things signified, but also their signs, have corresponding universals. But it does not follow that every universal causes a universal idea in the mind.

Objection:
2. A true or a false proposition would only signify an idea, truth or falsehood.

This is denied absolutely: any proposition may produce any idea, true or false, or none at all.

Truth or falsehood, i. e. the meaning of a proposition, is not to be likened to a substantial form.

Objection:
3. It would follow that the acts of the mind act on the mind, and so on ad infinitum. Denied.

Discrepat autem a 4^a via in hoc quod certificat qualiter insolubilia significant, et non fingit sophistice, dicens quod sequitur insolubile significare aliter, sed impertinens est qualiter aliter significet. Et sic ponendo in eleccione arguentis quomodo aliter wult propositionem significare, certum est quod illa responsio est similis evasioni | hominis desperati de vera solucione, postquam B 99^a scrutatus est multas vias et nullam invenit ducentem in noticiam veritatis.

Discrepat eciam a 5^a in hoc quod ponit intenciones universales eque de signis sicut de suis significatis. Nec sequitur ex isto quod quelibet proposicio vel intencio universalis A gigneret in anima aliam sibi similem, sicut non sequitur de specie singularis gignente aliam singularem vel universalem; quia tale signum non est per se completa causa speciei genite. Ymmo, etsi esset, cessaret ex capacitate anime gignere, sicut luminosum cessat gignere lumen.

Et si obicitur 2^o quod proposicio vera solum gigneret intencionem significantem proposicionem veram, et proposicio falsa solum gigneret intencionem significantem propositionem falsam: certum est quod nec illud dicendum nec eius fundamentum habet linearem umbram coloris; quia stat quamcunque propositionem gignere intencionem universalem significantem omnem propositionem veram vel falsam; et stat quod nullam gignat, sicut homo albus potest gignere intencionem universalem significantem nigrum hominem, et quomodoquaque accidentatum, sine hoc quod gignat intencionem in accidentatis. Non enim per veritatem et falsitatem tantum formas substantiales vel accidentales producit proposicio speciem talem; sed est obiectum immediatum anime, faciens cum aliis animam elicere speciem talem; sicut homo magis facit in anima intencionem significantem omnem hominem. Nec est aliquid falsius quam [quod] significacio proposicionis sit eius forma substancialis, sicut false fingit ista posicio. Et si 3^o inferatur quod actus anime ageret in animam, dicitur quod non sequitur; actus enim anime est accidentis de genere accionis. Nec ex hoc sequitur processus in infinitum 40

4. a'r. B. 13. agigne't B. 16. q'te cā B. 23. liare B.
27. intensionem(!) B. 29-30. acc're B. 36 quod deest. 37. fingitur B;
ib. int'r. B.

vel aliquid inconveniens. Et sic potest facere animam producere speciem, sicut per cogitationes de diversis individuis 2^m suas conveniencias et differencias producitur universalis species in anima.

- 5 Discrepat autem in hoc a 6^a via quod ponit multos casus impossibilis quos illa admittit. Dicit eciam quod tales oraciones consistunt in successione, ita quod est dare primum instans in quo non sunt; et per consequens non tunc sunt vera vel falsa. Dicit eciam quod 10 talis proposicio scripta, *hoc est falsum*, continue uniformiter sic significans, non plus foret vera pro uno instanti quam pro qualibet. Ymmo pro quounque instanti temporis significat primarie veritatem que, pro eodem instanti [quo] fuit, pro illo instanti est vera. 15 In ista autem materia diucius et frequencius fatigavi me ipsum quam in aliqua reliqua materia logicali. Nec dubito quin quilibet sex predictorum opiniancum habuit notabilem sollicitudinem pro veritatibus huius materie quas invenit. Modica tamen laus tribui debet invento- 20 ribus huiusmodi veritatum; quia certum est quod ex discibilitate veritatis (que satis presto est cuilibet indaganti), et ex mocione doctrinali prime veritatis, evenit cuicunque quod scrutando invenit veritatem aliquam quam prius ignorans diucius fuerat perscrutatus. Ideo 25 sit laus plena domino veritatis! |

And it differs from the 6^a in setting down many more cases as impossible; such propositions, if spoken, begin to be true and false at a given moment; but when written, are always equally so, as soon as they exist.
I have taken more pains about this subject than about any other part of Logic.
And I do not doubt but the authors of the other six opinions have done their best.

14. quo *deest* B. 19. *inet* B. 23. *c^oç* B.

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 The Society's book for 1896 is now ready; and the works for 1897 and 1898 are in the binders' hands, and can be sent next month to such Members as will pay their Subscriptions for those years. The Subscription for 1896 became due on Jan. 1, and should be paid at once to the Hon. Sec., J. W. STANDERWICK, Esq., GENERAL POST OFFICE, LONDON, E.C. Cheques to be cashed, 'London and County Bank.'

The Wyclif Society.

*Tenth Report of the Executive Committee, for 1896.
(April, 1896.)*

THE continued help that the Society gets from its printer, Mr. Carl Georg Fromme of Vienna, combined with the devotion of its editors, M. Dziewicki and Prof. Loserth, aided by Mr. Matthew, alone enables it to produce its books in time, and in advance.

The volume for 1896, comprising the third and fourth parts of Wyclif's *Opus Evangelicum*, edited by Prof. Loserth, is bound and ready for issue.

The volumes for 1897 and 1898, *De Logica II*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki, and *De Simonia*, edited by Prof. Dr. Herzberg-Fränel and M. H. Dziewicki, are in the binders' hands, and can be issued next month to any Members who will pay the two years' subscription in advance.

The Society is clear of debt to the end of 1895; but it owes Mr. Fromme £350 for its three volumes of 1896-8, and it has about enough in hand to pay its binders for covering these volumes. The Committee therefore appeal to Members for three years' advance subscriptions at once, so that a fresh start may be made, free from all liability, at the future years' work, 1899-1912.

For 1899 and 1900-1, *De Logica III*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki, and Prof. Loserth's edition of *De Civilis Dominio II, III*,—whose sheets Dr. Reginald L. Poole and Mr. F. D. Matthew see, and Dr. R. L. Poole side-notes,—have been some time at press, and may be finished this year. For 1902 or 1903, M. Dziewicki has kindly undertaken to edit the

Miscellaneous Tracts, Nos. 54-61 in Shirley's Catalogue, which were copied by Dr. Buddensieg, and were in the hands of Dr. Schnabel of Dresden, as editor, till his death three years ago. Also, for 1902 or 1903, the *De Potestate*, which has for many years been in the hands of M. Patera of Prag, has just been sent to Professor J. Loserth, so that it will probably go to press next year. For 1904, the Rev. Dr. Buddensieg hopes to produce his edition of *De Veritate*; and then all Wyclif's great *Summa Theologiae* will be in type, except the *De Mandatis Dei* and *De Statu Innocentiae*, which Mr. F. D. Matthew will take up as soon as his help to other editors leaves him time for his own texts.

The other works of Wyclif remaining unprinted and not likely to be included in the second volume of *Miscellanies* § now in charge of the Rev. J. P. Whitney, are, by Shirley's Nos.:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 6. De Materia et Forma.* | 26. De Imaginibus.† |
| 7. De Materia (?).† | 28. Peccatum Mortale et Veniale.† |
| 8. De Ente, Bk. I*, Bk. II.* | 32. Errare in Materia Fidei, &c.† |
| 9. Replicatio de Universalibus.* | (45. Commentary on N. Test. ? not
Wyclif's.†) |
| 10. De Universalibus.* | 64. De Paupertate Christi.† |
| 11. De Anima.* | (69. ? part of De Potestate Papæ.) |
| 13. De Fide Catholica.* | 70. De Clavibus Ecclesiae.* |
| 24. De Prophetia.* | |

Members have, then, to keep "pegging away" till the work they have set themselves is done, and England's long-due debt to Wyclif's memory paid. For that, money is wanted. Who will give it?

In order to increase the Society's funds, the Executive Committee have resolved that any Member may give the right to any Library or person to buy the first fourteen years of the Society's publications, 1882-95, at half-price—19 volumes at 8 guineas and a half—provided that with this sum are paid the full Subscriptions for 1896, 1897, and 1898.

England, Europe, and the rest of the Christian world owe so much to the memory of Wyclif, that support ought to be forthcoming for the printing of his Works, the records of his thoughts and life. Two-thirds of the Society's task will be done by 1900. It is for our Members to see that the other third is finished speedily. Editors are ready and willing. Money alone is wanting.

* Copied. † Not copied.

§ Shirley's Nos. 43, 44, 47, 48, 68, 77, 92, 94, 95.



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By *174 Subscriptions of £1 1s. each	182 14 0		" Printing and Copying
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* In respect of 1885	1		
" 1886	1		
" 1887	1		
" 1888	1		
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" 1890	1		
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12th March, 1896.

Examined and found correct, { CHAS. P. MERRIAM.
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§ For these particulars the Auditors are not responsible.

The Society's Publications for 1882—1898 (£1 1s. each year) are:—

- 1882.* 1. Wyclif's *Latin Polemical Works*, vol. I, edited by Dr. R. Buddensieg.
1883.* 2. " " " vol. 2,
1884. 3. Wyclif's *De Civili Dominio*, Lib. I, edited by Reginald Lane Poole, M.A., Ph.D.
" 4. Wyclif's *De Compositio Hominis*, edited by Dr. Rudolf Beer.
1885. 5. Wyclif's *De Ecclesia*, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
" 6. Wyclif's *Dialogus, sive Speculum Ecclesie Militantis*, edited by A. W. Pollard, M.A.
1886. 7. Wyclif's *De Benedicta Incarnatione*, edited by the Rev. E. Harris, D.D.
" 8. Wyclif's *Sermones*, Part I, edited by Prof. Loserth, Ph.D.
1887. 9. Wyclif's *Sermones*, Part II, edited by Prof. Loserth, Ph.D.
" 10. Wyclif's *De Officio Regis*, edited by A. W. Pollard, M.A., and C. Sayle, B.A.
1888. 11. Wyclif's *Sermones*, Part III, edited by Prof. Loserth, Ph.D.
" 12. Wyclif's *De Apostasia*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1889. 13. Wyclif's *Sermones*, Part IV and last, edited by Prof. Loserth, Ph.D.
1890. 14. Wyclif's *De Dominio Divino*, edited by Reginald L. Poole, M.A., Ph.D.
1891. 15. Wyclif's *Quaestiones* and *De Ente predicamentali*, edited by Dr. R. Beer.
1892. 16. Wyclif's *De Eucharistia*, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1893. 17. Wyclif's *De Blaspomia*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1894. 18. Wyclif's *De Logica*, vol. I, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1895. 19. Wyclif's *Opus Evangelicum*, vols. 1, 2, ed. by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1896. 20. Wyclif's *Opus Evangelicum*, vols. 3, 4, ed. by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1897. 21. Wyclif's *De Logica*, vol. 2, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1898. 22. Wyclif's *De Simonia*, edited by Prof. Herzberg-Fränel, Ph.D., and M. H. Dziewicki.

The Society's Future Publications will probably be:—

1899. Wyclif's *De Civili Dominio*, Lib. II, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1900. Wyclif's *De Logica*, vol. 3, edited by M. H. Dziewicki. (*At press.*)
1901. Wyclif's *De Civili Dominio*, Lib. III, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1902. Wyclif's *Miscellanies* I, edited by M. H. Dziewicki (Nos. 54-61 in Shirley's Catalogue). (*At press.*)
1903. Wyclif's *De Potestate Papae*, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
Wyclif's *De Ente*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
Wyclif's *De Mandatis Divinis*, edited by F. D. Matthew.
Wyclif's *De Statu Innocentiae*, edited by F. D. Matthew.
Wyclif's *De Veritate S. Scripturae*, edited by the Rev. Dr. R. Buddensieg.
Wyclif's *Miscellanies* II, edited by the Rev. J. P. Whitney, M.A. (Nos. 43, 44, 47, 48, 68, 77, 92, 94, 95, in Shirley's Catalogue).
Wyclif's *De Actibus Animae*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
Wyclif's *Miscellaneous Philosophical Works*, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.

And the rest of Wyclif's Latin Works.

* The very heavy outlay for copying in these years (£295) made the issue of more volumes in them impossible.

